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i 
Abstract 
The French Revolution inherited structures in which foreigners played a role at almost 
every level in social, economic and administrative life. In the revolutionary conception of 
the state, only citizens were to be admitted to political rights. This idea challenged the 
position of foreigners in the army, clergy, administration and state finance, leaving 
unthreatened only those engaged in economic activity. Diplomatic, political and economic 
concerns, however, prevented the revolutionaries from following the 'nationalising' 
implications of their ideology. In the first two years of the Revolution, for example, 
foreign troops retained their separate units and regulations. Foreign clergy were immune 
from the decrees which reformed the Gallican Church until the Terror. The pragmatism 
of the revolutionaries was such that even as the approach and outbreak of war saw an 
upsurge in xenophobia, different types of foreigners were protected. This treatment 
contradicted the rhetoric and even the laws against foreigners. What increasingly 
detern-dned the fate of foreigners was less their nationality than either their usefulness to 
the Republic or the extent to which they conformed to the increasingly narrow confines of 
political orthodoxy. Foreign soldiers, artisans, merchants and bankers were protected 
from legislation against enemy subjects. Foreign patriots suffered less for their nationality 
than for their political affiliations with opponents of the revolutionary government. Those 
who could demonstrate active loyalty to the government were sheltered from arrest or 
expulsion. Three conclusions are mooted. Firstly, the gap between ideology and practice 
in the treatment of foreigners suggests that revolutionary discourse alone is insufficient to 
explain revolutionary action. Secondly, circumstances ensured that the revolutionaries 
could not exclude foreigners from the new civic order. Finally, the distinctions between 
citizens and non-citizens remained bluffed, implying that the political order established by 
the Revolution bore as much Ancien R6gime practice as it did modernity. 
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At the end of the First World War Albert Mathiez published a book whose arguments 
and tone were heavily influenced both by the conflict which had engulfed Europe with 
such horror and by the Bolshevik Revolution which had begun the previous year. La 
Rivolution et les &rangers: cosmopolifisme et Wfense nationale remains the only study 
dedicated entirely to the experience of foreigners in revolutionary France. ' Mathiez drew 
comparisons between revolutionary Europe after both 1789 and 1914. In a statement 
clearly coloured by bitterness after four years of war, he claimed that in neither year did 
the French people have bellicose feelings: 'loin de se pr6parer aux prochains combats, ils 
r6vaient la r6conciliation des peuples dans le travail et dans, le progr6s. Ils oubtiaient les 
vieilles haines et ils se proclamaient volontiers citoyens du genre humain'. In both cases it 
was the aggression of 'Germanic' sovereigns which forced the French into conflict. While 
the war which began in 1792 was to defend the social achievements of the Revolution, 
that of 1914 was fought by those powers who wished for independence from Germanic 
Kultur. ' Such an interpretation might be expected after years of wartime propaganda, but 
it ignores both the popular response in Britain, France and Russia to the outbreak of war 
in 1914 and the revolutionaries' own warmongering in 1791 - 1792, to say nothing of the 
imposition of French political Kultur on European peoples between 1792 and 1815. 
Beyond the parallels drawn between the'Great War' of 1914 - 18 and the 
Revolutionary Wars, Mathiez also saw similarities between the socialist internationalism 
of the early twentieth century and the cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth. If the 
internationalism of the French Revolution did not take the form of congresses, parties and 
slogans, 'elle existe dans les ames. He explained that across Europe 'toutes les 61ites 
grice i la philosophie du XVIIIe siMe, sont cosmopolites. Il r&gne partout un esprit 
europeen. Ce qui rapproche les hommes et ce qui les divise alors, cest moins la race et la 
langue que les id6es et les besoins'. Come the French Revolution, the European 
bourgeoisie championed the cause of their French social counterparts, while the 
'Recently, Sophie Wahnich has examined how foreigners were perceived by the 
revolutionaries, but not how they were treated in practice (La notion d'6tranger en Van II: 
Les constructions d'un dialogue Paris-Province dans les Archives parlementaires', Annales 
hisforiques de la NvolutionfranVaise Ixii (1990), 379 - 403; Vetranger paradoxe de 
l'universel: analyse du discours politique r6volutionnaire sur Utranger, de la F6d6ration i 
Thermidor', Annales historiques de la RevolutionfranVaise bdx (1997), 121 - 13 0. 
'Mathiez, A., La Nvolution et les efrangers. - cosmopolitisme et difense nationale (Paris, 
1918), 1-2. 
European clergy and nobility joined in solidarity with the French privileged classes. 3 
There were obvious parallels with the socialist aspirations put in the mouths of European 
proletarians by the Communist International, as against the capitalist-bourgeois classes. 
The First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution clearly led Mathiez to discuss the 
tension between cosmopolitanism and patriotism and the emergence of nationalism. 
In his book he argues that in the early years of the Revolution French patriots 
'prenaient au s6rieux leur r6le d'instituteurs des nations, de protecteurs des opprim6s. 
Dans toute 6tranger, ils voyaient un fr6re, un fr6re un peu inf6rieur dont ils se 
constituaient les tuteurs charitables et g6n6reux. ' After the flight to Varennes this pacific 
cosmopolitanism gave way to a more militant kind in which foreign patriots, 'stimul6s et 
bientOt subventionn6es par les Girondins', were encouraged to distribute propaganda 
among their countrymen and in which the Girondins campaigned for a war to liberate 
Europe. Mathiez can scarcely conceal his dislike for this development: 'les 6trangers dont 
jamais 6t6 plus choy6s, plus exalt6s qu. 'i ce moment de notre histoire oa nous engagions 
un combat i mort contre leurs patries d'origine. ' An over-confidence in the power of 
revolutionary principles and in the sincerity of foreign patriots, Mathiez suggests, meant 
that for the first year of the war no security measures were taken against foreigners. 
These same people were therefore allowed to have undue influence in revolutionary 
politics and 'cette situation anormale ne pouvait se prolonger sans de graves 
inconv6nients'. Even when the revolutionaries understood this, they tried to reconcile 
their cosmopolitan ideology with the demands of national security, refusing to take 
reprisals against enemy subjects when their own governments mistreated French citizens: 
'Autant dire que la R6publique se privait d'une des armes les plus efficaces pour atteindre 
ses ennemis'. Eventually, however, circumstances discredited cosmopolitanism and forced 
the revolutionaries to act against foreigners. ' Albert Soboul follows this interpretation, 
arguing that 'la guerre 6trangere et Pacharnement de la lutte donn6rent vite i la mentalit6 
populaire un caractere nationaliste et x6nophobe qui se marque d6s la fin de 1'6t6 1793 ... 
les sans-culottes classerent les 6trangers parmi les suspects et les trait&rent comme tels. " 
The rejection of the Revolution by peoples 'liberated' by the French, renewed defeats at 
the hands of the coalition and internal troubles led the revolutionaries to take the first 
'Mathiez, La Revolution et les ýtrangers, 2-3. 
'Mathiez, La Rivolution et les ýtrangers, 29,60 - 61,72,81,9 1. 
'LesSans-CulottesParisiensenL'AnII. HistoirepolitiqueetsocialedesSectionsde 
Paris, 2juin 1793 -9 thermidor An II (La Roche-Sur-Yon: Imprimerie Henri Potier, 
1958), 208, 
general measures against foreigners. These circumstances ensured that 'la d6fiance contre 
les 6trangers est i Vordre dujourand that'le cosmopolitisme reculait tous lesjours. ' The 
overthrow of the champions of foreign patriots, the Girondins, naturally made matters 
worse. The problems faced by the revolution deepened over the summer, both politically 
and economically. In response'le nationalisme commercial progressait du meme pas que 
le nationalisme politique. ' The ultimate expression of this development was the Terror, 
which for Mathiez was nothing other than an '6tat de si&ge', which entailed the suspension 
of civil liberties and, above all, the arrest of enemy subjects and the seizure of their 
property. He suggests that as revolutionary ideology lost its cosmopolitanism and 
focused on the defence of the nation itself ('defense r6publicaine et Mense nationale ... se 
confondaient') so an exclusive, chauvinistic form of nationalism was born. This 
development occured because foreigners' involvement in revolutionary politics tended be 
on the side of the opposition to the revolutionary government, namely the 116bertists or 
the Indulgents. It was this fratricidal conflict, involving the famous'foreign plot'which 
put unwelcome foreigners at the heart of politics both in reality and in the revolutionary 
imagination. This development convinced the government to complete its repressive 
legislation against foreigners. Mathiez does not, however, claim that this was anything 
more than'le rdveil du nationalisme'. He recognises that the whole panoply of 
revolutionary laws against foreigners did not amount to the same severity exercised 
against all enemy aliens by the belligerent powers in 1914. 'Par li, ' he concludes almost 
elegiacally, 'on peut mesurer dans quel sens, la civilisation a march6 depuis un si6cle. ' 
There are good reasons to re-examine the treatment of foreigners in revolutionary 
France. Historical writing on the French Revolution has undergone a sea-change since 
Mathiez published his book. Since the Revisionist' assault on interpretations which, in 
varying degrees, rested on economic and social determinism, politics and culture have 
become the focus of the work of historians. This development has, in turn, spawned 
'Mathiez, La Rdvolution et les diratigers, 123,125 - 126,132 - 133,137,147,162 - 163, 
171 - 172,177,181. 
various interpretations, as historians seek to explain the origins, course and effects of the 
Revolution in terms of politics, culture and their social context. " 
Firstly, among the most important of these developments are interpretations which 
place ideology and rhetoric at the heart of the Revolution. In Penser la Rivolution 
frangaise, Frangois Furet argues that the Revolution substituted the absolutism of the 
monarchy with the absolutism of popular sovereignty. If the king was not absolute in 
political terms, the eighteenth century maintained the idea that he was: 'La R6volution 
franose nest pas pensable en dehors de cette We, ou de ce fantasme, qui est un legs de 
Vancienne monarchie. ... Cest dans cette tentative de refaire un pouvoir sans partage avec 
une soci6t6 sans contradictions que se constituera la conscience r6volutionnaire'. As 
popular sovereignty was absolute, so revolutionary politicians had to miffor the will of the 
people precisely: any attempt to represent sectional or personal interests was not only 
pernicious, but counter-revolutionary. The claims of the Revolution for the absolute 
power of the people made pluralistic politics, in which different and contradictory interests 
could be represented and debated, impossible. Opposition was regarded as selfish, sinister 
and conspiratorial, the absolute extreme to the supposed transparency of the popular will. 
Obsession with plots was, for Furet, one of the central ideological dynamics which drove 
the Revolution. It stemmed from'la conviction democratique nouvelle, selon laquelle la 
volont6 gdn6rale, ou nationale, ne peut rencontrer d'opposition publique des int6r6ts 
particuliers. ' A logical product of the absolute pretensions of popular sovereignty, this 
phobia explains the paranoia, the punitive mentality and the violence of the September 
massacres and the Terror. If such atrocities were the product of revolutionary ideology 
rather than simply a reaction to circumstances, as Furet argues, then they were inherent in 
the Revolution from the moment the revolutionaries accepted the sovereignty of the 
nation as their guiding principle. 8 
Other historians, such as Lynn Hunt in her Politics, Culture, and Class in the French 
Revolution, have expanded on Furet's work by looking at the various expressions of 
revolutionary ideology in rhetoric, symbolism and ritual and at the people who practised 
politics. In placing political ideology in a broader social and cultural context, Hunt 
supports many of Furet's suggestions. She accepts the potency of revolutionary ideology 
or rhetoric as the dynamic which drove the Revolution along its path to Terror. The 
'Jones, P. (ed. ), 7he French Revolution in Social and Political Perspective (London: 
Arnold, 1996), 1- 10. 
Turet, F., Penser la Rgvolutionfranqaise (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 49,69 - 70,81 - 84 - 
95,300,311 - 312. 
obsession with conspiracy, above all, was 'the central organizing principle of revolutionary 
rhetoric'. She does suggest that this particular phobia was common to early modem 
society and cannot be attributed entirely to revolutionary ideology. Hunt also argues that 
'although the Terror followed logically from the principles enunciated in revolutionary 
rhetoric, it was not the only possible deduction from those principles. ' None the less, she 
claims that conspiracy only became 'a systematic obsession' with the emergence of mass 
politics and therefore shares Furet's generally pessimistic prognosis of the course of the 
Revolution. ' 
These interpretations of the Revolution raise important questions about Mathiez's work 
on foreigners. If, as he suggests, repressive legislation against foreigners resulted from 
the retreat of cosmopolitanism and the awakening of an exclusive nationalism, then this 
supports the contention of the centrality of ideology or rhetoric in the engine which drove 
the Revolution headlong into the Terror. As if anticipating Furet and Hunt's contentions 
about conspiracy, Mathiez recognises that the revolutionaries did have a tendency to 
blame foreigners for almost all their domestic and external difficulties. " None the less, 
while he gives ideology an independent role, that is not what drives the revolutionary 
response to foreigners: 'Si les doctrines dicterent encore les phrases, les n6cessites de plus 
en plus dict&ent les actes. "I In contrast to the thesis suggested by Furet and Hunt, it was 
circumstances which forced the revolutionaries to take harsh measures against foreigners. 
This difference in interpretation raises the question as to whether or not the exclusion, 
arrest, and expulsion of foreigners in the Terror was the logical product of revolutionary 
ideology, or whether the revolutionaries were genuinely reluctant to enact such laws 
against foreigners. If, as Furet and Hunt suggest, the Terror can be deduced from the 
principles enunciated in 1789, then this puts a pessimistic twist even on the pacific 
cosmopolitanism expressed in revolutionary rhetoric in 1789 - 1790 and on the universal 
pretensions of the doctrine of natural rights. This thesis will examine the effects of both 
ideology and circumstances to explain developments in the revolutionary treatment of 
foreigners. 
'Hunt, L., Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (1984) (London: 
Methuen, 1986), 19 -51. 
"Mathiez, La Nvolution et les itrangers, 121 - 122,172. 
"Mathiez, La Nvolution et les etrangers, 8 1. 
5 
Secondly, the focus on ideology and culture has led some historians to identify'the 
creation of modem political culture' as the main achievement of the Revolution. " This 
was a development encouraged in large measure by Furet's radical interpretation in 1978. 
Among the most important frames of reference in the new political culture were the 
citizen and the nation. Such terms, however, had to be defined: who was to be included, 
and who excluded? Research on this issue has taken different forms including broad 
discussions of citizenship, popular sovereignty, notions of patriotism and elections. " So 
far, however, little work has been published on the experience of foreigners as the 
revolutionaries defined the nation and its membership, yet the notion of the foreigner was 
one of the defining limits of the new civic order. " A discussion of the treatment of 
foreigners and their assimilation or exclusion in state and society might offer useful 
perspectives on how the revolutionaries sought to define citizenship and nationality. 
Foreigners were not, of course, the only people on the fiinges of the new body politic: 
Jews and blacks were all subjects of debate and action among the revolutionaries as they 
debated the limits of civil and political rights. " Significant advances have been made in 
the study of women and their role in the French Revolution in particular. " Joan Landes's 
work in this area offers an interesting parallel to the revolutionary experience of 
"See, for example, the collection of papers edited by Keith Baker, Frangois Furet, Colin 
Lucas and Mona Ozouf, Yhe French Revolution and the Creation ofModern Political 
Culture (4 vols. ) (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987 - 1994). 
"See, for example, Waldinger, R., Dawson, P., Woloch, 1. (eds. ), 7he French Revolution 
and the Meaning of Citizenship (Westport & London: Greenwood Press, 1993); 
Cranston, M., 'The Sovereignty of the Nation; Sewell, W. H., Jr., Le citoyen/la 
citoyenne: Activity, Passivity and the Revolutionary Concept of Citizenship'; Hampson, 
N., 1a Patrie': all in Lucas, C. (ed. ), 7he French Revolution and the Creation ofModern 
Political Culture, ii, 7he Political Culture of the French Revolution (Oxford: Pergarnon 
Press, 1988), 97 - 104; 105 - 123; 125 - 137; Crook, Elections in the French Revolution. "Wahnich, 'La notion d'6tranger en Van 11', 3 79. 
"On Jews, see Girard, P., La Rivolutionftanýaise et lesjuifs (Paris: Robert Laffont, 
1989); Godechot, J., 'La Rdvolution frangaise et les Juifs', Annales historiques de la 
RevolutionfranVaise, x1iii (1976 (1)), 47 - 70; Necheles, R., VEmancipation des Juifs 
1787 - 1795', Annales historiques de la RevolutionftanVaise, x1iii (1976 (1)), 71 - 86. 
On blacks, see Blackburn, R., 7he Overthrow of Colonial Slavery 1776 - 1848 (London 
& New York: Verso, 1988), 161 - 264; C6saire, A., Toussaint Louverture. La R&olution 
FranVaise et le problime colonial (Paris: Pr6sence Afficaine, 196 1); Gauthier, F., 'La 
R6volution frangaise et le probl6me colonial: le "cas Robespierre"', Annales historiques de 
la RevolutionftanVaise 1xiv (1992), 169 - 192; McCloy, S. T., 7he Negro in France 
(Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1961). 
"For example, Landes, J., Women in the Public Sphere in the Age of the French 
Revolution (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1988); Olwen Huflon, Women 
and the Limits of Citizenship in the French Revolution (Toronto, Buffalo, London: 
University of Toronto Press, 1992). 
6 
foreigners. Explicitly adopting Jorgen Habermas's concept of the bourgeois public 
sphere', she argues that in the Revolution the absolute monarchy gave way to 'a more 
pervasive gendering of the public sphere'. Despite the patriarchal character of the Ancien 
R6gime, women did participate in and influenced politics and political language in their 
roles at court, in the salons of literary society, in the traditional process of popular protest 
and even in formal political activities such as the elections to the Estates-General. Such 
exclusion from the public sphere which women experienced did not seem exceptional 
because few men or women enjoyed political rights anyway. Although the breakdown of 
authority in 1789 and the crisis of 1793 opened the public sphere to all forms of political 
expression, in which women played a prominent role, ultimately women were deliberately 
and explicitly excluded by the revolutionaries. This exclusion from political life was 
'central to its incarnation ... the 
bourgeois public sphere is essentially, not just 
contingently, masculinist. ... The Republic was constructed against women, not just 
without them. ' In the bourgeois view of universal natural rights, men were seen as 
properly political, while women were regarded as naturally domestic. None the less, the 
idea that rights were universal allowed feminists to expose the discrepancies between 
principle and practice: republican ideology had a capacity 'to encompass both feminist and 
antifeminist alternatives'. " Landes's work raises the question as to how far the 
revolutionaries also deliberately sought to define the nation and their political culture not 
only without foreigners, but even against them. 
Thirdly, discussions of the creation of modem political culture have led to debate over 
just how novel the political structures and practices of the Revolution were. If much of 
Franqois Furet's work owes an explicit debt to the Tocquevillian approach which stresses 
continuities, he claims that in ideological terms the Revolution represented a complete 
break with the past. Vancienne France dtait un royaume de sujets, la nouvelle une nation 
des citoyens. L'ancienne socidt6 6tait celle du privil6ge, la Revolution fonde NgalitE 
Ainsi se constitue une id6ologie de la rupture radicale avec le pass6'. " Furet subsequently 
argued that this break with the past led the revolutionaries to innovate and so 1789 was 
the 'birth of political modernity. " This 'rupture' thesis has been not been accepted by 
historians who have worked in detail on the political structures and practices of the 
Revolution. In recent works, both Peter Jones and Malcolm Crook argue the persistence 
"Landes, Women in the Public Sphere, 2,4 - 7,12 - 13,20 - 21,105 - 107. 
"Furet, Penser la Revolutionfranýaise, 49. 
"Quoted in Jones, P. M., Reform andRevolution in France. Yhe Politics of Transition, 
1774 - 1791 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2. 
of older forms and customs within French revolutionary politics. " An examination of the 
treatment of foreigners might also contribute to the question of rupture or continuity in 
the revolutionary creation of a modem political culture. 
Finally, historiographical developments outside the field of French Revolution studies 
have produced stimulating work on identity of various kinds. " Different attitudes towards 
foreigners are ways of emphasising the separateness, or even uniqueness, of ones 
homeland. The study of the identity of any people is consequently incomplete without 
some consideration for the way in which that people regards their neighbours and treats 
foreigners staying among them. Theodore Zeldin has written that 'France was defined as a 
nation not only by the policies of its rulers - or, alternatively, by the peculiarities of the 
provinces from which it was formed - but also by the way it distinguished itself from the 
nations that surround it. To understand France, one must appreciate the complexity of its 
attitudes towards foreigners. " Studies of identity, because of the very nature of its slow 
evolution, must take a long-term perspective, as both Eugen Weber and Linda Colley do 
in their studies of France and Britain. None the less, it is hoped that in taking a snapshot 
of an eight-year period in which French attitudes towards and the treatment of foreigners 
underwent many mutations, some tentative remarks might be offered on the Revolutiows 
impact on French national identity. 
In summary, this dissertation seeks to address several questions: how far was ideology 
an overriding factor in the treatment of foreigners in revolutionary France? How far, on 
the other hand, did circumstances dictate revolutionary policies, and how far did 
circumstances interact with ideology to produce the legislation regarding foreigners? 
How far did the revolutionaries seek to define the nation and membership of it by the 
deliberate exclusion of foreigners? How'modern' were the measures and attitudes which 
emerged and how much do they owe to Ancien R6gime practices? Finally, can 
revolutionary attitudes towards and treatment of foreigners tell us anything about the 
Revolutiods influence on the development of a French national identity? 
"Jones, Reform and Revolution in France and Malcolm Crook, Elections in the French 
Revolution. An apprenticeship in democracy, 1789 - 1799 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
"For France, see, for example, Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen. 7he 
Modernization ofRural France, 18 70 - 1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976). 
On Britain see Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707 - 1837 (1992) (London: 
Pimlico, 1994). 
"France 1848 - 1945: Intellect andPride (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 86. 
8 
This thesis accepts that while the privileged, corporate structure of Ancien R6gime 
society allowed foreigners to serve the king without any apparent anomaly, the 
revolutionary notion of the sovereignty of the nation implied that they be excluded from 
serving in the French state, namely the army, the church and the administration. On the 
other hand, it is argued that any ideological dynamic which emerged from the principles of 
1789 was not the main force in determining the fortunes of foreigners in France. The 
'nationalising' tendencies inherent in the Revolution were never fully applied because the 
revolutionaries were pragmatic enough to understand the very real practical problems 
which they faced. These problems led them to take decisions which may have been 
explained or justified with reference to revolutionary principles, but which nonetheless 
were not driven by those ideas. In the case of foreigners, it was the diplomatic, economic 
and political fallout which might have come from their exclusion and the useful services 
which they might offer which dictated revolutionary policy. Revolutionary pragmatism 
may have limited the extent to which ideology acted as a factor in the development of 
political culture. 
The same pragmatism none the less meant that the revolutionaries were willing to 
exclude foreigners when circumstances made certain types appear to be more of a threat 
than previously thought. This was particularly true in the wake of the flight to Varennes, 
the fall of the monarchy, the military crisis of early 1793, the Prairial uprising, the 
Quiberon landings and the Babeuf conspiracy, when all other considerations seemed to be 
secondary to the external and internal security of the state. None the less even during the 
Terror nationality was not the only factor which determined the fate of foreigners. Their 
ability to be useful to the new order ensured their freedom and might even have saved 
their lives. Equally important, however, was loyalty to the revolutionary regime. As the 
Revolution became more radical, so it became less tolerant of opposition and diversity of 
opinion until, during the Terror, loyalty was meant to focus on the government itself 
Such a development affected French citizens and foreigners alike, so, exclusive as political 
orthodoxy became, it cut across lines of nationality. Despite the letter of the laws which 
targeted foreigners for their nationality, even the regime of the Terror made allowances 
for those who were still useful to the war effort or whose loyalty to the government was 
in little doubt. 
This study does not claim to be comprehensive in its coverage of foreigners. Mathiez! s 
work concentrates on foreigners engaged in revolutionary politics and in the foreign 
legions recruited in the first year of the war. There were, however, other important 
categories of foreigner, such as regular troops, clergy, merchants, manufacturers and 
financiers. A study of their experience might yield different perspectives on the place of 
foreigners in a country which was seeking to regenerate itself through principles and 
concepts which threatened to exclude them. The limits of this thesis have also been 
dictated in part by constraints of space: the story is taken up to the peace of Campo 
Formio in October 1797. While the essential arguments can be made without reference to 
the subsequent period, the last two years of the Directory and the period of the Consulate 
saw their own developments in the treatment of foreigners and are worthy of 
consideration. The years after Campo Formio will be the subject of further research and 
this thesis only represents an interim report. 
Il 
Finally, the scope of this dissertation must also be defined by determining who were 
French and who were foreign in this period. The Ancien R6gime definition of a foreigner 
was stated baldly in 1779 by the jurist Claude-Joseph de Ferri&re as 'celui qui est nd hors 
le Royaume'. ' Conversely, to have been born in France was to be a rignicole, a natural 
subject of the king. It was assumed that such an individual accepted the king! s protection 
and offered obedience to his laws in return. This simple formula immediately posed 
problems, as the frontiers of the French kingdom were not easily defined. A few years 
previously, Turgot set up a Topographical Bureau with the task of marking out the limits 
of French territory, but the task was not a simple one, because the exact position of the 
frontiers were not certain. In Lorraine, for example, it was not clear where the 
possessions of the king of France ended and those of the Elector of Trier began. " Border 
arrangements were still being discussed with princes of the Holy Roman Empire in the 
mid-1780s. 1' Moreover, the French monarchy periodically laid claim to territory beyond 
its existing frontiers, and could treat those who were technically living under the 
sovereignty of another prince as its own subjects. The Comtat-Venaissin and Avignon 
"Ferri6re, C. -J. de, Dictionnaire de droitpractique contenant 1explication des termes de 
Droit, d'Ordonnances, de Coutumes & de Pratique: avec lesjurisdictions de France (2 
vols. ) (Toulouse, 1779), i, 658. 
"Jones, Reform andRevolution in France, 13. 
'Archives Nationales (hereafter AN), K//2033; F/7/4399; Sahlins, P., 'Natural Frontiers 
Revisited: France's Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century, American Historical 
Review, xcv (1990), 1440 - 144 1. 
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were papal territories enclaved in the south of France. Both enclaves were ceded to the 
Pope, the Conitat in 1275 and Avignon in 1348. In 1789, as the British traveller Dr. 
Edward Rigby discovered, Avignon'still belongs to the Pope ... we were therefore 
required to take a passport on leaving it. 126 Yet the border was far from insurmountable 
for these papal subjects: in 1348 an edict of Philip VI declared the Avignonnais and the 
Venaissins to be French subjects and this was confirmed in 1540. By these edicts, 
inhabitants of the enclaves could even hold ecclesiastical benefices in France, a privilege 
otherwise denied to all but rignicoles by the Blois ordonnance of 1579. ' Culturally and 
linguistically, too, the inhabitants had much in common with the people who lived in the 
kingdom of France itself. In all aspects of French life, therefore, Avignonnais and 
Venaissins were in practical terms completely indistinct from rignicoles: quite simply, 
they were not treated as foreigners. In a similar fashion, from 1702 the inhabitants of 
Savoy were treated as rignicoles, although they were subjects of the king of Sardinia. " 
Such rulings were dictated by the monarchy's desire to justify and reinforce older claims 
on the territory concerned. 
Moreover, there were territories within France over which the king laid claim to 
sovereignty, but in which he recognised certain legal jurisdictions of foreign princes, as in 
the enclaves of Alsace. There, inhabitants owed allegiance to the princes of the Holy 
Roman Empire by virtue of the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, by which France won 
possession of the province, but recognised some of the legal and fiscal rights of the 
princes who owned estates and fiefdoms there. Such privileges varied from one lord to 
another, but they included the appointment ofjudges and clergy, the imposition of taxes 
and the levying of dues. "' The population of these enclaves therefore owed obedience not 
only to the king of France, but also to their princely, German lord. 
Such overlaps were not considered unusual by the standards of the Ancien Regime in 
Europe. Concepts of nationhood were developing and some European sovereigns did 
seek to consolidate their dynastic lands into single parcels, but the weight of tradition, 
"Rigby, E., Dr. Rigby's Lettersfrom France, etc., in 1789, edited by his daughter Lady 
Eastlake (London: 1880), 126. 
27 Villers, R., 'La Condition des f-trangers en France dans les trois derniers si&cles de la 
Monarchie', Recueds de la SocieM Jean Bodin, x, Vjýýanger (Brussels: Editions de la 
Librairie Encyclopddique, 195 8), 144,148; Jourdan, Decrusy, Isambert, Recued giniral 
des Anciennes loisftanqaises depuis I'an 420jusqua la R9volution de 1789 (29 vols. ) 
(hereafter Isambert), xii, 743. 
2'Boizet, J., 'Les Lettres de naturalit6 sous I'Ancien regime' (Thýse de droit, Paris, 1943) 
(Paris: Lavergne, 1943), 5 1. 
29AN, F/7/4399. 
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prescription and international treaties - the droitpublic of Europe - led most people to 
accept such apparent anomalies as existed in Avignon, the Comtat, Savoy and Alsace. 
Such attitudes meant that there was no clear-cut, codified definition as to what constituted 
a French subject and, conversely, a foreigner. Certain general terms describing a 
foreigner, such as aubain, had emerged from customary rules and judgments of lawcourts, 
but these were not always consistent. " 
In 1694, the Dictionnaire de Mca&mie defined the nation as'all the inhabitants of the 
same state, of the same country who live under the same laws and use the same 
language. "' If this were the case, then the people over whom the king of France claimed 
sovereignty would never constitute a nation. In addition to the overlaps in sovereignty, 
linguistically, religiously, culturally and even geographically because of the Vosges, the 
inhabitants of Alsace were very different from the other people in the French kingdom. In 
July 1789 Arthur Young remarked that'I found myself to all appearance veritably in 
Germany ... here not one person in a hundred has a word of French! and he commented on 
how striking it was 'to cross a great range of mountains; to enter a level plain, inhabited by 
a people totally distinct and different from France, with manners, language, ideas, 
prejudices, and habits all different. "' He also commented that the inhabitants of 
Roussillon 'are Spaniards in language and in customs, but they are under a French 
government'. " Furthermore, Basque was spoken along the western Pyrenees and Breton 
in Lower Brittany. Conversely, French was spoken in Brabant, under Austrian 
sovereignty. French language and the culture stemming from it could not, therefore, be 
one of the prime legal determinants of French nationality. 
Similarly, religion was not a factor, despite the theoretical commitment of the French 
monarchy to extirpate heresy. It is true that, to be naturalised, a foreigner had in theory to 
convert to Catholicism, but this practice became rarer over the course of the eighteenth 
century. The king tolerated Jews and Protestants among his subjects, even if they were 
'second class'behind Catholics. Ethnicity excluded Jews and blacks from the full 
privileges and protection of the law under the Ancien R6gime, but contemporaries still 
saw them as subjects of the king of France, if only, for one, as a religious and racial 
"Brubaker, R., Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), 36 - 37. 
"Quoted in Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and German 192n.. Y, 
"Young, A., Travels in France during the Years 1787,1788 & 1789 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1929), 180. 
"Young, Travels in France, 3 8. 
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minority to be grudgingly tolerated and, for the other, as a racial group to be subjected to 
segregation and exploitation. Jews and blacks themselves regarded themselves not as 
foreigners, but as French subjects suffering severe discrimination. Zalkind Hourwitz, a 
Jew of Polish origin, argued that the cultural characteristics which differentiated Jews 
from other French subjects arose because of the laws which restricted their behaviour and 
prevented them from realising their full potential. Suppress those laws, the argument ran, 
and Jews would assimilate with the French people. " When Jews were accorded full civil 
and political rights on 27 September 1791, the revolutionaries implicitly rejected the view 
of abb6 Maury, that 'calling Jews citizens would be like saying that without letters of 
naturalization and without ceasing to be English and Danish, the English and Danish could 
become French. "' 
Blacks were enslaved not because they were foreigners, but because of their race, 
which determined the entire social hierarchy in the French colonies. " Enslaved blacks 
were not only subject to the will of their immediate 'owners', but also to the Code noir and 
as such were forcibly subject to the authority the king of France. If they were freed from 
slavery, which was theoretically possible if they arrived in metropolitan France undeclared 
by their master, they became full subjects of the king and thereby enjoyed the qualW de 
franýais. ` Similarly when slavery was abolished in the French colonies on 4 February 
1794, blacks were not required to be naturalised. All men 'without distinction of coloue 
were to be considered French citizens enjoying all the rights assured by the French 
constitution. " The revolutionaries werenot naturalising blacks, but abolishing one of the 
last and the most despicable of the hierarchical societies in the French empire: the one 
based on race. 
Under the absolute monarchy, the varieties and distribution of privilege among the 
king's subjects did not matter, nor did their various languages, ethnic origins and even 
religions. What bound together the French kingdom and empire was the monarchy itself, 
or rather the assumption that ultimately all those bom on the domains of the French king 
"Godechot, J., 'La R6volution frangaise et les Juife, 54; 'Vindication of the Jews', extract 
in Hunt, L. (ed. ), Ae French Revolution and Human Rights. A BriefDocumentary 
History (Boston & New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1996), 48 - 50. 
"Maury's opinion of 23 December 1789, in Hunt, Yhe French Revolution and Human 
Rights, 89. 
`C6saire, Toussaint Louverture. La R&olution Franqaise et le proWme colonial, 3 1. 
"For a full but dated study of blacks in France see McCloy, S. T., Yhe Negro in France 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 196 1) and, by the same author, 'Negroes and 
mulattoes in eighteenth-century France', Journal ofNegro History, xxx (1945), 276 - 292. 
"Decree in Hunt, Ae French Revolution and Human Rights, 116. 
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were subject to his laws, and received his protection in return for their obedience. Legal, 
linguistic, religious, cultural and ethnic differences between subjects were not anomalous 
to eighteenth-century jurists such as de Ferri&re, because it was related to the very nature 
of Ancien R6gime society. Privilege, or absence of it, defined the various individuals, 
guilds, corporations, towns and provinces from each other. In this corporate society, 
what tied them all together was loyalty to the same king. Their Frenchness was defined 
only by the vertical ties of obedience to the monarchy, while they remained separate and 
distinct from each other because of their differences in privilege. " During the elections to 
the Estates-General, some provinces resisted the idea that they formed part of the 
kingdom of France, invoking a purely dynastic link to the French crown. The Estates of 
Navarre, for example, were scandalised at being treated as anything other than a kingdom 
separate from France. " 
The question as to what constituted French nationality boiled down to whom one owed 
ultimate allegiance. In cases such as Alsace, the papal enclaves and Savoy, international 
treaties, the droitpubfic of Europe, determined the principle, if not the practice, of 
nationality. If the people of Alsace owed their first obedience to their immediate masters 
in the Holy Roman Empire, at a deeper level they were considered French rather than 
German because their ultimate overlord, by virtue of the treaties of Westphalia in 1648 
and Ryswick in 1697, was the king of France. "' Meanwhile, and despite their 
naturalisation by the French monarchy, inhabitants of the papal enclaves and of Savoy 
were legally foreigners. In practice, of course, the subjects in question may have felt 
differently and behaved accordingly: an Avignonnais, technically a foreigner, had more in 
common with a French-speaking subject of Louis XVI than did a German-speaking 
Alsatian. None the less, people born in France were assumed to have made the 
commitment of loyalty to the king. This territorial basis of nationality was referred to as 
the droit de sol, and included those born in France of foreign parents, and children born 
abroad of French parents, provided that they fixed their domicile in France. What, 
"Fitzsimmons, M. P., 'The National Assembly and the Invention of Citizenship', 
Waldinger, Dawson, Woloch, Yhe French Revolution and the Meaning of Citizenship, 29. 
"Jones, Reform and Revolution in France, 13 - 14. 
"This did not, however, preclude disputes over the extent of French royal sovereignty 
over the German princes themselves (Muret, P., Uaffaire des princes possessionnds 
d'Alsace et les origines du conflit entre la Rdvolution et lEmpire, Revue dhistoire 
moderne et contemporaine i (1899 - 1900), 434 - 43 9). 
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conversely, defined a foreigner was his loyalty to a sovereign other than the king of 
France, and this was usually determined by birth in another kingdom. " 
The revolutionaries aimed to create a new civic order based on the abolition of all 
distinctions based on birth and privilege among all citizens. At the same time, they made 
the nation, rather than the king, the source of political legitimacy. Both developments 
redefined the relationship of the citizen to the state. The abolition of privilege on 4 
August 1789, the administrative division of the kingdom into departments, the 
emancipation of Protestants, Jews and eventually blacks theoretically erased the old 
sources of social differentiation and identity. People's loyalty and identity were now 
expected to focus on the entire French people, rather than one's corporation, guild, town, 
or province. What defined French nationality was no longer one! s loyalty to a monarch, 
but rather to the community of citizens who shared the same rights within the same patrie. 
In this respect, the Revolution inherited from the Ancien Regime the tendency to define 
French nationality only in political terms, without reference to language, culture, religion 
orrace. Siey6s defined the nation in 1789 simply asun corps d'associes vivant sous une 
loi commune et repr6sentds par la m8me ligislature'. " On one hand, this confirmed the 
assimilationist tendency in the definition of French nationality, which could encompass 
anyone who sought to participate and contribute to the life of the nation. On the other 
hand, this definition was not only dictated by principles. To insist on language, 
ethnicity or religion as a basis for nationality would have made France as it was in 1789 
merely a state rather than a nation, and a state constructed from a variety of 'nations' or 
peoples who might demand, on the basis of the Revolution's own ideology, their own 
rights to self-determination. By defining a nation in the broadest sense, without reference 
to race, language or religion, the revolutionaries precluded such a possibility. Moreover, 
the short-lived attempt to impose linguistic conformity on all French citizens by the law of 
20 July 1794 floundered because it was unworkable. 44 Besides, the surging of 
revolutionary armies into Belgium and the Rhineland, the ultimate annexation of the 
"'Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 38; Danjou, C., La 
Condition Civile de lbranger dans les trois derniers si&Ies de la Monarchie (Paris: 
Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1939), 11. 
43 Siey6s, E., Quest-ce que le tiers etat? (Paris, Flammarion, 1988), 40. 
44Archives Parlementaires de 1787 d 1860, Recued complet des dibats ligislatifis et 
politiques des chamhresfranýajses (I &e s6rie: 1787 - 1799) (96 vols. ) (Paris, 1877 - 
1990) (hereafter AP), xciii, 367 - 368; Lyons, M., Regionalism and linguistic confbrnýty 
in the French Revolution!, Forrest, A., & Jones, P. (eds. ), Reshaping France. Town, 
country and region during the French Revolution (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1991), 185,188. 
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former and the claims on the latter naturally reinforced the tendency to exclude language 
as a defining characteristic of French nationality. If the Revolution represented a break 
with the past in terms of the transfer of sovereignty from king to nation, the definition of 
membership of the nation, and the motivation for it, marked a continuity. 
The Revolution also inherited the same problems of making a line of demarcation 
between French and foreigners. Unlike the Ancien R6gime, the absolute pretensions of 
the principle of national sovereignty could not accommodate such overlappings of 
jurisdiction as existed in Alsace. It could not resist for long the demands of Avignon and 
the Comtat Venaissin for 'reunion' with France, either, as they were apparently the express 
will of the people of those enclaves. In the cases of the papal enclaves and of Alsace, the 
Revolution sharpened the focus in the definition of French nationality by denying the 
legitimacy of the apparent anomalies tolerated by the old droitpublic of Europe. 
More problematic was the fact that the political boundaries of the French nation were 
in flux Ibr most of the revolutionary period, mainly because of the war. This meant that 
the limits of French nationality still remained unclear. The example of the Belgians and 
Li6geois will suffice to illustrate this point. Early in 1793, the Convention accepted the 
mainly extorted 'petitions' from Belgian communes for'reuniod with France. Henceforth, 
the Belgians and the Li6geois might have expected to be considered French citizens, as 
indeed they were legally. None the less, when the Austrians reconquered their territory 
the revolutionary authorities treated Belgians and Li6geois in France ambiguously. 
Sometimes they were deemed French citizens, but on other occasions they were treated as 
foreigners. 45 
The question of the nationality of Belgians and Li6geois was eventually decided when 
their countries were formally annexed by France on I October 1795. This annexation and 
the forced cession by the Empire of the left bank of the Rhine in December 1798 
represented victories for the proponents of France's 'natural frontiers! or 'grandes limites'. 
They also made, in theory at least, French citizens out of Flamands and more German 
speakers. Appeals to nature justified these expanded limits of the Republic and, tellingly, 
if the Rhine was France's 'natural' frontier, nature herself had not preordained nations to 
speak the same language. The revolutionaries were in reality guided by strategic 
"For example, while they were exempt from the confiscation of foreigners' property on 7 
September 1793 on the grounds that they were French, on 25 December Robespierre 
had them exempted from the law expelling all foreigners from elective office not because 
they were considered French citizens, but because they fulfilled their functions honorably 
(AP, lxxiii, 504; lxxxii, 304). 
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concerns. It was such calculations which dictated the geographical limits of the nation 
and, consequently, the definition of the French people. As the revolutionaries created a 
new state and a new political culture, therefore, the very people whom they sought to 
regenerate by these changes remained fluid both in definition and in fact. 
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Chapter One. To live Free, to die a Slave: Foreigners in Ancien Rigime France. 
On a December morning in 1750, a funeral procession left the Renaissance chateau of 
Chambord. A carriage, draped in black and built specially for the occasion, was drawn by 
six horses also clothed in black. The coffin was attended by no less than three equerries, 
two pages, four valets, six lackeys and four guards. This corfte was in turn escorted by 
one hundred horsemen, bristling with sabres, carbines, lances and dressed variously as 
dragoons, uhlans and tartars -a reflection of their diverse and exotic origins, from Afiica 
to eastern Europe. This procession was made rarer by its destination: not a local 
churchyard or family mausoleum, but the Lutheran chapel of Saint Thomas in Strasbourg. 
The man honoured in this way was Maurice de Saxe, Marshal of France, Duke of 
Courland and natural son of Frederick-Augustus, the Elector of Saxony and later 
Augustus 11, King of Poland. The cavalrymen escorting his coffin were once his own, part 
of his thousand-strong regiment of horse, the Saxe-Volontaire. Maurice's final journey 
would take two months. On its way through the garrison towns of north-eastern France, 
church bells tolled solemnly and guards of honour presented arms. In the countryside, 
small clusters of peasants followed in silence. When the convoy finally reached 
Strasbourg on 8 February, it was greeted with twelve cannon shots and attended by 
officials and notables of Alsace, non-commissioned officers of the Saxe-Volontaire, four 
fieutenant-generals of the royal army and no less than forty-three Protestant pastors. The 
entire garrison of the city lined the route from the Porte de France to the chapel. Banners 
were lowered in respect as the carriage rumbled by and drums, covered with black crepe, 
quietly rolled. After the funeral service, the crowds which had massed in the street were 
allowed to file past the tomb, either to pay homage to the Marshal or to satisfy their 
curiosity. 
The bill for these sixty-odd days of deference to a Protestant foreigner, as Maurice de 
Saxe was never naturalised in spite of thirty years' service to the French crown, was 
footed by the royal treasury. ' This favour bestowed on Maurice by Louis XV was only 
the last of many. Besides his rank of mar9chal de France, de Saxe had also been granted 
a pension, Chambord and all its dependencies, the governorship of Alsace, the right to 
enter the Louvre in a horsedrawn coach and, significantly in a court still meticulously 
'The details of Maurice de Saxe's lavish funeral are taken from Hulot, F., Le Marechal de 
Saxe (Paris: Pygmalion/Gerard Watelet, 1989), 266 - 268, and Fieff6, E., Histoire des 
troupes etrangýres au service de France (2 vols. ) (Paris: 1854), i, 280 - 282. 
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governed by fine points of etiquette, the right to sit when in audience with the King and 
other members of the royal family. ' He had furthermore been granted permission, unlike 
many other foreigners in France, to dispose of his property to whomsoever he pleased. 3 
With such favours, it might have been that Maurice de Saxe never felt the need to be 
naturalised. The absense of naturalisation also allowed Maurice to remain a Protestant 
even while occupying some of the highest military and administrative positions in the 
Catholic kingdom. 
Maurice de Saxe had no need to convert to Catholicism, let alone be naturalised, to 
prove his loyalty to the French crown: he had won the trust of Louis XV and immense 
popularity amonst the people at large thanks mainly to his victory at Fontenoy in 1745. 
Equally important for the King, however, was his fidelity. When Maurice was maHchal 
de camp, a relatively humble position among the higher echelons of the military, his half- 
brother Augustus III of Poland offered him the command of his army in the War of Polish 
Succession (1733 - 1735). The Saxon Protestant replied that he had served the King of 
France for thirteen years and would not now abandon him. As French policy dictated 
support for Augustus' rival, Stanislas Leszczinski, Maurice found himself duty-bound to 
fight against his blood-relative, to whom he was not reconciled until 1736. It was such 
displays of loyalty, as well as his success on the battlefield, that made Maurice de Saxes 
status as a foreigner a minor consideration. 
There were others like him in eighteenth-century France. As a Protestant the Genevan 
banker Jacques Necker was denied entry into the royal council and excluded from the post 
of contrdleur-giniral of finances, but he nonetheless took charge of them with a different 
title, as directeur-gMiral, from 1776 to 1781 and again from 1788 to 1790. He never 
converted to Catholicism and he was never naturalised, unlike one of his predecessors, the 
Scottish Protestant John Law. ' Both Necker and de Saxe remained Protestants and 
foreigners, but they reached the pinnacles of the French state. What mattered was not 
their nationality, but rather the personal ties of service and loyalty between monarch and 
servant. Their respect for these bonds, and the recognition of their value to the state, 
gave de Saxe and Necker the credentials required for the highest positions in the kingdom 
without having to undergo a religious conversion or naturalisation. Necker and de Saxe 
'Hulot, de Saxe, 176. 
'Isambert, xxii, 185. 
"Harris, R. D., Necker: Reform Statesman of the Ancien Roime (Berkeley, Los Angeles 
& London: University of California Press, 1979), 1-2. 
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were, however, remarkable exceptions. The privileges which de Saxe and Necker enjoyed 
underscored the disadvantages which humbler foreigners usually faced in France. 
While there were rules and obstacles which theoretically applied to all foreigners, the 
main legal divide was not between Frenchmen and foreigners. What mattered to a 
foreigner, as much as the fact of not being French, was the function which he or she 
performed in French society, and the privileges and obstacles which that function 
presented to them. Privilege defined relationships between the component parts of Ancien 
R6gime society, ' and different foreigners enjoyed different privileges and confronted a 
variety of difficulties, depending upon their occupation. Naturalisation, inheritance laws, 
religious and legal obstacles all affected foreigners, " but not equally from one foreigner to 
the next. Foreign soldiers, clergymen, artists, intellectuals and exiles, merchants, 
manufacturers and bankers and poverty-stricken migrants all enjoyed or suffered differing 
degrees of privilege and disabilities depending on a variety of factors. Among those 
factors was their country of origin, religious affiliation and, crucially, occupation. 
Such a variety of conditions did not go unchallenged in the eighteenth century. By 
1789 both the government and the limited, literate section of the population which made 
up public opinion had occasionally challenged both the privileges and the barriers affecting 
foreigners in France. On the one hand, the questioning was based on eighteenth-century 
'philosophic cosmopofitanisrre and new economic philosophies, which tended towards the 
greater assimilation of foreigners into French society by the removal of the legal 
disabilities imposed on them. On the other hand, some of the challenges tended towards 
exclusion of foreigners, not from France or from much of the life of the nation, but 
certainly from sections of the French state where foreigners had traditionally played a part. 
Both these challenges to Ancien R6gime customs and practices were to be given fuller 
expression and implementation during the Revolution. 
'Jones, Reform andRevolution in France, 58, 
'Much work has been done on these general conditions affecting foreigners. See, for 
example, Boizet, 'Les Lettres de naturalit6 sous I'Ancien r6gime'; Danjou, La Condition 
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The most important of these old practices towards foreigners was the droit d'aubaine, 
which was the right by which the king was the only inheritor of the property of foreigners 
who died in France without leaving regnicole - French-born - heirs. Even naturalised 
foreigners who had no heirs born in France, or who had failed to write a will, were subject 
to this droit. Tobias Smollett, arriving in France in July 1763, called it a1yranny' and 
explained that it was 'founded at first upon the supposition, that all the estate of foreigners 
residing in France was acquired in that kingdom, and that, therefore, it would be unjust to 
convey it to another country. 17 
While Smollett's explanation for the droit d'aubaine was certainly one expressed by 
French jurists, ' the legal justification for the confiscation of foreign inheritances rested on 
a distinction, drawn from Roman law, between droit des gens and droit civil. The former 
was Icelui que la raison naturelle a dtabli parmi tous les hommes, & qui est communement 
requ & observ6 par toutes les nations' and therefore applicable to all people, even 
foreigners, while the latter was le Droit de chaque peuple en particulier' and therefore 
applicable only to citizens of the country in question. Montesquieu, while opposed to the 
droit d'aubaine, made a similar distinction between the two branches of law. ' 
Under the droit des gens foreigners were capable of making contracts, to receive, buy, 
give or sell property from or to anyone, regardless of nationality. The crucial point was 
that all these activities were done while the foreigners concerned were alive. Such acts 
were considered part of the droit des gens because all human beings had the right to 
provide for themselves and their families while they were still alive: the need to work, eat 
and live were naturally common to all human beings. On the other hand, transmission of 
wealth because of death, through acts such as wills and testaments were considered to fall 
into the realm of droit civil and could not, therefore, be enjoyed by foreigners, either as 
the deceased or as the inheritors. The explanation as to why foreigners could provide for 
'Smollett, T., Travels through France andItaly (London: Oxford University Press, 1907), 
9. 
"Ainsi les biens qu'ils laissent ici en mourant appartiennent au Roi qui a bien voulu leur 
permettre den acquerir dans son Royaume'(Ferri6re, Dictionnaire de droitpractique, i, 
142). 
"Ferri6re, Dictionnaire de drod practique, i, 585-586; Montesquieu, De I'Esprit des Loix 
(1748), in 0euvres Complites deMontesquieu (3 vols. ) (Amsterdam and Leipzig: 1758), 
book i, chapter 3. 
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their families while alive, but not in death, came from Roman law, in which foreigners 
'vivent i la v6ritd comme libres; mais ils meurent comme esclaves'. 1' Foreigners did not, 
therefore, share the same rights in civil law as free citizens. Why wills and testaments 
should have belonged to French droit civil rather than the droit des gens was never 
satisfactorily explained by French eighteenth-century jurists, but it is possible that it 
stemmed from a broad application of the Roman law of citizenship, whereby one of the 
privileges enjoyed by a citizen was the right to trade with other Roman citizens. " If 
foreigners in France were'freewhen alive, they could therefore make contracts and 
exchange wealth, but if at death they fell to the status of 'slaves', the right to freely dispose 
of one's property was withdrawn. If Smollett had been aware of this justification of the 
droit d'aubaine, his language might have been even stronger. 
Despite the justifications based on Roman law, the origins of the droit d'aubaine are 
obscure. In the eighteenth century, aubain was a legal term to describe a foreigner, while 
aubaine was a foreigner's inheritance, but in a memorandum for Vergennes, the foreign 
minister, in 1785, it was explained that the word aubain was in regular use by the ninth 
century to describe any outsider who had settled on a lord's domain and who was liable to 
mainmorte. " This use of the term predated the introduction in the thirteenth century of 
the Roman distinction between droit des gens and droil civil. " By the eighteenth century, 
Roman law had become the principle explanation for the droit d'aubaine, but it was not at 
the root of the practice. 
Right up to its abolition in 1790, the droit d'aubaine was not applied uniformly from 
province to province, or even from town to town, Exemptions and different rules as to 
the applicability of the droit d'aubaine limited its impact across the kingdom, particularly 
"Ferri6re, Dictionnaire de droitpractique, i, 141 - 142. "Heater, D., Citizenship: the Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education 
(London and New York: Longman, 1990), 16. 
"Archives de la Nfinist6re des Affaires ttrang6res (hereafter MAE), Affaires Diverses 
Politiques (hereafter ADP), France, 1, dossier I ('Par M. Steffel', c. 1785). Mainmorte 
was the right of the seigneur to seize the property of a deceased vassal whose children 
were no longer resident on the domain, The fact that mainmorte was practised in many 
parts of western Europe might explain why the droit d'aubaine existed not only in France, 
but in Germany and elsewhere. The link between mainmorte and the &oil daubaine may 
have arisen from the assumption behind both that those who left the domain to which they 
were originally attached were fugitives, liable to servitude wherever they settled, and as 
such assumed to have no legal family under the law - and significantly the term aubain 
was also used to describe the child of a bastard (Ferri6re, Dictionnaire de droitpractique, 
i, 591; Boizet, 'Les Lettres de naturalite sous I'Ancien r6gime', 33 - 34). 
"Danjou, La Condition Civile de lbranger, 23. 
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in provinces and towns only recently absorbed by the French crown. Out of respect for its 
customary laws, for example, the king admitted in 1689 the claim that foreigners in the 
bishopric of Metz were exempt, while the bishoprics of Toul and Verdun insisted that they 
had similar rights. " Entire provinces also claimed, or were granted, exemptions. In 
response to a questionnaire on legal practices sent by Chancellor d'Aguesseau in August 
173 8 to the various parlements and conseils souverains of France, both the parlement of 
Toulouse and that of Besangon claimed the inapplicability of the droit dlaubaine for, 
respectively, Languedoc and the Franche-Comtd. Other parlements placed limitations on 
the extent and the specific circumstances in which the droit d'aubaine applied. " 
If the king alone held the droit d'aubaine, that meant that he, too, could alter its 
applicability and extent, and even abolish it outright. " It was this use of royal power 
which made the occupation of a foreigner as important as his nationality. The king 
granted privileges to those whom he wished to attract to the kingdom, namely merchants, 
manufacturers and mercenaries. " In the eighteenth century, however, the exemptions 
granted to merchants were generally considered to apply only to their movable goods and 
their merchandise. Soldiers who served the king of France were also the object of 
privileges. In 1481 Louis XI issued kurespatentes exempting his Swiss guards, their 
wives and families from the droit d'aubaine, an exemption which underwent many 
renewals and remained in force up to the Revolution. " 
Exemptions were also granted out of diplomatic necessity: to avoid any incidents, 
ambassadors and the members of notable families had a privileged status regarding the 
droit d'aubaine. De Ferri&e explains that ambassadors and their train were exempt 
because their function was'de droit commun entre tous les souverains'. 1' Diplomats were 
"Danjou, La Condition Civile de Ittranger, I 11. 
"AN, K\\873, dossiers 4&9. The replies of all the parlements on the droil d'aubaine are 
analysed in great detail in Folain-Le Bras, M., 'Un projet d'ordonnance du chancelier 
Daguesseau', 68 - 84. 
"MAE, ADP, France, 1, dossier I ('Par M. Steffel', c. 1785). 
"For example, lettrespatentes of Louis XI in 1472 and 1474 exempted all foreign 
merchants established in Bordeaux - with the notable exception of the English - from the 
droit d'aubaine, provided that the wealth passed on or inherited from those merchants 
was not transported out of the kingdom. Merchants at the fairs of Troyes, the 
Champagne and Lyon were also exempt. To attract foreign investors, Henri III exempted 
from the droit d'aubaine those who bought royal rentes in 1586, but bonds drawn from 
other sources were still liable to the droit (Folain-Le Bras, Un projet d'ordonnance du 
chancelier Daguesseau', 47,47n.; Danjou, La Condition Civile de Ittranger, 83; Ferri6re, 
Dictionnaire de droitpractique, i, 593; Isambert, xiv, 604). 
"Isambert, xi, 310 - 312; xii, 23 - 25. 
"'Ferri6re, Dictionnaire de droilpractique, i, 592. 
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protected by the droit des gens and therefore it would have been unjust to submit them to 
the droit d'aubaine. Under the protective shell of the droit des gens, ambassadors, unlike 
other foreigners in France, could leave wills and even die intestate without their property 
being seized by the crown. This dispensation applied only to movable goods, however: all 
real estate and rentes acquired by ambassadors in France were subject to the droit 
d'aubaine, as was made clear by an arrel du conseil of 21 July 1726. " 
In the later eighteenth century, however, is was not local privilege or a foreigner's 
occupation which determined the extent of his or her subjection to the droit d'aubaine, 
but increasingly the important factor was their nationality. From the mid-1760s, a series 
of treaties between the king of France and other sovereigns provided for the reciprocal 
abolition of the droit d'aubaine. Over the last two decades of the Ancien Rigime these 
treaties severely reduced the extent of this ancient royal right. Much has been made of the 
influence of the Enlightenment and of laissez-faire ideas in the decline of the droit 
d'aubaine, " but evidence suggests that pressures of more immediate concern were of 
greater importance. 
There was undoubtedly a growing belief that the droit d'aubaine had outlived its 
usefulness. Necker declared in 1785 that the fiscal advantages of this droit could not 
compensate for all the obstruction it caused to the commercial development of the 
kingdom, while the populationist Moheau wrote in 1778 that the numbers of non-exempt 
foreigners were so few that the droit d'aubaine could be of very little benefit to the royal 
treasury. " Both Necker and Moheau were writing after the torrent of treaties had begun, 
but they were in fact expressing 'expert' opinion on what many people had already 
suspected for decades: that the revenue gained from the droit d'aubaine was minimal 
compared to the damage it did to the French economy. This belief did not stem from any 
new ideas, however: the earliest exemptions from the droil d'aubaine in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries were, after all, aimed at encouraging trade. Furthermore, the royal 
minister who in 1780 first proposed, in vain, a unilateral and general abolition of the droil 
"Danjou, La Condition Civile de Fttrangi? r, 100; Ferri6re, Dictionnaire de droil 
practique, i, 593. 
"Boizet especially stresses the role of new ideas in the demise of the doit d'aubaine, 
saying that the 'Economists' saw it as a useless obstacle to trade. Boutillier described it as 
'hainewe, while Montesquieu regarded it as 'insens6' ('Les Lettres de naturalitd sous 
I'Ancien r6gime', 129); Folain-Le Bras also cites Montesquieu and says that the droit 
d'aubaine fell into disfavour with thephilosophes and theEconomiste as the idea of 
conserving riches in France was replaced by more liberal economic ideas of the free 
circulation of wealth CUn projet d'ordonnance du chancelier Daguesseau', 82 - 83). 
22 Both cited in Villers, 'La Condition des ttrangers en France', 146n.. 
24 
d'aubaine was Necker, who was far from being a Physiocrat. The individual treaties 
addressing the droit d'aubaine suggest that commercial and political motives were more 
important than new economic theory and enlightened ideas. 
The abolition of the droit d'aubaine for Spaniards in France nestled as only one clause 
among many in the renewal of the pacte defamille between the monarchs of Spain and 
France in 1760.1 The lettrespatentes abolishing the &oit d'aubaine for Polish subjects, 
issued in 1777 stress the king's wish to 'donner i la nation polonoise une preuve de notre 
bienveillance'. " It is perhaps more than coincidence that these letters were issued less 
than a year after the collapse of French policy in Poland. No doubt the'preuve de 
bienveillance' offered by the French crown to the victorious pro-Russian Polish 
government was an attempt to salvage some of the flagging French influence in eastern 
Europe. Economic motives were rarely absent, of course, but this does not mean that 
they were necessarily dictated by new economic ideas, or that they were more important 
than political aims. The convention between Louis XV and Maria-Theresa abolishing the 
droit d'aubaine in France for her Bohemian and Hungarian subjects was clearly intended 
for political purposes, even though the commercial impulse was present. The two 
monarchs declared that, among other reasons, they wanted to 'resseffer de plus en plus les 
liens de I'alliance, de l'union & de 1'amiti6 sincere qui subsistent entr'Elles'. 1 
When Necker's proposal to abolish the droit daubaine unilaterally in France was 
rejected by the government, it was probably afraid that such an act would lead to a flight 
of capital, leaving France at a disadvantage. Foreigners would have been able to take any 
inherited cash and kind out of the country, while French subjects could not bring back into 
France any legacies from countries which exercised the droit d'aubaine. Consequently, 
the theme of reciprocity echoes both in the treaties and conventions abolishing the droil 
d'aubaine and in their execution. Almost all of the seventy-nine treaties made by 1789 
stressed that their clauses only applied if they were mutual. ' 
I'Villers, 'La Condition des Etrangers en France', 148. 
24 Isambert, xxv, 15 1. 
2'AN, K\\2033 (Convention signed on 24 June 1766). 
'6MAE, ADP, France, 1, dossier I ffableau pour le code diplornatique des Aubains'). See 
also the treaty between France and the Duke of WOrtternburg, signed in 1778 and the 
correspondence between the French envoy to the Swiss Protestant cantons and the 
Chancellery of Basle in 1761 in AN, K//2033. 
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This emphasis on reciprocity belies the claim that by the Revolution the droit d'aubaine 
had all but disappeared in France. " Had any sovereign failed to keep to the stipulated 
terms of the treaty, then the king of France would have had the right to exert anew the 
droil d'aubaine against the subjects of such recalcitrant princes. The decline of the droit 
d'aubaine was therefore far from irreversible. Furthermore, many treaties did not abolish 
all restrictions on foreigners' inheritances. Many German princes in particular retained the 
A bzug or A bscho! fl, which usually amounted to ten percent of the value of inheritances 
exported from their lands. Under the conditions of reciprocity, therefore, the king of 
France could also exercise this right, called in French the droit de ditraction, on the 
relevant foreign subjects, including those from thirty different German states, cities and 
orders, Austria, Portugal, Britain and Poland. " Seen in the light of reciprocity and the 
persistence of the droit de &traction, the treaties abolishing the droit d'aubaine appear at 
the very most to be a compromise between the new ideas of the freedom of circulation of 
wealth and older mercantilist thinking which sought to restrict its exit from the kingdom. 
Some treaties had limitations other than the retention of the droil de ditraction. The 
British and the Swedes, in 1739 and 1784 respectively, enjoyed the abolition of the droit 
daubaine only for movable goods, "while others only enabled foreigners to inherit 
legacies by testament - and not to bequeath them. Even the lettrespatentes of 1787 
(significantly after the treaty of commerce of the previous year) allowing the British to 
inherit all types of property in France make no mention of their right to dispose of wealth 
by will or testament. 30 
The variety of the provisions of the treaties and the diversity of their scope show that if 
the droit d'aubaine was dying out by 1789 it was doing so in a very irregular way. Rather 
than improve conditions for all foreigners equally in France, the treaties created many 
differences in the status of different nationalities. The most favoured were people such as 
I'Villers, for example, says that by 1789 the droit d'aubaine was'moribund'('La Condition 
des ttrangers en France', 150); 1 Mathorez claims that by the time the Constituent 
abolished it in August 1790, it had virtually ceased to exist anyway (Les brangers en 
France sous lAncien Regime. Histoire de la Formation de la PopulationfranVaise (2 
vols. ) (Paris: 1919 - 1921), i, 139). 
'MAE, ADP, France, 1, dossier I ('Tableau pour le code diplomatique des Aubains'). For 
examples of treaties in which the French king retained the droil de ditraction, see AN, 
K\\2033; Isambert, xxv, 151 - 152,258,265,285,363,394; xxvi, 44 - 46,106,117,348; 
xxvii, 166; xxviii, 316 - 318; Villers, 'La Condition des 
ttrangers en France', 149). 
'In 1789 there were eight treaties of this kind, including those with Algiers, Morocco, 
Tripoli, Tunis and Turkey (MAE, ADP, France, 1, dossier I ffableau pour le code 
diplornatique des Aubains). 
301sambert, xxviii, 3 16 -3 18. 
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the Americans and Russians, who were among the subjects of twenty-seven states who 
benefited from the complete abolition of the droits d'aubaine el de d9traction on all kinds 
of property. " 
Among other reasons, it was this lack of system, the unequal treatment of different 
types and nationality of foreigners in the droil d'aubaine which offended the 
revolutionaries who abolished it in 1790. By making the exemptions usually dependent 
upon reciprocity, by retaining the droit de ditraction, by sometimes abolishing the droit 
d'aubaine only for specific types of wealth, or only for receiving and not transmitting 
inheritances, the monarchy showed that it had no intention to abolish completely the droit 
d'aubaine. 
Another restriction on the lives of foreigners in France was more successfully 
overcome by government initiative. Many foreigners came from countries where the 
established religion was not Catholicism, but Protestantism and, in rarer cases, Orthodox 
Christianity or Islam. Since the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, the French 
government had the problem of maintaining religious orthodoxy among its subjects, while 
also trying to entice often Protestant foreigners, with all their expertise and wealth, to the 
kingdom. As early as 1686, Louis XIV was passing edicts in an attempt to encourage 
foreign Protestants to remain or move to France. " Religious toleration was offered to 
foreigners, but precautions were taken to ensure that French subjects were not exposed to 
the 'errors' of other faiths. 
Thanks to the concessions won between 1715 and 1729 by their ambassador Hop, 
Dutch Protestants in Paris were assured of decent burial and freedom of worship, but only 
in the embassy chapel. Royal soldiers were posted outside the chapel doors with orders to 
arrest French subjects to prevent them from submitting to Ies effeurs du calvinisme chez 
le sieur Hop'. " Foreign Protestants of all nationalities were guaranteed a Christian burial 
when in 1713 Louis )UV gave permission to foreign Protestants to bury their dead in 
France and declared that a site would be designated in Paris for this purpose. This did not 
actually occur until the Regency. A persistent petitioning campaign by Protestant 
foreigners in Paris, who had been reduced to burying their dead in private gardens or in 
the semi-rural area behind the Invalides, brought the Conseil detat to provide a burial 
"MAE, ADP, France, 1, dossier I ('Tableau pour le code diplornatique des Aubains'); 
Isambert, xxv, 200 - 201; xxviii, 483. 
"MAE, ADP, France, 7, dossier 155 (Arret of the Conseil dlitat, 1720). 
"Quoted in Mathorez, Les brangers en France sous IAncien Rigime, ii, 325 - 326. 
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ground in 1720. The edict was hedged in by precautions which would ensure that no 
French subjects would be encouraged to dissent from the established Catholic faith: article 
six of the arrel stressed that Protestant burials could not serve as a pretext for foreigners 
to practise their faith publicly. To ensure that none of the Protestant contagion spilled 
over onto the streets of Paris and infected the king's subjects, burials were to be 
performed without ceremony and within the hours designated by the lieutenant-gMeral 
depolice. No French subjects were allowed to attend. Furthermore, the edict insisted 
that the cemetery be enclosed behind a high wall and guarded by a concierge appointed by 
the king. This last condition was probably intended as a prophylactic to protect French 
people from Protestantism, but when the site was opened near the Porte Saint-Martin, it 
was not enclosed. The first corpse to be buried in the new site, that of the Saxon minister 
plenipotentiary, was exhumed at night by a mob and horribly mutilated. It was in 
response to this, rather than a fear of Protestantism, that the government built the wall and 
provided the guard. " 
The practice of burying foreign Protestants in separate burial sites persisted into the 
1780s. Dr. Edward Rigby, visiting Vienne on 27 July 1789, described 'a singular place, 
something like an apartment in a rocle, where Rigby and his companions saw a monument 
to a young Englishman who had died about a year earlier and been buried in unholy and 
ignoble ground', so 'leave had been obtained to appropriate this place to the interment of 
strangers, and of those who had professed a foreign religion ... 
.... Otherwise, the 
alternative for foreigners was to transport the body out of the kingdom and to do so 
required the special permission of the king, particularly if the relatives of the deceased 
were to avoid the indignity of having to pay customs, excise or other droits in the 
process. " Besides restrictions on worship and burial, non-Catholic foreigners also faced 
other civil disabilities which sometimes threatened progress in their careers. A colleague 
of the German engraver Johann Georg Wille, named Schmidt, could not be accepted into 
"MAE, ADP, France, 7, dossier 155 (Arrel of the Conseil ditat, 1720; 'Copie d'un 
M6moire de M. Badr sur le Cim6tiere des Protestans a Paris'(July 1784)). 
"Rigby, Lettersftom France, 121 - 122. 
"See, for example the permits granted to the families of an unnamed Englishman (1769), 
Lady Mountgarrett, Jean Hart and Thomas Nash (all three in 1778). The bodies of the 
last two were deposited in the foreign cemetary in Paris while their relatives awaited royal 
permission to repatriate them (MAE, ADP, France, 7, dossier 149). 
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the Acadgmie royale de peinture because of his Protestantism until Louis XV gave him 
special dispensation in 1742. " 
Schmidt's experience is revealing. The monarchy, for all its apparent Catholic 
orthodoxy, was willing to waive religious conditions imposed on French and foreign 
subjects alike if it thought the potential of the individuals concerned was worth such a 
concession. Furthermore, the French monarchy was not entirely dogmatic in its 
Catholicism when it came to converts from Geneva. This city was the only state with 
which the French monarchy had an agreement for the repatriation of children who fled one 
or the other state in order to change faith. Calvinist children from Geneva under the age 
of seventeen who fled to France in order to convert to Catholicism could be returned to 
their families if they appealed to the French government. The families of French Catholics 
of the same age who slipped across the border to the city-state in order to become 
Calvinists had the same right. " 
By the 1780s the growing religious tolerance in the French government loosened some 
of the restrictions on foreigners' worship. At first, treaties with specific countries in the 
decade preceding the Revolution permitted foreigners to practise their faith freely, as in 
the commercial treaty between France and Britain in 1786 and the treaty of navigation and 
commerce between France and Russia in 1787. " This freedom to worship was however 
restricted to private observance, a condition probably dictated as much by a concern for 
public order as by a desire to preserve the Catholic orthodoxy of the French people. In 
November 1787, civil rights were granted to all Protestants in the kingdom, so by 1789 
the question of religious tolerance was no longer an issue for most non-Catholic 
foreigners in France. 
If advances had been made in the conditions of foreigners as regards their inheritance 
rights and religious toleration, other restrictions remained firn-Ay in place. The cautio 
judicatum solvi, for example, was a deposit which a foreign plaintiff had to pay when 
taking court action against a French defendant. The purpose of this deposit was to ensure 
that the foreigner could pay the legal costs and penalties should his case fail. French 
jurists claimed that without such a deposit a foreigner might be able to sue whomsoever 
`Wille, J. -G., Mimoires etjoumal de Jean-Georges Wille, Graveur 
du Roi (3 vols. ) 
(Paris: 1857), i, 82. 
"MAE, ADP, France, 14, dossier 305 ('Copie de la lettre de M. le Ctl- de Vergennes ä M. 
le Cal de la Rochefoucault', 17 September 1779). 





he pleased with impunity as he could easily flee across the frontier to his native land. The 
cautiojudicalum solvi, payable in both the first instance and on appeal, did not apply 
either to foreigners who had sufficient real estate in France (but not movable goods, as 
they could be spirited out of the Idngdom), or to commercial cases. The plaintiff could 
alternatively present a third party willing to pay any expenses and fines should they have 
arisen. The deposit was not demanded of foreign defendants, on the grounds that self- 
defence was natural to all human beings. 'O 
Perhaps even more onerous was the contrainte par corps for civil (as opposed to 
commercial) debts. Imprisonment for debt was abolished for French subjects by the 
ordonnance of 1667, but was maintained for foreigners to prevent them from fleeing the 
kingdom in order to avoid honouring their payments. Foreign debtors were in fact caught 
between a rock and a hard place, as they were also denied the right to obtain from the 
chancellery the lettres de ripi (from the word Wpit) which granted French debtors who 
had suffered considerable losses a delay in which to raise sufficient funds to pay off his 
creditors, who could take no action against him until that delay had expired. Foreigners 
were also denied what was known as 'le refuge des mis6rabl&, the cession de biens 
whereby a debtor unable to make financial payments could hand over his property as 
payment in kind. " These draconian rules were probably based on the assumption that 
foreigners would rather flee than settle their debts. Had foreigners been allowed to apply 
for lettres de ripi or to enact a cession de biens, there might not have been any need to 
imprison them for debt in the first place. As the law stood until the Revolution however, 
foreigners unable to meet their debts went to prison until they, or someone willing to help 
them out, came up with the necessary funds to placate their creditors. And foreign 
debtors were indeed imprisoned. Dr. Rigby witnessed on 13 July 1789 the release from 
La Force of one such unfortunate, the Irish nobleman Lord Massareene, who was 
rumoured to have been held in prison for twenty-three years for debts of between fifteen 
to twenty thousand fivres. It does seem that if Massareene! s time in prison was 
exaggerated by rumour, it was not by very much. " Occasionally the crown could grant 
letters of safe-conduct, which allowed foreign debtors to collect their property and sort 
out their affairs without being arrested. These guarantees seem to have been given to 
"Danjou, La Condition Civile de Ittranger, 34. 
"'Ferri&re, Dictionnaire de droit practique, i, 142,272. 
'Rigby, Lettersftom France, 52; Alger, J. G., Englishmen in the French Revolution 
(London, 1889), 3-8. Alger suggests that Massareene was held for at least nineteen 
years. He had certainly been in La Force since 1780. 
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those foreigners whose arrest might cause diplomatic embarrassment, such as the count 
Gyldenstein, chamberlain to the king of Denmark, in 1720. " 
Beyond the financial and legal disabilities, foreigners were, in theory, also denied any 
important role in government, church and judiciary. It was considered dangerous (and of 
course contrary to the droit civil) to give foreigners any authority which they could use 
against the interests of the kingdom. Ordonnances dating to the sixteenth century barred 
foreigners from holding ecclesiastical positions, " but by the eighteenth century these laws 
were being ignored or circumvented. In the machinery of state, foreigners were not 
allowed to become tax farmers. A declaration of 1651 by theparlement of Paris banned 
all foreigners 'm8me naturalisds' from the conseil du roi. While this measure was aimed at 
Cardinal Mazarin, Necker fell foul of it, resigning in 1781 ostensibly because he was 
refused a place in the Conseil ditat. None the less, both he and John Law still played 
leading roles in the administration of the royal finances. " Foreigners were barred from the 
judiciary and were not allowed to become avocals. In certain commercial spheres, too, 
the role of foreigners was hedged in by extra regulations. A foreigner could not, for 
example, run a banking business in France without paying a deposit of 150,000 livres 
every five years. ' 
On top of these legal restrictions, foreigners were also subject to police surveillance, 
especially in Paris and fortress towns, even if it was discreet and haphazardly executed. 
On entering Paris, foreigners had their names recorded by the makres desportes and the 
owners of h6lels and chambres gamis were required to keep a register of their guests for 
the inspection of the police, who would send a report every three days to the ministry of 
foreign affairs. There, officials would compare the registers of the maitres desportes with 
those of the h6tels and chambres garnis to get an idea as to the number and types of 
foreigners in the city. In Paris, however, these procedures were rarely adhered to strictly. 
A memorandum in the foreign ministry complained in August 1782 that the records kept 
by hoteliers 'sont informes, incorrects et pr6squ'ind6chifrablee. As not all foreigners 
entered the city by the royal postal carriages, not all arrivals were easily verified by the 
"MAE, ADP, France, 14, dossier 3 10 CSaufconduits et sauvegardes, 1714 - 183 0). 
44 Villers, 'La Condition des Etrangers en France, 144; Danj ou, La Condition Civile de 
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4'Danjou, La Comfition Civile de Ittranger, 49; Isambert, xvii, 243; Doyle, W., Origins 
of the French Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 58. 
'Daniou, La Condition Civile de lbranger, 51,52. 
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authorities. Furthermore, there was no means by which the police or the government 
could know of foreigners who were staying in the private homes of friends or associates. "' 
For this reason, it was suggested that foreign visitors in Paris be subjected to the same 
system as existed in fortress towns. At every entrance to those towns there were 
consignes where the names of every foreigner arriving by whatever mode of transport 
were recorded, as well as the address at which they planned to stay. These registers were 
forwarded to the military commandant and the magistrates. Meanwhile, all inhabitants 
were obliged to give written details of the foreigners who were staying with them within 
twenty-four hours, or be liable to a fine. These details were deposited in a locked box at 
the h6tel de ville and were then compared with the registers submitted by the consignes. 
The foreign ministry suggested that while the immensity of the city of Paris made the 
establishment of consignes at every entrance impractical, a box similar to those in fortress 
towns could be placed in every quarlier. Every person, without exception, should be 
obliged to supply details of foreign guests, for the perusal of the fieutenant-genjral de 
police. " Nothing seems to have come of this proposal, but the fact that it was made 
suggests that certain sections of the government were concerned with keeping a watchful 
eye over foreigners in the kingdoms largest city. From 1787, at the latest, daily reports 
arrived at the ministry of foreign affairs giving the names, nationality and lodgings of 
certain foreigners who had arrived in Paris and details of their intentions and travel plans. "9 
In wartime, such information could be used by the government to great effect. In 
theory, the subjects of a foreign sovereign could be expelled, arrested as hostages, or have 
their wealth seized. In practice, the measures taken varied greatly from conflict to conflict 
and between the nationalities involved. While the French government recognised that 
there were limits placed by the droit des gens as to what actions could be taken against 
enemy subjects, these limits were never defined with any precision. In 1733, a foreign 
ministry memorandum took the Treaty of Westphalia as its starting point to advise the 
government that 'il ify a point de regle certaine qui designe precisement toutes les chose 
permises, ou non permises dans la guerre', but that the droit des gens allowed sovereigns 
to do 'tout ce qui peut contraindre cet ennemy a ceder sur ce qui fait le suJet de la guerre', 
but that such measures should not be done'par pur esprit de vengeance, which would not 
"MAE, ADP, France, 14, dossier 302 (Rapports avec la Police g6n6rale relativement aux 
Etrangers en France, 1782 - 1826). 
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bring peace any closer and which would encourage the opposition to exert its droit de 
reprisailles. This last right was generally believed to belong to any sovereign who, in 
response to the unfair treatment of his subjects in a foreign country, could exact the same 
penalties on the subjects of that country who were on his territory. The memorandum 
concluded that the government could seize all merchandise and vessels which could be 
used against the French in wartime, as well as arrest all naval and army officers ýparfonne 
deprecaution, en vertu du droit des gens'. On the other hand, merchants and everyday 
goods were protected to a greater extent by the droit des gens, because they worked 
towards Tavantage commun des nations. The government could only take measures 
which prevented enemy agents and spies from using commerce as a cover for their 
operations. As a precaution, therefore, merchants should be given between three to nine 
months to leave the country, but their non-military goods could not be confiscated 
because they might be trading on behalf of neutral or friendly nations. All these 
precautions were subject to the principle of reciprocity, which was also provided by the 
droit des gens: the French could go further in their measures only in reprisal for any 
harsher treatment of French subjects abroad, 50 
The restraints put on government action against enemy subjects in France looked good 
on paper, but the problem in practice was defining precisely the terms. Almost any form 
of merchandise or any vessel could be deemed to be useful to the enemy's war effort. 
Consequently, in the reign of Louis XIV the Dutch, except for those in Bordeaux, found 
themselves expelled in 1672, while in 1688 all their ships and property in France were 
confiscated along with those of Spanish subjects. Meanwhile, Austrian notables in Paris 
were seized as hostages or expelled from the kingdom. " In the eighteenth century, 
despite the number of wars the age witnessed, such 'precautione taken as a general 
measure were rare, possibly because they were considered counter-productive in that they 
disrupted commerce. British subjects were expelled at the outbreak of the Seven Years 
War, but at the same time, foreigners, and especially the British, were offered an absolute 
guarantee that their state rentes would not be touched, a concession dictated by financial 
considerations. At France's intervention in the American War of Independence, the 
government stressed its right to exact reprisals on British subjects, but not to take any 
"MAE, M6moires et documents, Allemagne, 94, document 37. 
"Isambert, xix, 12; xx, 66,70,76 - 77; Mathorez, Les 
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pre-emptive measures. " In practice, however, the French did seize British shipping as a 
precautionary measure. Such seizures could include the hapless passengers and crew, as 
the Dutch merchants Paul van de Serre and Girard Meyners found to their outrage in 
1779. Their British-built ship, owned in partnership with the British captain was seized in 
the Mediterranean by a French ffigate, even though it was flagged as a Dutch ship. " 
While in France, foreigners did have some protection in the form of consuls. These 
foreign officials were sometimes chosen by their government from among merchants or 
landowners already in France, or they were direct appointees sent to France to act 
specifically in a consular role. They were expected to look after the interests of their 
countrymen in France, particularly in commerce, but also to provide assistance when they 
were legally challenged in civil and criminal cases. " The eighteenth century saw a growth 
of consulates in France, both in number and in the importance assigned to their role. In 
1716, there was no list of consuls in the Almanach Royal. In 1774, fourteen different 
countries were listed as having between them sixty-two consuls and vice-consuls scattered 
around the different cities and ports of France, some of them very small. By 1789, the list 
had expanded to include twenty-two countries, with no less than 219 consuls and vice- 
consuls across the kingdom. " 
Unless he was Maurice de Saxe or Jacques Necker, the only sure way for a foreigner to 
escape all the legal and civil disabilities was to become a French subject by applying for 
lettres de naturalW. In the hands of the crown naturalisation could be used as an 
instrument with which to attract foreigners to France. The king granted leures de 
naturaliti gingrales to specific types of foreign artisans in certain manufactures or 
projects, or to soldiers who fulfilled certain conditions, particularly in the seventeenth- 
century. The assumption was that these foreigners had shown, or were going to show, 
enough proof of loyalty to the king through the exercise of their skills or profession, so 
"Isambert, xxv, 331,353; Mathorez, Les Etrangers en France sous lAncien R40me, i, 
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that the usual procedures for individual naturalisation could be waived. The ultimate aim 
of these general letters, of course, was to enhance French wealth and power. '6 
The key to individual lettres de naturafili - and thereby to French nationality - was an 
expression of loyalty by a foreigner to his or her new sovereign. Such loyalty was usually, 
but not always, demonstrated in two ways: by conversion to Catholicism and by 
permanent residence in France. The king of France swore at his coronation to stamp out 
heresy and so in theory he could not accept among his subjects people of any religion 
except Catholicism. Lef6vre de la Planche wrote that'tout homme en France est pr6sum6 
Catholique', " but in practice being French did not necessarily mean being Catholic, as the 
existence of Jews and Protestants subjects on French soil attested. Perhaps in recognition 
of the near impossibility to impose orthodoxy, both Louis XV and Louis XVI tended to 
waive the demands for conversion by a naturalised foreigner by according a dispense de 
cathoficitg. It would be wrong, however, to assume that the crown was entirely 
indifferent to religion as a basis of nationality. Dispenses de cathoficitJ tended to be 
granted only to other Christians. In those rare cases where foreign Jews and Muslims 
applied for lettres de naturaliM, they declared their conversion to the Catholic faith. 
Furthermore, if some Protestants escaped the need to convert, others did not. 51 The 
engraver Johann Georg Wille, a Protestant born in K6nigsberg, converted to 
Protestantism before his naturalisation in 175 8: his journal records that his eldest son had 
his first communion in the parish of Saint-Andrd-des-Arts in Paris, where he had been 
bom in 1748. 's' Jean Lampe, of Danzig, declared on his naturalisation in 1779 that he 
rejected 'les erreurs du calvinisme qu'il avoit eu le malheur de sucer avec le lait'. 1 
The second proof of loyalty, residence in France, was not a condition prior to 
naturalisation, but a foreigner, once naturalised, was legally bound to stay in the kingdom 
for the rest of his life. Although a voyage abroad'avec Vesprit de retour' did not endanger 
his naturalisation, a prolonged absence did. The king could waive the condition of 
residence, however, by granting a dispense dincolat in the letters. Those who received 
this privilege were usually those who had rendered great services, which were deemed to 
"Folain-Le Bras, M., Un projet d'ordonnance du chancelier Daguesseau', 5 1; Mathorez, 
Lesbrangers en France sous lAncien Rggime, i, 99; Danjou, La Condition Civile de 
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be enough of a sign of loyalty to the king without the obligation to live in France. Other 
dispensations were granted to members of great noble families, probably in recognition of 
their duties in their country of origin. " 
The importance of lettres de naturalitg was that they symbolised the adoption by the 
king of his new subject. They were a sign of the personal ties of loyalty which bound the 
subject to the monarch. For a foreigner the registration of the lettres de naturafiM 
confirmed both Tabdication de son ancienne patrie' and 'la vraye acceptation et 
I'accomplissement de la grice du Roy. " Naturalisation was therefore symbolic of the 
two-way process of loyalty and obedience on the part of the subject and of protection on 
the part of the king. It was the acceptance of these mutual obligations which determined 
the new nationality of a foreigner. For people born as French subjects, it was assumed 
that these obligations were already implicit. It was these personal ties between ruler and 
subject which defined nationality. All the diverse corporate, municipal and provincial 
identities in France were bound together as a kingdom through their loyalty to the king 
and not, theoretically, by the multitude of horizontal threads which interwove the 
everyday lives of French subjects. 
The general treatment of foreigners in France varied according to their specific 
nationality, their religion and specific exceptions granted by the king. Under the Ancien 
Rdgime, however, where social status was determined largely by privilege, the main 
determinant of the conditions in which foreigners lived was their occupation and, if any, 
the corporate body within which they practiced their profession. Foreigners participated 
in almost every major aspect of French society, including the army, the clergy, intellectual 
and artistic fife and the economy. There were also political refugees and those who were 
considered less desirable, the migrant poor. 
"Boizet, 'Les Lettres de naturalit6 sous I'Ancien r6gime', 72 - 77. 
"'Dupuy, P., Traitez touchant les droils du Roy trýs chrestien sur plusieurs estats et 
seigneuries possidjes par diversprinces voisins etpourprouver qu'il fienhijuste titre 
plusieurs provinces contesNespar lesprinces estrangers (Paris: 1655), quoted in Boizet, 
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ii 
Conservez les rdgimens 6trangers, ceux que j'ai id sont de toutc bontd forts ct complets; [their 
recruitinent] 6tent des troupes aux ennernis; nous radnagent des sujets et servent pour les sujets du 
royaurne de quoi un homme vous sert pour troiS. 63 
It might not be surprising that the person who wrote this favourable opinion of foreign 
soldiers in the service of the French monarchy was Maurice de Saxe, a foreign soldier 
himself, but he was merely citing what was conventional wisdom for most governments in 
early modem Europe. 64 In time of war, one of the quickest and easiest ways of 
expanding the armed forces was to raise mercenaries who were already trained and 
experienced in warfare and who were loyal so long as they were paid. None the less, 
some, such as the Irish regiments, were not mercenaries. The regiments in the Irish 
Brigade had been in French service since the Williamite war which finished with the 
evacuation of 20,000 Irish troops by Louis XIV in 1691. Since then, Irish recruits faced 
dire penalties imposed by the Irish Parliament if they were caught trying to enlist in these 
units. ' The Swiss had a long tradition of service in the French army, dating back to the 
Treaty of Perpetual Peace between the French monarchy and the Swiss Confederation in 
1516. 
By 1789, there were thirty-two foreign regiments in the French army, out of a total of 
172, twenty-four of which were infantry (12 Swiss, 8 German, 3 Irish and one Lidgeois) 
and eight of which were cavalry (one German, one Irish and 6 Hussar, which were 
theoretically Hungarian). In addition, a seventh of the troops in the twelve light infantry 
battalions in the French army were foreigners, mostly from the Italian states and 
concentrated in the battalions of the Chasseurs Royaux-Corses and the Chasseurs 
Corses. ' Many of these regiments were founded generations before the Revolution, but 
"Letter of de Saxe to dArgenson, 15 May 1748, quoted in Haas, R., Un Roiment Suisse 
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as their members became increasingly assimilated into French society, the genuinely 
'foreign' element in them dwindled. ' Of all the foreign units in France, the Swiss remained 
the most exclusively foreign, but even they were only three-quarters Swiss: the rest were 
men of other foreign nationalities and two to three hundred were French. ' 
The varied composition of foreign regiments in the service of France makes a figure for 
the total number of foreign troops in 1789 hard to calculate. Moreover, a third of all 
foreigners in the infantry were scattered among French units rather than in those 
designated for foreigners. One estimate places the figure at less than 8% of all the French 
infantry outside the Swiss regiments, one-seventh in the light infantry and 6% in the 
cavalry. " If this figure were accepted, then taking the total number of troops in the Royal 
Army as 156,000 in 1789, of which approximately 13,770 were Swiss, " a reasonable 
estimate of the number or foreign troops in the Royal Army might be around 24,000, or 
just over 15% of the army, a figure which confirms the more conservative contemporary 
estimates. " 
The value which the French monarchy placed on these foreign troops is reflected in the 
high rates of pay, the fostering of an esprit de corps and the privileges granted to certain 
'See, for example, the Compagnie tcossaise in the royal bodyguard in AN, KK\\537 
CEtat de la Compagnie Ecossoise des Gardes du Corps du Roi. Ann6e 1765). This 
document actually has entries dating from 1693 to 1785. Between January 1713 and June 
1785, for example, the Compagnie Ecossaise des Gardes du Corps du Roi recruited 
about 1,230 men. Only three were natives of Scotland, while a fourth had a Scottish 
name, but was born in France. Two were German. While in the Irish regiments the 
officer corps remained predominantly Irish (90%), at least in name and in heritage, the 
rank and file were drawn increasingly from other sources: 10% or 12% were probably of 
Irish or British origin while a similar proportion were French origin. Of the rest, half were 
from the Austrian Netherlands, Li6ge and the United Provinces, between a fifth and a 
quarter came from Germany and the remainder included men from Switzerland, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, Sweden, Russia and even the nascent United States 
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Savannah, 1779', Ae Irish Sword Ae Journal of the Military History Society of 
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foreign units. Foreign troops were paid more than their French counterpartS"2 both 
because of the desire to attract quality foreign troops into the royal army and because to 
reduce this pay would lead to an exodus of disgruntled troops, which actually happened in 
the Irish regiments in 1697. An esprit de corps was encouraged by the retention of the 
'national' character of each foreign regiment. Each had its own distinctive uniforms and 
carried special emblems on parade and in battle. The Swiss units wore red coats, as 
distinct from the Bourbon white, while the banners of the Irish regiments bore the harp. It 
is said that in 1789, when as little as 10% - 12% of the Irish Brigade were actually from 
the British Isles, the officers of the Irish regiments still gave orders in Gaelic. In the 
Hussars, where only 6% of the soldiers were actually foreign in 1789, French recruits 
were still taught to curse in Hungarian. " 
The privileges granted foreign troops by the monarchy gave them a status superior to 
that normally attained by soldiers and none were more privileged than the Swiss. The 
capitulations negotiated between the French king and the Swiss cantons laid out the terms 
and conditions of service and they guaranteed a wide range of special rights for Swiss 
troops. They were granted fiscal immunities which included an exemption from the droit 
d'aubaine and taxes such as the taille. They were allowed to live on any property which 
they acquired in France'comme des Commensaux ou des Nobles', which meant that they 
only paid the same taxation on land as the French nobility did. " The Swiss also had 
judicial privileges: litigation between Swiss soldiers and French subjects was to be judged 
in the lieux et juridictions des d6fendeurs'. The jurisdiction for Swiss troops was defined 
as their regiment, their judges were their officers and so, if they were prosecuted by a 
French subject, the case was heard by a council drawn from among their own officers. " 
Although there was some dispute as to whether or not this privilege included both civil 
and criminal cases, soldiers of the ilite company of the Cent-Suisses, the king's personal 
"See, for example, the figures for 1741-1748 in Poussou, J. -P., Un monde plein', Lequin, 
Y. (ed. ), Histoire des &rangers et de l7mmigration en France (Paris: Larousse, 1992), 
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bodyguard, were tried before their own officers in cases when they were accused of 
crimes against French civilians. " 
The Swiss were furthermore granted religious toleration, a crucial point if the French 
wished to recruit from the Protestant cantons. In practice Protestants in the Swiss 
regiments in France found that to obtain further favours, such as admission to the 
Invalides on their retirement, a timely conversion to Catholicism was practical if not 
compulsory. This was particularly true in the earlier part of the eighteenth century: in the 
1720s, Swiss Protestants in the Invalides were told that they could enter and remain only 
if they converted to Catholicism. Between August 1725 and October 1726 nine 
Protestant former soldiers from the Swiss regiments renounced their faith one or two 
months after admission. " In 1760, however, Choiseul proposed to establish separate 
companies of Protestant pensioners in the Invalides, probably to conform more closely to 
the capitulations, 
If the government was willing to pay the price of maintaining foreign regiments in the 
French army, the population at large was less so. The privileged position of the foreign 
regiments, while justifiable in the eyes of the state, was a source of grievance for French 
people. Particularly galling was the knowledge that foreign troops were paid more than 
their compatriots for the same service to the King. In 1789, the cahier de doMance of the 
parish of Neuilly-sur-Marne complained that 'il est honteux et humiliant pour la nation, 
qu'elles soient pay6es plus cher que les nationales', an opinion shared by the third estate of 
Toulon, the clergy of Melun and Moret and the nobility of Touraine. " Another economic 
argument was voiced in the cahier of the clergy of Melun and Moret, who claimed that 
the use of foreign troops by the king deprived 'un grand nombre de familles, dans tous les 
6tats, des ressources que le service du Roi leur procurerait'. 19 Among some people, there 
was even the suspicion that foreign troops were actually being paid more money for less 
return: the parish of Neuilly-sur-Mame, while admitting the loyalty of the foreign 
regiments, pointed out that some of their conditions of service prevented them from being 
as useful to France as they might be, 'puisque leurs diverses capitulations ne permettent 
pas de les envoyer ni en Amerique ni aux Indes orientales, comme on y transport des 
"AN, Z\lR\7 (Cent-Suisses, criminal cases). See especially theDossier du greffe de la 
compagnie, Frangois Conus: Plainte et Informations' (1734) and the'Plainte du procureur 
du Roy A l'occasion de l'assassinat de Kerner, soldat' (5 June 1764). 
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troupes nationales. "' This claim, while not true for the Irish regiments, which served in 
the American War of Independence, was certainly correct for the Swiss regiments, whose 
capitulations stipulated that they should not be shipped for service overseas. 
There is plenty of evidence thatforeign troops assimilated into French society to a 
great extent, or at least fraternised with locals. Foreign soldiers garrisoned in the 
provinces often found temporary work, while those in Paris and Versailles, particularly the 
Gardes-Suisses, whose capitulations stipulated that they always be close to the king, had 
opportunities of finding long-term employment, the only interruptions being during 
campaigns. Many of the soldats-cultivateurs who owned plots of land around Paris were 
Swiss. Others worked as sharecroppers, as field-hands or as guards of granaries. 
Retirement from foreign regiments often led to assimilation into French civilian society, 
although former soldiers tended to take up jobs traditionally associated with them. Swiss 
soldiers on leaving the army were known for establishing cabarets and for working as 
suisses de porte, or gatekeepers in the hdtels of the wealthy, as well as church guards. "' 
Marriages between foreign soldiers and French women were frequent, especially as 
marriage could mean an escape from the confinements of military life, even if such 
marriages did cause problems with the local men. The young men of Argenteuil and 
Saint-Denis, both towns in which Swiss Guards were quartered, once demanded that the 
Swiss be sent elsewhere because they left them with no possibility of marriage. " In their 
leisure hours, foreign soldiers frequented bars and cabarets, sometimes in defiance of 
restrictions placed on them by barracking. " 
On the other hand, these points of contact with the French population became rarer in 
the last decades of the Ancien Rigime, mainly as a result of the army reforms initiated by 
the duc de Choiseul between 1763 and 1765. As minister of war (merely one of his 
numerous portfolios), he hoped to shape the French army into a more professional arm of 
the state by stressing the humanity of the common soldier who was deemed to perform a 
service 'pr6cieux i PEW'. In return, however, soldiers were expected to adopt a more 
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meant increasing segregation from civilians, more barracking, less billetting, less work 
outside military duties and more inaction in soldie& free time. 
While some of these developments may have had some salutary effect on relations 
between foreign troops and French civilians, by reducing certain sources of tension such 
as billetting, they also accentuated the isolation of foreign soldiers in France. Of course, 
all soldiers, whether French or foreign, were increasingly isolated from the population at 
large and billetting, foraging and the hooliganism of some soldiers were common to 
French and foreign troops alike. Furthermore, the rift between soldier and civilian could 
become a gaping chasm when the former was employed by the authoritie's against rioters 
and protesters in times of civil unrest. For the foreign soldier, however, the isolation from 
civilian life was even greater, sometimes owing to linguistic barriers and the privileges 
extended to them. In 1789 twenty-nine general cahiers de do1jances called for the 
'nationalisation! of the army. 84 At least seven called for the disbandment of their regiments 
and three came from parishes where people were likely to have come into contact with 
Swiss Guards: in the Paris region. " It was there that, in July 1789, the suspicion that 
foreign troops were the passive instruments of the monarchy was confirmed. 
"See Appendix to Hyslop, B. F., French Nationalism ill 1789 according to the General 
Cahiers (New York: Octagon, 1968). 
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that a restraint on the number of foreign troops be considered), 294 (the community of 
Gardanne - demanded that all foreign troops be disbanded), 370 (the town of Pertuis - 
asked that only those foreign units in French service by virtue of treaties be maintained). 
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III 
Like foreign soldiers, the foreign Catholic clergy who practised in France were to 
become suspect during the Revolution. Most were in France as a result of the persecution 
of Catholics in Protestant countries since the Reformation, particularly in Britain and 
Ireland. By 1789, there were no less than eighteen monasteries and convents for Irish or 
British inmates. Of those, ten were English womeds convents (four Benedictine, " four 
Poor Clares, " one Augustinian and one Immaculate Conception") and eight were merf s 
monasteries, (three English Benedictine, " two Irish Franciscan, ' one English Franciscan? ' 
and two Irish Capucie). There were also twelve educational establishments intended 
primarily as sen-dnaries for those who aspired to the priesthood or to become missionaries 
to the British Isles. They included seven Irish, "' two Scots" and three English colleges. " 
There were also foreigners who became secular clergymen, attending to the needs of 
laymen around France. In 1772, for example, there were 15 Irishmen who were parish 
clergy in the diocese of Bordeaux and by 1789 there were about 40 Irish priests in the 
dioceses of Bordeaux and Bazas, some of whom were in retirement, while others were 
teachers and 'birds of passage'. ' This number seems exceptional, but there were a handful 
of foreign priests who served as private confessors, as tutors, or as chaplains attached to 
the army. Father Mather-Flint, for example, was not only the curate of Mesnil, but also 
the confessor to the duchesse d'Orl6ans. " The Irish College in Paris boasted that its 
"'At Carnbrai (founded in 1623), Paris (1633), Dunkirk (1662) and Pontoise 
"At Gravelines (1608), Dunkirk (1625), Aire (1629) and Rouen (1644). 
"Both in Paris (1633 and 1658 respectively). 
"'At Dieulouard (1606), Douai (1619) and Paris (1642). 
16At Boulay (1700) and Bordeaux (? ). 
"At Douai (1616). 
'At Vassy Q) and Bar-sur-Aube 
93 At Paris (1578), Douai (1594), Bordeaux (1603), Lille (1610), Rouen (1612), Toulouse 
(1659) and Nantes (1689). 
94 At Paris (originally in 1325, but merged with another endowment in 1639) and Douai 
(originally in Lorraine in 1576, but moved to Douai in 1592). 
"At Douai (1568), Saint-Omer (1592) and Paris. 
'Loupýs, P., ! Les Eccl6siastiques Irlandais dans le Dioc&e de Bordeaux sous I'Ancien 
R6gime', Fed6ration Historique du Sud-Ouest, Bordeaux el les ftes britanniques du MHe 
au XXe si&le. Actes du Colloquefranco-britannique tenu a York du 25 au 28 septembre 
1973 (Bordeaux: 1975), 88; Loup6s, 'The Irish Clergy of the Diocese of Bordeaux during 
the Revolution', Gough, H., & Dickson, D., (eds. ), Ireland and the French Revolution 
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1990), 28. 
91AN, S//4619 (Letter of Mather-Flint to Placid Naylor, confessor of the English 
Benedictine nuns in Paris, 13 April 1789). 
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graduates often became 'des Aurnoniers et Interpretes aux Arm6es frangoises, comme 
MM. D'Orleans, de Guichon, de la Motte Piquet et Rochambeau peuvent I'attester'. 9' 
These Catholic clergy were refugees, driven from the British Isles by the Reformation, 
the successive defeats of the Jacobites and by penal laws against Catholics. ' In France, 
they sought to follow their vocation and to be trained as missionaries for the salvation of 
both Catholic souls and Protestant heretics in the British Isles. France, in particular, drew 
such Catholics for a number of reasons, besides the fact that it was a Catholic country. 
Firstly, the centre of the Jacobite cause was for a long time the palace at Saint-Germain- 
en-Laye. There, James II and VII's queen, Mary of Modena, made special efforts to 
persuade the Gallican clergy to help exiled Catholic ecclesiastics find positions and 
financial help from the church and the state. Saint-Germain therefore became a centre of 
patronage for Catholic clergy from the British Isles. 
Secondly, France was close to the British Isles and was linked to them by trade routes 
served by Irish and British merchants resident in the major French ports. Such proximity 
had two advantages, both expressed in a 1769 petition from a group of English Cannes 
Wchaussis seeking to set up a monastery in Boulogne: 
La proximitd dAngleteffe Eviteroit les fraix qu! il faut faire pour Envoyer les postulants dans les 
pays lointains ... et ... la facilitd dune coffespondance presque joumaRre mettront leurs 
professeurs en un dtat detre instruits des Effeurs dominantes et darmer ces jeunes atheletes 
pour les Esp= de Combat cpfils auroient A soutenir. 100 
Many of the religious houses acted as seminaries and ran courses for the training of 
priests and missionaries. The English Franciscan monastery at Douai, for example, 
offered classes in theology and philosophy. "' One of the main subjects of study in the 
Scots College in Paris was Ia langue Ecossoise, pour pouvoir exercer avec fruit les 
91AN, D/XIX/30 (Petition of Tr8tres Irlandois rue des Carmes'to the Comitj 
Ecclesiastique, n. d. ). 
99Details of anti-Catholic legislation in England after 1688 can be found in Watkin, E. I., 
Roman Catholicism in Englandftom the Reformation to 1950 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1957), 104 - 110. For Ireland, see Wall, M. (ed. OBrien, G. ), Catholic 
Ireland in the Eighteenth Century: Collected Essays ofMaureen Wall (Dublin: 
Geography Publications, 1989), 9- 18. 
"AN, G/9/66 (1-3) ('Mdmoire'of the'Carmes d6chauss6s Anglais', n. d. [1769] 
101AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Letter of Bonaventure Healy, 'Gardien des Rdcolets Anglois', Douay, 
27 February 1767). 
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fonctions de missionnaire en Ecosse'. " Crucially, none of the houses were meant to 
admit Frenchmen, because missionaries from the British Isles were'les plus capables d'en 
bien posseder la langue, den connoitre les moeurs, le Caractere et les coutumes'. 1' To be 
a teacher or student in the Scots College of Paris, one had to be born in Scotland and be a 
Catholic. "' At Dieulouard, the English Benedictines drew all their recruits from 
England. "" 
Such policies ensured that the foreign religious houses in France, unlike foreign 
regiments, actually retained a genuinely foreign character. If members of these 
establishments were in France because they were pushed there by persecution at home, the 
French authorities, both secular and ecclesiastic, had their own reasons to welcome and 
perpetuate their presence in France. There may have been a political motive, at least until 
the mid-eighteenth century: should the Jacobites have been successful in restoring the 
Stuarts, the Catholic clergy would have found themselves in some demand in the British 
Isles and might have played an important part in winning hearts and minds for the Stuarts 
and for French interests. 
It was of course in his interests to show how useful the foreign clergy were to the 
French state, but Dom Augustus Moore did provide other motives for the support which 
both church and state in France provided. Speaking of the English Benedictine college 
and monastery at Douai, he claimed that 'elle a portd toutes ses vues a se rendre utile au 
public par ses Vwux, par ses pri6res les plus ardentes, ... par les Milliers de livres qu'elle a 
depens6 dans cette ville, et les Etrangers qu'elle y attire. "' 
The claim that the foreign clergy could be useful in their religious functions was 
supported by some of the calculations made by the French clergy. In 1769, the King's 
Conseil de Conscience, for example, accepted the argument of the English Carmelite 
friars that they would be able to fill the vacuum in pastoral care left by the closure of the 
Minimes'house in Boulogne. Both the officials of the sinichaussie and the Bishop of 
Boulogne pointed out that the buildings were located inun des quartiers des plus peupl6s 
102 AN, H/3/256 I/A (Letter of Gordon and Riddock: 'A Messieurs les Commissaires du 
Parlement', 31 December 1762). 
103 AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (M6moire pour la Congr6gation des B6n6dictines Anglo&, n. d. 
[1768? ] ). 
10'AN, H/3/2561/A ('Ecossois', report by Cochet, Hamelin and Guerin, 'anciens Recteurs 
de l'universit6 de paris', to the Commissaires of the Parlement of Paris, n. d. [ 1763? ] 
"'AN, G/9/66 (1-3) ('M6moire pour la Congr6gation des B6nedictines Anglois', n. d. 
[1768? ] ). 
"AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Letter of Moore, I November 1766). 
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de cette vile, ou il rfy a que deux autres Couvents d'hommes compos6s l'un et autre dun 
nombre peu considerable des religieu)e. " 
Moreover, in showing largesse to the stricken Catholic martyrs of persecution and 
repression in Protestant countries, the monarchy was reinforcing its prestige as an 
institution founded on the Catholic faith and the foreign clergy were to reciprocate any 
favours granted to it by perpetuating this image. Many of the lettrespatentes which 
allowed foreign clerics to set up houses stress the part they were to play in supporting the 
Most Christian King. " The monarchy's Catholic image needed some reinforcement after 
the expulsion of the Jesuits and because, between 1766 and 1784, the church itself closed 
down hundreds of small, uneconomic religious houses. So when the English Carmelites 
applied to take over the buildings of a suppressed Minimes monastery in Boulogne in 
1769, the royal Conseil de Conscience saw a means of replying to 'Vaccusation de tout 
d6truire'. 1' On the other hand, the foreign clergy had been known to participate in 
movements which threatened the orthodoxy of the Gallican church. Thomas Innes, 
Prefect of Studies in the Scots College in the early eighteenth-century, modelled his 
teaching on practices of the Port-Royal and was accused of Jansenism after the Papal bull 
Unigenitus. In 1737, the acting papal nuncio, ordered by the Propaganda Fide in Rome 
to investigate, concluded that the Scots College was infested with the Jansenist heresy. 
The superiors of the College protested their orthodoxy and loyalty to the Pope. "' 
Moore's other argument is interesting because it reflects a common assumption about 
the economic benefits of foreigners: that they brought money into the kingdom. There is 
little doubt that certain religious establishments did provide local tradesmen with business. 
By the spring of 1790, the twenty English nuns of the Immaculate Conception in Paris 
owed 20,312 livres, mostly to various craftsmen and mainly for repairs to the convent 
buildings and the properties which they rented out. "' Among the debts of the twenty-one 
English Augustinian nuns on the rue des Foss6s-Saint Victor in Paris, 1539 livres was 
"AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Rapport du 2 juillet 1769'; Du Registre servant a Venregistrement 
des assemblees et deliberations de M. M. les officiers de la S6ndchauss6e du Boulonnois', 
30 April 1770; andAvis' of Frangois Joseph, Bishop of Boulogne, 27 April 1770). 
"See, for example, AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Lettres d'Etablissement des Benedictins Anglois, i 
Paris', 1650). 
"AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Rapport du 2 juillet 1769). 
11'McMillan, J. F., 'Jansenism and the Scots College books in Paris', Innes Review, xliv 
(1993), 74; McMillan, J. F., 'Jansenists and Anti-Jansenists in Eighteenth Century 
Scotland: the Unigenitus Quarrel on the Scottish Catholic Mission, 1732 - 1746', Innes 
Review, xxxix (1988), 14,16. 
"'AN, S//4616 (Immacul6e Conception rue de Charenton: inventory of 2 March 1790). 
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owed to Santerre, the brewer and future commander of the Paris National Guard, 'pour 
fourniture de Biere', in the summer of 1790. "' 
With the apparent advantages to be drawn from foreign religious establishments, the 
monarchy and church alike were willing to grant certain concessions which made the 
foreign clergy a particularly privileged group among foreigners in France. Such privileges 
included the granting of special - and conditional - lettres de naturalitj enabling foreign 
clergy to hold benefices. Letters of naturalisation awarded to foreign churchmen by the 
King had the specific purpose of allowing them to assume benefices and to administer 
parishes as any French priest could. Sometimes, letters were granted to entire religious 
communities. "' Care was taken, however, to ensure that the Gallican church was not 
adulterated by too many foreigners. Three conditions were usually attached to these 
lettres de naturaidg. Firstly, the beneficiary was responsible for getting Papal consent 
that should his post fall vacant for whatever reason, the successor would be'i la 
nomination du Roi'. Secondly, should any disputes arise over the benefice, the incumbent 
would not be permitted to appeal to Rome, but only to French courts. The third clause 
usually stated that the receiver of the letters 'ne prendra Vicaires ou Fermiers qui ne soient 
Franqais'. '" This last condition was not always adhered to in practice, '" although it is 
possible that those priests who appointed their countrymen as vicars or as successors had 
obtained the usual, secular lettres de naturah1j, which did not carry the same conditions. 
Both the Gallican church and the secular authorities also granted the foreign clergy 
special financial privileges and exemptions. In 1700, Louis MV granted the English 
Benedictine monastery at Dieulouard the drod defranc-saM, 1` which brought exemption 
from the salines, the tax raised, like the gabelle in other parts of France, on salt in the 
north-eastern provinces. In 1634, the English Franciscans of Douai had been granted 
permission to beg in the town by the magistrates. "' In 1663, Louis MV gave the same 
"'AN, S//4616 CMunicipalite de Paris, Proces Verbal: Religieuse Anglaise rue des fossdes 
St. Victor', 23 June 1790). 
"'See, for example, AN, G/9/66 (1-3) ('Coppie des Lettres de Naturafit6 accord6es aux. 
Benedictins Anglois 6tablis i Paris' [ 1674] ). 
114 Ferri&re, Dictionnaire de droitpractique, ii, 152 - 153. 




G/9/66 (1-3) CChapitre: Etat de la Maison des Benedictins anglois etablis a Dieu 
Louard en Lorraine', n. d. [ 1766] ). 
"'AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Extract from the registers of the 'Recolets Anglois de la Ville de 
Douay en Flandres', February 1767). 
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friars more latitude, allowing them to beg across all Artois. "" The English Clarists at Aire 
were given permission to beg by Louis XIV 'i cause de la detresse ou elles se trouverent 
plong6es'when, unexpectedly, charitable donations from English sympathisers began to 
dwindle. "" Four years after their establishment in 1603, the Irish serninarists in Bordeaux 
were allowed by their founder, the archbishop Frangois de Sourdis, to carry the dead at 
funerals in order to earn their keep. By 1774, however, this 'privilege' was no longer 
regarded as such. The superior, Martin Glynn, travelled around the British Isles to raise 
enough money by 1780 not only to reconstruct a crumbling wing of their premises, but 
also to free the Irish from what was now seen as the humiliation of having to bear corpses 
at burial. "' Those studying for the priesthood or as missionaries at the Irish college at 
Lille were allowed to take collections at church doors and, like their counterparts in 
Bordeaux, were pern-fitted to carry the dead at funerals. In 1711, the municipality of Lille 
made the latter a right exclusive to the Irish seminarians. "' 
The French church and state also provided some financial support to the foreign 
establishments. Such funding was limited, not least because the government made it very 
clear that the foreigners ought not to become charges of the state. An analysis of the 
fixed annual revenue of eleven of the English establishments in France shows that the 
church provided on average only 7% of their annual income, while the state accounted for 
10%. The bulk of their revenue came from their property (50%) and their investments 
(33%) usually rentes. The vast majority, if not all, of the original funds for the property 
and investments came from their own sources. The same was true of the Scots College in 
Paris, of which Alexander Gordon, the principal, claimed in 1790 that annual accounts 
proved that the College funds came from the donations of British subjects. "' In all 
foreign establishments, these funds included the orders' own movable wealth spirited 
across the Channel during its flight from persecution; donations from wealthy Catholic 
benefactors; the dowries of nuns and the endowments or pensions brought by novices. '23 
118AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (lettrespatentes of 27 September 1663). 
"'AN, D/XIX/30 ('Memoire pour les Clairisses anglaises etablies A Aire, 15 October 
1790). 
'I'Loup6s, 'Les Eccl6siastiques Irlandais dans le Dioc6se de Bordeaux!, 82. 
111 Giblin, C., 'The Irish Colleges on the Continent', Swords, L. (ed. ), Yhe Irish-French 
Connection 1578 - 1978 (Paris: Irish College, 1978), 19. 
"'Black, J., 'The Archives of the Scots College Paris on the Eve of their Destruction', 
Innes Review, x1iii (1992), 5 6. 
"The English establishments whose revenue and property were analysed were: the men' s 
Benedictine monasteries at Paris and Douai (described as a'maison Conventuelle et 
Coll6ge en m6me tems': it includes the English College of Douai) in 1766 (AN, G/9/66 (I - 48 
Such money was invested in property and bonds, but not always with success. By 1766, 
for example, a combination of the disruption of financial ties with Britain in the Seven 
Years'War, disastrous investments, the high price of staples in France and the cost of 
repairs to its crumbling buildings forced the English College and monastery at Douai to 
contract debts of 18,000 fivres. " 
The Gallican church gave the foreign establishments financial support in three ways: it 
n-dght provide them with lump sums of money for investment; it could make an 
engagement to pay an annual grant, in cash or kind, to individual establishments; and it 
could grant them property. Royal donations came in four different forms: the king could 
grant pensions to Merent establishments or individual clerics; the crown might also 
donate annual alms to various houses; the state could allow foreign clergy to share in 
government handouts to the church and finally, the government might subsidise the 
livelihood of the religious establishments by granting rebates on certain taxes and dues. 
Contact between foreign clergy and local people varied from one order to the next, 
depending upon their rules and function. The strict cloistering of the English Clarists, for 
example, would not have encouraged frequent interaction, '25 but most of the foreign 
religious orders claimed to fill the role of preachers, teachers and dispensers of charity 
among local people. In their pastoral duties, the English Franciscans of Douai claimed to 
fulfill a catalogue of duties, including 'Visitant les Malades, assistant les Moribonds, 
entendant les Confessions, tant en Ville qua la Campagne Some of the convents 
undertook to give French children a basic education not geared exclusively to the religious 
life. The English Clarist convent at Gravelines in France declared in December 1789 that 
they received as pupils 'indistinctement des Dernoiselles angloises et frangoises; elles 
3)); the womeiYs Benedictine convents at Cambrai, Paris and Dunkirk in 1790 (AN, 
D/XIX130; AN, S//4619); the convents of the Poor Claires at Gravelines, Dunkirk, Aire 
and Rouen in 1790 (AN, DIXIX/30); the convent of Augustinian nuns in Paris in 1790 
(AN, D/XIX/30; AN, S//4616) and the convent of the Immaculate Conception of Paris in 
1790 (AN, D/XIX130; S//4616). This gives a sample of eleven houses (counting the 
Benedictine monastery and the English College at Douai as one) out of a total of twenty- 
nine establishments, including the colleges which were run by the foreign clergy. This 
sample is admittedly far from satisfactory, not least because it ranges in time from 1766 to 
1790. These figures cannot, therefore, give an accurate picture of the financial state of 
the English establishments in France at any one time, but they may provide an idea as to 
from whom, and to what extent, they received financial assistance. 
"AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Letter of Moore, I November 1766). 
"AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Letter of Fr6re Philippe Andr6, Provincial of the Tr6res Mineurs 
Recolets de la Province d'Angleterre', Douai, 27 June 1767). 
126, AN , 
G/9/66 (1-3) (letter of Bonaventure Healy, 'Gardien des R6colets Angloie to the 
Commission of Regulars, 27 February 1767). 
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enseignent i ces dernieres la langle (sic) angloise qui fait actuellement partie de 
127 VEducation francoise', as well as giving them the usual religious education. 
Too much contact between the foreigners and locals could lead to a degree of 
assimilation which was regarded as unsuitable for people intended to return to the British 
Isles as missionaries. This problem was certainly faced by the Irish College in Paris. 
Those seminarians who arrived to train as missionaries while still young found that they 
lost the use of Irish Gaelic, while they became fluent in French. They were less inclined 
to return to Ireland, so that between 1694 and 1734, only twenty-five missionaries who 
were not actually secular priests went to serve in Ireland, 129 
There is no evidence that those of the foreign clergy who were cut off from French lay 
people, either through the language barrier or because of the rules of their order, were 
respected or resented any more than other ecclesiastics. There was occasional hostility 
between French laymen and foreign, as in Bordeaux in 1759, when a fight broke out 
between members of the Irish College and the local conftjrie of barrel-makers, over 
precedence when both organisations tried to bury one of their dead at the same church at 
the same time. 129 It is not clear, however, that the tonneliers were motivated either by 
anti-clericalism or xenophobia. 
Nonetheless, it is certain that the presence of foreign clergy could provoke outbursts of 
xenophobia among local people, although such outbursts appear to have been rare. In 
July 1769 the petition of the English Carmelite friars to take over the Mnimes monastery 
in Boulogne was opposed by some of the municipal officers of the town who had been 
persuaded that the English establishment would act as a Trojan horse for sinister foreign 
interests. It was claimed that the Carmelites were'capables d'envahir sous le norn d'un 
commis le commerce des negocians de Boulogne, et d'yjouir meme le role d'espions du 
gouvernement d'Angleteffe. "'o British merchants would use the fflars as their agents in 
the port and the friars in turn would be the eyes of the British cabinet. Such fantasies 
were however dismissed by the Commission of Regulars, who argued out that the monks 
were unlikely to assist either Protestant merchants or the British government. If anyone 
`D/XIX/30 ('Adresse a Fassernblee Nationale par les Religieuses clairisses angloises 
Etablies i Gravelinee, 20 December 1789). 
"'Giblin, C., 'The Irish Colleges on the Continent', 15. 
"Loup6s, P., 'Les Eccl6siastiques Irlandais dans le Dioc6se de Bordeaux', 94. Loup6s, 
while admitting that such disputes were common in the Ancien R6gime, claims that 
Taffrontement n'en est pas moins r6v6lateur dun climat latent de x6nophobie. 
"'AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Memoire of the Commission of Regulars, in favour of the English 
'Carmes D6chauss6s', n. d. [ 1769] ). 
50 
should worry about the English Carmelites as spies, then it should be the British monarch, 
because the English friars would be more willing to act on behalf of Louis XV than 
George IIV` The response of the Commission of Regulars served to underline the 
commitment of the Ancien R6gime to tolerating the existence of foreign Catholic clergy in 
France, provided, of course, that they neither became a charge on the state, nor threatened 
the prerogatives of the king over the Gallican church. 
IV 
The students who studied at the English, Irish and Scots colleges in any one year were 
refugees in much the same way as their teachers, the British and Irish clergy. In general, 
the seminarians planned a religious life, particularly as priests and missionaries for service 
in the British Isles. Others, however, studied in the foreign colleges because their 
religious conscience (or that of their parents) barred them from higher education of any 
kind at home. As Joachim Ingram, of the English Franciscans in France in 1768, 
explained of the students at Douai, 'les jeunes El&ves ne peuvent aller continuer leurs 
Etudes en Angleterre ... parce qu'ils ne peuvent s'y appliquer a I'Etude des hautes sciences 
que dans les Universit6es protestantes'. 1" The Irish College in Paris may have been 
intended as a seminary, but those who entered the communauM des Clercs eltcoliers at 
the College engaged in a five-year course at the Coll6ge de Plessis at the University of 
Paris and many of them went on to become doctors, surgeons or soldiers in the Irish 
regiments. "' The Scots College in Paris, like the English College of Douai, had a dual 
purpose in educating young men: 'tant pour en faire des missionaires pour la propagation 
de la flay, dans le pals dEcosse, que, pour 6lever de Jeunes gens, i la Science et i la 
vertu. "" By 1789, the College had virtually ceased to act as a seminary, with the last 
student to be ordained as a priest in 1788.111 All such colleges were intended for men, 
however, so it was the English convents which took women as pupils: the convent of the 
131 ANP G/9/66 (1-3) (Memoire of the Commission of Regulars, in favour of the English 
'Carmes D6chauss6s', n. d. [1769] ). 
13'AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (petition of English Franciscans, signed by Joachim Ingram 
Provincial des Recollets Anglois, to Louis XV, n. d. [1768] ). 
133 Swords, L., 'Coll6ge des Lombarde, Swords, Yhe Irish-French Connection, 53 - 54. 
134AN, 11/3/2561 /A (Letter of Gordon and Riddock, A Messieurs les Commissaires du 
Parlement, 31 December 1762). 
13'Moran, P. A., 'Grisy, the Scots College Farm near Paris', Innes Review, x1iii, 61 & n.. 
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Immaculate Conception on the rue de Charenton in the faubourg Saint-Antoine in Paris 
claimed in 1790 to have beenune Maison d'education ou les familles Catholiques 
d'angleteffe, d'Irlande et d'ecosse envoyent instruire leurs enfants ... '. In March, that 
convent had eight pensionnaires en classes. "' That same year the Augustinian nuns of 
the rue des Foss6s-Saint-Victor, also in Paris, claimed that they'veillent i Nducation 
d'environ vingt quatre enfans en classe'. " Two of the four English Clarist convents, those 
at Gravelines and Dunkirk, declared in the autumn of 1790 that they taught English 
pensionnaires both in religious education and languages. "' 
The teachers at the foreign ecclesiastical establishments were foreigners themselves and 
sometimes rose to some distinction, although by law they could not become principals or 
regents. 1350 In Nantes, the Irish College itself became a constituent college of the 
University in 1766 owing to its good academic reputation, accommodation for eighty 
students and four professors and adequate lecture theatres. " Throughout the eighteenth 
century, Irishmen occupied chairs of Theology, Philosophy and Medicine at the University 
of Paris. "" The abb6 MacGeoghegan, elected provisor of the Irish College in Paris in 
1734, wrote a three-volume Histoire d7rlande, ancienne et moderne. The Irish Jesuit, 
Joseph Ignatius O'Halloran, educated in Bordeaux and then successively Professor of 
rhetoric, philosophy and divinity at the University of Bordeaux, was credited with having 
introduced the philosophy of Newton to the University, displacing Descartes. In the 
process, he had taken the first steps to reconcile Newtonian physics with Catholicism. 
Like many intellectuals, however, O'Halloran fell victim to the pressures of orthodoxy: he 
returned to Ireland when the Jesuit order was suppressed in France. The brothers Thomas 
and Lewis Innes, Principal and Prefect respectively of the Scots College, gained notoriety 
for their Jansenist leanings. 142 
"AN, D/XIX/3 0 (M6moire: 4 Pieces justifficatives au soutien de la Petition present6e i 
I'assemblie Nationale par les Religieuses Angloises de la Rue de Charentod); AN, S//4616 
(Inventory of 2 March 1790). 
131AN, S//4616 (Troc6s Verbal: Religieuses Anglaises rue des fossds St. Victor', 23 June 
1790). 
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The Catholic refugees were not, however, the only foreign students and teachers in 
France. There were others in different French educational institutions from as far afield as 
Brazil, Russia and even China. The Universities of Montpellier and Bordeaux accepted 
several Brazilian students, mostly from the rich province of Minas Gerais, to study 
medicine. When Jos6 Joachim de MaYa, one of the future leaders of the 1789 uprising of 
Minas Gerais against Portugese rule, graduated from Montpellier as a doctor of medicine 
in 1787, he took his degree with ten other foreigners who had origins as diverse as the 
United States, Smyrna in Turkey and Lima in Peru. "' The University of Angers boasted 
Polish and German scholars studying law and French, while in the nearby Acad6mie 
dEquitation, of 334 acadýmiciens taught between 1755 and 1792, no less than 201 whose 
nationalities are known were foreigners. 144 At the University of Strasbourg 'beaucoup 
d'Allemands et d'Anglais viennent s'y instruire'. "' Between 1785 and 1787, of one 
hundred students of 'distinction! (meaning of social standing rather than academic merit) at 
the school of medicine, forty-four were Russian. Goethe, himself studying law at 
Strasbourg, recognised the medical faculty there as the best of them all and he attended 
classes in chemistry, anatomy and clinical medicine himself 146 Montpellier, which had a 
reputation for medicine dating to the Middle Ages, drew numerous German students in 
the eighteenth century and, after graduation and returning to practice in Germany, 
continued in their relations with their former masters, asking for advice on recent 
developments. Between 1751 and 1766, two Chinese students, Ko and Yang, were sent 
by the Jesuit mission to Paris for their education, presumably for training as Christian 
missionaries in China. 147 
Foreign students received little or no financial aid from either the French state or the 
church, as bursaries were only offered to French students. 14' Foreigners could, of course, 
set up their own endowments, as happened with the Scots College which supported four 
I "'Chacon, V., 'ttudiants br6siliens; i Montpellier et R6volution franqaise', Annales 
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students, but they usually studied in France at the expense of their parents, as was the case 
with the thirty boarders at the English College at Douai in 1766.11 In 1761 Johann-Georg 
Wille received as students two Russians (one a Cossack), who had been given bursaries by 
the Tsarina to study art in Paris. Other Russian students lived, depending upon their 
means, in modest townhouses or withfruiliers, digraisseurs, cordonniers or wig- 
makers. 110 
For those students and intellectuals who were not in France for religious reasons, the 
attractions of the kingdom, and Paris in particular, lay in its reputation as the great cultural 
hub of Europe. Many contemporaries regarded Enlightenment Europe as I'Europe 
franVaise. This term was first coined in 1777 by the marquis Carracioli, the Neapolitan 
ambassador to Versailles, as a means of describing the cultural hegemony of France at the 
time: 'On reconnalt toujours une nation dominante qu'on s'efforga dimiter. Jadis tout 6tait 
romain, aujourd'hui tout est frangais. "'I This was not to elevate France above all other 
powers, but simply to state its apparent cultural hegemony at this time. This dominance 
was partly due to the lead taken by Louis XIV in reshaping courtly culture at Versailles, 
an example which other monarchs in Europe followed. It was, however, largely due to 
the use of French as the international language of diplomacy and cultural exchange, "' but 
it was not always accepted willingly and it certainly frustrated writers in other languages 
who sought to elevate theirs to an equal status. Moreover, the apparent importance of 
French language and culture among the European elites should not be allowed to detract 
from the important cultural and linguistic differences which separated the philosophes 
from the Aujkldrer and the illUMinali. 153 The artistic and literary importance of French 
culture in Europe nonetheless played an important part in attracting foreigners to Paris. 
Wille arrived in Strasbourg in 1736 on his way to Paris from his native Bieberthal near 
K6nigsberg. When Wille's companion decided that he would not continue the journey to 
Paris, Wille tried in vain to persuade his friend to reconsider, saying that 'quelque s6j our i 
Paris lui seroit profitable et lui donneroit de la r6putatioif. 15" 
119ANp G/9/66 (1-3) (letter of Augustus Moore, I November 1766). 
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Wille did not, however, travel to Paris on his own. He was accompanied by Schmidt, 
another artist, and by a Moravian cabinetmaker who quickly found work in the faubourg 
Saint-Antoine. Schmidt rapidly made his reputation and in 1742 was elected to the 
Acadimie royale depeinture on the strength of his engravings and then became, like Wille 
after him, a gmveur du Roi. Others came to France to study under French masters: David 
counted at least twenty-seven foreign pupils from North America to Russia. Between 
1758 and 1789, thirty Russian students worked under the painters and sculptors of 
Paris. "' As Wille established his reputation as an engraver in Paris, he eventually became 
an integral part of the network of cultural exchange, friendship and rivalries sometimes 
referred to at the time as the'republic of letters'. His journal in the 1750s and 1760s 
shows that he was forever being visited by artists and patrons from across Europe at his 
home at rue de la Harpe. He corresponded with Kaunitz's secretary; with Hertz, the 
director of the Imperial Academy of Fine Arts at Augsburg and he engraved the five silver 
medals which were to be the prize of the Danish Royal Academy; he corresponded with 
Winckelmann for twelve years and in 1768 he received a visit from the Polish magnate, 
Adam de Czartoryski. Wille alone received as visitors travellers, merchants, artists and 
politicians from places as diverse as Amsterdam, Saint Petersburg, Vienna, Madrid and 
London. ` 
For foreign artists themselves, therefore, association with France was far from being 
regarded as a betrayal. Even they, however, sometimes came up against certain hurdles 
before they could obtain the highest honours in Paris. In order to be accepted into the 
A cadýmie royale de peinture, some artists had to get special dispensation from the king if 
they were to avoid a religious conversion to Catholicism. While Wille converted, Schmidt 
and the Swedish portrait painter, Alexander Roslin, received special permission not to 
from Louis XV. 111 
The 'republic of letters' naturally included writers and scientists as well as artists. Of 
the 120 encyclopidistes whose identity is known, at least fifteen were born abroad. "" 
They did not all live in France and indeed some of the French contributors lived abroad at 
the time, but in so doing were part of the broader international network. Other foreign 
"'Wille, Mimoires e1journal, i, 60 - 61,82,115; Reau, LEuropefranVaise au sikle des 
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writers came to Paris, sometimes with a mission of their own in response to French 
cultural hegemony. Grimm, for example, arrived in Paris in 1748 with his pupil, the count 
von Sch6nberg, with a view to 'unir les grices et le gofit frangais au g6nie allemand' and 
he stayed for over forty years. Paul-Jer6mie Bitaub6, born in K6nigsberg in 1732, 
translated the Iliad into French and became a friend of d'Alembert, who urged him to 
come to Paris, where he stayed and was elected a member of the Acad6mie des 
Inscriptions. Certain salons became associated with foreigners: Madame de Geoffiin's 
became associated with the Poles who surrounded count Stanislas Poniatowski before he 
became king of Poland in 1764. She also received Hume and Kaunitz. Her rival, Madame 
du Deffand, counted Horace Walpole and the count Bernstorff of Denmark among her 
guests. Madame de Boufflers, who was a correspondent of Gustav III, became a focal 
point for Swedes in Paris, while Madame d'Holbach gathered Galiani, Grimm, Beccaria 
and Sterne. "" 
Science was also regarded in cosmopolitan terms. Among the seventy-six members of 
the AcaWmie des sciences eight members could be foreign. As Karamzin observed, Ies 
6trangers regardent comme un grand honneur d'etre membres de cette Acad6mie 
parisienne'. " Benjamin Franklin mixed with French scientists there during his stay in 
Paris between 1776 and 1785. He was appointed with Lavoisier to a committee to 
investigate Mesmerism and the climax was his embrace with Voltaire at the Academy in 
1778.1" Franklin, of course, had both scientific reknown because of his lightning-rod and 
had broader popularity because of his acquired plain manners and dress, which made him 
seem to be the quintessential 'Americae, straight from the Rousseauistic simplicity and 
honesty of the New World. " Of course, the extensive contacts made in the'republic of 
letters' tended to be built up by the successful artists and intellectuals who had established 
a reputation. This form of cosmopolitanism was very much an 61ite phenomenon. Nor 
was it universally appreciated. A wealthy aristocrat from Cleves, Jean-Baptiste Cloots, 
was once described as 'burnable in Rome, hangable in London, and breakable on the wheel 
"'Poussou, J. -P., Les internationales de I'"honn&e homme"', Lequin, Histoire des 
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in Vienna!. A francophile and disciple of Voltaire, Cloots settled in Paris in 1775 and 
became embroiled in the religious debates with his defence of the philosophes. Hisrabid 
anticlericalism. brought him to the attention of the police in 1785 and he was forced to 
flee. "' The authorities patronized and basked in the reflected glory ofTEurope frangaise' 
only for as long as its participants did not challenge too explicitly the existing political or 
moral order. 
In another way, the intrusion of foreigners into French cultural life was not welcomed 
by everyone. It was clear that many viewed French society with a critical eye. The 
usually 'cosmopolitan' Louis-Sdbastien Mercier warned his fellow-countrymen: 
Prenez-y garde, tous ccs dtrangers, sans exception, sous I'air le plus modeste, se rendront les 
inspecteurs ct les rMscurs de notre esprit, ct ne doutez pas qu'ils n'amassent Ics matdriaux des 
petites satires qu'ils feront contre Ics Franqais ... . 
64 
Mercier's warning reflects a concern for how foreigners perceived the French. Such a 
concern is in itself an important dimension of the way in which a people sees itself as 
distinct from its neighbours. It was, however, one of the prices to be paid for cultural 
vitality. If France was one of the epicentres of European civilisation, it had to expect 
criticism as well as praise. Some towns suffered from this scrutiny: between 1763 and 
1789, Montpellier lost pride of place to Nice as the resort of wealthy British tourists and 
the comments written and published by British travellers, most notably Smollett, who 
claimed to have been poisoned by garlic and (worse) being served tea without milk. "' 
Nonetheless, with France, and Paris in particular, as a major focal point of the 'republic 
of letters', its many notable foreign visitors would reinforce certain elements in French 
identity and politics. For one, the highly-publicised visits of Franklin and other Americans 
to France helped to reinforce the impression, in 1789, that the French Revolution was 
directly related to its sister in America. For many of the revolutionaries who had 
participated in the Enlightenment as publicists, journalists, writers and scientists, even if 
many had been denied access to the glamour and recognition of the salons and the inner 
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circles of intellectual life, the international focus of Paris and the notion of a'republic of 
letters' suggested that all men were brothers. Combined with the highly-charged politics 
of the Revolution itself, the 'cosmopolitanism! of some of the intellectuals and publicists 
was to inspire the notion of a'crusade for universal liberty, which many of the original 
participants in the pacific republic of letters were to reject in horror. An exception was 
Cloots, who in 1785 published a tract urging the French government to set its sights on'la 
borne naturelle des Gaules': the Rhine frontier. " For many of the artists and intellectuals 
who enjoyed international cultural exchange, however, the improvement of humanity was 
to remain in the moral sphere of human endeavour and even to be restricted to the 
educated 61ites. It was not to be transformed into political action. 
V 
France did, however, attract individuals and groups who had failed in their political 
endeavours abroad. Over the course of the eighteenth century, they varied in their aims 
and ideology, from the absolutist and often Catholic Jacobites in the first half of the 
century to the radical Genevans and Dutch in the 1780s. The Jacobites had come from 
the British Isles since the Revolution of 1688-89. They included soldiers shipped from 
Ireland at the end of the Williamite war in 1691, Catholic clergy who suddenly found 
themselves no longer tolerated after the respite under James 11 and VII and the Jacobite 
court, which settled at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. The obvious attractions of France for 
Jacobites was its proximity to the British Isles, its Catholicism and the support the 
government was likely to give to their cause. Between 1688 and 1760, the French 
occasionally gave assistance to the Jacobite cause, although the last real hope of the 
Stuarts perished at Culloden in 1746 and with the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. 
Jacobites used France as a base for their activities against Britain: some, such as the Walsh 
family of Saint-Malo used their knowledge of English and of the coastal waters to raid the 
British Isles as corsairs or privateers. " 
After the failure of the uprising of 1745-46, those Jacobites who escaped limped to 
France and there received a degree of help from the French government. The foreign 
minister d'Argensons private instructions regarding an ordonnance of 15 February 1746, 
"Mathiez, La Nvolution et les 6trangers, 50. 
"Simms, 'The Irish on the Continent', 643. 
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raising two Scots infantry regiments for service in Scotland, promised that those who 
joined the units and then moved to France would be promised positions in the French 
army. "' After the final defeat in April, a large number of Scottish officers did flee to 
France and received, not commissions in the French army, but handouts from the 
government to support them in their exile. Between 5 October 1746 and 9 October 1747, 
for example, just over 227,973 livres were allocated in 222 different gratifications, 
varying according to the rank of the recipient. " It was not just military men who 
received financial aid. Among those recommended by the prince for French money were 
Alexander Gordon, of the Scots College, who received 800 livres. "I There was good 
reason to treat the Jacobite exiles well: in the event of a Stuart restoration, as unlikely as it 
was after 1748, the few hundred thousand livres spent supporting them in France would 
reap dividends in terms of gratitude once the Jacobites were in control of one of the most 
prosperous powers in Europe. 
For all the apparent amity between the Jacobite court and the French government and 
the coincidence of their interests, the exiles were still watched carefully by agents 
reporting to the ministry of foreign affairs. One report dated 30 July 1746 by d'Eguilles, 
gives details of the character of leading Scottish, Irish and English Jacobites in Paris, of 
whom to be wary and, significantly who still had influence with the prince and who was 
now entirely dependent upon him for their livelihood. "' Charles Edward Stuart was 
eventually imprisoned at Vincennes in 1748 and then expelled from France as a condition 
of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. With the Jacobite exiles, as with other refugees, raison 
dWat took precedence over ideological affinity. 
In the case of the Polish exiles, rival groups appeared in France, surrounding different 
candidates for the throne. In a foreshadowing of the more brutal factional struggles 
between radical exiles of the same nationality during the Revolution, the supporters of the 
Russian candidate, Stanislas Poniatowski sparred with those who backed Xavier de Saxe, 
"'MAE, MD, Angleterre, 79, pi6ces 34 & 35 (Ordonnance du Roy pour la cr6ation de 
deux regiments d'Infanterie Ecossoise'; Instructions to French commander in Scotland, 
from d'Argenson, 15 February 1746). 
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son of Augustus III. The focal points for these groups were, respectively, the salon 
Madame de Geoffiin and Xavier de Saxe himself, who settled in a h6tel in the Marais in 
1771 after his unsuccessful bid to be elected king of Poland seven years previously. The 
Geoffrin set had somewhat more success than the Jacobite exiles in influencing French 
policy. Although in 1764 the government backed Xavier rather than Poniatowski, who 
was, after all, the Russian candidate for the throne, de Geoffi-in used her influence at court 
to secure French recogntion of the latter's election. She arranged a meeting between 
prince Sulkowski and Sainte-Foy, of the ministry of foreign affairs, which led to official 
French acknowledgment of Stanislas as king of Poland in 1766. "' 
The crucial difference between the Jacobites and the supporters of Poniatowski was, of 
course, that the former had failed in their objectives while the latter succeeded. This 
meant that diplomatic necessity made the powerless Jacobite exiles pawns while the 
Poniatowski entourage in Paris, who had Russian backing, were suddenly more substantial 
pieces in the international game. In another anticipation of revolutionary politics, the 
status and importance of political exiles was determined less by the sympathy of the 
government to their cause than by the demands of international politics. 
Given its pragmatic approach to political exiles, the toleration by the French 
government of Genevan Repr6sentants who fled to France after 1782 is surprising, the 
more so because the French had provided troops to oust the Genevan patriots in the first 
place. Yet Genevan exiles such as the financier Etienne Clavi6re, Etienne Dumont and 
Jacques-Antoine Du Roveray enjoyed a remarkably high profile in exile in France in the 
1780s, despite the order given in June 1782 that Tintention du Roy est que vous ne 
laissiez plus aucun Repr6sentant passer la fronti6re. Furthermore, in July Vergennes 
171 
wrote that 'les Insurgents que je chasse de Gen6ve ... sont 
les agents de I'Angleteffe. 
Clavi6re worked through his acquaintances Nfirabeau and Brissot to further both his 
political and financial ambitions and thereby had much publicity in France. He engaged in 
pamphleteering battles involving, among other institutions, the Caisse descompte and the 
Compagnie des Eaux de Paris. His campaign against the latter got him into trouble with 
the authorities. Clavi6re, the Genevan Representant once accused of being a British 
agent, who had brushed with the government over the very delicate issue of finances, none 
the less remained in France and enriched himself further through shrewd investments and 
"'Mathorez, Les k1rangers en France sous lAncien Rigime, i, 245 - 259. 
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in August 1788 was made adininistrateur-gengral of the Compagnie d'assurances Sur la 
vie. 174 
For an exile still apparently committed to the overthrow of a r6gime guaranteed by the 
French government, Clavi6re had assumed a very high profile, sometimes aided and 
abetted by the French government itself Perhaps the reason behind the authorities' 
tolerance was the occasional use to which his financial expertise could be put. For 
Calonne, Clavi6re had served a useful purpose in his campaigns against financial interests, 
including the Caisse descompte and, furthermore, they had a mutual enemy in Necker. 
Clavi6re's huge investments in the French financial market appeared to tie up his fortunes 
so much with the fate of the French monarchy, that he may well have appeared to have 
been tarned. "' 11is closest Genevan associates, Dumont and Du Roveray, did not arrive in 
Paris until 1789, by which time the government was concerned with matters far more 
important than the presence of three Genevan dissidents on its territory. 
Unlike the Genevans, the Dutch ? atriots'were more openly welcomed by the French 
government, in spite of their commitment to overthrow or at least limit the powers of the 
Stadholder. Having fled from the Prussian invasion of the United Provinces in September 
1787, they were the largest single group of political exiles established in France before 
1789. By the summer of 1789, there were about 5,000 Patriots gathered in Paris and 
northern towns such as Saint-Omer, Gravelines, Dunkirk and Watten. "' Why they should 
be tolerated by the French monarchy in such large numbers on French soil can be put 
down to practical politics. The strategic and commercial importance of the Netherlands 
was obvious to France as well as to Britain. 177 
The French may have accepted some responsibility for the Patriots at their defeat, 
because, like the Jacobite exiles, they were a ready-made corps of leadership who might 
be expected to impose Francophile policies should their political fortunes change. For the 
Patriots'part, the French were still their best of hope of support in Europe. In Brussels, 
they established a commission to 'support and defend the interests of the Patriot nation at 
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the court of the King of France and to press with especial vigour for armed assistance to 
help re-establish the downtrodden liberties of the nation'. "' Despite the ideological divide 
between the exiles and the monarchy, both sides could see mutual advantage in 
maintaining relations with each other. The Patriots, however, had to tread a treacherous 
path between their 'democratic' language and the practical necessity of retaining French 
support: the one could not be entirely accommodated without some damage to the 
other. "" They seem to have avoided the pitfalls, for, Eke the Jacobites, the Dutch exiles 
were soon in receipt of financial assistance from the French government. 
In 1788, Johan Valckenaer, one of the Patriot leaders in France, had persuaded the 
French minister responsible for the Dutch refugees on French soil, Lambert, to provide 
subsidies towards the fugitives' keep. The usual allocation was 14 fivres on arrival in 
France. Unfortunately for all concerned, management of the pensions was devolved onto 
Coert Lambertus van Beijma, Valckenaer's rival. Van Beijma! s mismanagement of the 
French pensions, coupled with his refusal to allow the government to inspect the registers 
of the pensions put those very funds in jeopardy. Lambert imposed a deadline at the end 
of 1788, after whidh no new arrivals in France would be eligible for pensions. Repeated 
demands for the opening of the registers for government inspection were not met until 
1790. "' The divide between the Patriots in France would carry over into the French 
Revolution, with lethal consequences. 
The Ancien R6gime approach to political refugees was based on political necessity. 
While ideological affinity may have hidden this fundamental motive in the case of the 
Jacobites, the use which the French crown had for Clavi6re and the Dutch Patriots makes 
it more obvious. The policies of the French Revolution were to be much the same, 
although once more the basic pressures of practical politics were to be hidden by the 
ideological pretensions of both the exiles and the revolutionaries. None the less, 
diplomatic tact and ideological conformity helped to make relations between refugees and 
government smoother and the latter more inclined to be generous. This factor was also 
present under both the Ancien R6gime and the Revolution, although the peculiar 
circumstances of the latter were to exaggerate the need for political orthodoxy to an 
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unprecedented extreme. For all the apparent rupture with the past in 1789, the policies of 
the Revolution towards political exiles were dictated by the same concerns which 
confronted the ministers of the absolute monarchy. These considerations were the 
refugees' potential in furthering French interests abroad and the need for some assurance 
that their presence posed no threat to the domestic and external security of the French 
r6gime. 
vi 
If foreign refugees had a high profile in France, those who. contributed to the French 
economy were less visible, but more than any other type of foreigners were encouraged to 
settle in France. The establishment of foreign manufacturers, merchants and financiers 
was nothing new in the eighteenth-century. In the second half of the seventeenth century, 
Colbert's mercantilism and attempts to build up the French navy had led him to invite or 
attract foreigners with expertise in specific areas. "' The eighteenth century witnessed a 
continuity in these policies, with new expertise and technology being imported by various 
means, both foul and fair. 182 
Among the fair means by which industrial skills and artisans came to France was 
through the legitimate migration of foreign artisans and manufacturers, such as Christoff- 
Philipp Oberkampf or, in some cases, through the adoption of those who felt persecuted 
or restricted in their home country, like John Kay and John Holker. The fouler methods 
used included the poaching of skilled workers and entrepreneurs who were enticed to 
leave their country to develop their manufactures in France. Among these dibauchis - 
the term used to describe those lured to France with promises of plump bounties and 
profits - were the brothers Michael and Joseph AlcockWilliam Wilkinson and John 
Badger. 
I "'Poussou, J. -P., 'A 1'ecole des autres', Lequin, Histoire des 9trangers et de limmigration 
en France, 23 5,23 6. 
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'Skills and the Diffusion of Innovations from Britain in the eighteenth century, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, xxv (1975), 93 - 113; Harris, J., 
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Crossley, C., & Small, I., Yhe French Revolution andBritish Culture (Oxford and New 
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Artisans who travelled to France with their skills or to obtain an apprenticeship could 
form a substantial proportion of the population in some neighbourhoods. By 1789, 
perhaps four percent of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine was foreign-born, half of which came 
from Germany. The artisans of this nationality contributed greatly to the reputation of the 
Faubourg for cabinetmaking, while craftsmen from Brabant and Liýge worked on other 
furniture, on metalwork and in textiles. The small group of Italians, mainly from Tuscany, 
made figurines. 183 Such artisans worked in traditional crafts in an area renowned for its 
artisanal fife. Others, however, brought new methods and industries to France, or helped 
to develop those which were still growing. Christoff-Philipp Oberkampf belonged to this 
last category. 
Born in 1738 at Vaihingen-an-der-Enz, seventeen miles north-west of Stuttgart, 
Oberkampf came to France after being brought to Basel by his father, a calico dyer, where 
he began his apprenticeship as an indienneur, a printer of the fine cotton cloths imported 
from Asia. In 1758, he deserted his father and in Mulhouse met an agent for the factory 
of Jacques-Daniel Cottin at the Arsenal in Paris. After a trial period, Oberkampf was 
signed on for three years as a colour-maker at the printers. This method of recruitment by 
French manufacturers, particularly from among foreigners, was not unusual when certain 
skills and knowledge were in short supply. Adept dyers and printers of fine cloths were 
scarce in France in the mid-eighteenth century because the import of indlennes had been 
banned since 1686, and the wearing and use of them proscribed by a decree of 1692, in 
order to protect the producers of i1offes natiotwles, such as Lyonnais silks and Norman 
woolens. These restrictions started to lift after 1750 and in response Cottin leased 
buildings in the Arsenal for six years from 1754 to dye cotton using indigo, but over half a 
century of restrictions meant that local talent for this promising industry was limited, or 
even non-existent. Cottin was forced to look to areas of Europe where the activity was 
well-developed, such as Switzerland and western Germany. Oberkampf had precisely the 
sort of skills which French manufacturers like Cottin required. "" 
Unlike Oberkampf, John Holker from Lancashire had no choice but to come to France. 
A Catholic, he joined the Jacobite army in 1745 and after his capture was sentenced to 
I "Monnier, R., Le Faubourg Saint-Antoine (1789 - 1815) (Paris: Soci6W des Etudes 
Robespierristes, 1981), 33 - 34,71,302. 
'"Chassagne, S., Oberkampf. un entrepreneur capitaliste au SiMe des Lumiýres (Paris: 
Aubier Montaigne, 1980), 21 - 30; Chapman, S. D., & Chassagne, S., European Textile 
Printers in the Eighteenth Century. A Study of Peel and Oberkampf (London: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1981), 104,106 - 108,113 - 115. 
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death. With his dramatic escape to France in 1746 he brought an expertise in textiles 
obtained during his partnership in a Manchester calenderees firm. While an exile in 
France, he impressed Marc Morel, an inspector of manufactures, with his knowledge of 
textiles, especially cotton and velvet. He was employed by Daniel Charles Trudaine of the 
bureau de commerce as an agent for the illicit recruitment of British expertise in textiles. 
Meanwhile, Holker was made a partner in two progressive Rouen firms, one for the 
manufacture of cotton velvet, the other for calendering and 'English' finishing of cloth. 
The intention was to integrate Holker into these firms which would employ the British 
artisans who had been dibauchJs, who in turn would train French workers in their 
methods. The imported artisans would also be circulated among several firms, to spread 
the new techniques and to avoid, as Trudaine hoped, the creation of monopolies. As with 
Oberkampf, Holker and the artisans he lured over from Britain had skills which were 
lacking in France, but which were nonetheless in great demand: attempts by Rouen cotton 
manufacturers to introduce cotton velvets and other cloths had floundered owing to lack 
of the technology and the quality of the fabrics. "' In September 1754, the cloth-finishing 
business in which Holker was involved became a privileged manufacture royale and a 
centre for the diffusion of the new techniques in France. It employed ninety-two workers, 
of whom twenty were British. In 1755, Holker's achievements were rewarded by his 
appointment as an inspector of foreign manufactures for the bureau de commerce. He 
used this position to entice more skilled artisans and manufacturers to France. "" 
This policy was driven by the desire to keep apace of Britains rapid econon-dc 
development in textiles, metallurgy and the manufacture of hardware, but nfilitary 
considerations, such as the manufacturing of weapons, also entered the equation. The 
bureau de commerce was all too aware of advances made in the industrialising areas of 
France's great rival. Its agents such as Gabriel Jars and Marchant de la Houili6re gained 
access to British manufactures and returned with reports on new techniques. "' While 
these experts could not disguise their enthusiasm for the developments, their missions 
"'Harris, J. R., 'John Holker: a Lancashire Jacobite in French Industry (The First Chaloner 
Memorial Lecture)', Newcomen Society Transactions, lxiv (1992-93), 13 2- 13 5; 
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- 1780 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1931), 196 - 197; Henderson, W. 0., 
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Industrial Revolution in Western Europe (3 rd. ed. ) (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 
1972), 14 - 17. 
"'Gillispie, C. C., Science andPolity in France at the End of the OldRegime (Princeton: 
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were often driven by the alarm which the government felt at them. De la Houliere, for 
example, was sent to Staffordshire in 1775 to discover how the British moulded their 
cannon and he was struck by the advantages which the British navy drew from the 
Wilkinson brothers' methods of founding iron and boring the barrels for artillery pieces. 
He set about enticing the younger Wilkinson, William, to France. "' 
The traffic in artisans and technology was certainly a seller's market, not only because 
the skills and methods were in great demand, but also because workers and manufacturers 
who left their home countries were often running grave risks, owing to laws prohibiting 
the export of machinery and the emigration of skilled workers. In 1756, Mchael Alcock's 
wife was arrested in London with four workers on their way back to France from 
Birmingham, while in 1765 another recruiter for the Alcocks, William Hyde, was nearly 
killed with a worker in a shoot-out on their returnjoumey towards London. "' Inorderto 
attract and then retain the migrants or Mauch& which it so craved, therefore, the French 
authorities had to pay handsome sums, grant concessions and, in some cases, show 
inexhaustible patience. John Kay, the inventor of the flying shuttle, had fled from Britain 
to France in 1747, either to flee the mob violence wherever he tried to introduce his 
invention, or because of his unsuccessful defence of his patent rights. In France up to his 
death in 1779, his temperament and ambition made him quarrelsome and a difficult man to 
deal with, but the French government realised that they had to be patient and generous 
because 'to leave him without recompense would be to disgust foreigners from bringing 
their industry into the kingdom. 1' 
The government did achieve some success in enticing foreign entrepreneurs to France. 
In 1753, John Badger, a calenderer, was brought to Lyon to set up a calendering works to 
produce watered fabrics. in return, he received one louis a week for subsistence on route, 
the supply of all the necessary machinery and tools, a guinea a week paid to his wife in 
London during his absence, a promise to look after his widow and two children should he 
die before his enterprise was established and a pension or a fourteen-year privilege to 
produce finished silks once he had produced'des moarres [moires] aussi belles que celles 
"'AN, F\12\1300 ('Memoire sur les Moyens demployer le Charbon de terre i fondre la 
Mine de fer, a fabriquer du fer forg6 &a MouUer d'excellens Canons, pour la Marine, 
comme on le pratique en Angleterre', 18 September 1775). 
"'AN, F\12\1315a (Letter of Trudaine to d'Argenson, 18 May 1756; M6moirefor 
Wiffiam Hyde, n. d. ). 
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d'Angleterre'. His wife soon joined him with his two children. "' In Staffordshire, dela 
Houli6re played on what he saw as the Tesprit de gain trop ordinaire en cette Nation' to 
encourage William Wilkinson to come to France. Wilkinson was offered an advance of 
50,000 fivres towards the establishment of a foundry in France, 200 - 300 guineas for his 
moving expenses and a further 50,000 fivres on the production of the first twelve working 
cannon. 112 He also received an annual pension of 12,000 fivres on his arrival in France in 
1777. " 
Such enticements could not be restricted to the manufacturers themselves, as skilled 
workers were also required to set up the establishments initially and then to train local 
people in the necessary skills and techniques. Nfichael and Joseph Alcock, for example, 
had established a manufacture of hardware such as buttons, candlesticks, buckles and 
locks at La Charit6-sur-Loire in 1756. In order to draw the required skilled workers from 
Birmingham, special concessions were offered to encourage them to make the often 
hazardous journey. Workers at La Charit6 were exempt from the droit d'aubaine, all 
personal taxes, from service in the milice and from billetting. Holker further suggested 
that 150 fivres be awarded as a bounty to Joseph Alcock for every worker he brought 
over from Britain. The artisans themselves were offered 'gratifications' for their move to 
France. In 1759, William Green, who had come to France at the urging of his daughter 
who was already working at La Charite, was given a bounty of 500 fivres and a pron-dse 
by the government that if his work was of good quality, he would be rewarded further. "' 
The efforts of the manufacturers and the artisans were met with some success, both in 
establishing prosperous factories and in spreading the skills and techniques among the 
French. At the end of 1759, Oberkampf entered into a partnership with three 
entrepreneurs to set up a calico-printing plant at Jouy near Versailles. After teething 
problems mainly involving disputes with his associates and failed experiments, Oberkampf 
entered into a more successful partnership two years later and in 1787 became the sole 
owner in the works at Jouy. Just over nine percent of his workers were drawn from 
191 AN, F\ 1 2\ 1442 (Etablissement du Sr. B adger a Lyon pour les Modrres fagon 
d'Angleterre', 1753). 
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abroad, although his overseers were still recruited either from among Oberkampf s family 
and from Germany. " 
Oberkampf, however, was not obliged to train French artisans to perform all the 
necessary tasks. I-Iis was a private enterprise, only getting the title of manufacture royale 
in 1784. Holker and the others, meanwhile, owed their businesses to the support of the 
bureau de commerce and were expected to teach the French the new methods. Success in 
this task was checkered. John Kay's shuttle was tested in Normandy and was adopted in 
at least one of the manufactures royales, but progress in its adoption was slow and by 
1790 its use had been dropped altogether. " Likewise John Badger's attempts to 
introduce new silk methods to Lyon were met with difficulties in the procurement of the 
right parts for the machinery and raw materials, which left the enterprise dependent upon 
imports from Britain, defeating the whole object of the exercise. Nonetheless, Holker did 
persuade the government to provide Badger with a subsidy to pay for the training of 
workers in finishing heavy woollens. "' 
In contrast to these failures, however, Holker expanded from his manufacture royale at 
Saint-Sever, outside Rouen, to set up other plants at Vernon, Elbeuf and Pont de I'Arche. 
Saint-Sever produced the tools and machinery which could be moved elsewhere in France 
and French artisans learnt to build the looms and jennies. He encouraged other British 
manufacturers to come to France with designs and new methods and John Nfilne and his 
three sons came with a smuggled Arkwright machine and erected it at Oissel. " The 
Alcocks, too, had some success in communicating their skills. When in 1760 one of their 
French associates, Frenais, broke away after a dispute, he set up his own manufacture of 
buttons in Paris, taking with him two workers who were French and who were offered 48 
fivres bounty. The Alcocks also expanded their enterprise by establishing a new 
manufacture at Roanne in 1765 and then Michael set up a steelworks at Villefray in 
1767. "' By 1788, Willfiarn Wilkinson had a manufacture at Indret on the Loire near 
"'AN, F\12\876 (Petition for Abraham Guerne de Tavannes, to Terray, 1774; M6moire' 
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Nantes and at Le Creusot, where Arthur Young reported that he had employed between 
500 and 600 workers - all but two of them French. " 
As a further means of enriching the kingdom, colonies of foreign merchants in the great 
maritime towns of France were allowed to develop. In Bordeaux in 1777 there were no 
less that III foreign merchants and commissionaires, with Germans being the most 
important group at 52, the 'Jacobite' anglo-irlandais coming next with 33, followed by the 
Dutch with 17. The rest were Swedish, Danish and Swiss. In Marseille ten years later, of 
209 foreign Protestant negociants, 157 were Swiss, who also played an important role in 
banking. "' These merchants were considered an integral part of the network of 
commerce which helped to bring prosperity to France and fill the coffers of the monarchy. 
To encourage trade, therefore, the French government extended special privileges to 
the foreign mercantile colonies, such as exemptions from the droit d'aubaine and general 
decrees of naturalisation. In spite of such measures which might have encouraged the 
assirrfflation of merchants into the broader French communities, many persisted in doing 
business with their own countrymen. This might be explained by the merchants' habits of 
acting as the agents or as the partners of their compatriots, which reinforced the network 
of commerce in which the French government wanted French-based merchants to 
maintain a presence. The Irish merchants of Bordeaux and Nantes present good examples 
of this practice. Many foreign merchants who made enough money then sank it into 
landed property, and this is particularly true of the Jacobite exiles from the British Isles 
after mid-century, when it became clear that a triumphal return home under a Stuart 
monarchy was increasingly unlikely. "2 
The government was also willing to develop some of France's primary industries, 
particularly in fishing. Nantucket whalers were established at Dunkirk in May 1786, when 
three ships arrived from across the Atlantic by agreement between William Roth and the 
French government, represented by the naval minister, the marechal de Castries. Roth had 
promised to bring ten to twelve whalers to Dunkirk in return for certain conditions, 
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including a bounty of 50 fivres for every tonnage of ship brought to France and a 
guarantee of their freedom to worship as they pleased. By 1788, there were three 
Nantucket shipowners in Dunkirk, managing eight whalers between them. ' Meanwhile, 
Catalan fishermen had long used Marseille as a seasonal port for their fishing expeditions, 
with special rights dating back to the reign of Louis XIV. The right of Spanish fishermen 
to fish freely in French waters was confirmed by thepacte defamille of 1761. By the 
time of the Revolution their relationship with French fishermen was marred by tension 
owing to different techniques and other disputes which were to explode in 1790. 
The presence of such foreigners in France had clear advantages for the government. 
They brought with them skills and techniques which the French would otherwise have 
lacked, thereby enriching the kingdom (and the tax base) and helping France in its 
commercial rivalry with Britain. The dividends which the government hoped to reap from 
the spread of their skills made it willing to spend a lot of time, money and effort in 
attracting the right people to France and keeping them there. Foreign artisans, , 
manufacturers, merchants and fishermen they tended to avoid politics and so, while some 
of them were difficult, they were never perceived as posing any threat to the established 
order of the Ancien Regime in the same way that political refugees may have done. This 
pattern of behaviour was to be altered only slightly during the Revolution. 
Banking and finance, however, were so tied up with the state finances that those 
foreigners who participated in them could not always avoid embroilment in the politics of 
the court. The involvement of foreign bankers in French administration could have its 
advantages. The Genevan Jacques Necker, for example, was barely twenty-four when he 
and another Genevan, George-Tobied Thellusson were given the management of the bank 
of Isaac Vernet in 1756. By 1770, when the two Genevans took over ownership from 
Vernet, the bank Aellusson, Necker & Compagnie was one of the largest Protestant 
banks in Europe, with contacts among the vast European network of Huguenot, Genevan, 
Swiss, Dutch and British bankers. " The vast majority of correspondents of another 
foreign bank, that of Necker's rival and compatriot, Isaac Panchaud; were also abroad, 
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(Dunkirk: Soci6t6 Dunkerquoise & Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985), 
270,271 - 272. 
"'Uithy, H., La Banque Protestant en France, de la Revocation de I'Edit de Nantes ii la 
R&olution (2 vols. ) (Paris: SEVPEN, 1959 - 1961), ii, 230 - 231,315. 
70 
especially in the Netherlands, while those in France were also foreigners, mostly British 
and Swiss, including the Neuchatelois, Jean-Fr6d6ric Perregaux. 205 
The connections of Necker and Panchaud were useful to the French government when 
it came to raising much-needed loans, or placating the monarchys foreign creditors. ' 
For the French monarchy to have such an asset explains why the government was willing 
to create the post of Director-General of Finance to allow Necker control of the royal 
purse-strings. When Necker was deposed after his first ministry in 178 1, the monarchy 
was not short of similar contacts and it was Panchaud who took over, not as Director- 
General of Finance, but as financial advisor to Necker's replacement, Joly de Fleury. 
Panchaud, in turn, used his contacts, mainly in Amsterdam, to float loans for the 
monarchy. 207 
Furthermore, foreign bankers, like manufacturers and artisans, could bring expertise 
and ideas which encouraged the development of Paris as a financial centre. It was 
Panchaud who in 1776 masterminded the creation of the Caisse descompte, a banking 
institution which was to become of key importance in the last years of the Ancien Regime 
and a matter of bitter political feuding in the early Revolution. Its primary purpose was to 
enhance commerce by discounting letters of exchange, as well as acting as a bank dealing 
with the expenses and revenue of notaires, bankers and merchants. " 
Foreign involvement in French finance none the less fed the paranoia of those who saw 
in the international Protestant banking network a threat to French (and Catholic) interests. 
There certainly was plenty of evidence to suggest the involvement of foreign banking 
interests in French domestic affairs. Both Necker and Panchaud raised money for the 
French government by selling rentes viagJres which paid interest until the holder of the 
bonds died. The exploitation of such schemes by foreign, Protestant financiers led 
Necker's enemies to claim that he had sold France out to foreign capitalists. ' 
Furthermore, perhaps owing to the nature of Panchaud's correspondents, all but two of 
the members of the Caisse descompte's first conseil d'administration were foreigners. 210 
Suspicion of foreign bankers was to persist and deepen, especially when the state of the 
monarchy's finances came to light in the late 1780s. By then, the belief that foreign 
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financiers were manipulating the government and the destiny of France had wide appeal. 
With the continued involvement of foreign bankers, and the indebtedness of the French 
state to foreign creditors, it was perhaps inevitable that suspicion of foreign financiers 
should persist into the Revolution, sometimes with lethal consequences. 
If foreign manufacturers, artisans, fishermen, merchants and bankers helped to generate 
wealth in the French economy, there were others who contributed in smaller ways, but 
whose services were nonetheless widely used. Seasonal migration, brought on by high 
birth-rates and limited agricultural resources, brought to the large cities labourers from all 
parts of France and Europe, but especially from Savoy. In Paris, Savoyards emerged from 
their lodgings in the quartiers of the Ville Neuve near the Porte Saint-Denis, or in the 
faubourgs Saint-Jacques and Saint-Marcel to work the streets as lamplighters, 
messengers, chimney sweeps, shoe-shiners, sawyers or even as &crotteurs, people who 
earned their keep by taking mud off peoples boots. Savoyard women worked in Lyon as 
fireuses de cordes for the silk weavers. "' They were stereotyped for their poverty: 
'Savoyard' became a generic term for anyone who performed the dirty and menial tasks in 
the streets. Johann Georg Wille stumbled across a group of chimney sweeps in their 
sordid lodgings and he concluded instantly that they were Savoyards: 
j'entrois dans une maison dont I'allde, remplic dordures, me choquoit ddji; mais, par pure 
curiositd, je Nndtrois plus avant oit jy voyois une grande pi&e noircie de fumde et salie de tous 
c8tds. C'dtoit le logement crune socidtd de petits ramoneurs de Savoie dont chaque membre avoit le 
bonheur de dormir sur un grabat de paille hachde, A deux sols de loycr par nuit, payd davancc. 
AM que je d&ampai bien vite de cctte inisdrable cavcmel 212 
Like many of the labouring poor, Savoyards were often regarded with suspicion by the 
authorities, occasionally being fingered for involvement in the more boisterous political 
demonstrations. When the parlement of Paris was recalled in 1774, the celebrations went 
on into the early hours of the morning and the guard had to force the crowd from the 
courtyard of the Palais de Justice. It was reported by the officer in charge that Savoyards 
213 were among those ejected. 
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The Savoyards worked long hours, however, being among the first out on the streets 
by 5 o'clock in the morning and staying out until late at night. "' Mercier stressed that, as 
poor as they were, 'ils 6pargnent sur le simple n6cessaire, pour envoyer chaque annde i 
leurs pauvres parente and he praised them as'mod6les de Varnour filial'. "' Mercier was 
not exaggerating: each year, towards the end of the eighteenth century, up to 40,000 
people returned to Savoy with varying amounts of money saved up. Moreover, some 
were skilled artisans, including among them stonemasons, and colporteurs who became 
small commerVants with their own shops. "' 
Savoyards, despite speaking French, retained a distinct identity while in France. 
Mercier observed that 'ils se distinguent toujours par Varnour de leur patrie et de leurs 
parents! They often organised themselves in a self-regulating community which kept 
them out of trouble with the authorities: 'les plus ig6s ont droit de Vinspection sur les plus 
jeunes 
... on les a vus faire justice de l'un d'entre eux qui avait vold; ils lui firent son proc6s 
et le pendirent. "" They were none the less an important part of French urban life. 
At the very bottom of the social pile, however, were those who provoked not just 
suspicion, but outright hostility: migrant beggars. The same economic factors which 
drove the Savoyards to seek low-paid work in France also forced less fortunate people to 
seek a living by charity. Occasionally the problem provoked the authorities at the highest 
level into action. Between 1780 and 1783, twenty-one beggars, mostly from northern 
Italy, were arrested in France at places as diverse as Poitou, Angers, Rennes, Pau, 
Besangon and Aix-en-Provence. What linked them together was that they all carried false 
letters from religious orders permitting them to beg for alms. They were all forged by a 
schoolmaster from the Val de Styr in Switzerland, who had acquired copies of the official 
stamps of the superiors of various monastic orders and made wood-block imitations. On 
17 April, the king gave orders for the expulsion of all foreign beggars in France, including 
foreign peripatetic fiiars who begged for alms. By 29 April more than sixty religious were 
arrested and ordered to leave the country. This order was confirmed by an edict 
registered a year later. "' If genuine fflars were expelled along with beggars with false 
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papers, it reflects the authorities' determination to get rid of those whom it saw as a threat 
to the peace of the countryside and towns. 
Vil 
The contrasting treatment of different types of foreigners in France before 1789 shows 
that they were encouraged to settle in France where they were deemed of use to the state. 
Such uses could be obvious, such as the role of foreign troops in the defence of the 
kingdom, the use of foreign refugees like the Jacobites and the Dutch Patriots as pawns in 
France's foreign policy, and the enrichment of the country, particularly when foreigners 
had technical skills which French people lacked. Less obvious was the reinforcement of 
the prestige of the monarchy, either through enhancing its Catholic image by tolerating 
foreign clergy, or by seeking a reflection of its glory through patronising foreigners in the 
arts and sciences. 
Yet the state also had to balance its use of foreigners with other considerations, such as 
domestic stability and diplomacy. As open as the Ancien R6gime was to the contributions 
of foreigners, it was also ready to dispense with them or at least control their activities 
when practical politics dictated. The state sought to prevent the foreign clergy from 
becon-dng financially dependent on the crown, for example, and, in order to preserve the 
essentially French fabric of the Gallican church, it attempted to prevent foreign priests 
from appointing foreign vicars or successors in their benefices. Despite its interest in a 
Stuart restoration in Britain, the French government discarded the Jacobites when broader 
diplomatic pressures required. The absolute monarchy was pragmatic in its approach to 
foreigners, waiving rules such as religious conformity for naturalisation or membership of 
French academies when it suited. This pragmatism was possible because it was 
theoretically within the monarchy's power to establish general rules, but also to tinker and 
alter them at will. Such an approach also helps to explain why the droit d'aubaine was 
not unilaterally and completely abolished in France before 1789. While it recognised the 
potential econon-dc benefits of such a measure, the government was unwilling to ease 
restrictions on foreigners while French subjects abroad remained liable to similar 
impositions. The monarchy therefore insisted on reciprocity, which meant that far from 
sliding inevitably to its death, the droit d'aubaine was very much alive in various forms, 
even if its effects were limited to the droit de ditraction for most nationalities. 
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The practical way in which the monarchy dealt with foreigners means that the Ancien 
R6gime cannot be judged as being assimilationist or exclusivist except by reference to 
specific types of foreigners. In fact, the treatment of foreigners depending on their role in 
French society corresponded with the entire social structure of the Ancien R6gime, in 
which people were organised into groups based on function, each with varying degrees of 
privilege. In these circumstances, the nationality of foreigners mattered less than loyalty 
and obedience to the king and, above all, the function they performed in society. 
The Revolution presented an ideological challenge to this corporate society, by 
breaking down the barriers between corporations and, above all, by abolishing the 
multitude of privileges which defined these groups. In making the nation the essential 
source of identity, the Revolution put into question the role of foreigners who had long 
enjoyed a privileged role in various branches of the French state and society. None the 
less, ideology concealed the fact that the fundamental pressures which had faced the 
Ancien R6gime remained the same. The revolutionaries were not doctrinaires who blindly 
applied their principles regardless of the consequences. Instead, when they dealt with the 
problems posed by foreigners they were as sensitive to the financial, political and 
diplomatic considerations as the Ancien R6gime had been. For this reason, the Revolution 
witnessed a good deal of continuity from the absolute monarchy in its pragmatic ways of 
dealing with foreigners. This is not to suggest, however, that the intellectual challenges 
which underpinned revolutionary attitudes towards foreigners were irrelevant, for the 
importance of the revolutionariee pragmatism can only be fully gauged against their views 
of citizenship, nationality and patriotism. 
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Chapter Two. Patriots and Cosmopolitans. The ideology of assimilation and 
exclusion in eighteenth-century France. 
Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Un corps dassocids vivant sous une loi commune et reprdsentds par la 
radme Mgislature ... 
- Emmanuel Siey6s, Quest-ce que le tiers &at? (1789). ' 
La philosophie Wavait pas encore rdvdld A 1'esp&e hurnaine cette grande maxime que la libertd 
proclame: Les hommes fortnent une m8me famille rdpandue sur la surface de la tcffe. 
- Bertrand Bar6re de Vieuzac, 6 August 1790. ' 
Je vous I'avois bien dit que les journaux aristocratiques ... cridroient que la d6nonciation du 
CONUTt AUTRICHIEN Wdtoit pas fondde, ... Au reste, quand on a lu les discours de MM. 
Gensonnd et Brissot, et quand on ajoute aux faits qa'ils ddvoilent, la masse des faits plus connus 
dont personne ne peut avoir perda le souvenir, on trouve contre les conspirateursAuMchiens tant 
de preuves, qull ify a plus dembarras que sur le choix. 
- Jean-Baptiste Louvet, La Sentinelle, May 1792. ' 
In the decade which followed the convocation of the Estates-General, the 
revolutionaries expressed a wide range of attitudes towards foreigners, from the broad, 
assimilationist definition of the nation by Siey6s and the cosmopolitan appeal by Bar6re to 
the xenophobia of Louvet. Historians of the period and of nationalism have identified the 
main development as a progression from the enlightened cosmopolitanism of 1789 - 1790 
to a narrow, militant nationalism by 1793 - 1794. In this view, the French Revolution 
eventually rejected the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment and put in its place an 
I Siey6s, Quest-ce que le tiers &af?, 40. 
2M, 
xvii, 628. 
'La Sentinelle, No. 7 (26 or 27 May 1792). 
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aggressive ideological force which excluded on the basis of nationality and which justified 
territorial expansionism. ' This view is acceptable, but needs some some qualification. 
In the first place, the cosmopolitanism and patriotism expressed by the revolutionaries 
were based less on the content of the Enlightenment itself, than on the revolutionaries' 
own adaptations of the various strands of eighteenth-century philosophy. Such 
interpretations were adapted to suit their own circumstances. In this respect, 
revolutionary cosmopolitanism and patriotism was an invention of the revolutionaries 
themselves. Moreover, attitudes towards foreigners were not based only on the 
intellectual currents, but on the legal, political and cultural conditions in which the 
revolutionaries had been immersed before 1789. 
Secondly, a move away from pacific cosmopolitanism to an aggressive nationalism is 
apparent, but this is only part of the picture. Revolutionary attitudes towards foreigners 
and other countries were based not only on ideological and cultural currents, but also on a 
pragmatic response to circumstances. Consequently, while the ideology might have 
become nationalist, exclusive and aggressive, outside the public halls of debate 
revolutionary authorities quietly ensured that certain foreigners were protected from the 
'Albert Mathiez, for example, writes of the summer of 1793 that 'la d6fiance i 1'6gard des 
itrangers s'accommodait mal avec la continuation de la propagande dans les pays voisins. 
... Le cosmopolitisme reculait tous les jours. ... Le nationalisme commercial progressait du meme pas que le nationalisme politique. Apres le Purgatoire, les 6trangers allait connaittre 
I'Enfer. '(LaRivolutionetlesitrangers, 130,132,137). In his study on Enlightenment 
cosmopolitanism, Thomas J. Schlereth writes that despite the avowed cosmopolitanism of 
the Revolution, 'a strain of national intolerance and aggressiveness soon became 
discernible in the words and deeds of the revolutionaries ... the Revolution swung toward a messianic nationalism! (ne Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment nought. Its Form 
and Function in the Ideas ofFrankfin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694 - 1790 (Notre Dame & London: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 133). See also the article by 
Virginie Guiraudon, 'Cosmopolitanism and National Priority: Attitudes towards 
Foreigners in France between 1789 and 1794, History ofEuropean Ideas, xiii (199 1), 
591 - 604. Some studies on nationalism and citizenship have also seen in the French 
Revolution the transformation from eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism to nationalism. 
Boyd C. Shafer writes: 'As the Revolution became more violent and as France warred 
with much of Europe from 1792, the philosophic cosmopolitanism of eighteenth-century 
liberals tended to disappear and national prejudices and national hatreds to be 
accentuated. ' (Faces ofNationalism. New Realities and OldMyths (New York and 
London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), 110). Hans Kohn writes that the war 
converted the French 'from the peaceful spirit of eighteenth century Enlightenment to the 
aggressive dynamism of modem nationalism! (Nationalism. Its Meaning andHistory (rev. 
ed. ) (Princeton: van Nostrand, 1965), 27). More recently, Derek Heater has written that 
'the forces of cosmopolitanism and nationalism struggled for supremacy in the French 
Revolution' (World Citizenship and Government. Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of 
Western Political nought (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1996), 76). 
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effects of the rhetoric. In such circumstances political orthodoxy and usefulness, rather 
than nationality, became the determining factor in the way in which foreigners were 
treated. Such a situation had implications for the meaning and content of patriotism and 
cosmopolitanism in the 1790s. 
The role of the Enlightemnent in shaping revolutionary ideology has long been a source 
of controversy among historians. ' The different and often contradictory strains of 
Enlightemnent thought encapsulated a range of ideas and attitudes which were often 
contradictory. The extent to which the revolutionaries were directly influenced by the 
philosophes'views on issues such as m&s common humanity, war and peace is 
questionable. The deputies to the Estates-General were certainly familiar with some 
elements of Enlightenment thought and language, but in the early months of the 
Revolution, at least, they were more likely to allude to history and the classics than to 
Rousseau or to Voltaire. ' It is possible, therefore, that if revolutionary cosmopolitanism 
and patriotism stemmed from certain aspects of Enlightenment thought, it was less the 
product of direct continuity, than of the revolutionaries retrospectively interpreting and 
claiming as their own certain strands of the Enlightenment. ' The actual content of the 
ideas of thephilosophes was not so important as how the revolutionaries interpreted, 
extrapolated and used it for their own ends. The debates in May 1790 on the 
constitutional question as to who had the right to make war and peace, which spilled over 
into broader issues, such as international law and the conduct of foreign policy, illustrate 
this. The discussion led to the famous declaration of 22 May 1790, inserted into the 
Constitution of 179 1, in which 'la nation frangaise renonce i entreprendre aucune guerre 
'See, for example, the readings in Church, W. F. (ed. ), 7he Influence of the 
Enlightenment on the French Revolution: Creative, Disastrous or Non-Existent? 
(Boston: D. C. Heath, 1964). 
"Tackett, T., Becoming a Revolutionary. Yhe Deputies of the French National Assembly 
and the Emergencý of a Revolutionary Culture (1789 - 1790) (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 65. 
'As Roger Chartier suggests, 'it was the Revolution that made the books and philosophy' 
by selecting certain works and authors said 'to have prepared and announced it'. It 
amounted to a 'retrospective construction of the Enlightenment' (Chartier, R- (trans. 
Cochrane, L. G. ), 7he Cultural Origins of the French Revolution (Durham & London: 
Duke University Press, 1991), 87 - 88, 
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dans la vue de faire des conqu8tes, et rfemploiera j amais ses forces contre la libertd 
d'aucun peuple'. ' On both sides of the argument, the revolutionaries alluded to a vast 
array of authorities. Those from the eighteenth century included the abb6 de Saint-Pierre, 
Rousseau, Montesquieu and the abb6 de Mably. " 
Saint-Pierre had envisaged a European Diet which would be the forum for compulsory 
mediation between potentially warring sovereigns, an idea which Rousseau later criticised 
for depending too much on the good will of monarchs, but which he also popularised in 
the process. " There is clear evidence that their work was known to French people 
outside the National Assembly, among pamphleteers, journalists and political clubs. " For 
most revolutionaries, however, as for most eighteenth-century philosophers, war was a 
sad fact of human existence. Voltaire, above all, mobilised his wit in his abhorrence of 
war, but he was no pacifist and derided plans such as Saint-Pierre's: Ies hommes seront 
toujours fous; et ceux qui croient les gu6rir, sont les plus fous de la bande'. " 
The revolutionaries did not inherit any clearly-defined cosmopolitan ideology from the 
Enlightenment, but rather a vague humanitarianism which regarded the pursuit of 
happiness as a legitimate human activity and which accepted that man was naturally 
good. " Such views on humanity led to an abhorrence of war and persecution which fed 
into both the left and right wings of the Constituent Assembly. In the debates of May 
1790, both sides in the argument on war and peace therefore tried to appropriate the same 
authors and texts, and Montesquieu, in particular, to support their own arguments. 
Reubell, Robespierre and P6tion used arguments similar to those adopted by Montesquieu 
'AP, xxxfi, 541. 
"See, for example, the speeches by the due de Levis on 16 May, by the due de Praslin and 
the abb6 Maury on 18 May, the abb6 de Montesquiou on 19 May and Bengy de Puyvall6e 
on 20 May (AP, xv, 526,558,566 - 567,590,616). 
"Saint-Pierre, CA. C. de (ed. Goyard-Fabre, S. ), Projetpour rendre Ja paixperp&uelle 
en Europe (1713) (Paris: Gamier Fr6res, 1981); Rousseau, 'Jugement sur le projet de paix 
perpdtuelle de M. 1'abb6 de Saint-Pieffe'(1782), Petits Chefs-d'Oeuvre de J-J Rousseau 
(Paris, n. d. ), 268 - 271. 
"Lemaitre, M., Riflexionsphilosophiques sur leprojet de 1AW de Saint-PierreparM. 
L***, de Versailles (n. p., 1790); Le Patriote FranVais, No. 459 (10 November 1790). 
"Voltaire, F. -M. A. (trans, Butt, J. ), Candide (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1947), 25 - 26; 
Voltaire (trans. Besterman, T. ), Philosophical Dictionary (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1972), 23 1; Gay, P., 77ze Enlightenment: an Interpretation (2 vols. ), ii, 7he Science of 
Freedom (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), 404; Meyer, H., Voltaire on war and 
peace, Besterman, T. (ed. ), Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, cxliv 
(Banbury: Voltaire Foundation, 1976), 169. 
"Momet, D., Les Origines Intellectuelles de la Rivolution FranVaise (1715 - 178 7) (2nd 
ed. ) (Paris: Colin, 1934), 109 - 111,258. 79 
and Rousseau, even if they did not cite them by name. Rousseau had argued that kings 
were unlikely to temper their ambitions for the sake of the common good, while 
Montesquieu suggested that the spirit of monarchy is war and expansion, -while that of a 
republic is peace and moderation. " Their opponent, Maury, cited Montesquieu's 
ConsWrations sur les causes de la grandeur el de Ja Wcadence des Romains against the 
view that republics are naturally peace-loving. " 
The Enlightenment also had some influence in shaping views on international law, 
referred to as the droit des gens and as the droitpublic de I'Europe. None the less, most 
deputies had probably been introduced to the concept less through reading the 
philosophes than through the legal training which much of the Third Estate had received. 
The droit des gens governed relations between individuals of different nationalities and 
was meant to offer them some protection when they were abroad. The term was also 
used to describe the theoretical rules of international relations. Under this tacit law, 
foreigners and commerce were supposed to be protected from the worst abuses of alien 
governments and atrocities committed in wartime were meant to be proscribed. The droil 
public consisted of the actual treaties and alliances by which states were meant to abide in 
their relations with each other. Of the Enlightenment writers cited by the revolutionaries, 
Mably wrote about the latter, Montesquieu, the former. " Montesquieds views on 
international law were cited in the May debate by the duc de Levis. " Rousseau also 
wrote on droit des gens and was more critical than Montesquieu about the way in which it 
failed to remove all abuses inflicted on enemy subjects in wartime. He particularly 
condemned the droit de represailles, whereby one government could enact measures 
against the subjects of another in retaliation for similar abuses. "' The revolutionaries 
inherited this same disgust for these bad old ways but, in the first year of the Constituent, 
the revolutionaries persisted in using Montesquieu, not Rousseau, as a source of authority 
in their efforts to build a new conception of relations between the states and the treatment 
14Ap, XV, 518,539,559; Rousseau, Jugement sur le projet de paix perpituelle de M. 
Fabbd de Saint-Pierre', 268 - 27 1; Montesquieu, C. -L. de Secondat, De lEsprit des Loix 
(1748), book ix, chapter 2. 
"AP, xv, 567. 
"Mably, abb6 G. B. de, Principes des Nigociations, pour servir d7wroduction au Droil 
Public de I'Europe and Le Droit Public de lEurope, fonW sur les Trailis, vols. vii -x of 
Oeuvres CompOes de lAbbj de Mably (19 vols. ) (Toulouse, 179 1); Montesquieu, De 
Mpril des Loix, book i, chapter 3. 
11AP, xv, 526. 
"Rousseau, J. -J., Discours sur Forigine et lesfondements de Finigalitj parmi les 
hommes (1755) (Paris: tditions Sociales, 1971), 126 - 127. 
80 
of foreigners in France. On 6 August, Bar6re quoted Montesquieu. in his attack on the 
droit d'aubaine, describing it as one of the'droits insens6s'of the Dark Ages. "' 
Montesquieu popularised the Ancien Wgime's legalistic and diplomatic conception of the 
droit des gens among those who had neither diplomatic experience nor legal training. 
The sparse references by the revolutionaries to Grotius, Pufendorf, Mably and 
Montesquieu on the subject of international law suggests however that those 
revolutionaries who seemed comfortable with the concept of the droit des gens may have 
been familiarised with it through other media. Many deputies had received legal training 
and dictionaries of law and works on jurisprudence explained the term at length because 
the distinction between the droit des gens and the droit civil justified the legal treatment 
not only of foreigners, but also of illegitimate children. " The work of the Genevan 
international jurist Emmerich de Vattel was certainly known to some of the deputies. " 
The large contingent within the Constituent Assembly who had some sort of legal training 
suggests that many of the revolutionaries may have acquired familiarity with the concept 
through texts on jurisprudence rather than the Enlightenment. The theorists of 
international law may therefore have had a more direct influence on the revolutionaries, in 
their attitudes towards foreigners because they discussed the justifications behind the rules 
of conduct towards foreign subjects, as well as the laws themselves. 
Combined with the humanitarianism of the Enlightenment, ideas on international law 
led some revolutionaries to give universal application to revolutionary ideology. These 
revolutionaries proclaimed that henceforth French diplomacy and the treatment of 
foreigners would be based on a new legality. Volney, whose Ruines, ou Miditations sur 
les rivolutions des empires, published in 1791, envisaged a General Assembly of 
PeopleS'22 made a similar suggestion to his fellow-deputies in May 1790: 'Dans cette 
grande soci6t6 g6n6rale, les peuples et les Etats consider6s comme individus jouissent des 
m8mes droits naturels et sont sournis aux m8mes r6gles de justice que les individus des 
soci6tes partielles et secondaires. 23 While Volney's Assembly of Peoples was regarded as 
a chimera by most revolutionaries, his appeal to regard the whole human race as forming a 
19AP, xvii, 628; Montesquieu, De FEsprit des Loix, book xxi, chapter xvii. 
"See, for example, Ferriere, Dictionnaire de droitpractique, i, 585 - 586. 
21 Vattel, E. de, Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle (1758). See Heater, 
World Citizenship and Government, 75 and Hinsley, F. H., Power and the Pursuit of 
Peace. Iheory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1963), 166 - 167. 
2'Heater, World Citizenship and Government, 78. 
2'AP, xv, 576. 
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single society struck a chord, as it did with Bar6re when he called for the abolition of the 
droit d'aubaine on 6 August. " 
Economic theory, however, also entered into the equation. A few revolutionaries who 
had given attention to economic thought before 1789 were aware of Adam Sn-ýitws work, 
Wealth of Nations, published in 1776. Smith was cited in the discussions on the caisse 
d'escompte by Mirabeau and Dupont de Nemours, both of whom had developed the 
economic ideas of the 'Physiocrat' Frangois Quesnay. " Their ideas pointed to the same 
conclusion, that free trade ought to be beneficial to all concerned. ' "le much of the 
stress on free trade sought to provide the country's own needs, some idealists went further 
in regarding international commerce as a channel through which moral, social and political 
benefits could flow, as both Voltaire and Smith himself wrote. " 
Progressive eighteenth-century thinkers saw a link between commerce, a nation! s 
wealth and the ability of foreigners to settle freely in the country, without fear for either 
their personal security or their property. In 1755, Turgot translated and published a 
pamphlet written by Josiah Tucker on the British parliamentary bill for the naturalisation 
of foreign Protestants. The message, he believed, applied equally to France. Foreigners 
contributed to the manufacturing, commerce and, therefore, the wealth of the nation. The 
naturalisation of hardworking, thrifty and sober foreigners would reform the morals of the 
nation. "' The economic benefits of immigration encouraged some royal ministers 
including Necker and Calonne to consider a unilateral abolition of the droit d'aubaine. 
The revolutionaries inherited this thinking. In January 1790, Jean-Paul Marat wrote in 
his newspaper: 
Nous observons ici avec joic, quune constitution libre deviendra, pour la France une source 
intarissable de biens. Rdunis A la beautd du climat, A la fdconditd da sol, A la douceur du 
commerce de ses habitans, les charmes de la libertd attircroit bicnt6t parmi-nous une foule 
NAP, 
xvii, 628. 
25A, p, ix, 363 - 364; x, 139 - 140. 
26 Lewis, G., Ae French Revolution. Rethinking the Debate (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 64 - 65. 
27 Voltaire, Lettres philosophiques (173 3) (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1964), letter x; 
Smith, A., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations (1776), Gay, 
P. (ed. ), Ae Enlightenment: a comprehensive anthology (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1973), 609,611. 
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d6trangers, avcc leurs talens, leurs arts, leurs fortunes; ajoutons avcc leurs vertus, car il ny a que 
les coeurs honn8tes, les Ames dlcvdes qui se passionnent pour la libertd. ... Vexemple de leurs 
29 
vertus, fixeront la mobilitd de notre caract6re-, ils nous donneront des lumWes et des moeurs. 
Such ideas received practical application later that year, with the abolition of the droit 
d'aubaine. There were also broader, cultural and political influences at work in 
developing attitudes towards foreigners in the eighteenth century. Cosmopolitanism was 
not only a philosophy which recognised common characteristics among all humanity, but 
for an 61ite few, it was a way of life. The network of patrons, friendships and rivalries 
across Europe and the Atlantic in the eighteenth century, existed not only among the 
philosophes, but also among merchants, artists, acaden-&s, scientists, journalists, military 
officers, diplomats and aristocrats on the 'Grand Tour. Those who partook in the 
exchange of ideas, art, literature and science believed, like John Adams, that 'science and 
literature are of no party nor nation!. " During the Seven Years War, Casanova was told 
that a personal letter of introduction would ease his passage across war-torn Germany far 
more than any official passport. 31 
The development of international communication was aided by the fact that French was 
the international language of culture and diplomacy, which led some contemporaries to 
speak of I'Europefrangaise. The cosmopolitanism of the western world's political, 
cultural and scientific 61ites and the role of the French language in promoting it should not 
be overstated. Enlightenment cosmopolitanism and EuropefranVaise papered over deep 
cultural differences which in the long term proved to be more lasting than the 
cosmopolitan networks and lifestyle of the cultural and political 61ites. Local social, 
cultural and political circumstances produced regional and national peculiarities within the 
European Enlightenment itself 
. 
32 None the less, in France itself some of those who 
engaged in the veneer of cosmopolitan culture, or who saw it through the window of 
literature and the press, may have been left with the impression that Europeans and 
Americans thought in fundamentally the same way as the French. 
29LPAMi dU pellple, No. 96 (13 January 1790). 
"Quoted in Wood, G. S., Yhe Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: 
Vintage, 1993), 221. 
"Pomeau, R., LEurope des lumieres. Cosmopolitisme et uniN europ&nne au 18e SijCle 
(Paris: tditions Stock, 1966), 16. 
32 See, for example, the discussion of the Aujkldrung in Blanning, Reform and Revolution 
in Mainz,, I-37. 
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In literature, fictional foreigners, sometimes from very exotic places, were the innocent 
observers of French or European mores. Their alien origins detached these fictitious 
observers from everyday European life and allowed the writer to criticise and lampoon 
targets through the ignorant or nalve eyes of their character. " Such literary devices, of 
course, did not in themselves bring people to regard foreigners in a different light. As a 
means of criticising French and European customs and habits, however, they might have 
persuaded some of the more adventurous readers to consider that the norms of foreigners 
may have been viable, if not better, alternatives to those of the French. Such attitudes fed 
into a longer-term trend, at least among the intellectual 61ites, which stemmed from 
interest in both 'primitive' peoples on continents such as the Americas and civilisations 
such as the Chinese, both of which were idealized to some extent by some of the 
philosophes and other writers of the eighteenth century. 34 
Most French admiration for other cultures, however, focused on other European 
peoples, or those of European origins. For much of the eighteenth-century, Anglomanie 
was a strong cultural force among the social 61ites. Anglomanie operated at two levels: as 
a deep, critical interest in British society, letters and institutions and as a superficial 
inýiitation of British fashion and demeanour, sometimes to the extreme. 35 
Voltaire had sparked the interest in British institutions with his Lettresphilosophiques, 
If he was not uncritical of Britain 3' his approach was intended to imply that things were 
worse in France. This device was used against various aspects of French politics and 
society and one did not need to be blindly anglophile to do so. Echoing Voltaire, many 
writers praised British legal and political institutions, while savaging the superficial 
adoption of British fashions by French men and women of society. Louis-S6bastien 
Mercier wrote that the French had adopted British styles of clothing and entertainment, 
but 'quand leur prendrons-nous quelque chose de plus important A saisir, comme par 
"See Granderoute, R., 'Comment peut-on 6tre peruvienne ou Les Lettres dune 
peruvienne de Madame de Grafigny, Centre Interdisciplinaire bordelais d'6tudes des 
lun-dýres, Regard de/sur I'91ranger au XJ17IIe sikle (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de 
Bordeaux, 1958), 35 - 50. 
3'Mornet, Les Origines Intellectuelles, 259; Hampson, N., The Enlightenment 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 26 - 27,104,107. 
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exemple la loi habeas corpus? "' The political content of Anglomania in France was 
potent. Supporters of the Parlements sometimes suggested that the solution to the 
problems of absolutism was in the adoption of British parliamentary institutions. 38 
Voltaire, Montesquieu and Chastellux all praised the balance of crown, people and 
31 parliament. 
The American Revolution and the drafting of the United States constitution in 1787 
delivered a blow to the British political system as the avant-garde model for French 
opponents of ministerial 'despotism', who by the 1770s were calling themselves 'patriots'. " 
By late 1789, admiration for British institutions was more likely to be expressed by the 
monarchiens to the right of the National Assembly rather than the left, who debunked the 
British example because of its bicameral legislature and the power it afforded the king and 
his ministers. " None the less, a residual interest in British institutions and practices - 
ensured that, for the early years of the Revolution at least, British travellers and residents 
in France would be feted, as Dr. Rigby, Arthur Young and John Moore found between 
1789 and 1792. For political models, however, some radicals by then had dismissed 
looking abroad altogether and sought ideas in their own, French genius. They could still 
however turn to the United States for inspiration. The Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen in 1789 had striking similarities to American versions, particularly 
Virginia's, and this is partly explained by the fact that Lafayette was active in the 
preparation of the French document. He worked closely with Jefferson, who was in Paris 
at the time. On the other hand, for French patriots American political structures could not 
offer a blueprint for French institutions, for like the British, the Americans had split the 
people's representatives into two houses. At the very least, however, the United States 
was a precursor, a model of political virtue, with a constitution on which the French could 
now improve. "' 
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Revolutionary cosmopolitanism was a cocktail made from very different cordials. 
Enlightenment humanitarianism, legal concepts of international law, economic theory, 
international cultural exchange, anglomania and the idealization of America all weighed in 
varying degrees on individual revolutionaries. This diversity of intellectual and cultural 
origins, however, meant that cosmopolitanism would be given a wide variety of 
expression by different revolutionaries, whose motives were almost always driven by 
practical considerations. To speak of eighteenth-century'cosmopolitanisd is only useful, 
therefore, as a shorthand for a range of humanitarian sentiments and ideas, some of them 
very vague, which recognised the unity of mankind in a variety of forms. The 
revolutionaries succeeded in giving these impulses some coherence through the doctrine 
of the rights of man and, in doing so, created their own, 'revolutionary' cosmopolitanism. 
As human rights were attributed to man by nature, it followed that they were universal, as 
some of the American revolutionaries had claimed. The French Revolution was regarded, 
and not only by the French, as a force for positive change in the world, 'either as an 
example to follow, or as an active, proselytising agent. Once the universal implications of 
the rights of man were understood, so the other intellectual and cultural influences which 
the revolutionaries had inherited from the decades before 1789 were invested with a more 
radical meaning, 
These cosmopolitan impulses had their opposites and contradictory implications which 
were equally rooted in the intellectual and cultural background of the eighteenth century, 
Such antitheses to cosmopolitanism were also given coherence by the egalitarian notions 
of the rights of man. Humanity was so vast that benevolence was most effective if it was 
not aimed at people too far away. One's first duty was to one's fellow citizens. "' The 
obverse side of the cosmopolitan coin was therefore patriotism, and Rousseau has borne 
much responsibilty for its development. 
The influence of Rousseau on the political ideas of the revolutionaries in 1789 has been 
hotly debated. If the deputies had read Rousseau, who was undoubtedly a popular author 
among all the reading public from artisans to the aristocracy, they were not necessarily 
influenced by his political ideas. " Whether Rousseau was influential before 1789, or 
of a'community of ideas'rather than of any direct influence from America. While 
recognising the role of Jefferson and Lafayette, he points out that it was Mounier who 
drafted the first three articles, and he was not close to the American ambassador (Palmer, 
The Age of the Democratic Revolution, i, 487). 
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whether his writings were plundered retrospectively, what matters is that the 
revolutionaries, at some point, used his ideas in their formation of a patriotic ideology. At 
issue, therefore, are the varieties of patriotism which might have been drawn from his 
ideas. 
When Rousseau's conception of the social contract and the general will was discussed 
by the people who read and understood his ideas, as they did during the Maupeou crisis of 
177 1, its relevance focused on the internal tension within the state, in relation to the 
politics of the Ancien Regime. Those who opposed royal power called themselves 
'patriots' not in the sense that they felt threatened by or aggressive towards foreigners, but 
because they sought to put the interests of the country as a whole above the sectional 
interests of royal ministers. By 1789, this patriotism also entailed an assault on privilege, 
for the same reasons. For as long as patriotism meant opposition to the government, it 
was entirely compatible with cosmopolitan sentiments. Volney, the visionary of world 
citizenship, was regarded as one of those who styled themselves as 'national' or 'patriotic' 
opinion in the pamphlet war over representation to the Estates-General in 1789. " 
None the less, some of Rousseau's celebrations of patriotism did have connotations 
which were opposed to cosmopolitanism and which entailed the exclusion of foreigners 
from the nation! s political and social life. Concerned for the well-being of his homeland, a 
patriot might well be suspicious of the cosmopolitans who read approvingly of far-off 
places, but did nothing for their fellow citizens. This was what Rousseau meant in his 
influential work on education, tmile, when he warned'D6fiez-vous de ces cosmopolites 
qui vont chercher au loin dans leur livres des devoirs qu'ils dedaignent de remplir autour 
d'eux. "' This, written in 1762, was a reversal of his view published seven years previously 
in the Discours sur linigaliN, which described the 'grands imes cosmopolites qui 
franchissent les barri&es imaginaires qui s6parent les peuples et qui ... embrassent tout le 
genre humain dans leur bienveillance. 147 It has been suggested that Rousseau recognised 
man's common humanity in the abstract, but put patriotism first because communal 
solidarity is limited by distance . 
4' Rousseau remained steadfast in his denial of 
cosmopolitanism from 1762 onwards. In Du Contrat Social, he suggested that most of 
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what Peter the Great did for Russia was n-dsguided because the Russians were not ready 
for government through civil law: 'he tried to turn them into Germans or Englishmen 
instead of making them Russians'. " 
For Rousseau, there could be no constitutional or legal blueprint suited to all men, but 
rather they must suit the particular character and circumstances of the people for whom it 
was destined. National character was not only desirable, but necessary. In his Projet 
pour la Constitution de la Corse written in 1765, he declared that 'le meilleur mobile dun 
gouvernment c'est Vamour de la Patrie et cet amour se cultive avec les champs. A 
national identity should be invented if one did not exist already: 'tout peuple doit avoir un 
caract6re national et s'il en manquait it faudrait deja commencer par lui en donner'. 'o In 
this respect, Rousseau is rightly seen as the founder of modem nationalism, because he 
recognised the need of a people with no coherent identity or a clear-cut historical claim to 
nationhood to invent or to extrapolate one from the past, from language and from culture. 
For the Poles, in particular, the need for an aggressive patriotism was pressing in the 
struggle for independence and survival. 
Rousseau's view of nationality and its relation to the state was also modem in that it 
implied the exclusion of foreigners from the internal workings of the state. Foreigners did 
not have a sense of national identity inculcated from birth and so they would not have the 
necessary passion for the interests of the country. For this reason, Rousseau warned the 
Poles against mercenaries in his ConsWrations sur le gouvernment de Pologne. " The 
idea of a citizen army had a certain appeal among French people in the later eighteenth 
century, if only because both within the government and outside it many were already 
thinking along the same lines. " 
It was not, however, only to the army that the general ideas of national exclusion might 
have been applied, but also to government, administration and the clergy. At least one 
cahier de do1jances in 1789 denounced the appointment of foreigners to French public 
office and clerical benefices, while another complained that foreigners could acquire 
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lettres de naturalitj too easily. On the other hand, such expressions of exclusivity were 
rare. More cahiers were inclined to make naturalisation more accessible to foreigners, 
while others proposed that foreigners receive the same protection of the law as French 
people. " 
If Roussea&s ideas on patriotism had resonance among the reading public of the 
decades before the Revolution, it was because, as has been shown, they coincided with 
concerns and ideas already in circulation, but there were also broader, cultural influences. 
The most important of these, at least for educated people, was their knowledge and 
reading of the classics. Those who opposed royal power were more likely to draw on 
examples from Greek or Roman history than from Rousseau. If they looked to any 
eighteenth-century philosophe in their support for the parlements, it was Montesquieu, 
who himself referred frequently to the classics. While defying the crown, the 
parlementaires themselves played the part of Roman patricians defending the interests of 
thepatrie . 
5' During the Revolution, Hercules would come to symbolise the French people 
and the speeches of the revolutionaries would rely on classical examples, which could be 
traced to their education. While patriots in the later eighteenth century could find models 
worthy of emulation in the contemporary examples of the United States, Switzerland and 
Britain, history offered only the beacons of Sparta, Rome and Athens, with the intervening 
period being don-driated by kings and oppressive noblemen. " 
The main difference between the patriotism understood by opponents to royal power 
and that of conservatives was that the former focused on the internal political life of the 
nation itself, while the latter identified the patrie with the king rather than the people. 
Although conservatives were no more susceptible to xenophobia than theirpatriot' 
opponents, their defence of royal power put them in the forefront of the reaction against 
anglomanie before 1789. Meanwhile, 'patriotic' opponents of royal prerogatives were 
more willing to look abroad, for example to the United States and Britain, for models 
which they considered to be worthy for an enlightened people such as the French. 
Moreover, the example of the American Revolution had impressed French observers of 
the power of patriotism. Lafayette commented on the commitment of the American 
troops, saying that 'only citizens could support the nakedness, the hunger, the labours, and 
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the absolute lack of pay'. 56 For French patriots, the Americans offered a model of virtue, 
combining moral, political and scientific progress with the self-sacrifice required in the 
service of their fellow-citizens. 
The French intervention in America none the less gave conservatives the opportunity to 
express their own form of patriotism. In helping to establish a republic in America, 
defenders of royal absolutism ironically regarded the war as a struggle against the less 
radical, but apparently more threatening, British way of life. An anonymous 
correspondent of the Russian court reported of the atmosphere in Versailles in January 
1778, saying that 'il s'agit d'humilier l'orgueil Anglois et de rendre a la France son egalit6 
et sa sup6riorit6 sur la mer'. " The intervention in America did not, of course, create 
anglophobia. Besides a long-standing rivalry which naturally found expression in culture 
and politics, from the mid-eighteenth century anglophobia. was in part a reaction against 
anglomania, particularly for political conservatives. For Fougeret de Montbron writing in 
1757, 'Engfish Libertywas nothing other than'le droit fdroce de pouvoir insulter 
impun6ment i la Majest6 Rolale', that source of national identity for conservatives. 
During the Seven Years War, the conservatives' assaults on anglomania broadened in 
purpose. From defending the French system of government against its French opponents, 
they also sought to reinvigorate national pride. Their efforts intensified after the bitter 
disappointment of the peace. In 1765 the government commissioned from Pierre de 
Belloy a play entitled Le SMge de Calais, which met with resounding success. The heroes 
were naturally the six burghers who were willing to sacrifice all for their loyalty to their 
king and dismissive reviews by philosophes such as d'Holbach provoked fury from the 
piece's supporters, one of whom accused the iconoclasts of attemptingune Saint- 
Barth6lemy philosophique' on filial, fraternal and patriotic devotion. " 
Conservatives sought to show that their political opponents lacked love of country and 
that they slavishly imitated British forms and fashions. The mobilization of xenophobia as 
a political tool was to be used to devastating effect by the revolutionaries against their 
domestic opponents, but it is now clear that they did not invent this type of tactic. 
Jacques Necker suffered for his apparent adoption of 'British! practices, such as the 
publication of the Compte Rendu, attacked by conservatives who feared that he preferred 
British forms of government and even sought to introduce them into France. Moreover, 
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as a Genevan banker, he was suspected of being at the centre of an international network 
of Protestant financial institutions behind which lurked the British government. " In the 
last years of the Ancien R6gime, conservatives who supported the government's coup 
against the Parlements in May 178 8 accused the judges of 'anglomania! for their attempts 
to play a role in the governing of the kingdom. In the dispute over the organisation of the 
Estates-General, conservatives equated anglomania with republicanism and blamed British 
ideas for the Third Estate's intransigence. By 1789, the centre of debate had itself shifted 
leftwards after the collapse of royal authority. Consequently, the debate was no longer 
between absolutists and constitutional monarchists, but between different degrees of the 
latter. The admirers of the British 'constitution' now found themselves on the 
conservative side as the radicals looked to other sources of inspiration. Anglophobia now 
became the reserve of the left. ' 
In the years immediately before the Revolution, anglophobia was given another, 
popular appeal by the effects of the Eden-Vergennes commercial treaty between Britain 
and France signed in 1786. Of at least forty-six cahiers de doliances which mentioned 
the treaty, eleven expressed strong reservations about its effects. 6, Reading between the 
lines, it is possible to detect a smouldering resentment at the British in these 
denunciations. " On 4 November 1787, Arthur Young was amazed to find people crying 
for war against Britain in Lille, ostensibly over the United Provinces. Young, however, 
was certain'that the origin of all this violence is the commercial treaty, which is execrated 
here, as the most fatal stroke to their manufactures they ever experienced. ` Normandy 
was also reputed to be in favour of war for the same reason. Some manufacturers and 
artisans suspected that the British were not honouring the terms of the treaty and, while 
flooding France with their goods, were boycotting French imports. ' 
As much as the British, the Austrians were also the targets of French revulsion. 
Matters were made worse because they appeared, at least to educated French eyes, to 
have no redeeming features such as a model constitution and civil liberties. Like Britain, 
the Habsburgs had long been a traditional enemy of France, going back more than two 
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centuries, at least to the age of Emperor Charles V. As d'Argenson wrote, 'it has always 
been a fundamental rule of our statesmen that Habsburg power must be reduced to the 
point at which the lands of the Emperor are no greater than those of the wealthiest 
Electoe.,, Yet by the time of the French Revolution, public opinion in France also had to 
swallow the bitterness of an unpopular alliance with Austria in 1756. The ensuing 
decades saw foreign policy disasters for France, ' which explains why, in the words of the 
French foreign minister, de Bemis, Frederick II was'loved to the point of madness' in 
France, while 'the court of Vienna is hated because it is seen as the bloodsucker of the 
state'. ' Hostility to the Austrian alliance was shared by public opinion outside the court 
and the foreign ministry. In 1778, the abbd de Mably predicted that 'the Emperor will call 
on us to restore Lorraine, Alsace and anything else he pleases. " Austrophobia appears to 
have had the power to unite, however ephemerally, conservatives and 'patriots' in later 
eighteenth-century France. Supporters of royal absolutism blamed the Austrian alliance 
both for defeats by the British while their opponents suspected an Austrian faction at 
work in the court of Versailles. They regarded Maria Theresa, not unfairly, as a religious 
bigot and as a friend to the Jesuits. In common with the conservatives, opponents of the 
absolute monarchy blamed the Austrian alliance for undermining French prestige and 
power on the international stage. ' Austrophobia was translated into very personal terms 
when it was aimed at Marie-Antoinette. Much of the gossip about her profligacy, her 
sexual appetites and her undue political influence stemmed from rival political factions in 
thecourtitself. The revolutionary phobia about the 'Austrian Committee' and the fantastic 
charges levelled at Marie-Antoinette at her trial can therefore be traced back in part to the 
politics and malicious rumour of the court at Versailles. 'O 
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The revolutionaries' notions of patriotism stemmed from a wide variety of sources. If 
Rousseau's ideas influenced the development of revolutionary patriotism, then they did so 
because they coincided with and reinforced broader cultural and political factors. 
Concerns of people about royal 'despotism' naturally made them receptive to Rousseau's 
ideas about the general will, the social contract and the need for institutions which 
reflected the 'national character' of the people, but Rousseau was not the only factor in 
shaping revolutionary patriotism. Patriotism defined as opposition to royal power drew 
inspiration as much from the classics and from the examples of Britain and America as 
they did from Rousseau. In turn, these cultural and intellectual influences were given 
weight by the experience of politics in the last decades of the Ancien R6gime, which most 
educated people viewed as spectators. 
Patriotism as understood by the revolutionaries in 1789 was inward-looking in the 
sense that it focused on the good of the people and the state, rather than outwards in any 
aggressive fashion. In this respect, it was possible for a patriote to be a cosmopolite as 
well. Before 1789 it therefore fell to conservatives to express a strain of patriotism which 
was more explicitly xenophobic. Anglophobia was the reserve of the defenders of 
absolute monarchy. These conservatives sought to show that, as their opponents sought 
to introduce foreign systems into France, they were at heart unpatriotic and even the 
agents of foreign interests. The revolutionaries would later use similar tactics against their 
opponents, but it is clear that they were not the first to use xenophobia as a political 
weapon. As their political thinking led them to identify the king with the patrie, 
conservatives were also led to focus more exclusively than their opponents on traditional 
French institutions, for at least two reasons. First of all, as the last Bourbon kings 
themselves claimed, these institutions emanated from royal authority. Secondly, they 
were the very structures which the 'patriote sought to change. This is not to say, 
however, that the 'patriots' were immune from xenophobia, or that the conservatives had a 
monopoly of it. Austrophobia appears to have been shared in equal measure by both 
camps, even if it was for different reasons. During the Revolution, it was the 'patriots' of 
the left and not the right who expressed hostility to British institutions, because, in a 
reversal of Ancien R6gime conservatives' motives for anglophobia, they were not radical 
enough. 
if the origins of revolutionary cosmopolitanism and patriotism present a complex 
picture, so too does the relationship between them. It has already been suggested that in 
1789 it was possible to be both a patriot and a cosmopolitan, but if patriotism meant 
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surrendering one's interests for the good of the nation, that also meant defending it from 
foreign attack. During the summer of 1790, therefore, some revolutionaries were moved 
by the threat of war into cosmopolitanism, while others were driven to xenophobic and 
bellicose patriotism. The fact that the same circumstances could provoke such a wide 
range of responses among the revolutionaries suggests that they - and the Revolution 
itself - were not driven by any single ideological dynamic. There were cases where 
patriotism and cosmopolitanism coincided, usually when the revolutionaries saw national 
interest being served by adopting pacific or humanitarian policies. Such a coincidence 
was also made possible because both patriotism and cosmopolitanism shared similarities in 
their cultural and intellectual origins. If the revolutionaries gave them some ideological 
coherence, they did not eliminate the possibility of overlap between the two. For this 
reason revolutionary attitudes towards foreigners did not develop from a clear-cut conflict 
between cosmopolitanism and patriotism. 
11 
The revolutionaries gave coherence to the various manifestations of eighteenth-century 
cosmopolitanism and patriotism by anchoring them to the doctrines of the rights of man 
and the sovereignty of the nation. Ideology, of course, was not the only factor which 
shaped attitudes towards foreigners: the traditional phobias and prejudices brought into 
the Revolution from eighteenth-century society were important as well. The xenophobia 
which emerged as early as the summer of 1791 in response to the flight to Varennes, but 
which received its sharpest expression during the Terror, was not created by the 
Revolution. Rather the problems which arose, many of which were admittedly of the 
revolutionaries' own making, gave rise to phobias which had been deeply embedded in 
both 61ite and popular culture for years before 1789. Xenophobia, invasion scares and 
conspiracy theories were not a product of revolutionary ideology, but the revolutionaries 
were certainly not above manipulating these customary fears for their own political ends. 
The result was that revolutionary ideology often incorporated longer-term prejudices, the 
one giving greater force to the other. 
Eighteenth-century culture did not, of course feed only into xenophobia. The legal 
minds of many of the deputies made them respect the basic civil rights of foreigners and 
object, even in the autumn of 1793, to some of the measures taken against them on 
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various ideological and econon-dc grounds. Outside the Assembly, there is evidence to 
suggest that, from 1789 to the Year II and beyond, lower-ranking officials and ordinary 
people were receptive and sympathetic to foreigners. Revolutionary ideology provided a 
coherent framework within which these various impulses and traditional attitudes could be 
expressed. Meanwhile, this ideology itself had both cosmopolitan and patriotic 
implications. Circumstances and the revolutionaries' pragmatic responses to events 
determined the evolution and relationship between the two. 
lEstorians who have identified ideology and rhetoric as the dynamic which pushed 
revolutionary politics to ever more radical positions until the Terror of the Year 11" have 
not, of course, looked specifically at attitudes towards foreigners. None the less, the fact 
that the concept of national sovereignty implied that foreigners should be driven from 
participation in French public life - and the fact that this did not happen in any clear-cut 
way - begs the question as to how important any ideological dynamic really was when set 
next to more pragmatic concerns. For this reason, it is worth examining the development 
of revolutionary patriotism and cosmopolitanism during the various crises faced by the 
revolutionaries. It is best to begin this examination by looking at the concepts of national 
sovereignty and the rights of man. 
In defining the nation simply as a group of associates who lived under the same laws 
and same legislature, the abb6 Siey6s allowed for a wide scope of people to be included. 
A common culture, history, religion, language and ties of race or'blood' are absent, which 
implied that anyone who sought to affiliate with the nation could do so merely by 
expressing a desire to live under the same laws and legislature as everyone else. There 
were practical as well as ideological reasons for this assimilationist approach, but when 
Siey6s wrote these words naturalisation and immigration were not foremost in his mind. 
For Siey&s early in 1789, those who elected not to live under the same law and the same 
legislature were the privileged orders. None the less he also asked whether those who did 
not contribute to the life of the nation in some way should be admitted to political rights. " 
He answered his own question during the discussion of the rights of man and the citizen in 
August 1789: women, children, foreigners and'those who contribute nothing to 
maintaining the public establishment, should have no active influence on public affairs'. 
"See, for example, Furet, Penser la Revolutionftanýaise, 81 - 119; Hunt, Politics, 
Culture and Class in the French Revolution, 19 -51. Hunt, at least, admits that 'although 
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They can all 'enjoy the advantages of society' and share in civil rights, but only those who 
contribute to national life 'are the true active citizens, the true members of the 
associatiore. " Revolutionary concepts of rights explicitly excluded foreigners from the 
body politic from the very outset of the Revolution. Foreigners could contribute privately 
to the economic and social fife of the nation, but revolutionary ideology had a 
'nationalising' logic which ought to have led to their exclusion from the military, the 
church and from politics, because those activities entailed direct involvement with the 
state. 
The doctrine of the sovereignty of the nation also had implications for foreigners 
outside France and it was in that direction that its first great challenge was inadvertently 
directed. The decrees of 4-II August 1789 theoretically destroyed not only seigneurial 
privilege, but also distinctions between provinces, towns and corporations. In so doing, 
they attempted to make the nation rather than the province or municipality the source of 
identity and legitimacy. The application of these decrees in Alsace challenged not only the 
patchwork quilt of internal French differences, but also the droitpublic in Europe. 
Princes of the Holy Roman Empire who had estates in Alsace had privileges and 
sovereignty which had been guaranteed by treaty since the province first fell into French 
hands in 1648. The revolutionary assault on privilege and the absolute nature of national 
sovereignty was theoretically irreconcilable with this apparent anomaly of overlapping or 
enclaved sovereignty within French territorial limits. The attempt by the revolutionaries 
to apply their laws and their principles to Alsace therefore brought them running headlong 
into the established international order. " The response of the revolutionaries revealed 
two tendencies, one in favour of compron-dse, the other unbending and doctrinaire. La 
Rochefoucauld sought to reconcile the interests of diplomacy with the principles of the 
French Revolution, and suggested negotiation with the princes for compensation. On the 
other hand Rewbell, himself an Alsatian, insisted on the absolute sovereignty of the 
people: the National Assembly's decrees must apply and there should be no 
compensation. " In the end, the Constituent accepted la Rochefoucauld's more diplomatic 
position on 28 October 1790. The decree recognised that the princes should be 
compensated not as of right, but because of 'la bienveillance et Varniti6 qui, depuis si 
"Sieyes, Treliminary to the French Constitution% Hunt, Ae French Revolution and 
Human Rights, 8 1; Jennings, J., 'The DMaration des droits de Momme et du citoyen and 
its critics in France: reaction and i&o1ogie', Historical Journal, xxxv (1992), 843. 
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longtemps unissent la nation frangaise aux princes d! Allemagne', which was a polite way of 
saying that compensation was being offered out of diplomatic necessity. " The 
revolutionaries were clearly not being led by their ideology, but by pragmatic diplomatic 
considerations. 
For the first two years of the Revolution, most deputies believed that it was in the 
national interest not to challenge the international order, despite the implications of their 
principles. This pragmatic approach to international politics emerged both in the affair of 
Alsace and in the declaration of 22 May 1790, but is most dramatically illustrated with the 
papal enclaves of Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin. The eloquent support of left-wing 
deputies like Ntion and Robespierre for the petitions of the Avignonnais and the 
Venaissins for annexation did not convince the Constituent Assembly to accept their 
requests for annexation until late in its existence. This was despite the fact that from June 
1790 onwards both territories had chased out the papal rulers, that the inhabitants of the 
enclaves had long been treated as French subjects and that the evidence suggested that the 
desire of most of the inhabitants for 'reunion' with France proper was sincere. " Both 
Robespierre and Wtion based their arguments on the right of self-determination. "' 
Ironically, both men had also been leading proponents of the declaration of 22 May, but 
there was little contradiction in supporting the annexation of Avignon and the Comtat. 
The deputies on the left were convinced that annexation of the papal enclaves would be 
no conquest as the peoples there had exercised their sovereign right to determine their 
own political allegiances. "' Both the May declaration and the arguments for annexation 
were also based'on a particular view of national interest. The former aimed at ensuring 
that France would be left at peace while the latter claimed that the papal enclaves were the 
refuge of dmigr6s and counter-revolutionaries. " 
For the time being, however, most of the deputies were too wary of the consequences 
of applying the principle of self-determination outside France's frontiers. At least Alsace 
had been ceded to France by treaty, which was why the government could have some 
legitimacy in implementing the laws of August 1789. For Avignon and the Corntat, no 
such traditional legality existed, bar a few ancient and obscure edicts which suggested that 
"'AP, xx, 84. Some of the princely complaints and the memoranda on the progress of 
negotiations may be found in AN, F/7/4399. 
"Godechot, La Grande Nation, 69. 
"See, for example, Robespierre, Oeuvres, vi, 589. 
`Robespierre, Oeuvres, vi, 591. 
"Robespierre, Oeuvres, vi, 594. 
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the French kings had retained control of the enclaves. " For a while the political sense of 
the revolutionaries made them reluctant to apply the idea beyond France's borders, 
The revolutionaries were equally pragmatic when they implemented their ideas and 
their legislation on foreigners living in France. If they were not immediately aware of the 
exclusive implications of their ideas, they were very much aware of the practical pressures 
to purge the army, church and state of foreigners whose dedication to the nation might 
have been considered less than wholehearted. At the same time, however, to have' 
followed these impulses might also have caused a diplomatic farore and have practical 
effects on the state. Moreover, the very concept of natural rights lent itself to the 
cosmopolitan strands of eighteenth-century thought and culture which encouraged the 
participation of foreigners in French society. 
For the revolutionaries, patriotism implied a recognition of the rights of one's 
neighbours, as well as the interests of the nation. While one merely had to be born human 
to have natural rights, it was in society that these rights became civil and perhaps active 
political rights. It was the many institutional differences by which man traded his natural 
liberty for his civil liberty which was one of the factors which differentiated one nation 
from another. None the less, these differences could not obscure the fact that they 
stemmed from the same, universal and natural rights. 
In the early years of the Revolution the more exuberant patriots were in no doubt that 
it was the role of the French to enlighten other peoples of the good news about their 
universal and inalienable rights. On 5 August 1789, the abb6 Fauchet told his audience 
that 'la France sera le mod6le des Nations & l'institutrice de la vraie Libert6 dans 
l'Univers. "' Early in 1790, Bar&e wrote that France was now'une nation dclair6e, amie 
de Phumanit6' which would 'adresse enfin a tous les peuples le seul langage qui puisse 
convenir a la sagesse humaine: les droils de I'homme sont la liberij, lapropri&j, la 
sfiretg, et la Hsistance ii Foppression. 183 There was of course a good deal of national self- 
congratulation in this assumption of the role of moral leadership. This feeling fed 
naturally into the later view that the French should take a more active role in 'liberating' 
the subject-peoples of Europe. For the time being, however, the revolutionaries' 
"Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, 78; Blanning, 7he French 
Revolutionary Wars, 50-51. 
"Fauchet, C., Discours sur la fiberMfranpise, prononci le mercredi 5 aofit 1789 (Paris, 
1789), 15. See also Fauchet's Sermon sur lAccord de la Religion et de la fibertj 
prononcý dans laMtropole de Paris, le 4 Hvrier 1791 (Paris, n. d. ), 31-32. 
"Bar6re de Vieuzac, B., Efrennes dupeuple, ou D&Iaration des droils de Momme et du 
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assumption of the mantle of educators was expressed in a more pacific way. As the 
debates on war and peace in May 1790 show, many deputies were painfully aware of 
French military and fiscal weaknesses, a knowledge which gave pacific cosmopolitanism 
potency. The National Assembly adopted the famous declaration of non-aggression 
because the revolutionaries could follow no other policy. It did, however, coincide 
happily with the sincere beliefs of some deputies. 
Beyond the hard realities of foreign policy, some revolutionaries argued in 1789 - 1790 
that France was to reap the benefits of liberty by attracting the skills, expertise, wealth and 
morals of foreigners. In 1790 both Marat (himself Swiss of origin) and Bar6re 
pragmatically argued that foreigners would bring various benefits to France. " Combined 
with the doctrine of natural rights, such ideas led the revolutionaries to take an 
assimilationist attitude towards those foreigners who could offer something to the nation, 
economically, socially or intellectually. The desire to adopt foreigners who chose to live 
in France and to become French citizens was therefore based on a combination of 
enlightened self-interest and cosmopolitan ideology. 
This coexistence of national interest with cosmopolitanism was graphically illustrated 
by the festivals in the surnmer of 1790. Across France they had a distinctly martial tone, 
with the National Guards, regular soldiers and officials taking pride of place. Besides the 
emphasis on national unity and the rule of law, both of which were internally-focused, the 
festivals also stressed the willingness of citizens to fight and die for the whole community, 
thepatrie within which individual citizens enjoyed their rights. " On the other hand, 
politicians and citizens alike saw no contradiction in admitting foreigners to the 
celebrations. In Paris, for example, Anacharsis Cloots led thirty-five 'comn-dssairee of the 
'comite des itrangers' to the bar of the National Assembly on 19 June 1790 and received 
permission to participate in the celebrations. " French militia and regular troops swearing 
to defend the patrie alongside foreigners celebrating the unity of the French nation 
suggested that the Revolution was of universal significance and that its defence would be 
a struggle not only for the French people, but for all mankind. In Nantes a festival was 
held 23 August 1790 to celebrate a future federation of understanding between Britain 
and France. The organisers saw no contradiction in proclaiming'patrie, uniod, and 
'06ration du 14 juillet'next to'r6volution de I'Angleteffe' (that of 1688-89) and'grande- 
"L'Ami du Peuple, No. 96 (13 January 1790); AP, xvii, 628 - 629. 
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charte' (Magna Carta). " To the Nantes Jacobins, national unity and patriotism cohabited 
with cosmopolitanism. 
Such symbolism and ideas were not always lost on people beyond those who could 
afford journal subscriptions or the dues payable to political clubs. An awareness, no 
matter how inaccurate or crude, of the political situation of other countries could lead 
some among the menu-peuple to feel sympathy for the plight of other peoples, and 
perhaps to express these feelings in terms of the rights of man and revolutionary 
cosmopolitanism. " The evidence for this is impressionistic, and is limited to chance 
encounters between travellers and ordinary French people. In Paris on 14 July 1789, for 
example, Doctor Edward Rigby and his English travelling companions were'recognised as 
Englishmen; we were embraced as freemen. "' He was told by a shopkeeper at Antibes 
that 'the English had a Revolution a hundred years before, but he hoped the French would 
have a more complete one. " Sometimes, the reputation of a single foreigner might elicit 
favourable ideas about that person's nationality. The Russian traveller, N. M. Karamzin, 
was speaking German with his companions at a frontier inn on 4 March 1790. An old 
man, hearing them talk, approached and spoke of the marichal de Saxe in glowing 
terms. " If the people at large had little conception of cosmopolitanism, they had their 
own legends and images which made them no less willing to accept foreigners in their 
midst. They were certainly neither indifferent to foreigners nor traditionally xenophobic. 2 
None the less, both revolutionary cosmopolitanism and patriotism had its opponents. 
There was first of all conservative patriotism, which rejected both eighteenth-century 
"Revolutions de France et de Brabant, iv, Nos. 45,47; Patriote Franýais, iii, No. 407 
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cosmopolitanism and revolutionary patriotism, because they both implied criticism and 
change of traditional French insitutions. In the National Assembly on 21 May 1790, the 
royalist Cazales rose to express this more exclusive love of country, which focused 
entirely on the French people themselves. 'La patrie', he declared, 'doit 6tre l'objet exclusif 
de notre amour'. 9' His distrust of cosmopolitanism did not come from any latent 
xenophobia so much as a concern for national honour and pride in national institutions. 
For Cazal6s, a person received his attributes as both a man and a citizen only through his 
love of the patrie, which was more than just a political association, but a whole cultural 
and social ethos attached to the country. In this view, there were more factors dividing 
the whole of humanity than those bringing them together. For this reason, national 
honour was more important than peace or the rights of other nations. Similarly, on 15 
May the duc de Biron suggested that never before was peace more vital to France's 
interests and was worth pursuing at any price, 'mais non pas celui de Phonneur et du 
caract6re national. #94 
The conservative emphasis on honour jarred with the left's version of patriotism. On 
an individual level, honour was aristocratic because it could stem from the conferring of 
privilege and office by the king. It conflicted with revolutionary egalitarianism and 
meritocracy. The German traveller CamPe witnessed a commotion in the National 
Assembly in August 1789 when Target opened a speech withVAssembl6e nationale a 
Monneur... 1. He was shouted down with cries of 'Point d'honneurl Point d'honneur! 
Effacez ce motl'95 In July 179 1, Brissot claimed that the philosophes had undermined 
honour in favour of virtue, which meant that patriotism was to be based not on service to 
the crown, in return for honour and position, but on the citizens' willing subjection of their 
own personal interests for the greater good of the nation. ' 
Much conservative pride in national institutions and character was not that different 
from some of the sentiments which underlay the patriotism of the left. The essential 
difference was that the left wished to take pride in institutions which it sought to create, 
while conservatives sought to preserve traditional French structures as much as possible. 
On 15 July 1790 the editor of the Gazette de Paris complained that the Festival of the 
Federation was being compared to those given in Ancient Rome and Greece, which he 
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saw as republics: 'Let us not change our ancient formulas. Heirs of the Franks ... 
let us 
fight, love, live and die like them, faithful to the principles of our Fathers'. ` Like this 
conservative journalist, some radical, left-wing patriots also rejected classical models, but 
because they saw the Revolution as a complete break with the past and rejected all 
precedents. 
The focus of such radical patriots on modem, French thinking for inspiration could 
sometimes be expressed in terms of anglophobia. As the Revolution offered opportunities 
to go further than the British in limiting royal power, so many radicals came to regard the 
British and even the American constitutions as unsuited to the French, who were 
beginning with a tabula rasa, and who were theoretically ready and willing to construct a 
pure system based on the rights of man. If the revolutionaries recognised a debt to the 
British and the Americans, there was no doubt in their minds that the French were to take 
the torch of human rights further than their anglophone predecessors. The abb6 Fauchet 
commented that'la premi6re grande nation qui poss6de laplinitude de la libert6, c'est la 
nation Anglo-Am6ricaine; la premi6re qui s! appr6te ij ouir de la perfecfiýn de la liberte, 
c! est la nation Frangoise'. 98 
The belief that the French were going further than the British and the Americans was 
not only ideological, but political because it clashed with both royalists and the 
monarchiens. It explains the irritation with which deputies on the left greeted citations of 
British examples. When Nfirabeau presented Samuel Romilly's work on the procedures of 
the House of Commons for the benefit of the Estates-General in the spring of 1789, the 
acidic reply, Etienne Dumont remembered a decade later, was that 'nous ne sommes pas 
Anglais et nous ifavons pas besoin des Anglais'. ' A more important rejection of the 
British parliamentary system as a model by the left came during the constitutional debates, 
in which opponents of the royal veto rejected the British model. It was, in contrast, the 
moderates and the royalists on the right who enthusiastically cited British, and even 
American examples. " 
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It is one thing to criticise the institutions of a particular country, another to resent its 
people. Even the latter emerged in some of the speeches of both left and right during the 
Nootka Sound crisis. On the right, the baron de Menou issued the call to arms, to 
thunderous applause, 'nous irons attaquer I'Angleterre en Angleterre m8me. ' None the 
less, he tempered his bellicose rhetoric by admitting that 'I'Angleterre est une nation libre, 
magnanime et g6n6reuse', although the French, now free, would be a match for the 
British. Boisgelin, the archbishop of Aix, argued in favour of standing by Spain on 21 
May because to do otherwise would be to leave Britain, 'cette puissance rivale', with an 
open field in which to become'la maitresse et I'arbitre du commerce, nous ravirait a la fois 
et tous les tr6sors de la paix et toutes les ressources de la guerre. ' On the left, Le 
Chapelier described Britain as a country who 'a touj ours 6t6 notre rivale et notre ennemie 
... Elle menace i la fois nos possessions dans nos iles et notre industrie. This description 
of Britain gave rise to murmurs, showing that some in the Assembly on both left and right 
were carried away by appeals to national greatness and were spoiling for a fight against 
the old enemy, while there was an equally vocal group, possibly cutting across political 
divisions, which was anglophile and opposed to going to war for both pragmatic and 
ideological reasons. "' Anglophobia was virulent on both left and right and took on both a 
political form in the constitutional debates and a more emotional expression which 
stemmed from customary fears and prejudices towards the old enemy. 
Such prejudices had a long history, and were shared by a wide variety of people at all 
social levels. In the 'Great Fear' of 1789, memories of past invasions took on a legendary 
form in the minds of the peasantry. In Alsace and Lorraine, rumours of Swedish brigands 
circulated, which can only be explained by folk-memory of the Thirty Years War. In the 
centre and the Midi, traditions went back even further, to the Hundred Years War. In the 
Vivarais, one rumoured band of brigands called itself 'la troupe anglaise. "' During the 
first two years of the Revolution, there were various invasion scares in which the local 
population variously blamed the British and the Dutch (Toulon, December 1789); the 
6migr6s, the Sardinians, Savoyards and Nigois (Marseille, May 1790); the Savoyards and 
the 6migres again (Grenoble, July 1790); the Austrians (the Ardennes, July 1790); the 
6migres supported by Spain, Sardinia, Austria and Prussia (the Comminges, July 1790); 
the Austrians again (the Clermontais, August 1790) and the Spanish (the Basses-Pyr6n6es, 
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July 1791). " Each scare was usually provoked by local rumours embellished by tradition, 
but they sometimes had foundations in wider political circumstances: it is no surprise that 
the bulk of invasion scares should have occured over the summer of 1790, when it seemed 
even to those in touch with diplomatic affairs that France might go to war with Britain. 
The fright in the Ardennes in July 1790 was echoed within the chamber of the National 
Assembly itself, as it was tied to the diplomatic manoeuvres of the Austrian ambassador 
who had sought permission for the passage of Austrian troops across French territory. 
The rumour of an Austrian invasion spread quickly and in the last ten days of July, 
peasants in the Ardennes took up arms and patrolled the frontiers at night, awakening 
their compatriots with cries of 'Aux armes, voici Vennerni! "' 
Tied up with these invasion scares and fears of foreign brigands was another cultural 
tradition common to much of the western world: the fear of conspiracy. Without easy or 
affordable access to information, peasants, artisans, professionals and aristocrats alike 
slipped easily into conspiracy theories as a means of explaining problems or crises whose 
origins were not immediately apparent. If it was such a mentality which helped to drive 
the Revolution along its radical and bloody course, "' it was not the product of 
revolutionary ideology, but of the social and cultural conditions of the eighteenth- 
century. " Such conspiracy theories were often driven by evidence of malign intentions 
which with hindsight might not have been proof of plots, but which was sinister enough in 
itself. During the Revolution, foreigners figured highly in such conspiracy theories. The 
presence of a high proportion of foreign troops in the build-up of forces around Paris and 
Versailles in July 1789 aggravated the already deep fears amongst the population and 
politicians alike. " The tradition of conspiracy theories and the diverse expressions of 
xenophobia fed each other and would merge in a most sophisticated way in the Year 11 
with the famous 'foreign plot. 
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The first two years of the Revolution saw the expression of the whole variety of 
eighteenth-century strands of patriotism and cosmopolitanism. For the revolutionaries, 
both developments were given a new coherence and expression through the doctrine of 
the rights of man. As they shared this same ideological framework, cosmopolitanism and 
patriotism were not immediately in conflict, but overlapped, particularly when the 
revolutionaries' view of the national interest dictated a pacific, but defensive attitude 
towards foreign powers. For conservatives, the radical implications of both revolutionary 
cosmopolitanism and patriotism had to be combatted with their appeals to the exclusive 
love of country, its traditions and its existing institutions. There were areas, however, 
where revolutionary and conservative patriotism coincided: many radical revolutionaries 
and royalists alike rejected anglomania and both could be stirred by the call to arms and 
the appeal to the martial valour of the nation. Both also rejected appeals to the classical 
past for models of patriotism. The meaning and direction behind these expression were 
however different. For radicals, the British system was too monarchical and aristocratic, 
while royalists rejected it because it stripped the king of too much power. In the middle 
ground, as was made evident by the festivities and journalism of 1789 - 1790, most 
revolutionaries were willing to recognise their inheritance from the British and the 
Americans, while suggesting that the French would go still further. In the midst of this 
national self-congratulation, it was possible for patriots to cast themselves as the 
educators of the rest of Europe and, consequently, to be cosmopolitan in their attitudes 
towards foreigners. Beneath the surface of these pacific forms of patriotism and 
cosmopolitanism, however, lurked the fears and prejudices inherited from the cultural and 
social milieu of the eighteenth century. The shock of Varennes and the conservative 
backlash would upset the careful equilibrium of pragmatism and idealism which the 
revolutionaries had maintained until the summer of 179 1. From that time on, they would 
give expression to some of the more extreme implications of their ideology. Traditional 
fears would burst out with a vehemence which drowned out the careful cosmopolitanism 
of the earlier years of the Revolution. 
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III 
Revolutionary attitudes towards foreigners were irreversibly affected by the flight to 
Varennes. Underlying phobias and prejudices erupted into revolutionary politics and, 
eventually, led the revolutionaries to abandon their former caution and follow the more 
radical implications of their patriotic and cosmopolitan principles. 
On 21 June 1791 Charles de Lameth, denying that the king had been kidnapped, 
warned of 'ces f6d6rations des despotes contre la libert6 et les int6r6ts des peuplee. 
Outside the assembly, Brissot steeled himself for something greater than a defensive war: 
'La Rivolution frangaise sera le foyer sacr6 d'&t partira 1'6tincelle qui embrasera les 
nations dont les maltres oseront I'approcher. "' While Brissot did not call for an 
aggressive war of liberation, the noises he was making were still indicative of a more 
defiant attitude towards the European powers. He also showed a tendency towards 
germanophobia. I-Es journal, the PatrioteftanVais, announced the imminence of a 
German invasion at least three times in the summer of 179 1, months before he made his 
first bellicose speech as a deputy in the Legislative Assembly on 20 October. "' From 23 
July, Prudhomme's Nvolutions de Paris urged vigilance against invasion and in August 
presented a defensive plan against'la ligue des tyrans. "11 Convinced that Varennes was a 
prelude to invasion, the radical press now invoked the patriotism which entailed defence 
of the patrie. Patriots were certain that a people fighting for its newly-won freedom 
would be invincible. The prospectus of the Journal du Club des Cordefiers confidently 
predicted that 'cette horde de vils esclaves et de brigands' would easily be dispersed by 
free men. The Rivolutions de Paris declared that the invasion plans of the 'hordes 
6trang6res' would be in vain. "' 
The confidence in the ability of free men to fight for their liberty combined with a 
genuine fear of foreign attack or interference was a fatal mixture. It turned revolutionary 
patriotism outwards against the Revolutiods enemies and gave revolutionary 
cosmopolitanism a more militant and aggressive form. Revolutionary perceptions of 
foreign hostility encouraged two important developments in revolutionary attitudes. First 
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of all, the traditional suspicions of Austria and, in particular, of an Austrian faction at 
court, re-emerged. The flight to Varennes and the king's later use of the royal veto on the 
laws against 6migr6s and refractory clergy convinced people that government policy was 
being directed by an 'Austrian comn-iittee, led by Marie-Antoinette in collaboration with 
the 6migr6s and the Austrian court. This potent cultural and political device only 
intensified once France actually went to war with Austria. 
Secondly, the revolutionaries were more willing to follow their principles of national 
self-determination. Until the flight to Varennes, the Constituent had been reluctant to 
accept arguments which legitimised the annexation of Avignon and the Corntat Venaissin. 
It was only from the summer of 1791 that the annexationists gained ground, with the 
flight to Varennes, the Padua Circular and the Declaration of Pillnitz. These events and 
wider fears of foreign intervention had prompted the revolutionaries not only to take a 
more defiant posture towards the European powers, but also to seek jurisdiction over 
enclaves which, it was claimed, harboured counter-revolutionary elements. It was only 
when that point was reached that the Constituent annexed Avignon and the Corntat 
Venaissin on 14 September 179 1. That it was less the logic of revolutionary ideas which 
led the revolutionaries to take this step than a response to the crisis of the summer is 
shown by the decree of annexation itself, which combined the old and the new 
justifications. The people had freely expressed their desire to join France, but France had 
a legitimate claim to jurisdiction over the enclaves by virtue of ancient rights which had 
never been rescinded. 113 
Although revolutionary principles of self-determination implied a challenge to the 
international order in Europe, the French themselves only applied them when they felt 
driven to do so by circumstances. None the less, the long-term result of applying such 
notions against the traditional droit public of Europe was explosive. From the very 
beginning, the definition of a nation without reference to language, religion or ethnicity 
had been clearly assimilationist in terms of the internal questions of citizenship and 
naturalisation. It also implied, however, that there were no set geographical limits to the 
nation, either. "' This meaning did not emerge until after the first conquests were made by 
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of free men sharing the same law, and not the traditional division of lordship, parish and 
custom, who then was to say where the frontiers of liberty should lieT (Patriots and 
Liberators. Revolution in the Netherlands 1780 - 1813 (2nd ed. ) (London: Fontana, 
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the French in the late autumn of 1792. None the less, the fear inspired by the flight to 
Varennes among patriotic circles and the bitterness felt by the radicals after the 
conservative backlash led some of the more ambitious among them to exploit the universal 
implications of the rights of man for their own political ends. Fused with the bellicose 
language which followed the flight, the cosmopolitanism inherent in revolutionary 
ideology was finally turned outwards towards other peoples in a militant, crusading 
fashion. 
As a deputy to the Legislative Assembly Brissot had a national platform for the rhetoric 
which he had poured out in his newspaper. The increasingly shrill demands for war to 
disperse the 6migr6s and to prevent foreign powers from interfering in French domestic 
affairs had a heavy impact on revolutionary patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Although 
the war was initially billed as a just one of self-defence, revolutionary cosmopolitanism 
was adopted in the service of the warmongers to give the war a more noble, historic 
significance. A justification for a cautious foreign policy in 1790, cosmopolitanism 
became an argument for war against the old r6gime powers. 
If Brissot and his colleagues concentrated their fire on the 6migr6s who clustered in 
some of the Rhenish states, they also tried to convince their audience that Austria, Prussia 
and other European powers were combining forces against the Revolution. The 
Brissotins and the Fayettists stirred up the urge to defend the patrie which had been 
expressed in the Festival of the Federation, but which became very real and urgent after 
the flight to Varennes. The campaign for war developed the principle of national 
sovereignty into an outward, aggressive form. Playing on fears of foreign interference 
enabled the revolutionaries to reconcile the Constituent's declaration of 22 May 1790 with 
the fact that they successfully sought to declare war first. On 20 January 1792, Fauchet, 
while calling for war, disingenuously told his fellow-deputies that while the Constitution 
forbade aggressive wars, it was still necessary to attack potential enemies on the 
frontiers. "' The same formula was used in the declaration of war itself "' 
For the revolutionaries, however, national defence was compounded with a political 
ideology which in theory recognised not only the doctrine of national self-determination, 
but also the universality of natural rights. If the patrie was worth defending because it 
offered the liberty to citizens, then the war would be still more just if it spread these 
11 Tauchet, C., Discours sur les traitis, les alliances et la guerre, prononci a l'assemblie 
nationale, le 20janvier 1792 (Paris, 1792), 5. 
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benefits to the rest of Europe. With the perceived threat to the Revolution from the 
outside, it was an easy step to convert revolutionary cosmopolitanism into a more militant 
ideological device. In what was fundamentally a high-risk political strategern by the 
warmongers to gain political power, the coming conflict was painted not only as the 
struggle of the French people to determine its own affairs, but also as a'crusade for 
universal liberty, as Brissot put it to the Jacobins on 31 December. "' Pierre Chaumette 
proclaimed that 'the land which separates Paris from Petersburg will soon be Gallicized, 
municipalized, Jacobinized'. "' It is undeniable that one of the conditions for this 
transformation existed in the way in which cosmopolitanism had been expressed as early 
as 1789. There was much national self-congratulation in the revolutionaries' early 
cosmopolitan utterances and this lent itself to the more militant style of Brissot, 
Chaumette and, above all, Anacharsis Cloots. The French, Cloots claimed, had achieved 
the perfection of liberty and would now develop the same virtues in other people. "9 As 
the French people represented the hope of mankind, both the revolutionaries and their 
foreign sympathisers alike regarded France as thepatrie not only of French citizens, but 
also of any right-thinking people. This feeling could be found from the very early days of 
the Revolution, but received militant expression in the Legislative Assembly's invitation of 
20 April 1792 for any foreigners to range themselves under the banners of the French 
nation. 
In the summer of 1791 Brissot, the Cordeliers and others had stirred up defensive 
patriotism against foreign and domestic enemies. By year's end they had turned 
revolutionary cosmopolitanism into a messianic mission. The crusade for universal liberty 
was a far cry from the bilateral and pacific exchange of morals and ideas envisaged by 
Marat early in 1790. This change was the product, firstly, of the warlike feelings which 
had been stiffed by the royal flight to Varennes and its aftermath; secondly, of 
revolutionary cosmopolitanism and a confidence in the French achievement since 1789; 
and, thirdly, of the doctrine of national self-determination being turned outwards, against 
the perceived foreign enemies of the Revolution who were accused of interference. " It 
resulted, in short, from the confluence of cosmopolitanism with nationalism. 
II 'Blanning, 7he Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, I 11. 
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The mulling of cosmopolitanism with defensive, national militancy was a development 
opposed only by a very few, isolated politicians such as Robespierre, whose primary 
concern was with the threat of domestic counter-revolution. In this respect, Robespierre's 
opposition to war was 'patriotic' in that it focused on the life of France itself and on the 
failures of the Revolution to have fulfilled its early, domestic promise. "' He turned the 
language of national self-determination against Brissot's notion of a crusade for universal 
liberty. On 2 January 1792, he responded to Brissot with the famous words, 'Personne 
daime les n-iissionaires arm6es ... ', and he suggested that foreign peoples would repel 
them as invading enemies. " He accepted that, while not perfect, the Revolution was still 
the best hope for humanity, but it must be consolidated at home first. To try to spread 
liberty beforehand, Vest d'assurer i la fbis notre servitude et celle du monde entier. ", In 
his opposition to the war Robespierre retained the pragmatically-driven cosmopolitanism 
expressed by many others in the first year of the Constituent Assembly. The ultimate 
triumph of the war parties represented the swing away from this internally-focused 
patriotism which could cohabit with pacific cosmopolitanism. Now revolutionary 
cosmopolitanism flattered aggressive French nationalism with a universal significance. 
The outbreak of the war and the first defeats of the summer intensified the kind of 
Patriotism which meant the defence of one's country, as was shown by the response of 
Volunteers and regulars to the decree of the patrie en danger. 121 What helped to sustain 
the morale of the troops was the support which they felt they were getting from home. 
Beyond the various social and welfare schemes promised the soldiers by the politicians, 
the accolades they received from the citizenry, local festivals during the recruitment and 
departure of the troops, speeches and j ournals praising them and the cause for which they 
were meant to be fighting may not have instilled patriotism as they were intended, but 
they may have reassured the soldiers that they had the support of the people they were 
leaving behind. Friends, family and community were the personification of the patrie, 
which was otherwise merely an imagined community of citizens. " 
"'See, for example, Robespierre, Oeuvres, viii, 48,61. 
"Robespierre, Oeuvres, viii, 81-82. 
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None the less, for the revolutionaries this'imagined political community"" did have 
political significance. A citizen who died for his country was sacrificing his own life for 
the greater good of the whole. In return, while he was alive, the patrie offered hope of a 
better future in which the rights of all were recognised and protected bylaw. Thepatrie 
had to be defended not only from its foreign enemies, but also from its domestic foes. 
From early in the Revolution, internally-focused patriotism implied the vigilance of all 
citizens against counter-revolution. 121 There could be a xenophobic edge to this 
patriotism where foreigners were believed to be hatching their evil designs in internal 
politics and the war intensified this into paranoia. Jean-Baptiste Louvet's Sentinelle, 
which first appeared on 20 April and was published every few days until November 1792, 
whipped up the old fear of Austrian-inspired conspiracy at the heart of the government. 
The Sentinelle bombarded anyone who cared to read it with 'proof of the existence of the 
'Austrian Committee' which lay at the heart of a conspiracy to undermine the war effort 
and to destroy the Revolution. " These accusations were echoed in the Legislative by 
Brissot, Gensonn6 and Chabot. "' Even if the notion of an Austrian committee was a 
shorthand device to convey patriotic anxieties to the people at large, "' it would have 
worked only if the people themselves believed it. Austrophobia was naturally encouraged 
by the war itself. Dr. John Moore, while impressed that in Paris 'the lowest among the 
French shew no positive hatred to foreigners', found that in the north, stories of Austrian 
and Prussian atrocities were readily believed. "' 
The patrie, however, was also a beacon for unfree people. The recruitment of foreign 
legions by the Legislative Assembly suggested that the imperilled patrie was not just the 
resort of French citizens, but also that of enlightened people everywhere. The patriotism 
which entailed defence of the homeland could still, for some revolutionaries, transcend 
nationality if the patrie being fought for had a universal significance. Such ideas could co- 
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exist with the defensive and even xenophobic patriotism mobilised by the war. For all his 
austrophobia, Louvet celebrated desertions of Austrian or Imperial troops to the 
French. "' What mattered, therefore, was less the nationality of an individual, than his or 
her political commitment. True enemies of the Revolution were the subject of such 
xenophobic outbursts as Louvet's attacks on the 'Austrian Committee, while supporters of 
the cause were celebrated, regardless of their nationality. Besides individual foreigners in 
France, there were entire nations who were considered to be free, if not quite to the same 
perfection as the French, particularly Britain, the United States, Switzerland and, for the 
time being, Poland. "' Patriotism was not seen by the revolutionaries as an exclusively 
French attribute. It is not certain, however, that all revolutionaries and militants so easily 
made the distinction between 'patriotic' and 'enemy' foreigners. "' 
With the fall of the monarchy, the definition of patriotism became narrower. The 
defining characteristic of a good patriot became an adherence to a certain political regime 
and set of beliefs, embodied in the Republic. Henceforth, the patrie was not simply a 
community of citizens living under the same laws and legislature, but a moral state as well, 
in which commitment to a set of ideals, rather than merely to some original social 
contract, marked one for membership. "' The stress on political orthodoxy naturally 
excluded French people from the nation. Saint-Just argued on 13 November 1792 that 
any citizen could justly kill Louis XVI, as criminals were excluded from the nation by their 
behaviour: ! Louis XVI must be judged as a foreign enemy. "" At a stroke, the destruction 
of the monarchy put a broad spectrum of revolutionary opinion outside the narrowing 
definition of patriotism. 
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As it was a moral quality, however, patriotism was the reserve of virtuous people, who 
were not exclusively French. This was illustrated when the danger of further diplomatic 
isolation loomed and the revolutionaries saw morale-boosting potential in expressing the 
universal significance of the Revolution. From this sense of beleaguered righteousness 
stemmed the decree of 26 August 1792 which naturalised those foreigners 'qui, par leurs 
6crits et par leur courage, ont servi la cause de la libert6 et pr6pare I'affranchissement des 
peuples'. The decree argued that such people'ne peuvent Etre regard6s comme 6trangers 
par une nation que ses lurni&res et son courage ont rendue libre. "" Virtue of the kind 
demanded by revolutionary patriotism was not an exclusively French characteristic. 
The problem with the French Republic was that it was far more radical in conception 
and in practice that other countries which up to now the revolutionaries had considered to 
be'free'. Suddenly, not even constitutional monarchies such as Britain were considered 
worthy of the same respect as republics such as the United States. The revolutionaries 
certainly hoped that the British people would remain true to their libertarian traditions and 
ensure that their government would remain neutral in the war. At the declaration of war 
on I February, however, the British were expected to overthrow the government in their 
own Revolution. The Jacbbin club of Libourne ominously lettered its British flag with the 
words: 'English! Out of respect for the rights of man, your flag will remain folded up in 
our hall until the time when your actions show that it again warrants placement next to 
ours. If you prove, after all, to be slaves of royalism, we will deliver it to the flames. "' 
The British had to fulfill their promise of being worthy of liberty by overthrowing Pitt and 
king George. For the time being, however, the revolutionaries insisted that their quarrel 
was with the British and Dutch governments, not the respective peoples. "" It would be 
some months before disillusionment set in. 
One of the reasons for the deterioration of relations with the Dutch and the British was 
the French conquests in the autumn and winter of 1792 - 1793. In the wake of Valmy and 
Jemappes, the revolutionaries abandoned the idea of a crusade for universal liberty and 
adopted a more nationalist approach to their foreign policy: territorial expansion and the 
exploitation of the occupied lands. Such policies, however, were cloaked in the language 
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of national self-detennination and of universal liberty. The 'Edict of Fraternity', or the first 
'propagandist decree' of 19 November 1792 promised that the French nation 'accordera 
fraternit6 et secours i tous les peuples qui voudront recouvrer leur libert6'. At the same 
time, the comitj diplomatique was charged with suggesting the means by which France 
would give such protection. " The result was the more hardnosed second propagandist 
decree. It was couched in the language of liberation and protested the revolutionaries' 
respect for other peoples! rights to self-determination. In reality it provided for the means 
by which French generals could both exploit the occupied territories and ensure that the 
people chose a form of government which suited French strategic interests. "' This decree 
shows that the revolutionaries had abandoned hopes for a mass uprising of peoples and it 
signalled the adoption of a more cynical treatment of France's neighbours. 
This change in attitude stemmed from the realisation that other Europeans were not 
only unwilling to have their own revolutions, but were often downright hostile to their 
French 'liberators'. I" To leave the Belgians and the Rhinelanders the absolute freedom to 
determine their own fate was to allow them the possibility to recall their former rulers, or 
at the very least to remain weak, independent states incapable of preventing their own 
reconquest by the coalition powers. The crusading rhetoric of international revolution 
became a veil for French expansionism. The language of French militant cosmopolitanism 
had subverted the universal principles of national self-determination in favour of the 
interests of France alone. 
Such nationalism took a more explicit form with the call for 'natural frontiers'. On 31 
January 1793, Danton justified the Rhine frontier by appeals to nature. "' If nature 
ordained where a nation! s frontiers lay, then the rights of those peoples within those limits 
to decide their own fate were non-existent. A delegation of Savoyards had already 
presented a petition, on 21 November, for'reunion! with France, and this was decreed six 
days later, "' but the second propagandist decree prepared the means by which the 
Belgians and the Rhinelanders could be'persuadedto vote for'reuniorf with France in 
order to provide her with the rest of her natural frontiers. From the end of January and 
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into March, Belgian communes voted, mostly under duress, to join France. On 14,20 and 
30 March, a hundred communities in the Rhineland were also annexed. 
The renewed defeats suffered by the French from March 1793, the explosion of civil 
war in western France and the defection of Dumouriez put the revolutionaries on the 
defensive once more. Combined with disturbances in Paris, which were blamed on foreign 
agents, the disastrous first months of 1793 finally brought the revolutionaries to enact 
laws against foreigners. These measures in turn perpetuated and even intensified 
xenophobia by setting foreigners apart from the French people among whom they had 
lived and worked. If political ideals and culture were the sources both of national identity 
and of nationalism, it was the increasing demands of the state bureaucracy which gave 
nationality immediate relevance. As the nature of this bureaucratic intrusion was a 
negative one, aimed at rooting out spies, it naturally put many foreigners under a cloud of 
suspicion where none had previously existed. By targeting foreigners, the watch 
committees legitimised and gave a function to xenophobia in the institutional structures of 
what was to become the Terror. 
IV 
The rejection of the French Revolution by the Belgians and Germans, the broadening 
of the conflict, renewed defeats early in 1793 and the range of domestic crises faced by 
the revolutionaries forced them to reconsider their policies towards foreigners. While 
remaining defiantly convinced of the justice and universal significance of their cause, the 
French none the less focused their energies on the life of the French nation itself On 13 
April 1793, the two propagandist decrees were repealed. Despite the occasional 
universalist claim to the contrary, the revolutionaries officially recognised the war to be 
what it had been since 15 December 1792: a war not for European liberation, but for 
national interests. The decree of 13 April laid the foundations of what was to become the 
foreign policy of the Terror: hostility towards commitments to liberate foreign peoples, 
along with a vigilance and defiance which focused on the survival of the Republic and the 
nation itself The death penalty was also voted for anyone who proposed peace on any 
basis other than that of the territorial integrity of the Republic. It became clear from the 
discussion which followed that the annexed territories were part and parcel of 
Tindivisibilit6 et l'unite de la Rdpublique'. Not only did this make a negotiated peace an 
115 
impossibility, it also made treasonous any concessions over both French conquests and the 
internal r6gime of the Republic. 115 
The principles laid down in the decree were reiterated by Robespierre in his speech to 
the Convention on 17 November. For as long as the Republic was still fighting on its 
own frontiers, caution was required in foreign policy, particularly towards the few fiiends 
which revolutionary France still had and towards neutrals who should not be 
antagonised. He bitterly denounced the lack of caution with which the Girondins had 
gone about their crusade for universal liberty, saying that they had deliberately mobilised 
all the tyrants of Europe against France. Prudence now dictated that France fight only 
for her own survival. In doing so, however, France was in fact struggling for all 
humanity in the long-run, even if the actual struggle for universal liberty had been 
abandoned: 'Que la libert6 p6risse en France, la nature enti6re se couvre dun voile 
fun6bre, et la raison humaine recule jusqu'aux abimes de Vignorance et de la barbarie. 
L'Europe seroit la proie de deux ou trois brigands ... I. 
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The persistence of such claims to universal importance can be seen in the Montagnard 
constitution 24 June, which lowered the barriers for naturalisation and proclaimed the 
Republic's guiding principles in foreign policy. France would not interfere in the domestic 
affairs of any country, but offered 'asile aux 6trangers bannis de leur patrie pour la cause 
de la libert6l. 147 It was one thing to risk one's own well-being in trying to free other 
peoples, but it was quite another simply to offer refuge to those persecuted for their 
ideals. Throughout the period of the Terror, France remained an asylum for foreign 
radicals, but it was not as comfortable an exile as it had been previously. Like the 
Constitution of 1793 itself, the cosmopolitanism implicit in the rights of man was to be 
suspended for as long as the Republic was threatened. Henceforth, the focus of all 
loyalties was to be the patrie, which in turn came be represented increasingly by the 
government itself. Foreign patriots were expected to understand and accept measures 
aimed at ensuring the safety of the Republic, even if they themselves suffered by them. 
Danton argued on 7 September after voting the seizure of property belonging to the 
enemy, Vil se trouve dans le nornbre quelques patriotes, ils doivent s'estimer heureux de 
souffirir pour la cause de la. liber&. ` 
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- Fears of domestic subversion by foreigners were being aimed increasingly at those 
whose revolutionary credentials had up to now been beyond reproach. This development 
was a product of the narrowing political orthodoxy brought about by the succession of 
political events which excluded more and more people from the revolutionary mainstream, 
particularly after the fall of the Girondins on 2 June 1793. The narrower revolutionary 
orthodoxy was defined, the more people were excluded. Those who opposed the new 
order were identified as opponents of the will of the nation, so they could easily be 
assimilated with the foreign enemy and its agents. On 25 February, for example, Dubois- 
Cranc6 implied in the Jacobins that the Paris food riots led by the Enrag6s had been 
fomented by the British. On 10 March, riots in which the Girondinjournalist Gorsas had 
his presses smashed were blamed by Lasource two days later on the emigr6s, but also on 
'les agents de Pitt, de Guillaume ou de Frangois ... 
les fuyards de la Savoie, de Mayence et 
de la Belgique qui affluent dans Paris ofi ils ne sont jetes que pour conspirer. 9149 
The suspicions of the Montagnard Dubois-Cranc6 and of the Girondin Lasource reveal 
an obsession with foreign-inspired conspiracy. Fears of foreign spies drove legislation 
aimed at foreigners, including the recognition of the comitis de surveillance on 21 March. 
Apparent evidence of British espionage presented to the Convention on 1 August finally 
led the deputies to vote a law for the arrest of all enemy subjects. A case of papers had 
been found on the ramparts of Lille, ostensibly belonging to a British agent. 110 The 
documents were probably fakes, but what matters is that the government and the 
Convention took them seriously. "' The revolutionaries were led to take their measures 
detaining enemy aliens by what they regarded as the hard evidence of foreign subversion. 
This led some revolutionaries to express an extreme form of isolationism which could only 
have had a chance of acceptance because of the war. In two speeches on 3 and 14 
August, for example, Fabre Aglantine urged his colleagues: 'Creusons donc un large 
foss6 autour de la R6publique, que nul ne puisse le franchir de part et d'autre, sans courir 
risque de perdre sa fortune ou sa vie'. "' 
None the less, not all revolutionaries were convinced of the need to take such drastic 
measures. In the first place, many took the view that if the Republic was the last hope of 
humanity, then the patrie which was being defended with such desperation still ought to 
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be the refuge of the few foreign but enlightened souls who might some day carry the 
gospel to the rest of the world. On 30 September, Delaunay dAngers, on behalf of the 
Commission des Finances, criticised the law of 7 September confiscating enemy subjects' 
property on these political grounds and for commercial reasons. Secondly, the Ancien 
R6gime belief that wars were matters between governments and ought not to affect 
individual subjects or citizens also persisted, even among the revolutionaries. As 
Delaunay argued, to seize the property of individuals was contrary to 'cette fbi de peuple, 
i cette probite universelle dont nous publions le code 6ternel'. 1" Delaunay dressed up his 
concerns in revolutionary ideology, but in fact they came from more traditional concepts 
of the droit des gens which were meant to protect individual foreigners in time of war. 
These survivals from Ancien R6gime practice and from revolutionary cosmopolitanism 
were however swamped by the xenophobia institutionalised by the Terror. In some 
cases, the 'nationalisation! of the war was not the direct result of events at the front, but 
the by-product of the internal political struggles between the revolutionaries themselves. 
On 7 January 1794, Robespierre proposed to the Jacobins a discussion of the crimes of 
the British government and the vices of the British constitution. This seems to have been 
Primarily an attempt to focus the club's energies on denouncing an external, common 
enemy at a time when the club was tearing itself apart between Indulgents and Mertists. 
Probably encouraged by a rumour which circulated in the clubs and caf6s that there had 
been an insurrection in London, "' most speakers dutifully distinguished between the 
British government for whom they expressed hatred and the people, with whom they 
sympathised. 115 On 30 January Robespierre finally intervened angrily: Ue n'aime pas les 
Anglais, moi, parce que ce mot me rappelle Vid6e dun peuple insolent osant faire la 
guerre au peuple g6n6reux qui a reconquis sa libert6. `11 If the British people were to 
become worthy of French esteem once more, they should have a revolution of their own. 
Robespierre's primary purpose on 30 January was to distract the Jacobins from the 
damaging internecine struggle between the factions. The price of securing this unity, 
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however, was the stirring of the worst xenophobic emotions, which were already highly- 
charged after a year of war with Britain. In the wake of this speech, those who sought to 
show off their conformity and loyalty to the revolutionary government followed suit. "' 
Suspected of emigration, the former Constituent Le Chapelier tried to show his loyalty to 
the government by writing two letters, one privately to Robespierre, the other to the 
Committee of Public Safety. In both, he spent the best part of his energies expressing his 
hatred for the British as a guarantee of his good faith, proposing that he undertake 
espionage missions for the government in London. "' It availed him nothing. 
Anglophobia none the less remained an easy way for revolutionaries to express their 
adherence to the government. Such emotion was given particularly paranoid expression 
in the panic unleashed by the assassination attempts on Robespierre and Collot d'Herbois 
on 20 and 23 May. Bar&e left no doubt that the British were behind the first attack. The 
Convention, the Parisian sections, Jacobin clubs across France and the press duly took 
their cue and let loose a storm of anglophobia reminiscent of Robespierre's outburst in the 
Jacobins over three months earlier. "" Much of this was certainly prompted by a desire to 
seem orthodox, but there is no doubt that much of the hatred expressed was real enough, 
drawing on deep-seated feelings which predated the Revolution. 
The acceptability of the language of national hatred certainly prepared the 
revolutionaries for more concrete measures which transformed words into deeds, namely 
the infamous law of 7 Prairial (26 May), which declared that no British or Hanoverian 
prisoners would be taken by the French armed forces. There was a direct link between 
this law and Robespierre's refusal to discriminate between people and government in the 
discussion on the British earlier that year. " The ordinary British soldier supported the 
war against the Revolution, so he should be punished for it. As Bar&re put it, 'la 
g6ndrosit6 exerc6e envers lui est un crime de 16se humanit6'. 111 In however an abstract 
"'The first to do so was Jeanbon Saint-Andr6, whose intervention in the Jacobins 
provoked Robespierre's outburst in the first place. He made an abject apology for his 
#errors' and thanked Robespierre for pointing them out to him (Moniteur, No. 136 (16 
Pluvi6se 11/4 February 1794)). 
"'Papiers inedits trouWs chez Robespierre, Saint-Just, Payan, etc., supprimes ou omis 
par Courlois (3 vols. ) (Paris, 1828), i, 273,278. 
119Bouloiseau, M., La Mpubliquejacobine: 10 aofit 1792 -9 thermidor mi II (Paris: 
tditions du Seuil, 1972), 228 - 229; Lefebvre, G., 'Sur la loi du 22 prairial an 11', Eludes 
sur la RJvolulionfranVaise (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 119,121 - 
123. 
IwWahnich, S., & Belissa, M., 'Le Crime des Anglais: trahir le droit', Annales Historiques 
de la Rgvolutionfranýaise, 1xvii (1995), 23 3- 248. 
161AP, xci, 38. 
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way, the war was a struggle which would eventually benefit all mankind. The British had 
put themselves outside humanity for fighting on the wrong side, when they should have 
known better. 
The decree of 7 Prairial marked the low-point of revolutionary xenophobia. It cannot 
be dismissed as an aberration, in which the revolutionaries forgot themselves and their 
principles, but it cannot be explained simply as a product of revolutionary ideology either. 
Ideology certainly played an important part. The vision of the war as a manichean 
struggle between liberty and despotism gave a perverse logic to the law. Just as Louis 
Capet was placed hors la nation for his behaviour, so the British were now placed beyond 
the human race. None the less, the emotional reception of the decree by the deputies 
cannot be explained by this cold logic, but by anglophobia, which had grown from its 
ancient roots in the acidic soil of Franco-British relations and had been intensified by the 
conflict since 1793. As abominable as the order was, stirring the revolutionaries was 
certainly its main effect. Forty individuals, workshops, political clubs, officials and local 
authorities gave the decree an apparently rapturous response, although many of these may 
have been driven by an urge to conform at the height of the Terror. 162 
The nationalisation of the war was accompanie y deepening suspicion of foreigners 
within France itself This was not only reflected by the legislation passed against 
foreigners, and enemy subjects in particular, but also in the increasingly frequent 
association of conspiracy with foreigners or foreign influence. With the xenophobia 
naturally inspired by the war, it was all too easy for revolutionay politicians and militants 
to accuse their opponents of complicity with foreign agents and foreign-inspired 
conspiracy. Marie-Antoinette and the Girondins were among the first to suffer from such 
charges. "' 
The most intense manifestation of the phobia for foreign conspiracy was the 'foreign 
plot'which broke in October and November 1793. Originally a financial scandal, it was 
exploited as the most significant of all 'foreign conspiracies' for two reasons. Firstly, it 
provided the government with the unifying thread which bound together all its opponents, 
royalist, Girondin, H6bertist and Indulgent, as part and parcel of the same over-arching 
counter-revolutionary movement, masterminded by the foreign powers and executed by 
"AP, xci, 204 - 205,258,273 - 275,280,289,376,437,450,457 - 458,458 - 459,518, 
625,628,704 - 705; xcii, 41,107,183,215,290,297,301,400,411,420 - 422,45 1, 
452,478,485; xciv, 14,154 - 155,164 - 165,321,335 - 336,471 - 472,534. 
"'Wallon, H, Histoire du Tribunal Rgvolutionnaire de Paris, avec le Journal des ses 
Actes (6 vols. ) (Paris: 1880 - 1882), ii, 319 - 320,340,372,386 - 388. 
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their agents in France. Secondly, its use by the goverment in this way drove at the very 
heart of Montagnard politics and, in the end, justified the destruction of both the 
Hdbertists and the Indulgents. It helped to legitimise the dictatorship of the governing 
Comn&tees. 
The device of the foreign plot was effective only because people in general appear to 
have believed in the possibility of subversion and corruption by enemy agents. This is 
understandable given the paucity of reliable information, the intensity of the war and 
apparent evidence for the existence of real conspirators. In August, the Convention itself 
had done much to publicise theBritish! portfolio found in Lille. People were aware of the 
existence of the baron de Batz, who cropped up in one denunciation of the foreign plot. 
Chabot had married the Austrian Uopoldine Frey, whose brothers were also implicated in 
the denunciations. The marriage itself was commented on by militants who regarded it as 
a disgrace for a conventionnel marry the daughter of a'slave'. ` 
Such 'proof encouraged xenophobia and made people receptive to the theory of a great 
conspiracy led by foreign agents. On 18 January, for example, the police spy Letassy 
attended a session of the soci&g populaire of the Halles section, in which the high price of 
food was blamed on'des agents de Pitt partout'. "" Added to both the austrophobia and 
anglophobia which had already been in evidence, fear of conspiracy provided fertile 
ground for the insinuations and accusations which government spokesmen planted against 
their enemies. The H6bertists were destroyed with scarcely a tremor from the sans- 
culottes they claimed to champion because they were presented as the executors of a 
foreign plot designed to starve Paris. "' 
Meanwhile the Indulgents were given no reason to celebrate. As Saint-Just announced 
the arrest of the H6bertists on 13 March, he warned that the Indulgents were also part of 
the same foreign conspiracy, working towards the same goal of destroying the Republic. " 
As the H6bertists went to trial, Robespierre told the Jacobins that 'Utranger soudoie 
parmi nous la faction des moder6s et celle des hommes qui, sous le masque dun 
patriotisme extravagant, voudroient 6gorger les patriotes. "' When it was the Indulgents' 
turn to be arrested, the charges against them set out to prove this point. "" 
164Cobb, 'Quelques aspects de la mentalitd r6volutionnaire', 108. 
16'Caron, Parispendant la Terreur, iii, 27. 
166AP, Ixxxvi, 434 - 442; Slavin, Me Hýbertjsts to the Guillotine, 13 8- 13 9; Moniteur, 
No. 183 (3 Genninal 11/23 March 1794). 
IVAP, Ixxxvi, 434 - 442. 
"Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, 411. 
16'Wallon, Histoire du Trihunal Rgvolutionnaire de Paris, iii, 157,159,187. 
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The idea of a plot uniting all opponents of the government certainly came from the 
revolutionary obsession with conspiracy, but this phobia had varied in intensity and scope 
over time. The revolutionary phobia for plots did not stem purely from an unwillingness 
to accept the legitimacy of organised opposition, "' but from the broader cultural 
background of the eighteenth century. Revolutionary ideology merely gave a novel, 
political form of expression to a more common obsession. This new expression was 
encouraged by a combination of the external circumstances of war, civil strife and actual 
evidence of subversive activity. It is doubtful that the'foreign! element in revolutionary 
conspiracy theories would have been so compelling at any point in the Revolution without 
the events which seemed to point, rightly or wrongly, to foreign intervention in French 
affairs. In July 1789, it was the use of foreign troops by the royal government. In the 
summer of 1791, it was the flight to Varennes. The following year, it was the outbreak of 
war and the defeats at the front. In the Year II it was a combination of the military and 
domestic crisis as well as evidence, no matter how dubious to modem eyes, of a sinister 
plot involving powerful opponents of the government. This is not to say that the 
revolutionaries did not create some of these problems for themselves, or that they were 
not averse to stoking and exploiting xenophobia for their own political ends. Rather, the 
obsession with conspiracy, and with foreign conspiracy in particular, had diverse sources, 
in eighteenth-century popular culture, in the intensity of the crises and certainly, in 
revolutionary politics itself. None of these factors were constants, as they fluctuated in 
importance throughout the 1790s. 
None the less, repeated denunciations of foreign agents and their conspiracies could 
not have failed to have placed even foreigners who had long been resident in France under 
a cloud of suspicion. As patriotism came to be focused increasingly on the revolutionary 
government, so foreigners who failed to show sufficient loyalty were dangerously 
exposed. Cloots was given a violent tongue-lashing by Robespierre in the Jacobin club on 
12 December 1793: 'Pouvons-nous regarder comme patriote un baron allemand? ... S'il 
eCit 6t6 bon Frangais, e6t-il voulu que nous tentassions la conqu8te de lUnivers? "" On 25 
December, Barere had the Convention decree that no foreigner could be elected to public 
office in France, 'R suffit de dire qu'appeler les 6trangers i manier les r6nes du 
gouvemement c'est en exclure les Fraqais'. 1" Both Robespierre and Bar6re were 
1"As Frangois Furet argues (Penser la Nvolutionftwifaise, 9 1). 
"'Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, 248. 
172A, p, bocxii, 304. 
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suggesting that one could not be a good patriot if one was not French, which would 
represent a complete rejection of the cosmopolitan content of revolutionary ideology. 
The development of a patriotism which focused exclusively on France and the French 
led some politicians to speak in terms of the patrie not only as a political and moral entity, 
but also as a cultural and geographical place. Robespierre asked the Convention on 25 
December, 'Qui peut aimer froidement la patrie? "' On 7 May, presenting his plan for a 
cult of the Supreme Being, he rhapsodised in tones reminiscent of Rousseads dedication 
to the Republic of Geneva: 'Oui, cette terre d6licieuse que nous habitons, et que la nature 
caresse avec pr6deliction, est faite pour 8tre le domaine de la libertd et du bonheur; ce 
peuple sensible et fier est vraiment nd pour la gloire et pour la vertu. '174 This suggests that 
a people was defined not only by the laws and institutions under which it lived, but by its 
particular characteristics and its attachment to the land. This is less assimilationist than 
Siey6s's definition of 1789. A people might even need to speak the same language. The 
law of 20 July 1794 imprisoned for six months all officials who used any language other 
than French. In fact, this law proved unworkable because of the persistence of regional 
languages and patois and it was suspended after the Terror. None the less, the poetics of 
Robespierre coupled with the attempt to impose linguistic conformity was the closest the 
French Revolution got to defining the nation on a cultural basis rather than simply on a 
contractual one. On these foundations, patriotism could have been defined as the reserve 
of French-born and French-speaking people. 
In fact, the revolutionaries never went that far. The implication that opposition to the 
government meant being hors la nation had its reverse side. If a French citizelys politics 
could effectively define him as a foreigner, foreigners were equally capable of the political 
virtue needed to be a good patriot. For as long as patriotism was defined on the basis of 
one's personal, moral attributes rather than one's place of birth, so some foreigners could 
still be included in the definition. The revolutionaries never entirely abandoned the notion 
that loyalty to the patrie could still cut across nationality. To have done otherwise would 
have been to dismiss the possibility that the Revolution was of universal value. It was just 
that loyalty to the patrie was defined extremely narrowly, as obedience to the 
government, which made the circle of true patriots a very exclusive club. 
Individual foreigners who had made the moral migration to the principles of the 
Revolution might be capable of living in the republicanpatrie, as the United Irishman 
"'Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, 276. 
V'Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, 445. 
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Archibald Hamilton Rowan and the Dutch Patriot Johan Valckenaer discovered. For a 
foreigner to show that he was a patriot, he had to accept the revolutionary government 
which was struggling to establish and protect liberty against overwhelming odds. After 
all, as Robespierre claimed on 17 November, this struggle was not just for Frenchmen, but 
for all humanity: Tunivers est int6ress6 i notre conservation. "" The urgency of the 
situation demanded that enlightened souls of all nationalities support the government in its 
efforts: that was true patriotism. The mistake of the likes of Paine, Cloots and those 
implicated in the foreign plot was that they had not shown themselves willing to subject 
their ideas, their independence and their interests to the government and, therefore, to the 
manichean struggle between Revolution and reaction. Opposition itself marked one out 
as a traitor to the universal cause, because support for the rights of man meant support for 
France in her struggle for survival, and that implied supporting the government. This 
adherence to a very narrow definition of political orthodoxy made the patrie an exclusive 
clique, but one which none the less did not exclude simply on the basis of nationality. 
V 
The attitudes which developed during the Terror persisted after 9 Thermidor. The 
change in the system of government did not ease the fear of conspiracy, did not blunt the 
acute xenophobia and did not put an end to the association of patriotism with political 
orthodoxy. None the less, the limits of that orthodoxy relaxed, to allow more debate and, 
therefore, to include more people within the definition of patriotism. At the same time, 
victories and conquests at the front brought the return of a war of expansion and 
'liberatioW. 
The debates over the question of France's 'grandes' or 'anciennes' limites and the 
annexation of Belgium on I October 1795 made it clear that the revolutionaries were 
conquerors in liberators' clothing. This is not to say, however, that the pretence of 
revolutionary cosmopolitanism had beenjettisoned, even if the substance had. This is 
evident in the establishment of 'sister republics', a system of spoliation which was none the 
less presented under the guise of international liberation and fraternity. The Batavian 
Republic recognised by France on 16 May 1795 suffered a punitive peace settlement with 
France despite her new political order and an alliance with her'liberatoe. The justification 
"'Robespieffe, Oeuvres, x, 179. 
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was expressed by General Sauviac who wrote to the Committee of Public Safety that the 
Dutch had done nothing to avoid being classed as a conquered people. "' 
Implicit in this view was that to prove themselves worthy of complete freedom, the 
people of occupied territories had to have their own revolution before the French armies 
invaded. The problem was that the'patriots'in these countries were always a tiny 
minority and so could do very little without the help of French soldiers. The role of 
foreign patriots could therefore be ignored or recognised at the convenience of the 
occupiers. "' Absolute independence for occupied peoples might allow them to chose the 
'wrong'form of government and it would leave them prey to the enemy forces which 
might easily overwhelm these small, isolated states and restore the old regime, leaving 
Franc&s frontiers once more unprotected. Theobald Wolfe Tone was chagrined in March 
1796 when he was asked by one of his contacts in the French government, General Henri 
Clarke, for a guarantee that after independence IrOand would not ally with Britain. A 
sense of betrayal by the United States, which effectively ruptured the Franco-American 
treaty of 1778 by signing the Jay treaty with Britain in 1795, may have driven Clarke's 
concern. Clarke later insisted that, come the revolution, the provisional government in 
Ireland consult the French on the form of constitution. "' 
The French approach to foreign peoples was not therefore dictated by any crusading, 
cosmopolitan ideology, but by the cold reasoning of France's own strategic interests. The 
whole approach of the French government to its conquests and the sister republics is 
summed up by the Director La Revelli6re-L6peaux, 'to unite Holland, France, 
Switzerland, the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics by an uninterrupted continuity of 
territory ... a nursery of excellent soldiers and a formidable [strategic] position. ""' Both 
the Thermidorians and the Directory therefore placed French strategic considerations 
above the cosmopolitan ideals of the Revolution. 
"'Quoted in Schama, Patriots and Liherators, 20 1. 
"'For example, the Cispadane and then the Cisalpine Republics were established with the 
help of foreign patriots only because Napoleon Bonaparte wished to fulfil his own 
personal goals. This development was also against the will of the Directory, which 
wished merely to use the conquests in Italy as a bargaining chip with Austria in its search 
for the main prize: the left bank of the Rhine. Likewise, Hoche established the Cisrh6nan 
Republic in August 1797 to prevent the left bank of the Rhine being sacrificed to Austria 
in order to save Bonaparte's republic in northern Italy (Lyons, M., France under the 
Directory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 198 - 199; Manning, Yhe 
French Revolution in Germany, 78 - 79), "'Tone, W. T. W. (ed. ), Life of Theohald Wolfe Tone (2 vols. ) (Washington, D. C., 
1826), ii, 51,93. 
119Quoted in Blanning, Ae Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, 177 - 178, 125 
None the less, French military success and expansion did not have an entirely negative 
impact on revolutionary attitudes to foreigners. Peace treaties with former enemies of the 
Republic, including Prussia, the Netherlands and Spain ensured that people from those 
countries who happened to be in France would receive better treatment under the law, 
simply because they were no longer enemy subjects. Symbolic of this superior treatment 
was the fact that while by the law of II July 1795 enemy subjects who were permitted to 
stay in France had the words Hospitaliti, Sfiretg on their identification cards, those of 
countries at peace with the Republic bore the additional word Fraterniti. 180 
As before some nationalities were regarded, more than others, as peoples whom 
French citizens could respect. Among the countries so honoured was Poland. A 
delegation of Polish patriots on 14 August 1794 were told by the president of the 
Convention that 'la fraternit6 unit tous les peuples fibres' and the Poles, locked in a 
struggle to the death with Russia between March and November 1794, naturally qualified. 
When the Dutch signed peace with France in May 1795, they were Reted in a way the 
Spanish and the Prussians were not, because they had established their own Republic. 
The Dutch, the American and the Genevan flags were all hoisted aloft in the Man6ge as a 
sign of fraternity between these free peoples. In contrast, the Swedish ambassador who 
arrived with his credentials on 23 April 1795 was welcomed without any such accolade, 
because he was the representative of a monarchy. "' 
As the welcome given to the Dutch showed, 'sister republics! were to be given the same 
respect as the Americans and the Genevans, even if in reality they were exploitable 
commodities. If the French were to keep up at least a thin veil of principle over their use 
of the sister republics, the peoples of those states had to be accepted as fully enfranchised 
partners in the great enterprise of the Revolution. The 'cisalpinized' Italian states were, 
contrary to all the initial expectations and demands of the Directory, to be spoken of as 
one of the fluctuating number of genuinely 'free' peoples. Bordas, speaking as President 
of the Conseil des Anciens on 20 March 1798, celebrated the sovereignty of the people by 
speaking of the awakening of nations: 'les peuples de l'Italie en sont la preuve irr6fragable. 
Flier ils 6toient encore avilis, degrades sous unjoug honteux et magique: aujourd'hui, ils 
sont a toute la hauteur des peuples libres'. Of course, they could only live in this new age 
"Woniteur No. 297 (27 Messidor 111/15 July 1795). 
181AP, xcv, 66,119 - 122,3 93 - 394; Monifeur Nos. 217 (7 Flor6al 111/26 April 1795), 
260 (20 Prairial 111/8 June 1795), 277 (7 Messidor/25 June 1795). 
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because the enlightened people in Italy 'appeloient un peuple lib6rateur. "" Behind the 
bombast, the message was clear: the Italians were free only because the French had made 
it possible. La Grande Nation was less an expression of cosmopolitanism than both a 
source and a symptom of French national pride. "' 
None the less, if people from 'sister republics' had to be regarded as fellow-travellers of 
the French, then patriotism was still defined, therefore, as a political virtue which cut 
across lines of nationality. Tallien declared in the spring of 1795, 'il Wy a d'6tranger en 
France que les mauvais citoyens'. "' This attitude was reflected in the Constitution of 
1795, which besides stipulating the prerequisites for naturalisation, also laid down actions 
in consequence of which citizenship could be lost. Among them was the acceptance of 
any honour which required either distinctions of birth or a religious oath. "' Accepting 
such an honour was a rejection of the civic equality of the Republic; it was a political 
statement which put the citizen beyond the pale of acceptable behaviour. To be a citizen 
therefore still implied adherence to certain republican values, even if they were not as 
strictly defined as they were by the likes of Saint-Just and Robespierre. As Tallien 
suggested, such republican values were not the exclusive reserve of French citizens, so 
that foreigners with sound principles and behaviour could still be defined as 'patriots' in 
France. The problem was that the definition as to who were'les mauvais citoyens, 
changed frequently between 1795 and 1799. This was particularly true under the 
Directory, where the political complexion of both the executive and the legislature 
changed with the various elections and coup d'6tats which affected the regime. None the 
less, the return to more open political debate meant that the definition of what political 
orthodoxy was became more relaxed and broader than the confined version which 
characterised the height of the Terror. It was easier, therefore, for foreigners to be 
defined as 'patriots' in France after Thermidor. 
Despite the conflict, post-Thermidor revolutionaries insisted in trying to 'end the 
Revolution' and return to normality in domestic affairs as far as possible. It was this, more 
"'Bordas, P., Discours prononce par P. Bordas, prisident du Conseil des Anciens. 
Siance du 30 vent0se, jour consacri ti celibrer la souverainetj du peuple; an 6 (Paris, an 
VI), 5. 
"'Norman Hampson suggests that it was the Revolution might have 'increasingly assumed 
the shape of a commodity for export' in compensation for lack of unity at home eThe idea 
of the nation in Revolutionary France', 22). It was also a refuge of disillusioned 
cosmopolitans, one of the'planks' to which, for example, Louis-S6bastien Mercier clung 
'in the shipwreck of his old ideals' (ibid., 24). 
"'Quoted in Brubaker, Citizenship andNationhood in France and Germany, 192n. 
'"Moniteur No. 340 (10 Fructidor 111/27 August 1795). 
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than any resurgent cosmopolitanism, which revived interest in the droil des gens. A 
desire to lay down guidelines by which foreign nations and foreigners within France would 
be treated was nothing new, but the constitutional debates in 1795 at least gave the 
opportunity to discuss them. This was in stark contrast to the treatment meted out to the 
abb6 Gr6goire on 18 June 1793, when he attempted to present his projet for the droit des 
gens to be inserted into the 'Jacobin' constitution. Bar&e gave the proposal short shrift, 
dismissing it as irrelevant given France's current situation in Europe: 'iI ne faut pas 
slextravaguer en opinions philanthropiques. "" 
The Thern-ýidorians self-consciously dismissed this attitude. Fear of a return to the 
police state of the Terror prompted some deputies to object to measures restricting the 
freedom of foreigners in France. These objections were usually based, not on 
cosmopolitanism, but on more general arguments about civil rights and their violation. It 
was not forgotten that the first legally-sanctioned duties of the surveillance committees 
had been to watch foreigners. The desire for a return to normality in French domestic 
politics was particularly strong under the Directory, which was meant to be the definitive 
form of Republican government without revolution. Despite the latent xenophobia which 
always lurked not far from the surface, a number of legislators opposed measures aimed 
against foreigners on the grounds that they presaged a more general infringement of 
people's liberty. "' Most revolutionaries feared the rebuilding of the machinery of Terror 
even as they gave expression to the same xenophobia and fear of conspiracy which had 
helped to create it in the first place. It was the determination not to replunge into 
dictatorship and surveillance of French citizens which led some revolutionaries to oppose 
laws against foreigners as the top of the slippery slope. Judging by the legislation 
restricting the movement of foreigners from 9 Thermidor to Campo Formio, however, the 
revolutionaries seem to have accepted the argument of Dumas, who told the Council of 
Elders on 28 March 1796 that 'ce dest qu'i la paix que vous pourrez d6barrasser vos lois 
de police ... de cette rigidit6 qui 
blesse l'ind6pendence quand elle cesse de la d6fendre'. 1" 
It was both the war and the concurrent political instability which gave force to xenophobia 
and which continued to produce legislation against foreigners. 
It would be wrong, however, to suggest that the post-Thermidor revolutionaries were 
devoid of any ideological cosmopolitanism. The end of the Terror and the opening of 
116AP, 1xvi, 676. 
"'See, for example, the opinions of Pastoret and Cadroy in the Council of Five Hundred 
(Moniteur No. 176 (26 Vent6se IWI 6 March 1796)). 
"Moniteur No. 193 (13 Germinal IV/2 April 1794), 
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political debate allowed some revolutionaries to develop their more abstract ideas about 
humanity, its rights and their application both in foreign policy and in the treatment of 
foreigners. "' On 23 April 1795, the aW Grdgoire explicitly rejected eighteenth-century 
cosmopolitanism outright as 'un vagabondage physique ou moral; nous devons un amour 
de pref6rence i la soci6t6 politique dont nous sommes membres'. None the less, he went 
on to say that: 
L'dgoisme national est aussi coupable que I'dgoisme individuel; le patriotisme West point cxclusif, 
Unergie de ce sentiment se concilie avec cette douce philanthropie qui s'efforcc dandantir les 
prdjugds, lintoldrance, les rivalitds, les haincs cntre les Pcuples, et de rcsseffer les noeuds de la. 
fraternitd entre les diverses sections de la famille humaine. 190 
While Gr6goire rejected both the uprooted cosmopolitan attached to no country and 
the blinkered patriot, his definition of droit des gens none the less bore the mark of the 
war: Un peuple a droit de refuser 1'entree de son territoire, et de renvoyer les 6trangers 
quand sa sfiret6 1'exige. On the other hand, any action against enemy subjects was to be 
limited by the application of Montesquieds maxim that 'les Peuples doivent en paix se 
faire le plus de bien, et en guerre le moins de mal possibles'. 1" The war clearly had not 
destroyed Gr6goire's humanitarianism, but it was certainly offset by a stress on internal 
security which would have been less palatable in 1790. On the other hand, the 
cosmopolitan sentiments in his speech would have been extremely dangerous views to 
express during the Terror. Gregoir&s was a sincere attempt to balance, in diplomatic and 
legal theory, national interest with the humane cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth-century. 
Moreover, the passing of the Terror combined with military success allowed some 
revolutionaries to express sentiments other than blind hatred for the enemy, and the 
British in particular. Some of the visions presented by the revolutionaries suggest a 
revival of the old dream which separated the good British people from their oppressive 
government. In the Convention on 22 June 1795, Louvet assured the Dutch 
plenipotentiaries that 'le peuple anglais commence i porter impatiernment le fardeau d'une 
guerre entreprise pour les seuls int6r&s de quelques ministres. "92 On 28 March 1796, 
119See, for example, the considerations on the droit des gens by Esschasseriaux (Vaine) and 
by Gr6goire, both presented to the Convention (Monifeur Nos. 49 (19 Brumaire 111/9 
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Mailhet told the Council of Five Hundred that the British political and corresponding 
societies were'le seul espoir du peuple pour recouvrer 1'exercise de ses droits'. "' If those 
clubs were now all but destroyed, at least Mailhet reminded his colleagues that, ' 
somewhere in the mass of British subjects, there might still exist enlightened souls who 
were denied their only means of opposition to their government. 
None the less, the xenophobia which gained official respectability during the Terror 
had not simply evaporated. Many of the attitudes which were expressed in their most 
acute form in the Year II continued to weigh heavily on the Thermidorians and under the 
Directory. This was because, no matter how successful the French were on the 
battlefield, the war itself continued and with it, the real or imagined threat of enemy 
subversion. That it was the conflict which bears the prime responsibility for the stirring of 
xenophobia probably explains why the law of 7 Prairial was actually extended to include 
Spanish soldiers on 11 August 1794, just as the machinery of the Terror was being 
dismantled. The law was not repealed until 30 December. 1514 None the less, never a 
consistent factor, xenophobia fluctuated according to the circumstances of war and 
domestic politics. Most persistent of all the hatreds was anglophobia. 
For the deputy Barailon on 29 October 1794, just over three months after 9 
Thern-fidor, the British were'les plus m6prisables ennernis de la r6publique ... les plus 
f6roces, les plus acharnes. ""' This hatred persisted throughout the post-Thermidor period. 
On 23 February 1796, Wolfe Tone was pleased to hear from James Monroe, the American 
ambassador, that 'not only the Government, but the whole people were most violently 
exasperated against England'. 19" Monroe's observation was confirmed by the German 
traveller Friedrich Meyer, who five weeks later was looking at a plaque commemorating 
the Saint Bartholomews Day Massacre. He was approached by a soldier who bitterly 
asked, Vela peut-il int6resser un mylord Anglais? '191 The persistence of this particular 
depth of anglophobia at all levels of society can only be explained by the continuation of 
the war, in which the British were proving to be the most resilient of France's opponents. 
193Moniteur No. 192 (12 Germinal IV/1 April 1796). 
19'Moniteur Nos. 326 (26 Thermidor 11/13 August 1794), 102 (12 Niv6se 111/1 January 
1795). 
19'Moniteur No. 40 (10 Brumaire 111/3 1 October 1794). 
196 Tone, Life, ii, 23. 
19IMeyer, F. J. L., Fragments sur Paris (2 vols. ) (Hamburg, 1798), i, 22 - 23. 
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It was the stresses of the war which turned the previously anglophile Louis-S6bastien 
Mercier into an anglophobe who wrote'Guerre, guerre 6ternelle aux Anglais! "' 
As before, such xenophobia was linked to fear of conspiracy, a fear which military 
victory did little to abate. On II July 1795, in a manner reminiscent of Robespierre, the 
deputy Mariette warned his colleagues that France's military success made it more likely 
that the coalition would turn to other means to defeat the republic. " Tallien had already 
succumbed to such a view during the Prairial uprising. On 2 Prairial (21 May 1795), he 
warned his colleagues that'tous les Anglais ne sont pas sur les bords de la Tamise; il y en 
a dans Paris, et H faut les exterminer partout oit ils se trouvent. '2' Thejounijes of Prairial 
were not caused by economic distress and popular discontent, he explained, but by British 
agents in the capital. The virulence of his denunciation was the product of a very real fear 
of the popular violence of which he and his colleagues had been witness and it was too 
tempting, in the context of continual warfare, to explain it in terms of enemy subversion. 
The revolutionaries sought to explain political unrest not as a hostile response to their 
own policies, but by drawing on the phobias which were rooted in eighteenth-century 
culture. 
The paranoia fed by the Prairial uprising was given real potency by the landing of a 
royalist force at Quiberon on 27 June - with British backing. It was not to be defeated 
until 21 July. These circumstances explain why the Convention should have been led to 
enact new measures against foreigners, at the very moment when France had made peace 
with two of its former enemies (the Netherlands and Prussia) and was close to signing a 
treaty with a third (Spain). Similarly, even as French forces advanced into Italy, the arrest 
of Babeuf and his fellow conspirators, including the Italian Buonarotti, in May 1796, led 
to a law expelling foreigners from Paris. Even Meyer accepted the view that'on ne peut 
pas nier Vintelligence de toutes les conjurations nouvellement d6couvertes avec 
1'6tranger'. 201 As Quiberon and the Babeuf plot showed, fear of foreign subversion was 
not always without some cause, but this obsession did lead the revolutionaries to see spies 
under their beds where in fact none existed. For as long as the war and the attendant 
political instability continued, the revolutionaries would continue to be prey to their own 
phobias. 
191Le Nouveau Paris (6 vols. ) (Paris, n. d. ), quoted in Hampson, 'The idea of the nation in 
Revolutionary France', 24. 
199Monifeur No. 297 (27 Messidor/ 15 July 1795). 
20OMoniteur No. 247 (7 Prairial 111/26 May 1795). 
201 Meyer, Fragments sur Paris, i, 27 1. 
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Revolutionary attitudes towards foreigners were not created only by revolutionary 
ideology: they were brought into the upheaval with the cultural baggage carried in from 
the eighteenth century. While this means that the increasingly harsh treatment of 
foreigners cannot be explained exclusively in terms of a response to the war, it also 
suggests that it cannot be attributed solely to revolutionary ideology. Older prejudices, 
phobias and more positive legal and cultural values continued to influence the 
revolutionaries. What revolutionary ideology did was to give these traditions a new, 
vigorous, political expression. In appropriating these longer-term impulses, both 
revolutionary cosmopolitanism and patriotism gained potency and acceptance. No matter 
how much they claimed to be establishing a new order, the revolutionaries could not 
escape from the weight of tradition. 
As they shared both the same cultural roots and the same ideological source in the 
rights of man, revolutionary patriotism and cosmopolitanism were not always in conflict 
but could coincide. On one hand the notion of national sovereignty had exclusive 
implications which allowed only citizens an active role in the various branches of the state. 
It also justified the assault on the old order in Europe, in Alsace and the papal enclaves. 
On the other hand, the contractual definition of the nation encouraged assimilation: it did 
not exclude on the grounds of race, religion or even language. The rights of man were 
universal, but France was the only country where they were enjoyed to their fullest. 
People were therefore encouraged to see the French Revolution as the hope and 
inspiration for all humanity. Enlightened, prosperous and talented foreigners were not 
only invited to contribute to the French patrie and, eventually, to become citizens 
enjoying its liberty, but they were also urged to spread the good news in their own 
country. Patriotism therefore cut across lines of nationality. For as long as patriotism 
meant support for an egalitarian civic order over the ruins of personal privilege, so it was 
possible for a patriot to be a cosmopolitan, hoping the same good for other peoples. 
With the flight to Varennes and the campaign for war, the pacific cosmopolitanism of 
the first two years of the Revolution was lost in a deluge of militant rhetoric which 
combined national sovereignty with international fraternity. This defensive reflex created 
a vision of a war both for the survival of the Revolution and for universal liberty. By the 
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end of 1792 it became clear that other peoples were hostile to the Revolution and that 
French strategic and military interests would be better served by exploitation rather than 
liberation of French conquests. Cosmopolitan ideology became a veil for national interest 
and aggrandisement. 
Despite their disillusionment with the 'crusade for universal liberty, the revolutionaries 
never entirely abandoned their cosmopolitan pretensions. Even as they indulged in the 
worst manifestations of xenophobia in the Year II, they accepted that a small core of 
foreigners whose revolutionary credentials were sound, or who contributed to the war 
effort, could be free from reproach. The treatment of foreigners was not determined, 
therefore, solely by the outcome of tensions between the cosmopolitan and exclusive 
implications in revolutionary ideology. The political tendencies and the wartime potential 
of the foreigners in question entered into the calculations. In their manichean vision of the 
revolutionary struggle, the two sides were divided between patriotic virtue on one hand 
and despotism, vice and self-interest on the other. Frenchmen and foreigners were to be 
found in both camps. The problem was that as the Revolution became more radical, it 
excluded groups whose politics did not conform with the demands of the new order. In 
the summer of the Year II, this development reached its zenith, with patriotism defined as 
obedience to the revolutionary government. It was this development which excluded 
foreigners and French citizens alike from the select club of true patriots. 
Meanwhile, cultural conditioning overlaid with actual evidence of foreign involvement 
in subversion encouraged expressions of xenophobia, often in the form of conspiracy 
theories. This hostility towards foreigners was linked to both the international and 
internal fortunes of the Revolution. Although the war did not create these various 
phobias, it was the conflict and the accompanying domestic troubles which intensified 
them. Eventually, these circumstances brought out the more exclusive implications in 
revolutionary ideology and led the revolutionaries to use national sovereignty as the 
justification for measures against foreigners, particularly during the Terror, but also 
subsequently. National interest demanded the temporary suspension of the rights of 
foreigners and their exclusion from the life of the state and even from France itself. 
None the less the idea that patriotic virtue was not a monopoly of French citizens 
survived. The beleaguered revolutionaries of 1792 - 1794 took heart from the notion that 
as they struggled for survival, they were cocooning the rights of man in the protective 
shell of the French Republic. All ffiends of humanity, whatever their nationality, still 
supported France's struggle and were thereby defined as patriots. In France, such 
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foreigners proved their patriotic credentials either through their contributions to the war 
effort, or through unswerving political loyalty to the revolutionary govermnent. 
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Chapter Three. Foreigners under the Constituent Assembly. 
Helen Mafia Williams at the Fete de la Rd6ration: 
You will not suspect that I was an indifferent witness of such a scene. Oh no! this was not a time 
in which the distinctions of country were remembered. It was the triumph of human kind; it was 
man asserting the noblest privileges of his nature; and it required but the common feelings of 
humanity to become in that moment a citizen of the world. -I too, though 
but a sojourner in their 
land, rejoiced in their happiness, joined the universal voice, and repeated with all my heart and 
soul, Tive la nation! " 
Helen Maria Williams expressed what many foreigners felt in the summer of 1790, one 
year after the fall of the Bastille. The Revolution in France had a global significance 
because the French had asserted not any historical, prescriptive rights as a people, but 
their rights purely and simply as human beings. When it came to the practical reality of 
foreigners in general, however, the revolutionaries were faced with a myriad of pressures 
which exerted their force in diverse and often different directions. When the Constituent 
Assembly embarked on its reform of France and was faced with the privileges of certain 
types of foreigners, it could not sweep them aside as easily as it did those belonging to 
French people, because often those privileges had been based on international agreements 
or on diplomatic considerations. Such concerns prevented the full application of the 
nationalising tendencies and the egalitarian ideals of 1789 under the Constituent 
Assembly. Similarly, the cosmopolitan implications of the rights of man were often 
restrained by the revolutionaries, aware as they were of France's own political and military 
limitations. 
I 
If Helen Maria Williams saw herself, for a moment, as a citizen of the world, the 
Constituent Assembly was faced with the reality of defining the limits of the French nation 
and how membership could be acquired. They inherited from the Ancien Rdgime a 
'Williams, H. M., Letters written in France in the Summer of 1790, to a Friend in 
England; Containing, various anecdotes relative to the French Revolution (London, 
1790), 13 - 14,21. 
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situation which was far from clear-cut. For example, while one of the prerequisites for the 
exercise of political rights was French citizenship, the monarchy had muddied the water 
somewhat by the occasional admission of foreigners in public affairs, including the 
elections to the Estates-General, by accident or design. Eligibility was based on those 
who were born or naturalised French, but on some occasions foreigners did acquire a 
voice. The Genevan ttienne Dumont attended the elections in the quartier of Filles- 
Saint-Thomas. Although guards had been ordered to admit only local inhabitants, anyone 
dressed respectably was allowed to join the deliberations. ' Dumont's situation illustrates 
how the lack of any clear definition of procedure could accidentally blur the distinctions 
between residents and non-residents, and even French citizens and foreigners. In the 
assemblies of the nobility of Gex, Quesnoy and Avesnes, foreign owners of fiefs claimed a 
right to representation. The keeper of the seals decided on each occasion that 
representation was the prerogative of property-owners, irrespective of nationality. Siey6s, 
however, questioned the right of foreigners to vote and to stand for election and on 14 
July the National Assembly heard a report contesting the right of the bishops of Ypres and 
Tournay to sit as deputies and decided six days later that those bishops should not have 
been elected as they were foreigners. ' The vast majority of foreigners in France remained 
without the suffrage and very few non-naturalised foreigners living in France tried to vote 
or to represent their order in the Estates. 
When the Constituent Assembly addressed the two questions of French nationality and 
the exercise of political rights on 20 October 1789, it was made clear that for a foreigner 
to have the latter, he would have to have the former first. In other words, he would have 
to fulfil certain conditions to be recognised as French first, and then he would need to 
meet the various prerequisites for political rights common to all French citizens. The first 
condition of an 'active' citizen was V6tre ne Franqais ou devenu Franqais'. Thephrase 
'devenu Franqais! raised the question as to how a foreigner was to become French: surely, 
asked the baron de Beaumetz, the Assembly had no intention to retain the old system of 
lettres de naturafiti, which implied bonds between king and subject, rather than between 
citizens? The Constituent did not rescind letters of naturalisation given under the Ancien 
R6gime, but sought to snatch the initiative of naturalisation away from the king and place 
it in the hands of the nation or its representatives. The lawyer Guy Target of the comiM 
'Dumont, Souvenirs sur Mirabeau, 4 5.0 
3 Siey6s, Quest-ce que le tiers &af?, 61 - 62; Portemer, J., 'L'Etranger clans le Droit de la 
R6volution frangaise', RecuejIs de la Societj Jean Bodin, x, LEtranger (Brussels: 
Editions de la Librairie Encyclop6dique, 1958), part 2,536n.. 
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de constitution gave expression to the transfer of sovereignty from the monarch to the 
nation' s representatives when he suggested that the Assembly draw up new conditions for 
naturalisation. ' 
The precondition of French birth or naturalisation for the assumption of political rights 
effectively disenfranchised those few foreigners who had voted or at least deliberated in 
the elections to the Estates-General. Similarly, any foreigners who had served in 
municipalities and corporations under the Ancien R6gime were to lose their eligibility in 
communal and departmental administration. Target recognised their services when he 
presented new conditions for naturalisation on 30 April 1790: 'les uns ont dt6 officiers, 
dans les anciennes municipalit6s; les autres sont officiers de la garde nationale: tous ont 
prdt6 le serment civique ... ce sont des amis de plus que vous acquerrez i une constitution 
qui voudrait rendre tous les hommes heureux. " 
Target's claim is borne out by the experience of individual foreigners in France. There 
was no reason why the Genevan Necker could not continue to serve in government, as the 
appointment of ministers remained a royal prerogative. The Dutch Patriot Jan-Antonie 
Daverhoult at least took out French citizenship before being elected to the department of 
6 the Ardennes. His compatriot Johan Valckenaer did no such thing when taking a 
commission in the Watten National Guard in Artois in 1790. He successfully urged other 
Dutch exiles to fill up the ranks. ' Benjamin Cuenet, a bourgeois of Yverdon in 
Switzerland, became a National Guard officer in Lyon. Eventually, the decree of 29 
September 1791 recognised thefait accomph by offering French citizenship to all 
foreigners who served in the militia, provided they fulfilled the other legal conditions. ' 
The significance of the naturalisation law was that it was, among other things, an 
attempt to assimilate more fully those foreigners already involved in the workings of the 
French state. Their loyalty to the new order was to be encouraged through their 
naturalisation: the first condition to be fulfilled was the civic oath, which was a public 
display of adherence to the Revolution. Nonetheless, the revolutionaries were aware that 
an oath on its own was no real guarantee of commitment to the new order. Consequently, 
foreigners were also required to have a material stake in the country. They had to have 
lived in France continuously for five years. Furthermore, they must have acquired 
'AP, ix, 469 - 470. 
'AP, xv, 245. 
'Mathiez, La R9volution et les &rangers, 3 1. 
'Schama, Patriots andLiberators, 148. 
'Mathiez, La Rivolution et les etrangers, 3 1. 
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property or established agricultural or commercial concerns in France. This clause 
stressed that the targets of the decree were not the multitude of poor foreigners such as 
Savoyards who swept chimneys and chopped wood in French cities, but rather those who 
could enrich France through commerce, industry or agriculture. Indeed, the only way in 
which a propertyless foreigner could hope to become a French citizen was through 
marriage to a French woman, which assumed a commitment to staying in France. The 
social basis of the Constituent's law on naturalisation was an effort to attract wealth and 
to avoid the assimilation of those unlikely to remain for long, or who were regarded as a 
drain on national resources. " 
None the less, naturalisation became a legal right for all those who fulfilled the required 
conditions: it was no longer a royal prerogative. The new law represented the transfer of 
sovereignty from king to the nation. It also suggested that the nation was being defined as 
a community of citizens sharing the same civil - but not political - rights. Naturalisation 
became the expression both of a desire by a foreigner to join the national community and 
of the nation' s acceptance of the foreigner as one of its own. French nationality was 
therefore based on individuals recognising each other as compatriots: it represented the 
abandonment of the corporate society of the Ancien R6gime, bound together by loyalty to 
a king. 
The sovereignty of the nation was further implicit in the clause (Article 4) which 
enabled the legislature to naturalise any foreigner at its own discretion 'sans autres 
conditions que de fixer son domicile en France et d'y pr8ter le serment civique. "' This 
reservation was an expression of the cosmopolitanism of the Constituent Assembly. The 
clause was later used by the Legislative Assembly in August 1792 to naturalise foreign 
men of letters who had supported the French Revolution, or at least causes apparently 
sympathetic to it. The Constituent was also stressing the absolute sovereignty of the 
nation. Like the king before, the representatives of the people could waive even their own 
conditions for French nationality whenever they saw fit. 
Additional clauses in the Constitution also determined how nationality could be 
transmitted from one generation to the next. In doing so, it retained an important 
tradition of the Ancien R6gime, ius soli, whereby nationality was determined by the 
territory upon which one was born. In 1791, those born in France of parents of any 
nationality were recognised as French citizens provided they continued to make France 
'AP, xv, 245. 
"In version which appears in the Constitution of 179 1, Titre Il (AP, xxxii, 527). 
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their home. On the other hand, children born abroad of a French father but who came to 
live in France and who took the civic oath were also considered French citizens, which 
suggested that nationality could also be inherited - by'bloo&, ius sanguinis. The French 
Revolution combined these two traditions of nationality. It did not replace jus soli with 
ius sanguinis, as has sometimes been claimed. " 
Language was not at this time a consideration. The law made no reference to a need to 
speak French, probably for the very practical reason that any linguistic condition would 
literally de-nationalise the peoples of whole French provinces such as Alsace, Brittany and 
Gascony, where languages and dialects as diverse as German, Yiddish, Breton and 
Gascon were in everyday use. The law on nationality was also devoid of any religious 
conditions. By the late eighteenth century the absolute monarchy had in fact rarely 
insisted on Catholicism from those being naturalised and French Protestants were given 
full civil rights on 19 November 1787. Nonetheless, the lack of religious content in the 
new regulations was not devoid of meaning. It is significant that Target's decree on 
naturalisation was passed a little more than two weeks after the rejection of Dom Gerle's 
motion which would have declared Catholicism the national religion and have allowed 
only that faith the right to worship publicly. The Constituent was consciously trying to 
shape a French nation which might still have supported Catholicism as the state religion, 
but which did not exclude anyone on the basis of faith either. " The law of naturalisation 
underscored the desire of the revolutionaries to secularise French society by defining its 
citizenry without reference to religious belief. Indeed, in the final version of the decree on 
naturalisation which appeared in the Constitution of 179 1, the Revolution officially 
renounced the persecution of the Huguenots by opening the paths of reintegration into 
French society in the most generous of terms: 'ceux qui, nes en pays 6tranger, et 
descendant, i quelque degr6 que ce soit, d'un Frangais ou dune Frangaise expatries pour 
cause de religion, viennent derneurer en France et preftent le serment civique. "' The 
removal of religious conditions meant that, theoretically, French nationality would be 
"See, for example, Danjou, La Condition Civile de Ittranger, 11. 
"Dom Gerle's motion was rejected on the grounds that Tattachement de I'Assemblee 
Nationale au culte catholique, apostolique et romain ne saurait We mis en doute' (quoted 
in Vovelle, M., La Revolution contre lVgfise de la raison a 1etre supreme (Paris: Editions 
Complexe, 1988), 27). 
13Ap, xxXii, 527. 
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open to people of all beliefs. " There were pragmatic grounds for this decision: religious 
minorities provided wealthy and gifted individuals, particularly in banking and commerce. 
The Constituent's marrying of ius soh with ius sanguinis and the rejection of language 
and religion as preconditions for French citizenship made French nationality more 
assimilationist than exclusive. French nationality could be inherited, but a person did not 
need to have French parents or French Vood' in order to become a French citizen. They 
could acquire French nationality either through birth on French territory or through 
fulfilment of the legal requirements for naturalisation. Membership of the nation was open 
to all regardless of racial, religious and linguistic background: all that was required was 
the fulfilment of certain prerequisites which assured their assimilation into both the nation 
and the new civic order. This ideal of citizenship was not only based on cosmopolitan 
ideas: there was also some hard-nosed pragmatism at work. The haphazard, historical 
formation of the French state, 'with all its linguistic, religious and cultural differences, 
made an assimilationist definition of nationality not only desirable, but necessary. 
Moreover, the Constituent sought to exclude transients and poor foreign vagrants. The 
disinherited and the rootless were not considered worthy of French citizenship. As 
pragmatic as the revolutionaries may have been, however, the law on naturalisation still 
stands as a milestone in the civic definition of nationality: it was based not on ethnicity, 
religion or language, but on a theoretical contract between equals. " 
Not all foreigners could or would be naturalised, which raised the question of their 
legal treatment while in France. The Constitution of 1791 declared that foreigners 'sont 
soumis aux m6mes lois criminelles et de police que les citoyens frangais ... 
leur personne, 
leurs biens, leur industrie, leur culte sont 6galement prot6g6s par la loi"' While droit des 
gens still existed as the unwritten code determining relations between states and their 
conduct towards each others' citizens, the decision to give legal parity to foreigners in 
France eradicated, in theory at least, the traditional division between droit des gens and 
droit civiL The fate of the droit d'aubaine was called into question. 
"In reality the French Jews themselves had to wait until 27 September 1791 before they 
received equal political and civil rights with other Frenchmen. 
"This defintion of nationality has with some justice been labelled 'radical-democratic'by 
E. J. Hobsbawm (Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality (2nd 
ed. ) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 40). The term is something of a 
misnomer in the context of the Constituent Assembly. Perhaps it is better described as 
'civic' to distinguish it from cultural, racial and religious bases of nationality. 
16AP, xxxii, 541, 
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When Bar6re rose in the name of the comili des domaines on 6 August 1790 and 
demanded complete abolition, he met little opposition. His arguments were little different 
to those used by those Ancien Rdgime ministers who had requested a similar measure. He 
suggested that the droits d'aubaine and de Mraction yielded a tiny amount of revenue, 
while abolition would encourage foreigners to invest in biens nationaux, commerce, 
industry and agriculture in France. He stressed the economic and fiscal benefits the 
measure would bring at such a cheap price. Of course, Bar6re embellished his speech with 
plenty of references to the cosmopolitan implications of the rights of man. He recoiled in 
horror at the exclusion of foreigners from French droit civil. '11 vit libre, mais il meurt 
serf. telle est la maxime atroce que les repr6sentants d'un peuple libre doivent s'empresser 
d'effacer de ses lois. La France doit ouvrir aujourd'hui son sein i tous les peuples de la 
terre. ' It was insult'au droit naturel et au droit des gens'. 1' 
The abolition of the droit d'aubaine represented the admission of foreigners to French 
droit civil. The measure was dictated primarily by French economic and fiscal interests, 
the perceptions of which had not changed very much between the old and the new 
r6gimes. The difference, however, lay in the way in which those interests were expressed: 
wrapped in the language of cosmopolitanism, the abolition of the droit d'aubaine and the 
drou de ditraction had instant appeal among the deputies. Only one deputy sought to 
limit the decree, which in the end was voted unanimously with little discussion. " For the 
time being, the revolutionaries' cosmopolitan ideology and their view of what was right 
for the state coincided. 
From the point of view of foreigners themselves, the significance of the abolition of 
1790 was its finality, that it made no demands of reciprocity and that it abolished the droit 
de ditraction. This meant that the droit d'aubaine would not return, no matter what 
governments of other states did. This was a path down which the absolute monarchy had 
been unwilling to tread, even when it did make special arrangements with other 
governments. " The droil d'aubaine brought little revenue to the state's coffers, but its 
abolition was symbolic of the new r6gime's attitudes towards foreigners and their place in 
society. 
17Ap, xvii, 628 - 629. 
"AP, xvii, 629. 
"The droit d'aubaine was none the less re-established by Napoleon's Civil Code after 
much debate. The First Consul concluded that France was losing out from the unilateral 
abolition of 1790 and 1791. See, for example the report penned by Roederer on August 
1801 (MAE, Fonds Ancien, ADP, France, carton 1, dossier 1). 
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Despite the claims of the Constitution to give foreigners legal treatment equal with 
French citizens, however, two Ancien R6gime practices aimed specifically at foreigners 
remained in force. The cautiojudicalum solvi was not abolished and nor was the 
contrainte par corps for foreign debtors until the Convention did so between 9- 12 
March 1793. On balance, however, when foreigners were not treated equally with French 
citizens before the law, it was usually in their favour because diplomatic or commercial 
motives so dictated. 
When titles of nobility were abolished on 19 June 1790, the deputies quickly foresaw 
the problems which might have arisen among titled foreign aristocrats and diplomats in 
France. The next day the Constituent exempted foreigners without discussion. When an 
outburst of xenophobia provoked by the flight to Varennes led the National Assembly to 
close the frontiers on 21 June 179 1, discretion ruled a week later. The Assembly's 
comilis diplomatique, des rapports et des recherches reported that arrests of foreigners 
on the frontiers would be counter-productive for both commercial and diplomatic 
reasons. 20 Foreigners were to be pern-fitted to leave France on production of a valid 
21 
passport issued by their local municipality or the minister of foreign affairs. While 
passports were later an ominous way of controlling the movements of foreigners and 
citizens alike, for now they were a means of exempting foreigners from restrictions on 
cross-border movement, a luxury denied to most French people for a while. The most 
dramatic cases of special consideration given to foreigners, however, came with decision 
to compensate the Imperial princes for the loss of their privileges in Alsace and in the 
Constituent's treatment of foreign soldiers and clergy. As will be shown in the case of the 
last two groups, such foreigners were protected from the full implications of revolutionary 
measures because of the very fact that they were not French. 
If the Constituent made important steps towards the equality of French and foreign 
citizens before the law, it was much more sweeping in terms of giving foreigners full civil 
rights. Perhaps the most important of such rights for foreigners was to worship freely. 
The absolute monarchy, of course, had made important concessions to Protestants in 
1787 and the Revolution continued this work. The recognition of full civil and political 
rights for Protestants made redundant the need for separate burial ground, which included 
the cemetery for foreign Protestants in Paris. While the foreign minister Montmorin 
"On 21 June the Constituent issued a declaration of France's peaceful intentions (AP, 
xxvii, 385 - 386. 
21Ap, xKvii, 358 - 359,563. 
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apparently thought that its closure might give rise to protests from foreigners, it was 
closed without a whimper in 179 L" 
The Constituent Assembly was pragmatic in its approach to the general conditions of 
foreigners in France. While they proclaimed high principles, in reality the revolutionaries 
were led not by ideology but by their view of national interest. None the less, in these 
early years of the Revolution, those perceptions led them to take an assimilationist 
approach to foreigners. Political, economic, fiscal and diplomatic considerations brought 
the revolutionaries to be flexible in the application of their principles. This flexibility 
could work both in favour and against foreigners. While they abolished the droil 
d'aubaine, the revolutionaries retained the contrainte par corps and the cautiojudicatum 
solvi, presumably because of the same legal justifications presented under the Ancien 
R6gime. On the other hand, while they claimed to treat foreigners equally with French 
citizens before the law, they understood that the application of all the sweeping changes to 
foreigners would have diplomatic and economic consequences and made the necessary 
exemptions in their favour. Foreign troops and foreign clergy best illustrate this point. 
11 
The behaviour of foreign troops during the collapse of the absolute monarchy left them 
open to suspicion and hostility. At the end of the Ancien R6gime these troops appeared, 
to both the authorities and the people alike, to be loyal to their aristocratic officers and to 
the old order. Their role in the crisis of the summer of 1789 seemed to confirm this 
prejudice. The high proportion of foreign troops in the military build-up around Paris and 
Versailles (5,800 out of 17,000 new arrivals) from 13 April 1789 encouraged wild 
speculation and rumour. ' The day after the fall of the Bastille, Mirabeau rose in the 
permanent session of the National Assembly and denounced 'ces satellites 6trangers' 
whose very presence was Tavant-scene de la S. Barthelemy'. " 
The foreign troops, with their reputation for iron discipline and obedience, may have 
caused consternation among the French population, but in fact they seem to have been as 
"MAE, Fonds Ancien, ADP, France, carton 7, dossier 115 (letter of Montmorin to Bailly, 
May 1790; letter of Lebrun to Pierre Louis Corroy, ex-concierge of the cemetery). 
'Scott, Yhe Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution, 51 - 55. 
"Moniteur, 15 - 16 July 1789. 
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affected by the political instability and uncertainty as French units. " There were however 
important exceptions, such as the Royal-Allemand and the Hussar regiments. For the 
former, the popular enn-dty which followed the events of 12 July in Paris was enough to 
ensure solidarity between officers and men . 
2' The very presence of such foreign soldiers 
in some of the more dramatic manifestations of loyalty and obedience to the old r6gime 
determined popular attitudes towards foreign troops, regardless of the realities of 
desertion and indiscipline in other units. 
What most people remembered was the charge of the Royal-Allemand cavalry in Paris 
on the place Louis XV and the Tuileries in Paris on 12 July. Besenval later praised the 
restraint of the German cavalry up to the moment they galloped into the crowd, " but the 
civilian population envisaged a more sinister picture of the troops' intentions and they 
were encouraged in this by the press. 'Trois r6gimens allemands avec leurs canons se 
seraient rendus i la porte d'Enfer, reported the Moniteur. The crowds returning from 
their Sunday strolls in the bois de Boulogne were caught up in the confusion of the charge 
of the Royal-Allemand: 'leur frayeur fut dgale i leur dtonnement en les voyant investis par 
des soldats 6trangers rang6s en bataille'. " 
People also remembered that thirty-two Swiss troops (from the Salis-Samade 
regiment) in addition to the eighty-two invalids had guarded the Bastille and fired from its 
ramparts into the crowd on 14 July. "' If eventually de Launay had been willing to 
capitulate, the Swiss commander, Louis de Flue, was not. 'O The Moniteur certainly 
claimed that while the majority of the defenders did not want to fire on the attackers, it 
was'les conseils perfides de M. Louis de Flue', himself following orders from Besenval 
'The Swiss Diesbach, Safis-Samade and Bouillon regiments all lost abnormally high 
numbers of men through desertion, while the Swiss Chiteauvieux regiment declared that it 
would never fire of the people. The German regiments of Bouillon and Nassau, the 
majority of whom were German-speaking French subjects, declared that they'did not wish 
to serve against their country' (Scott, 7he Response of the Royal Army to the French 
Revolution, 5 8,6 1). 
"Scott, The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution, 6 1. 
'Besenval, P. -V., Mimoires de M le baron de Besenval, Jcritspar lui-meme (3 vols. ) 
(Paris, 1805), iii, 411. 
"Moniteur, 17 - 20 July 1789. 
"Bodin, J., Les Suisses au Service de la France de Louis N6 la Legion etrangýre (Paris: 
Albin Michel, 1988), 246. 
"'Relation de la Prise de la Bastille, le 14 juillet 1789, par un de ses d6fenseurs', Revue 
R91rospective (16re S6rie), iv (1834), 291. 
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and Flesselles, which brought the garrison to use force. 'On avait fait jurer les Suisses 
qu'Us feraient feu sur les invalides s'ils reflasaient d'obdir au gouverneur ... '. 
31 
The plight of foreign troops in France during the Revolution was that if they insisted on 
retaining their separateness from the rest of the army and continued in their loyalty to the 
crown which was the cornerstone of their service in France, they would incur the odium 
of the people and of the new authorities. If, on the other hand, they declared their loyalty 
to the nation and the new order for the sake of survival and continued employment, they 
were betraying their own conditions of service and their sense of honour. Meanwhile, the 
dramatic experiences at the hands of foreign troops and popular hostility evident in the 
cahiers de do1jances, put pressure on the revolutionaries to consider very carefully the 
continued presence of foreign troops in the French army. 
In the Constituent Assembly, a number of deputies sought to forestall the counter- 
revolutionary potential of the army by speaking in favour of different forms of national 
service, which naturally excluded foreigners. On 18 September 1789 the vicomte Louis 
de Noailles stressed that the army ought to be considered as 'une partie de la totalit6 des 
citoyens qui se chargent i certaines conditions du service militaire, auquel seraient tenus 
tous les citoyens'. He then argued that the army should never act against the nation which 
it represents, except in cases laid down by law when public tranquility was at stake. For 
de Noailles, the army could be a threat in the hands of royalist officers, but it also 
provided protection against renewed insurrections by the people. For de Noailles, foreign 
regiments belonged to the former category as they knew only 'une ob6issance aveugle' and 
were therefore a threat to the new constitution. 32 
There was perhaps an element of national pride behind the arguments for the 
disbandment of the foreign regiments, a sentiment which again echoed those expressed in 
the cahiers de do1jances. In addition, the new, egalitarian definition of citizenship 
allowed no special privileges for any section of society and it admitted no one except 
citizens to full participation in the state, including the army. These ideas were voiced less 
than three months later by Dubois-Cranc6 of the National Assembly's military committee. 
On 12 December, he seized on the phrase of the nfilitary reformer, the comte de Guibert, 
and declared that 'tout citoyen doit 6tre soldat, et tout soldat citoyen, which left little 
33 
room for foreigners in French military service. The idea of equality of rights among 




citizens also implied an equality of duties. Those who did not opt to join the national 
community neither shared the same political rights as citizens, nor the same duties - and 
that included service in the armed forces. 
Circumstances did not, however, allow the National Assembly to exercise its principles 
to their logical extent. If Dubois-Crances bill did not become law, this was not because 
the deputies (except for some on the right) objected to the principle of excluding 
foreigners from service, but because they preferred to continue to rely for the time being 
on the professional line army already in existence. " The revolutionaries recognised the 
need to maintain the army to prevent continuing internal disorder and to forestall the 
possibility of invasion by foreign powers tempted by the soft target of a France weakened 
by domestic instability. " With disintegrating discipline and alarming rates of desertion, 
the army appeared to be bleeding to death at a precarious moment in France's history. 
Most revolutionaries recognised that to dismiss well-disciplined foreign regiments in such 
circumstances was the height of folly. 
On 18 September 1789 de Noailles therefore proposed, for the comitj militaire, that 
while no more foreign troops be engaged into French service, those units already in the 
French army be kept under new titles. The Swiss, of course, presented a special case: 
unlike other foreign regiments, they served the king of France by virtue of treaties and 
capitulations with their respective governments. It would have been diplomatically 
disruptive to have disbanded the Swiss regiments and so de Noailles insisted that the 
treaties with the cantons be respected. Even Dubois-Cranc6, for all his enthusiasm for 
lune conscription vraiment nationale', conceded this point. " These pragmatic arguments 
won the day over the fear and hostility towards foreign troops, the ideology of citizenship 
and national pride. Even the financial savings to be made by disbanding the foreign 
regiments did not, for the time being, prevail. The comitj desfinances on 2 October 1789 
stressed that any such steps made in order save money should only be carried out 'apr6s 
avoir mfirement pes6 les diverses consid6rations politiques qui ont fait cr6er les r6giments 
et leur donner un traitement consid6rabl&. 37 
The Constituent decided that the political and diplomatic considerations in favour of 
keeping foreign troops were more pressing than those against. The constitution militaire 
of 28 February 1790 stipulated (Article III) that the king could not introduce into France 
"Scott, Yhe Response of the RoyalArmy to the French Revolution, 156. 
"See, for example, Custine's opinion (AP, x, 556). 
"AP, ix, 38; x, 522. See also Custine's pragmatic arguments (AP, x, 557 - 558). 
37A, p, ix, 262 - 263. 
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any foreign troops without the permission of the legislature. Each legislature was 
empowered (Article XI) to pass further statutes on the admission of foreign soldiers. " 
This compromise reflected the Assemblys desire to retain a competent regular army, to 
maintain good diplomatic relations, but also to ensure that control over foreign troops 
was not exclusively in the hands of the king. 
The Constituent soon used the powers vested by the constitution militaire and fixed 
the number of foreign troops allowed in the French army. As if in anticipation of such a 
move, the minister of war, La Tour-du-Pin, suggested that, although the number of 
foreign troops in France numbered 24,000, they could not be reduced to any less than 
22,000, owing to'les raisons politiques', meaning diplomatic treaties and conventions. No 
one in the Assembly objected to these proposals, as the message of diplomatic necessity 
had by then been clearly and often repeated. On 13 July, de Noailles proposed that the 
number be fixed at 24,5 8 1, on the basis that in peacetime there should never be more than 
one foreign soldier to every 8 3/5 French soldiers and in wartime, one to every 4 3/5. De 
Noailles Supported his proposal by repeating the arguments used by Maurice de Saxe in 
favour of foreign regiments: they saved French manpower for more productive activities 
and for as long as they were in French service, they could not be used by foreign powers. 
None the less, he recognised that foreign soldiers could be useful tools in the hands of the 
monarch 'dans ces temps de troubles ou d'effervescence' and so recommended the fixed 
ratios of foreigners to French citizens in the army. On 18 August the Assembly produced 
its definitive decree which was more generous to the foreign units. In 179 1, the entire 
army would number 150,848 men, of which foreign troops would not number more than 
26,000.3' In other words, while de Noailles anticipated a fighting force in which between 
II 1/2and 12 percent of the troops were foreigners, the Constituent permitted a greater 
proportion of 17 percent. In practical terms the decree signalled no change in the 
numbers foreign troops in France. 
For as long as the revolutionaries recognised the need to retain foreign soldiers, the 
main problem became one of how to ensure their loyalty while also reforming the military. 
The problem was not merely one of ideology: there was genuine worry among both 
deputies and the people (as their response to foreign regiments in various parts of France 
made clear) that in retaining foreigners, the authorities were actually nourishing those who 
might become the stormtroopers of counter-revolution. 
38Ap, 
xi, 739 - 742. 39Ap, 
xii, 699 - 700; xvii, 74 - 76; xviii, 142. 
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The first solution proposed applied to all the military. The National Assembly decreed 
on 10 August 1789 that all soldiers would take an oath I la Nation, i la Loi et au Roi, 
chef de la Nation'. The comte d'Affry, colonel of the Swiss Guards and colonel-general of 
all Swiss and Grison troops in France, was told by La Tour du Pin on 23 August that 'les 
R6gimens 6trangers, comme les Nationaux, devaient y &re soumis. " The problem was 
that the oath demanded fidelity not only to the monarch, but also to the nation and the 
law, which ran contrary to the traditional oaths of Swiss troops in French service and 
upheld by their capitulations. It did not take long for the officers of the Swiss regiments 
to see the implications. On 24 August, captain de Lanther of the Castella regiment wrote 
an outraged letter to the Petit Conseil at Fribourg expressing the views of all the 
Fribourgeois officers of his regiment. They declared that the new oathtouche vos trait6s 
avec le Roy, par le serment i la Nation; a nos privil&ges et libert6, par celui i la Loi'. 
Nonetheless, d'Aff-ry decided that to delay taking the oath would be to subject the Swiss 
regiments to suspicion and hostility and he was supported in this assessment by a number 
of officers. One by one, the Swiss regiments took the oath, but with the proviso that it 
would be on a provisional basis until they received instructions from their governments. 
These orders soon came. On I September the Conseil des Deux-Cents of Fribourg 
advised its subjects in the French army to take the oath, but along with a carefully-worded 
protest that the oath must not be used as a justification to alter the treaties and 
capitulations still in force. Other cantons, such as Zurich, saw absolutely no problem with 
the oath as it stood. 41 
The protests from Fribourg and the reluctance of the Swiss officers to depart from the 
original formulae suggested that some cantons and officers were hostile to the Revolution 
itself This hostility was due in no small part to uncertainty over the future of foreign 
troops in France. At the time of the controversy over the oath, this issue had not been 
fully debated, but ideas about 'nationalising! the army had been volleyed about in the 
chamber of the Constituent. When the Assembly decided to maintain the foreign 
regiments, it seemed that the problems may have been resolved. 
The political situation in France did not stabilise, however, and the very fact that the 
National Assembly agreed to retain foreign regiments provoked instability in certain 
'Quoted in Zurich, P. de, 'Les derniers serments des troupes suisses au service de France 
sous Vancien rdgime', Zeitschriftfar Schweizerische Geschichte, )odi (1942), 228. 
"Zurich, 'Les derniers serments des troupes suissee, 222 - 224,230,236. 
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towns. " Relations between foreign soldiers and local people, delicate at the best of times, 
became strained because of the association of the latter with counter-revolution. Their 
very isolation and the hostility of the populace brought the troops to close ranks and thus 
maintain their discipline, which in turn reinforced the popular prejudice of foreign troops 
being obedient servants of aristocratic and counter-revolutionary officers. " In fact, it was 
the National Assembly itself which sanctioned the use of the military in restoring order, 
although it appeared to recognise that it was a dangerous card to play. Foreign units were 
used because, as general de Bouill6 recognised, they retained their discipline and were less 
susceptible than French troops to the blandishments of'patriote. DeBouill6 estimated 
that of ninety infantry battalions and of 104 cavalry squadrons in his command, which 
included Paris and north-eastern France, he could depend on only twenty of the infantry, 
all German or Swiss, and sixty of the cavalry, a third of which were German-speaking. " 
In 1790, against the background of municipal upheavals in cities such as Marseille and 
Lyon, in which foreign regiments were involved, a number of deputies in the Constituent 
raised once again the question of loyalty of foreign troops to the Revolution. 
On 5 May Peyssonnel demanded that foreign regiments be placed under the same terms 
and conditions as French units. He spoke specifically of the German regiments, tying the 
question to the privileges of Imperial princes who owned fiefs in Alsace. With a strong 
dose of germanophobia, he warned of the malign potential of the eight German regiments 
which were garrisoned in Alsace and Lorraine" and of the dangers of allowing German 
princes to retain influence over these troops. Brushing aside the diplomatic arguments, he 
argued that France's relations with Germany did not depend solely on the maintenance of 
these regiments. On the contrary, they presented too much of a danger to the internal 
"'See, for example, the case of the Swiss Ernst regiment in Marseille, which ended with 
the Swiss being hounded out of French service in May 1792 (AN, F/7/4401 (MJmoire Sur 
la malheureuse affaire du Regiment dEmest, 3 April 1792); Scott, W., Terror and 
Repression in Revolutionary Marseilles (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1973), 21 
- 26; Haas, R., Un Regiment Suisse au Service de France. Bettens 1672 - 1792 (Pont 
I'AW, 1967), 18 - 20; Scott, S. F., Ae Response of the RoyalArmy to the French 
Revolution, 139 - 141). See also the affair of the Swiss Sonnenberg and the German La 
Marck regiments in Lyon (Scott, 7he Response of the Royal Army to the French 
Revolution, 141 - 144). 
"As S. F. Scott argues in Yhe Response of the RoyalArmy to the French Revolution, 61 
and'The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments', 18 - 19. 
"'Scott, Yhe Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution, 9 1. 
"'The Alsace, La Marck, Royal-Su6dois, Royal Hesse-Darmstadt, Bouillon, Royal Deux- 
Ponts, Salm-Salm. and Nassau, all infantry, were usually posted on the north-eastern 
frontier. 
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security of the new order to be left as they were., The diplomatic fallout from disbanding 
or merging them with the French regiments was a small price to pay for the elimination of 
these sources of domestic instability. He conceded that the Swiss regiments ought to be 
left alone because of the French alliance with the cantons, but proposed that all other 
foreign regiments be subsumed into their French counterparts, with the same pay, 
discipline and uniforms. They were to be obliged to swear the civic oath - individually, 
not collectively as before - which would also act as a naturalisation ceremony. Those who 
wished to leave French service could and henceforth foreign regiments would recruit only 
French citizens. Tar le cours ordinaire des choses', Peyssonnel explained, 'ces corps se 
trouveraient, en peu de temps, composds de nationaux; le petit nombre d'6trangers qui y 
resteraient encore, seraient des individus naturalis6s, devenus citoyens et d6vouis par 
choix au service de la patrie adoptive. " 
Not all foreign regiments were written off by patriots and the people as the workhorses 
of counter-revolution. Peyssonnel's phobia over German troops ought to have been 
abated somewhat when in July the Salm-Salm, infantry regiment mutinied in Metz over the 
management of regimental funds. In this affair, the mutineers had the support of local 
people and they returned to barracks only when the mayor persuaded them. " The mutiny 
of the Swiss Lulfin-Chateauvieux regiment along with two French regiments in Nancy 
occurred in similar circumstances: they had the support of the patriotic townspeople, with 
whom they attended the local feast of the federation despite the opposition of their 
officers on 19 April 1790. Some Swiss soldiers joined the Jacobin club and socialised 
with the National Guard. When disorder broke out on 9 August among the French troops 
in the garrison, the Swiss joined them the next day. After Bouilld put down the mutiny, 
on 4 September one of the Swiss ringleaders was broken on the wheel, twenty-two others 
were hanged, forty-one condemned to thirty years in the galleys and seventy-four 
punished within the regiment. " 
The mutiny at Nancy seemed to show that not all foreign troops were immune to 
radical propaganda, even though there was no evidence to suggest that the Chateauvieux 
49 Swiss were acting on anything but strictly regimental grievances. If it still feared the 
'De Peyssonel's opinion is reprinted in AP, xv, 403 - 406. 
"'Scott, Ae Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution, 89. 
"'Details of the mutiny can be found in Scott, Ihe Response of the Royal Army to the 
French Revolution, 92 - 95 and Fieffi, Histoire des troupes etrangJres, i, 357 - 364. 49 See the demands of the regiment's comitj des soWls, in FieM, Histoire des troupes 
etrangýres, i, 358n. - 359n.. 
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counter-revolutionary potential of foreign regiments, the Constituent was now equally 
worried that should they become a source of widespread insubordination, among the most 
reliable troops in the French army would be disabled. The answer, it seemed, was to 
insulate all units, French and foreign alike, from radical influences such as political clubs. 
In September the Constituent accordingly banned all soldiers from attending political 
meetings and societies, a move welcomed in particular by the Swiss cantons, whose worst 
fears about the contagion of revolutionary propaganda appeared to be confirmed by the 
activities of the Club helvitique in Paris and by the Nancy mutiny. In fact, by the time the 
National Assembly banned soldiers from attending political clubs in the autumn, the 
numbers of soldiers attending the meetings had already begun to tail off and decline. 
Their own officers had already clamped down on their activities and their respective 
cantons warned the soldiers that to join the Club helvetique would lead to penalties for 
high treason in Switzerland, including banishment and seizure of property. 'O 
The mutiny at Nancy and the involvement of some foreign troops in radical political 
activity did little to abate popular hostility to foreign troops. If there were expressions of 
sympathy for the Chateauvieux Swiss, the conduct of other foreign regiments, including 
those who served against the mutineers at Nancy, did nothing to convince people that 
foreign troops could also be good patriots. In Belfort, the Royal-Li6geois infantry and the 
Lauzun hussars, who had both supplied troops to Bouille in the suppression of the Nancy 
mutiny, provoked the hostility of the populace when officers of the latter gave a banquet 
to those of the former on 21 October, hailing'les vainqueurs de Nancy. Outside the caf6 
where the festivities had taken place, a major of the Royal-Li6geois, perhaps the bolder 
for alcohol, showed a distinct lack of tact by exclaimingNous sommes les maltres, il faut 
hacher les bourgeois! ' Other officers got into the spirit of things by running through the 
streets, yelling 'Vive le roi! Vivent les aristocrates! ' and, even worse, 'Au diable la nation! 
"The Club helvitique had petitioned the National Assembly on 2 September on behalf of 
the Chiteauvieux regiment, which angered the governments in the cantons, who accused 
the National Assembly of receiving delegates who had no credentials. Worse, the club 
had some success in attracting the soldiers to its meetings: its first official meeting on 6 
June 1790 drew almost a hundred Swiss citizens, of whom twelve were known to be 
Cent-Suisses. On 27 June alone, of eighty new members thirty-six came were soldiers of 
the Gardes-Suisses from the barracks at Rueil and Courbevoie. Meautis, A., Le Club 
helvilique de Paris (1790 - 1791) et la diffusion des id&s revolutionnaires en Suisse 
(Neuchatel: tditions de la Baconni6re, 1969), 52 - 53,67; Maradan, LEchec de la 
Propagande du Club Helv6tique aupr6s du R6giment des Gardes 1789 - 1791', Vovelle, 
M., Paris et la Rivolution (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1989), 256; Zurich, P. de, 
Ies derniers serments des troupes suisses ... ', 240. 151 
They waved white handkerchiefs tied at the end of their swords, insulting and even 
wounding some of the locals. " The fallout from the Nancy mutiny also haunted the Swiss 
Vigier regiment. In March 1791 the regiment could spend only a few hours in Nancy, 
because of the 'insultes et des outrages que les officiers et soldats ... ont dprouv6s'. 
Vigier, the proprietary colonel, complained to the sympathetic French envoy to the 
cantons, de Wrac, who wrote to Montmorin that the incident underlined'la conduite 
ferme et distingude que ce Rdgiment a tenu le 31 aofit dernier i la malheureuse affaire de 
Nancy'. He found it disgraceful that the same town should give such a poor reception to 
the soldiers who had saved it from'tous les malheurs dont elle etoit menac6e'. " 
What de Wrac did not grasp was that the reputation of a foreign unit among the 
people depended upon its own actions: if it showed itself to be sympathetic to the 
Revolution, then it rose in popular esteem. If on the other hand it allowed its politics to 
be dictated by devotion to officers and to duty, then it reinforced popular prejudices. In 
turn, hostility from the population simply increased cohesion and discipline within the 
regiment. On the whole, with the highly-publicised exception of the Chiteauvieux 
regiment, whose own revolutionary credentials were dubious because it only mutinied 
over internal administration, most of the foreign units seemed to lean towards loyalty to 
their evidently aristocratic officers. 
The reputation of the foreign regiments was brought to a new low among the 
revolutionaries by the royal flight to Varennes on 20 - 21 June 1791. De BouilI6 was 
charged with providing military cover for the royal family as they rumbled their way 
towards the frontier in their ostentatious carriage. Of the ten cavalry regiments selected 
to provide detachments, half were German-speaking, including the notorious Royal- 
Allemand. The infantry to be used were two Swiss and four German regiments. " After 
the flight, one of the German regiments involved, the Nassau, was forced to march from 
hostile town to hostile town until the municipality of Metz finally found it in their hearts to 
let the long-suffering regiment billet there. They were to regret this hospitality, because 
men of the Nassau regiment promptly engaged in a running battle through the streets with 
the French troops. When this affair was reported in the National Assembly on 21 July, it 
was remarked that not only had the Nassau regiment been involved with de Bouilld's 
"Scott, The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution, 145 - 146; Fieff6, 
Histoire des troupes etrangýres, i, 369 - 370. "AN, F/7/4400 (De Wrac to Montmorin, Soleure, 30 March 1791). 
"Scott, Yhe Response of the Royal Anny to the French Revolution, 103. 
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machinations a month previously, but the hostility of the population might also be 
explained by its presence at Versailles in July 1789.11 
The atmosphere of uncertainty and fear brought by the royal flight to Varennes 
intensified the hostility towards foreign troops. The Constituent decided on 21 June that 
soldiers had to renew their commitment to the Revolution through a new oath which 
made no mention of the king. " The new formula provoked a wave of emigrations among 
the officers in the French army in general. Among these recalcitrant officers were thirty- 
one from the Irish Berwick regiment, twenty-seven of whom left France between 3 and 25 
July, with a few of the rank-and-file trailing after them, while the rest simply did not return 
from leave. These men considered that, if the king was not involved in the command of 
the army, then their last comn-dtment to serve was severed. " 
For the Swiss regiments the new oath had a similar meaning, but they could not act 
without the guidance of the cantons. The diplomatic tremors which the oath might have 
caused were considered a minor inconvenience by the revolutionaries, who believed that 
they now faced the serious possibility, for the first time since 1789, of foreign 
intervention. While foreign regiments seemed particularly susceptible to counter- 
revolutionary suggestion, France needed troops to face the potential threats of civil and 
external conflict more than ever. So on 25 June, the National Assembly ordered dAffry 
to have all Swiss regiments take the new oath. D'Affiy obliged, that same day warning his 
officers that'les circonstances commandent imp6rieusement ces dispositions... '. Between 
28 June and 14 July, each Swiss regiment accordingly took the oath, all with the 
reservation that the oath would have to be sanctioned by their respective cantons. The 
problem was, however, that on 27 June, unknown to the Swiss troops in France, the 
government of Fribourg had forbidden the Swiss to take any oaths without its prior 
permission. This was a decision confirmed by the Diet of Frauenfeld, where 
representatives of all the cantons met on 3 July. News that some of the regiments had 
already taken the oath gave rise to storms of anger in the diet, which sent off letters 
reprimanding d'Affiy for his conduct and protesting to de V6rac over the way in which the 
Swiss troops were being treated in France. The oath was eventually approved by all 
"AP, xxviii, 471 - 472. 
"Zurich, P. de, 'Les derniers serments des troupes suisses, 245. 
"Nine officers of the Dillon regiment refused to take the oath, a further twelve resigned or 
deserted by October and by the end of 1791 thirty had left the regiment. By September, 
fourteen of forty-eight officers of the Walsh regiment had refused the oath (Scott, Ae 
Response of the RoyalArmy to the French Revolution, 106,159 - 160; Scott, 'The French 
Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France', 19). 
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cantons except those Fribourg, Zurich, Bale and Berne. " In the end it was the French 
who softened their attitude with a new oath, V&re fid&le a la Nation, i la Loi et au Roi' 
on 17 September. The change, applicable to the whole army, was less in response to the 
diplomatic furore than the fact that Louis XVI had accepted the Constitution and was 
perhaps aimed at stemming the haemorrhage of officers through emigration. 
The treatment of which the Diet of Frauenfeld had complained in July was not 
restricted to the oath, however: two other measures by the Constituent also brought up 
more bile. One was the payment of soldiers in assignats. The Steiner regiment appealed 
to the state of Zurich over this, which prompted an official complaint to Montmorin on 22 
June 179 L" The Diet of Frauenfeld supported this protest on 7 July on the grounds that 
the capitulations with France 'exige que les appointements des officiers et Soldats soyent 
payds en argent'. "' 
This was compounded by the second of the 'innovations on6reuses, the decree of I 
May 1791 whereby the decision to forbid soldiers attending political meetings was 
rescinded. Almost immediately, a conflict blew up between the desires of the Swiss 
officers and those of the Constituent. On 10 May, d'AffiY sent an order to all Swiss 
regiments, saying that le but etant de mettre le soldat frangoise (sic) a port6e de s'instruire 
des principes de la Constitution frangaise et de s'y 6clairer sur ses devoirs comme Citoyely, 
it did not apply to the Swiss. He nonetheless agreed to allow any soldier who wished to 
attend the meetings in order to learn about the laws of a 'Puissance alfi6e et Arnie de ses 
souverains'. ' D'Affiy was trying to balance obedience to the laws of France with the 
demands of the Swiss cantons. 
His compromise was too mild for the Diet of Frauenfeld, which on 7 July unanimously 
agreed to send the Swiss troops a letter'dont le but est de les garantir de linsubordination 
et de les emp6cher de fr6quenter les Clubs dits PaIrioliques ... '. The Corps helvilique 
decreed that should any soldiers attend such clubs, 'nous nous verrions obfig6s de 
manifester notre disgrace ... et 
de les punir meme selon Vexigence du cas de peines plus 
fortes et irremissibles. ' On 30 July, both the Grand Conseil of Fribourg and the 
"AN, F/7/4400 (Pikesjointes au Reces de la Di&e de Frawenfeld lenue en Juillet 1791 
[7 July 179 1 ]); Zurich, 'Les derniers serments des troupes suissee, 246 - 247,249 - 25 8, 
264-266. 
"AN, F/7/4400 (ttat de Zurich to Montmorin, 22 June 179 1). 
"AN, F/7/4400 (Pikesjointes au Recýs de la Diele de Frawenfeld ... 
). 
'AN, F/7/4400 (D'Affiy, circular to the commanding officers of the Swiss regiments, 10 
May 1791). 
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government of Soleure repeated this order. "' The problem with the Diet's order was that 
it clashed headlong with the decree of the National Assembly. On 9 August 1791, the 
directory of the department of the Bas-Rhin heard from the French commandant in Alsace 
that the Vigier regiment in Strasbourg had received a copy of the order from the Fribourg 
Grand ConsejL The directory decided that no laws other than those of France could be 
recognised in the kingdom and that the law of I May therefore applied even to the Swiss 
troops. The directory finished by sharply reminding the Swiss officers that the rights and 
liberties of the soldiers 'ne peuvent Etre m agraves ni alien6s par des ordres arbitraires d'un 
Souverain 6tranger'. ' 
Two days later, the officers of the Vigier regiment defied this ruling, referring to their 
capitulations (which gave them jurisdiction over their soldiers) and the order of the Diet 
of Frauenfeld. The situation was made more critical when an outspoken soldier who 
refused to obey the order from Fribourg was flung into the guardhouse by his irate 
officers. In response the departmental administration ordered the commandant to 
countermand these orders, which represented Tusurpation des Magistrats de Fribourg!, 
reminding him that Ia Nation Frangaise soit et demeure seule Souveraine dans I'Empire 
Frangaise'. On 19 August, d'Afflry wrote to Montmorin, justifying the conduct of the 
officers of the Vigier regiment in a turnabout which can only be explained by the 
uncompromising stance of the Swiss cantons and his own reprimand from the Diet. If 
Swiss troops were allowed to attend political meetings, he argued, they would be led to 
disobey their officers and their government. At the same time, he reminded Montmorin of 
the diplomatic ramifications of the treatment of the Swiss regiments in France. "' 
In this affair, the department of the Bas-Rhin had taken the uncompromisingly 'national' 
stance in its refusal to admit the order of the cantons. By repeating that there could be no 
sovereignty on French soil than that of France, it was asserting the territoriality of French 
law as against treaties which dated from the Ancien ftime. It was also implying the 
egalitarian idea that there could be no privileged groups apart from or above the law. 
"AN, F/7/4400 (Piecesjointes au Recýs de la DiNe de Frawenfeld ... ; 
letter of the 
Directory of the Department of the Bas-Rhin to the National Assembly, 13 August 1791). 
"'AN, F/7/4400 (Difiberation du Directoire du &partment du Bas-Rhin, 9 August 
1791). 
'AN, F/7/4400 (Letter of Gelb, commandant in Alsace, to the Directory of the 
Department of the Bas-Rhin, 12 August 1791); letter of the Directory of the Department 
of the Bas-Rhin to Gelb, n. d. [13 August 1791? ]; letter of the Directory of the 
Department of the Bas-Rhin to the National Assembly, 13 August 1791; letter of d'Affry 
to Montmorin, 19 August 1791), 
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Foreigners in France, and foreign troops in particular, could claim no rights or protection 
other than those guaranteed by French law. 
In fact, those such as Peyssonnel who assailed the privileges of the foreign regiments 
won a victory from the unlikely quarter of the foreign troops themselves. After its 
odyssey around north-eastern France and the riot in Metz in July 179 1, the Nassau 
regiment had finally had enough. Four or five hundred soldiers tore off their Nassau 
buttons and insignia: 'ils ont d6clard qu'ils ne voulaient point servir, ni aller avec le 
r6giment, tant qu'ils porteraient Phabit 6tranger et qu'il serait cense r6giment 6tranger; 
qu'ils dtaient Frangais et qu'ils voulaient servir comme Franqaisý. These troops were, after 
all, mainly French citizens, probably from Alsace and Lorraine, and were fed up with 
being reviled as foreigners. Indeed, they remained in Metz and participated in the 
festivities on Bastille Day, taking the civic oath. " 
The patriotic example of a foreign regiment renouncing its privileged ways probably 
appealed to an Assembly which, in fight of the recent role of foreign troops in the ffight to 
Varennes, had come around to the radical thinking of Peyssonnel. On 21 July 1791, the 
National Assembly decreed that, apart from the Swiss regiments, all foreign units would 
cease to be considered as separate branches of the French army, would wear French 
uniforms and receive the same pay and regulations. ' Apart from the obvious financial 
advantages from the reduction of pay, the National Assembly had adopted, it thought, a 
further means of ensuring the loyalty of well-disciplined troops at a time when it appeared 
that they would be desperately needed. The Assembly hoped to replace separateness with 
a new source of pride: that of belonging to a national army in which the virtues of equality 
and patriotism would rise above those of loyalty to one! s officers and obedience to a royal 
master. 
Owners of foreign regiments were naturally alarmed by the implications, and no one 
more than the proprietor of the Nassau regiment itself. De Crolboy, envoy of the duke of 
Nassau-Saarbrucken, dashed off a memorandum to the Constituent's comW diplomatique, 
reminding its members that the duke was one of France's 'alli6s et ... Voisins 
les plus z6lds 
et les plus fiMes. He argued that the destruction of the regiment's separateness would 
ensure the collapse of discipline. The regiment'ne seroient bient6t plus quun 
rassemblement d'hommes vagabonds, recrut6s dans tous les pays et d6sunis par les 




Moeurs, Wayant plus de Relations avec leurs Souverains et par Cons6quent avec leur 
Patrie" 
The duke regarded the troops'loyalty to his person as a cement which bound the unit 
together. Even the original capitulation stressed, however, that the officers need not 
come from the dukedom itself, but anywhere in the Holy Roman Empire and from among 
officers already serving in other German regiments in France. The rank-and-file were to 
be drawn from among French subjects, bom in Alsace and Lorraine. ' The more valid 
argument marshalled, however, was that to reform the regiment without the prince's 
consent would be to attack his rights and prerogatives guaranteed by the original 
convention in 1777. ' De Crolboy's protests were in vain: the men of any regiment other 
than the Swiss were henceforth not the possession of any individual, nor subject to special 
privileges, but were to be treated like any other soldiers in the French army. They were 
expected to be patriotic defenders of the Constitution, faithful to the Nation, the Law and 
the King. 
The Constituent Assembly had resisted calls for the suppression of foreign units for 
two years, in spite of its own nationalising principles, because of diplomatic concerns and 
out of the necessity to keep the regular army intact. In the various crises of the period 
1789 - 1791, however, the foreign regiments, with one or two exceptions, appeared to be 
prone to counter-revolutionary activity, justifying the worst fears of even moderate 
revolutionaries. Many of these fears were self-fulfilling: often treated with hostility by the 
local population, the foreign troops naturally sought refuge within their own regiment, 
which usually meant that they were likely to retain their cohesiveness and their discipline. 
This in turn meant that the politics of the foreign troops were dictated by their loyalty to 
their officers. ' '9 Even when foreign troops did mutiny, as at Nancy, it was with strictly 
internal aims in mind. The support of the local population, fuelled by fears of aristocratic 
officers, merely gave the impression of 'patriotic' credentials of the soldiers. Most foreign 
units retained the suspicion and hostility of the population because of their counter- 
revolutionary reputation. This fear and loathing was intensified by the use of foreign 
'AN, F/7/4399 (De CrolboyWgiment de Nassau', n. d. [post-19 July 1791? ]). The 
memorandum protested against 'une Decision prdcipit6e', probably a reference to the 
decree of 21 July 179 1, when the Constituent decided to end all distinctions between the 
French and foreign regiments, except the Swiss, 
"AN, F/7/4399 (Regiment de Nassau': convention between the Louis XVI and the prince 
of Nassau-Saarbrucken, 1777). 
"AN, F/7/4399 (De Crolboy, 'R6giment de Nassau). 
"'As S. F. Scott argues in The Response of the Royal Anny to the French Revolution, 145. 
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troops in supporting the royal flight to Varennes. Yet at the same time, the apparently 
hostile gestures of Prussia and Austria over the summer of 1791 made it clear to the 
revolutionaries that a well-trained and disciplined regular army was needed urgently. To 
dismiss the foreign regiments would be the height of military folly, but it was politically 
dangerous to keep them as they were. This dilemma led the Constituent to dispense with 
diplomatic niceties and to risk relatively minor disputes by taking measures which 
breached French international commitments in the name of ensuring, or perhaps testing, 
their loyalty. There may also have been defiance in these actions. The persistence, for 
example, of the department of the Bas-Rhin in its opposition to the officers of the Swiss 
Vigier regiment over the summer of 179 1, the comiti diplomatique's ignoring of the 
prince of Nassau-Saarbruckeds objections to the decree of 21 July 1791, were borne of 
the same assertiveness which led the Constituent to annex finally Avignon and the Comtat 
Venaissin. These actions were not mere posturing, but the application of the 
nationalising, egalitarian logic of the Constituent's own principles, a logic which was let 
loose by the desire to ensure both the internal security of the Revolution on one hand and 
the strength of its military defences on the other. 
III 
As with foreign troops, the existence of the foreign clergy presented an obstacle to the 
full implementation of revolutionary reforms. Unlike the foreign troops, they were not 
protected by treaties, strategic considerations or political concerns, but they actually 
survived in their original state for longer. Revolutionary legislation directly concerned 
with the foreign clergy was protective rather than reforming: it sheltered them from most 
of the measures which affected their French counterparts. 
When the Constituent passed its decrees nationalising church lands (3 November 
1789), dissolving monasteries and convents, except for those engaged in charitable and 
educational work, and forbidding religious vows (13 February 1790), no one considered 
the complex problems which foreign clergy might pose. The first initiative was therefore 
taken by the clergy. On 8 October 1789, the deputy Lally-Tollendal, himself of Irish 
descent, presented a donation of silver and the vessels from the church of the Irish College 
in Paris. While the priests and students declared that they were bound to the French 'par 
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notre fidelit6, par le culte de nos p6res et pour le sang de nos Rois', they also swore 'les 
mEmes sentiments i la nouvelle patrie et au prince qui nous adoptait'. " 
It is possible that this gift was an attempt to pre-empt any accusations of attachment to 
the old r6gime at a time when ominous noises were being sounded by some 
revolutionaries who, since the decrees of 4-II August, began to argue that ecclesiastical 
property belonged to the nation. As will be seen there is evidence to suggest that the 
loyalty of the Irish was sincere, but the Constituent did not take the hint. The special 
place of foreign establishments in the French church was not even considered when the 
Assembly nationalised church property on 3 November. For the foreign clergy this 
seizure by the state presented a double-headed threat. In the first place, they were to lose 
their most important source of income. In the second place, they faced redundancy: if the 
French clergy were to be salaried by the state, would foreigners be included? Such fears 
were understandable, as on 9 November (less than a week after the nationalisation of 
church property) the abb6 Gr6goire deplored the appointment of foreigners as curates, a 
well-established practice in dioceses such as those of Bordeaux and Bazas. " Gr6goire 
requested that 'pour poss6der un b6n6fice i charge d1mes, l'on soit Franýais, ou naturalis6 
02 et r6gnicole au moins depuis dix ans. 
This demand was in keeping with the nationalising tendencies of revolutionary 
ideology, but it was brushed aside without a debate. Why this should be is a matter of 
speculation, but until the revolutionaries had worked out the broader issues around 
clerical reform, they presumably could not fiddle with the finer points. In fact, it would be 
a year before the fate of the foreign clergy would be resolved, if only temporarily. 
Meanwhile, the uncertainty of their future and the measures already taken by the 
Constituent provoked the piecemeal mobilisation of the foreign clergy. No concerted 
effort was made, except within the same orders. On 20 December the English Clairists of 
Gravelines, Aire, Rouen and Dunkirk drew up a petition in response to calls for the 
suppression of religious orders. 
The wording showed that the foreign clergy were now engaging in the debate on 
church property and on the fate of the regular clergy within the same frame of references 
"AP, ix, 385. 
"Where in 1789 there were twenty Irish secular priests, an increase of five since the 
grande enquete on parochial clergy in 1772. A number of them were, it seems, 
naturalised (Loup6s, 'The Irish Clergy in the Diocese of Bordeaux during the Revolution, 
29; Loup6s, 'Les Ecclesiastiques Irlandais dans le Dioc6se de Bordeaux sous I'Ancien 
R6gime', 88). 
12Ap, ix, 729. 
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as the Constituent itself To the argument that ecclesiastical property had merely been 
held in trust by the church on behalf of the people, the Clairists set out to show that their 
property and investments did not come from French sources at all: 'Quelques soient les 
besoins d'une Nation, peut-elle sapproprier des biens acquis sur son sol par des 6trangers 
et avec des fonds provenant de I'Etranger? ' The nuns were appealing to the inalienable 
and sacred right of property. " 
The Clairists also fell back on more traditional principles, appealing to the 'droit des 
gens et celui de 118spitalit6'. The French nation, they argued, had granted them the 'droit 
d'azile'. They also anticipated by almost two months the decree of 13 February 1790, 
which dissolved all religious houses not engaged in charitable or educational work by 
emphasising their role as an educational and charitable order. As if to follow up this point 
on their usefulness as a social institution, they stressed their civic virtue by offering the 
Nation a quarter of their revenue: 'elles ont le coeur frangais quand il faut secourir I'Etat'. " 
Petitions from the other foreign establishments repeated the arguments made by the 
Clairists, stressing, above all, the foreign origins of their property. Addresses to the 
Constituent or its comitg ecclisiastique all sought to adopt the revolutionaries' own terms 
and references, particularly the rights of property and usefulness to the state. " They 
combined this with references to Ancien R6gime notions such as droit des gens and the 
droit dlazile. They often substituted the term'natiorf, for 'king' or 'state', as if to underline 
the idea that the Constituent ought to honour commitments made before 1789. " 
If the Clairist nuns had French hearts, their petition, and those of the other orders, 
stressed their separateness from the French clergy in order to show that the National 
Assembly's decrees ought not to apply to them. Of all the arguments, this one was the 
most likely to grate against the abolition of privilege. Despite the number of petitions 
which all made similar points - at least seven were addressed by the English, Irish and 
"AN, D/XIX/30 (Adresse ... par les Refigieuses clairisses angloises 
Etabliesii 
Gravelines, 20 December 1789). 
"AN, D/XIX/30 (Adresse ... par les Refigieuses clairisses angloises Etablies 6 Gravelines). 
"See for example, the petitions of the English Augustinian nuns of the rue des Foss6s- 
Saint-Victor on 23 June and 22 September 1790 (AN, S//4616 [Procýs-Ferbak 
Refigieuses Anglaises rue desfossies St. Victor, 23 June 1790]; AN, D/MX/30 [Memoire 
des Refigieuses Anglaises etablies a Paris rue desfossis St. Victor, au Comitg 
Ecclesiastique de MsembMe Nationale, 22 September 1790]). 
16 See, for example, the English Augustinians (AN, D/XlXI30 [Memoire des Religieuses 
Anglaises etablies d Paris rue desfossJs St. Victor, au Comitg Ecclesiastique de 
I'Assemblee Nationale, 22 September 1790]). 
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Scottish establishments to the National Assembly or its comilg ec&siasfique - the 
uncertainty over the future of the foreign regular clergy remained until October 1790. 
Until then, local authorities and notaires made inventories of the property and the 
revenue of foreign establishments, apparently prior to their appropriation by the state. 
The first visits by officials began in February 1790 and the foreign clergy took the 
opportunity to make more statements in their defense on the grounds that most or all of 
their property stemmed from foreign funds. " What forced the revolutionaries to tread 
more carefully was the intervention of the British government. 
Alexander Gordon, the principal of the Scots College in Paris had written to Pitt 
himself in October 1789 seeking the British government's protection over the college. " 
Lord Robert Fitzgerald, British chargg d'affaires until May 1790, eventually presented a 
petition on behalf of the Scots College in Paris and made similar efforts for the Irish 
colleges in France. "' The apparent interest of the British government led Frdteau de Saint- 
Just to advise the National Assembly that the status of the British and Irish houses 
'pr6sente des c8tds d6licats au point de vue des puissances 6trang6res'. The Assembly 
accordingly decreed that all subsequent work on the foreign clergy would be referred not 
only to the comW ec&siastique, but the comitj diplomatique as well. " Until the 
Constituent had come up with a definitive decree, however, the uncertaintly continued. 
Some petitions therefore included requests concerning the disposal of the property of the 
foreign clergy should they be suppressed. " 
Finally, on 14 September, the comitj eccMsiastique decided to propose that the Irish 
College of Paris be exempted from the nationalisation of church lands. In a further 
petition the Irish priests urged the committee to formalise its decision with a decree, the 
most pressing reason being that the new Irish Parliament, elected that same year, was 
being approached by the British government to pass a domestic education bill, by which 
loopholes for Catholics seeking to study abroad would be sealed off, in return for some 
schooling in Ireland. Ironically, the priests also argued that the preservation of the Irish 
"Various inventories and declarations can be found in AN, D/MX/30, S//4616 and 
S//4619. 
"Black, 'The Archives of the Scots College Parie, 53,56. 
"'Scottish Catholic Archives (hereafter SCA), CAI/25/1-8 (Note remise i M. le Comte de 
Montmorin, par M. Fitz-Gerald, Ministre P16nipotentiaire d'Angleteffe'); AN, D/MX/30 
Qr6tres Irlandois rue des Carmes - Comitd Ecclesiastique', n. d. [1790]). 
"OAP, xix, 241. 
"AN, D/XIXI30 ('RequEte i Nosseigneurs de I'assembl6e Nationale', by the English 
Benedictine nuns of Cambrai, n. d. [1790]); SCA, CAI/25/1-8 (Note remise... par M. 
Fitz-Gerald'); AP, xvi, 109. 
161 
colleges would attract many Irish investors in biens nationaux'parceque les Individus 
82 
croiront a l'inviolabilit6 de leur propri&6. 
This last point, on property rights, was to be of great importance in the revolutionaries' 
final decision on 4 October. The Constituent's decree designating which lands were to be 
sold as biens nationaux excluded all foreign religious establishments for as long as their 
own governments respected the property of French citizens abroad. "' To have done 
otherwise would be to cast doubt on the Revolutions commitment to foreigners' property 
rights in France and to have created some undesirable commercial and diplomatic fallout. 
The importance of this decree, adapted gradually over subsequent days (6 - 15 October), 
was not only that the foreign clerical establishments were assured of an income from their 
lands, but also that the revolutionaries implicitly confirmed the legitimacy of their 
existence in France. It was not long before the ecclesiastic and diplomatic committees 
made this explicit. On 28 October, they agreed that the continued existence of foreign 
orders in France would be both 'opposde aux lois constitutionnelles' and contrary to the 
law of 13 February. In a report which owed much to the arguments made in the 
foreigners' own petitions, however, the committees urged that respect for legally acquired 
property should lead the Constituent to decree that foreign establishments 'continueront 
de subsister, comme par le passd'. 11 
There was a price to be paid for this survival. Any privileges which had been granted 
the foreign clerics by the church or monarchy were naturally abolished. For the English 
Benedictine monks of the faubourg Saint-Jacques, such a measure was financially 
disastrous. In the estimation of the comiti ecclisiaslique, the fourteen benefices held by 
the clerics of this monastery brought in an annual income of 72,388 fivres. In accordance 
with the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, adopted on 12 July 1790, these posts were to be 
elective like any other. Consequently, the benefices which had been tied to the English 
monastery could no longer be held by the monks as of right. Those deprived of a function 
and income were to be given a pension in compensation, backdated to I January 1790, but 
the pensions, alms and donations granted to the foreigners by the crown, as small a 
proportion of their income as they were, were to be reconsidered by the Assembly. 
Moreover, any tax exemptions enjoyed by the establishments disappeared. " 
"AN, D/X1X130 (Petition of the Irish priests, rue des Carmes, to the comitj 
eccMsiastique, n. d. [1790, late September, early October]). 
3Ap, xix, 436. 
'AP, xx, 67 - 68. "AP, xx, 68 - 70. 
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While the legal existence of foreign regulars was assured for the time being, the foreign 
secular clergy, in common with their French counterparts, faced the problem of the oath 
of loyalty to the Civil Constitution, laid down by the National Assembly on 27 November 
1790 and sanctioned on 26 December. The response of foreign secular priests did not 
mirror exactly that of their French colleagues. In the Gironde, for example, the eighteen 
Irish priests who actually held parishes or cures were split evenly between jurors and non- 
jurors. This was different from the figures for all priests across the Bordeaux region, 
where 59% of the clergy were jurors. Memories of persecution in Ireland may have made 
the Irish priests more dogmatic in their attachment to the 'old' church. "' Nonetheless, half 
of the Irish priests were initially jurors. James Burke, parish priest of the Bec d'Arnb6s, 
was even an enthusiast for the French Revolution, despite the fact that the Civil 
Constitution represented, for him, a cut in the value of his benefice, as it did for another 
Irish juror in the parish of Yvrac, Frangois de Loebardy. Burke even bought biens 
nationaux, taking over the lands of the Ursuline convent at Amb6s with two French 
merchants in March 179 1. He administered the property and its sixty labourers until his 
arrest in October 1793. " Some Irish jurors may have found nothing in the Civil 
Constitution or the oath to contradict Catholic doctrine. They might have been guided in 
their decision by their French congregations, but for some this was a painful step, as the 
number of retractions, even before the Pope spoke out against the Civil Constitution, 
seems to indicate. "' 
'Irish' factors did not necessarily lend themselves to conservatism. There is evidence to 
suggest that the very fact of persecution in Ireland pushed some clergy into the arms of 
the Revolution. The priests of the Irish College in Paris certainly showed revolutionary 
sympathies, arguing in one of their petitions that the French Revolution would inspire the 
Catholic majority in Ireland to throw off the yoke of British rule. The Irish Colleges had 
their part to play in instilling the principles of the rights of man in their students. " While 
the priests had ulterior motives, seeking to ensure the survival of their institution, their 
dislike for the British government was probably sincere. Crucially, they had identified the 
importance of loyalty to the new order as a factor in their survival as an institution. None 
the less, the priests in the College were more than just Irish exiles, but Catholic clergymen 
"Loup6s, 'The Irish Clergy', 30. 
loup6s, 'The Irish Clergy, 3 2,3 5-37. 
'Philippe Loupýs names two Irish jurors, Frangois Loebardy and Matthew O'Leyn, who 
retracted in the early months of 1791 (Loup6s, 'The Irish Clergy', 32). 
"AN, D/XIX13 0 (Observationsii M le Rapporleur, n. d. [ 1790]). 
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as well. If the oath was a test of loyalty, many priests in the College still refused it. 
Perhaps for many Irish clergymen, the Revolution seemed as anti-Catholic as the Anglo- 
Irish ascendancy. For some Irish priests, therefore, the Church and their place in it 
probably overrode all other considerations. This was especially true when the 
congregations of the foreign clergy were hostile to the oath. In January 1791, the English 
students at Douai provided the force behind the opposition to the administration of the 
oath, provoking a confrontation with the civil authorities. ' 
Such resistance to the oath implied hostility towards the Revolution and would mark 
out the clergy, French and foreign alike, for both official and popular suspicion. In 
coming years, acts of loyalty to the Revolution - or a lack of them - would determine the 
fate of foreign clerics in France. When popular hostility towards the foreign clergy did 
break out, it was based primarily on the fact that they were clergy, not that they were 
foreigners. None the less, the fact that they appeared to remain a separate, privileged 
group did provoke resentment. After Robert Fitzgerald's intervention on behalf of the 
Scots College in Paris, the Moniteur fumed that the College was'oppos6 aux Ddcrets de 
I'Assembl6e Nationale, quand le Clergd de France ... est 
d6truit comme Corps, an6anti 
comme Ordre, et ne pr6sente plus que des Citoyens fonctionnaires! "' 
It was the schism over the clerical oath which brought such hostility to the surface. 
Cornered in the faubourg Saint-Marcel, one of the heartlands of Parisian popular 
radicalism, the English Benedictine convent was a natural target for popular resentment 
towards the refractory clergy. The house was mobbed by a crowd 'consisting of the worst 
sort of people'. ' On 26 June 1791, Richard Marsh, superior of the English Benedictines 
at Dieulouard, had referred to Rome the question as to 'whether we may carry secular 
[clothes], since the religious habit is so ill looled upon in France. " Even the Irish College 
in Paris, for all its priests' protestations of their revolutionary sympathies, was not left 
unmolested. In the disturbances surrounding the oath in 179 1, a crowd tried to break into 
the College and were only prevented from doing so by a pistol-brandishing student. In 
September 1791, however, the demonstrations turned violent because the Irish College 
chapel was being used by French people who sought mass from a refractory priest. On 
'AN, S//4619 (Letter addressed to Mme Hagan, of the English Benedictines of Paris, 29 
January 1791), 
" SCA, CAI/25/1-8 ('Extrait du Moniteur No. 160). 
'Narrative of the English Benedictine Nuns, Rue de I'Allouette, Paris, reproduced in 
Alger, Englishmen in the French Revolution, 301. 
'AN, S//4619 (Letter of Richard Marsh to Naylor, 26 June 1791). 
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leaving, the congregation was mobbed and a lady, probably French, was publicly 
flogged. " The Irish priests were seen to be abusing French hospitality by harbouring, and 
encouraging, non-jurors and their congregations. The foreign clergy had finally run afoul 
of revolutionary orthodoxy. 
Until that point, however, the main problem facing the foreign clergy were the 
deepening financial difficulties which were partly the effects of the ecclesiastical reforms 
of the Constituent, but which had long-term roots. The Revolution was financially 
disastrous for the foreign clergy. The uncertainty over their future, at least until 28 
October 1790, ensured that recruitment of students and novices - and the fees and 
dowries which came with them - was reduced to a trickle. The English Augustinian nuns 
in Paris claimed on 22 September 1790 that while they had nineteen pupils, 'i repoque de 
la Revolution y 6toient en plus grande quantit6'. " 
The imposition of taxation on the clergy proved to be another grave problem. On 9 
September 1791, Marsh complained to Naylor that the taxes due since Easter amounted 
to 800 fivres. ' For many houses, however, taxation merely compounded financial 
problems which predated the Revolution. Another inmate at Dieulouard, Fisher, had been 
frank with Naylor in a letter in June 1791 as to the causes of the establishment's 
difficulties with money. WWle he did assign some of the blame to the Revolution, he also 
attributed some to mismanagment of funds and long-term debts. ' By the summer of 
1791, the Benedictines were considering drastic steps for the monks at Dieulouard. They 
contemplated an offer to take over the English Carthusian house at Nieuport in the 
Austrian Netherlands, in return for which'they wou'd teach all the lower classes publicly'. 
This meant leaving France for good, so they deferred their decision in favour of other 
measures. Marsh tried to prevail on Bennett, the superior of the apparently money- 
soaked English College at Douai, to transfer some of the wealth to its poorer relative at 
Dieulouard. ' 
Dieulouard's tribulations under the Constituent Assembly reveal the complexity of the 
problems faced by the foreign clergy in France. Suffering at first from uncertainty over 
their place within the new regime, even when the Constituent recognised the legitimacy of 
"Alger, Englishmen in the French Revolution, 163. 
"AN, D/MX/30 (Mimoire des Religieuses Anglaises etablies 'i Paris rue desfossis St. 
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their establishments their troubles were far from over. They were not integrated into the 
new order, but merely co-existed with it, their foreign status protecting them from most of 
the reforms which affected the rest of the church in France. This in itself caused some 
resentment. For as long as they remained a special case, their existence would sit 
awkwardly with the new state-sponsored ecclesiastical settlement. 
Against any'nationalising, urge to storm these survivals of clerical privilege stood an 
equally strong respect for one of the inalienable rights of man - property. The foreign 
clergy successfully convinced the revolutionaries that theirs had been legitimately 
purchased with their own funds. The revolutionaries realised that to nationalise this 
property would be to discourage foreign investment in the French economy and to cause 
diplomatic ripples. There was no ideological dynamic which made the eventual abolition 
of the foreign clergy inevitable. Rather, their survival was officially guaranteed by the 
revolutionaries' own respect for property, which was as much, perhaps more, a part of 
their ideology as was egalitarianism. 
The threat to this balance came from anticlericalism which stirred and expressed itself 
in ever more violent ways in the wake of the controversy over the ecclesiastical oath. 
Although they could not have known it at the time, many foreign clerics compromised 
their long-term chances of continued practice in France by refusing to swear. Their 
foreign status already placed them outside the reformed structures of revolutionary 
France, so their refractory status made them still more so. Nonetheless the violence and 
the popular hostility towards the refractory clergy were still not officially sanctioned by 
the authorities, so the single most important threat to the foreigners under the Constituent 
remained their financial problems. Taxation and uncertainty over their long-term future 
often compounded with financial difficulties which predated the Revolution. The financial 
problems were serious, but this did not drive out the foreign clergy - and nor did the 
revolutionaries seek to do so. It would take a dramatic shift in political opinion to do 
that. 
IV 
The fate even of those who were enthusiasts for the French Revolution, and who had 
much to gain from it, was also anchored in the precariously shifting sands of political 
alignments. These people were foreign radicals, political refugees and sympathisers to the 
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Revolution. In addition to the recognisable groups of radicals, such as the Dutch, the 
Swiss and the Genevans who were already in France, there were also individuals who had 
settled in France before 1789 who, with the fall of the absolute monarchy, embraced the 
Revolution. Most famous among these was Jean-Baptiste (later Anacharsis) Cloots; Paul- 
J6r6mie Bitaub6 from Konigsberg and Karl Konstantin von Hessen-Rheinfels-Rothenberg, 
a Hessian prince who in 1789 was serving in the French army. Karl Reinhard, a tutor to a 
Protestant family in Bordeaux, wrote enthusiastic letters on the Revolution to a 
newspaper in his native Wiirttemberg. Etta Palm d'Aelders, born in Gr6ningnen in the 
Netherlands, had moved to France in 1774 and in the Revolution aired her feminist views 
with the support of the Cercle Social, a radical society of which she was a member. 
William Priestley, oldest son of the Unitarian minister, scientist and reformer Joseph, was 
in Paris when the Bastille was stormed and scribbled an excited letter home to break the 
news to his parents. ' 
Organised groups of radicals had been in France not through any ideological affinity 
with the Ancien R6gime, but because they lived in hope that raison dVial might induce 
the monarchy to encourage them in their projects. The French Revolution provided an 
additional and more inspirational reason to be in France. The collapse of censorship, and 
the rise to prominence of the very people with whom foreign radicals and intellectuals had 
hob-nobbed in previous years seemed to show that political and moral regeneration was 
possible even in a kingdom Eke France. Paris was no longer simply a centre of the 
Enlightenment, but was now showing the way to a new era. France therefore attracted 
more radicals and intellectuals, some into long-term exile, others for brief, inspirational 
visits. A young Wilhelm von Humboldt arrived in France with his tutor, Campe, on 18 
July 1789 in order to witness the fall of despotism in France. The basis of both men's 
enthusiasm was a philosophical cosmopolitanism. " Thomas Christie, a Unitarian and a 
former pupil of Dr. Price, twice travelled to France in the period of the Constituent 
'Mathiez, La Revolution el les 91rangers, 49; Ruiz, A., 'Un regard sur le j acobinisme 
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Assembly, staying for six months from October 1789 to April 1790 and returning again, 
for a brief period in May 179 1. After his second trip, he addressed his defence of the 
Revolution, Letters on the Revolution ofFrance, to Edmund Burke. "' 
Cloots, Humboldt, Reinhard and Christie shared the cosmopolitan view that the French 
Revolution was the dawn of a new era in which old prejudices - religious and national - 
would be swept aside as people recognised their common rights. The Revolution was a 
moral as well as a political transformation which would affect all mankind. Decrees such 
as the renunciation of wars on conquest and aggression in May 1790 caused a sensation in 
radical and intellectual circles in Europe. Some revolutionaries invited, rhetorically or 
otherwise, foreign 'patriots' to share in the fruits of France's regeneration. " 
For some revolutionaries, the main advantage of France's openness to foreign radicals 
was the moral and intellectual cross-pollenation which would result. Some revolutionary 
politicians actually made practical use of these exiles. Mirabeau gathered around him the 
four leading Genevans as a 'think-tanle, Such behaviour merely served to confirm that the 
Revolution was the property of mankind in general, open to all who cared to participate. 
Many individuals were thus drawn to France in the period of the Constituent Assembly. 
Thomas Paine crossed the Channel in the late autumn of 1789, staying in France until 
early 1790, writing to George Washington that 'a share in two revolutions is living to 
some purpose. He revisited France in February 1791, staying in Paris until 9 July, when 
he returned to London. He would later reappear in France as a deputy to the Convention 
and a fugitive from prosecution in Britain. "' Benjamin Vaughan was a Unitarian and, like 
the Genevan Etienne Dumont, a protdg6 of Lord Lansdowne. He visited France in 1790 
and partook in some of the activities of the Nantes Jacobin club in November, before 
returning to Britain, ultimately to take up a seat in the House of Commons. Helen Maria 
Williams arrived in France with her sisters and mother in the summer of 1790 in order to 
view the F&e de la F6diration on 14 July. By 179 1, they were settled in Paris. A similar 
decision to turn a visit into something more permanent was reached by the vegetarian and 
former High Sheriff of Shropshire, Robert Pigott, who presented an address to the 
National Assembly in 1790 and, after dividing his time between Geneva and Lyons, was to 
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die in Toulouse in 1794. " John Oswald, a Scot by origin, spent the first months of the 
Revolution flitting between Paris and London. In Paris, he established the Universal 
Patriot, intended to appear simultaneously in Paris, Calais and London as a cross-Channel 
companion to Brissot's PatrioteftanVais. In May 1790, when the paper first appeared, 
Oswald left Britain to settle in France. " John Paul Jones, the Scots-born American naval 
hero, came to France from Warsaw in November 1789, possibly seeking a post in the 
French navy. He would die in France of dropsy in July 1792. " 
It was not just British or American enthusiasts who trickled into France. German 
moralists and intellectuals were also drawn to the country. Gerard Anton von Halem, 
from the duchy of Oldenburg, visited Paris in the winter of 1790, observing the activities 
of various clubs before returning to commit his thoughts to paper. Johann Wilhelm von 
Archenholz was a former Prussian military officer and publicist who came to Paris in the 
summer of 1791 to establish a journal, the Minerva, of Feuillant persuasion. Konrad 
Engelbert Oelsner and count Gustav von Schlabrendorff arrived in Paris in 1790 and both 
stayed until their deaths during the Restoration. The former worked on von Archenholtis 
Minerva. Georg Kerner entered Strasbourg University in the summer of 1791 to study 
medicine, but to the fury of both his father and the Duke of his native Wdrttemberg, he 
engaged in the Jacobin club there. Johann-Georg Schneider entered in Alsace in the 
summer of 179 1. Originally from Wdriburg in Franconia, Schneider settled in Strasbourg 
as Professor of Canon Law and as the vicar of the constitutional bishop of the Bas-Rhin, 
Franz Brendel, when the Elector of Trier dismissed him from his post as Lecturer of 
Rhetoric at the University of Bonn. He would soon rise to the leadership of the city's 
Jacobin club. " 
From regions further south, Jean-Nicolas-Andre Castella was a leader of the Fribourg 
uprising in 1781 who was in exile in Savoy in 1789. He was persuaded to cross the 
frontier by his compatriots in France during the campaign to press the National Assembly 
to release twoftibourgeois prisoners from Brest in May 1790. "' Frangois-Am6d6e 
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Doppet, a radical Savoyard doctor, left Chambdry for Grenoble, where he embarked on a 
military career. " Alfieri, the Italian poet, lived in Paris in the early years of the 
Revolution, writing advice to Louis XVI. Louis Pio was a knighted secretary to the 
Neapolitan ambassador, but was forced to resign when he expressed enthusiasm over the 
French Revolution. On II March 1790, at the instigation of the abb6 Fauchet, the 
Commune of Paris accepted the petition of the Feuillants district to decree his 
naturalisation as a French citizen. 110 
These individuals all had cultural, intellectual or political influence beyond their small 
numbers. Of greater numerical importance were those who fled upheavals which were 
crushed after 1789: the 'revolutions' in the Austrian Netherlands and the bishopric of 
Li6ge. The first refugees from these struggles for independence from, respectively, the 
Habsburgs and Holy Roman Empire, arrived in France before defeat seemed imminent. 
Camille Desmoulins, who reported religiously on events in the Low Countries, printed a 
letter from Lille, dated 22 November 1789: Ies Brabangons arrivent ici en foule; les maris 
amenent leurs fernmes & leurs enfants & retournent combattre pour leur libertV'11 
Lille, in fact, was one of the main towns in which the Belgian exiles congregated after 
they were defeated. The first to arrive were the 'democrats, supporters of Jean-Frangois 
Vonck, who had sought not only independence, but also domestic political reforms for the 
Austrian Netherlands. Hundreds of fugitives, including Vonck himself and the banker 
Edouard de Walckiers fled to France, stopping first at Lille and then making their way to 
Paris. When the Statists in their own turn were ousted by the returning Austrians in the 
late summer of 1790, they also fled to France, congregating around the duc de B6thune- 
Charost at Douai. ' 12 
The Li6geois fared little better than their Brabangon counterparts. The reformed 
municipal council, led by burgermeister A. G. J. Donceel, scrambled to the safety of Givet 
in the French Ardennes when Austrian troops restored the prince-bishop in January 1791. 
They were followed by hundreds of soldiers led by general Ransonnet. While Donceel 
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succumbed to illness in February, other Li6geois leaders such as Jean-Nicolas Bassenge 
and Jacques-Joseph Fabry made their way to Paris, where they sought to influence French 
policy. There they joined others such as Jean-Joseph Fyon, P. -J. Henkart and Pierre 
Lebrun-Tondu, a French-born journalist who had lived in Liege since 1785. "' 
Foreign exiles quickly understood that they were more likely to win the sympathy of 
the French revolutionaries if they echoed their principles and aspirations. They did not, 
however, blindly adopt French ideology and language. As foreign patriots, they viewed 
the Revolution in the light of their experience and aspirations for their own countries. 
This standpoint is echoed in the works of foreign, patriotic visitors (as opposed to exiles) 
such as Christie and Paine, for whom the Revolution offered a new standard by which the 
British constitution could be examined andjudged. "" Exiles, whose situation was more 
desperate and whose experience had already involved open resistance to their sovereigns, 
were more likely to adapt French ideas more directly in order to secure French sympathy 
for their aims. The address drawn up by the Fribourgeois for the release of their 
compatriots from the galleys at Brest in May 1790 stressed their loyalty to the French 
Revolution. Their invitation to all Fribourgeois in Paris to sign the address referred to the 
French Revolution as an example for them to follow. When Castella had plucked up the 
courage to enter France and to take over leadership of the Club helvitique with Roullier, 
a new petition described the Fribourg uprising of 1781 as a precursor to 1789. "' The 
Fribourgeois petitions are an example as to how foreign radicals in France sought to adopt 
the French Revolution to further their own, specific ends. They did not abandon their 
appeals to their national ancestry and their own political traditions, but tried to fit them in 
with the whirlwind of the French Revolution, by explaining it as part of a chain of events 
which included their own struggle. 
For this reason, the whole course of relations between the revolutionaries and foreign 
radicals in France was based on pragmatism accompanied by cosmopolitan flourishes. 
Obviously, where unadulterated cosmopolitanism could do no harm to French interests, 
the revolutionaries were willing to accept and encourage even its more eccentric 
manifestations. On 19 June 1790, Anacharsis Cloots (who had dropped his Christian 
name of Jean-Baptiste only weeks before) styled himself TOrateur du genre humain' and 
'I'Delange-Janson, Ambroise, 24 - 25; Raxhon, P., 'Les Rdugids Li6geois a Paris: un etat 
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led a delegation of people claiming to be Arabs, Chaldeans, Prussians, Poles, Britons, 
Germans, Dutch, Swedes, Italians, Spaniards, Americans, Indians, Syrians, Brabangons, 
Li6geois, Avignonnais, Genevans, Sardinians, Grisons and Sicilians to the National 
Assembly. "" Cloots asked that they be allowed to join the procession in the FEW de la 
F6ddration on the Champ de Mars on 14 July: 'cette solemnit6 civique ne sera pas 
seulement la fete des Frangais mais encore la fete du genre humaitf (a sentiment shared by 
Helen Maria Williams). The President, Menou, replied that 'les progrýs que fait une 
nation dans la philosophie et dans la connaissance des droits de Yhomme, appartiennent 
dgalement i toutes les nations' and he called on the foreigners who would attend the 
festival to tell their governors 'que s'ils sont jaloux de faire passer leur m6moire i la 
postdrit6 la plus recul6e, dites-leurs qu'ils Wont qu'i suivre Vexemple de Louis XVI, le 
restaurateur de la libert6 frangaise. "" 
If it was up to rulers to follow the French example, then the message of the baron de 
Menou was not a call for international revolution. Furthermore, there was some doubt in 
the Assembly itself that Cloots' deputation would ever be taken seriously by anyone 
anyway. For their part, the deputies in the National Assembly either laughed the affair off 
as eccentric or they saw no harm in accepting the flattery of the deputation and acting as 
little more than moral and intellectual leaders in a world which was still mostly ruled by 
tyrannical governments. As bizarre or ridiculous as Cloots' deputation may have seemed 
to many deputies, it gave the revolutionaries the opportunity to express their often sincere 
cosmopolitan aspirations without offending neighbouring sovereigns. "" 
For all the cosmopolitan implications of revolutionary ideology, the relationship 
between the French and foreign patriots were governed by pragmatic considerations. 
Both sides had concrete problems and aspirations of their own. Many foreign radicals, 
having tasted the bitterness of defeat and persecution, sought revenge and, like most 
exiles, to return home safely. For their part the French had no desire to alienate people 
who were manifestly their admirers and friends, but on the other hand, they did not want 
to encourage the radicals so far that they provoked a diplomatic incident at a time when 
the country needed peace and stability in its foreign relations. Consequently, beneath the 
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veneer of international fraternity lay a tug-of-war in which the foreigners tried to puff the 
revolutionaries further than their international political concerns would allow. 
When the Constituent released the two Fribourgeoisforcats on 20 May and refused to 
extradite nine members of the Club heUtique in October that same year, this was not 
because it put the rights of man over French international interests. "' There were other 
principles at stake which outweighed the risk of diplomatic fallout. As much as some 
deputies deployed the rhetoric of the rights of man, the National Assembly was 
determined to show that the sovereignty of the French nation over its internal laws was 
immutable. They would have no part in executing the sentences handed down by foreign 
courts. "' In the revolutionaries' response to the affairs relating to the Fribourgeois, their 
perceptions of national interest and their universalist pretensions coincided happily and 
allowed them to brave the potential diplomatic difficulties. 
The very fact that the French appeared to be encouraging the activities of exiles none 
the less brought some minor tremors in their foreign relations. From Soleure, the French 
ambassador to the Swiss cantons, de Wrac (no sympathiser to political radicalism) 
warned that the behaviour of Swiss patriots sheltered in France 'ne peuvent que nuire 
infiniment A nos int6rdts politiques et militaires'. On 22 July 1791 the abbd de Raze, Paris 
agent of the prince-bishop of Basel, reminded Montmorin of French obligations under its 
centuries-old alliance with the cantons. He expressed particular concern over the 
activities of 'le club des Suisses d6port6s', among whom were four Bilois who, he 
claimed, were 'les principaux auteurs des troubles qui ont d6soI6 jusqu'ici I'EvecM de 
Bffle. ' 121 
To these complaints, Montmorin could do little more than press the comW 
diplomatique to try to persuade the National Assembly to take measures against the Swiss 
radicals in France, while assuring the Swiss that the French government wished to satisfy 
its allies. At the same time he warned that he was obliged to tread with caution because, 
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as he told de Virac, 'd s'agit d'attaquer la libert6 individuelle. " Montmorin was in effect 
quietly reminding the ambassador of the fine balance between diplomatic necessity and the 
principles of the French Revolution. 
The revolutionaries themselves trod this balance with even greater care when they were 
dealing with governments which could cause difficulties greater than those threatened by 
the Swiss cantons. While the Swiss could withdraw their regiments in protest over French 
tolerance of the Club helv&ique, powers such as Austria could do far worse. For this 
reason, the Constituent either proceeded with extreme caution when it dealt with 
representations from the Belgian patriots, or else it split between the right, who urged 
such caution, and the left, who sought to encourage the Brabangons and the Li6geois. On 
10 December 1789, the President of the Assembly announced that he had received a 
package from van der Noot, which included the Brabangon manifesto for independence. 
At the same time Montmorin informed the National Assembly that he had received a 
similar package from the Statists, but that he had sent it back unopened because'Sa 
Maj est6 a jug6 qdil redtait ni de sa justice, ni de sa dignit6, ni de sa prudence d! accueillir 
une semblable d6marche. "" There were no howls of protest at Montmorids action and 
the question as to what to do with the package was adjourned. Van der Noot relaunched 
his initiative in March 1790, sending two delegates from the Brabant Estates to deliver a 
new manifesto to Paris. The foreign minister returned it unopened on II March. The 
Statists made a simultaneous approach to the National Assembly, but the President, 
Rabaut de Saint-Etienne, announced on 17 March that these letters had not been opened 
either. Lafayette claimed that the Belgian Estates 'ne parait pas avoir tous les caract6res 
qui 6manent de la puissance souveraine du peuple', "' but there was a pragmatic dimension 
to the rebuff. The French could not afford to risk diplomatic difficulties with Austria by 
appearing to encourage an open rebellion in one of the Habsburg territories. On the other 
hand, on 18 September 1790 the left and the right clashed dramatically over the , 
adn-dttance of two Liegeois exiles, Fyon and Rasquinet, to the bar of the Assembly. While 
the two men were permitted to read their petition, the right heckled them. " Until the 
summer of 1791, however, most revolutionaries usually accepted the need for discretion 
in their relations with foreign radicals. 
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Such caution also dictated the reluctance of the revolutionaries to go much beyond the 
limits set by the absolute monarchy in its assistance to foreign patriots in exile. On 28 
November 1789, the Consituent's comilg desfinances allocated 120,000 fivres for a two- 
month period to be paid from the state finances to the Dutch refugees. On 26 July 1790, 
a petition drawn up by the Valckenisten successfully secured further funds, this time to the 
tune of 829,000 livres, to go not only towards maintenance, but also towards the 
establishment of manufactures and workshops, including a fishery at Gravelines. Of 
course the Dutch had claimed not only that such industries would soften their dependence 
on handouts in the long run, but also be useful to France by encouraging industry. "' This 
was the extent of the revolutionaries' departure from the policies of the absolute monarchy 
in its treatment of the Dutch fugitives. The very nature of the innovation showed that the 
revolutionaries believed that the Patriots would be in France for a considerable amount of 
time, with the implication that the French would offer no practical political help in the 
short term. Furthermore, the wording of the decree which granted this funding implied 
that it was applicable only to those refugees already in France before the end of 1788, a 
deadline imposed by the Ancien R6gime minister, Lambert. The Patriots complained 
meanwhile that their request to the French ambassador to the United Provinces to grant 
asylum to a new wave of refugees had gone unanswered. In January 179 1, in response to 
a query from baron van Capellen tot den Pol, the foreign minister Antoine Delessart 
suggested that recent arrivals might be allowed to take over the pensions of those 
refugees who died in France. This did not imply that any funds would be made available 
on top of those already being paid out since 1788. "' 
The treatment of the Dutch Patriots in France showed that the revolutionaries were 
willing to accept the responsiblities bequeathed to them by the Ancien R6gime, but that 
they were unable, for both financial and diplomatic reasons, to extend such assistance. 
Their innovations showed that that they did not perceive the Patriot refugees as an 
immediate threat to the Stadholder, and therefore to the diplomatic relations between 
Paris and The Hague. Outside the National Assembly, revolutionary opinion echoed this 
caution on the whole. The Jacobins, for example, were unwilling to promise anything to 
the Dutch Patriots other than moral support, On 15 May 1791, they politely rebutted a 
Patriot appeal for a French invasion of the Netherlands. " 
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The pragmatism of the revolutionaries placed diplomatic concerns - in other words, the 
interests of France - far above cosmopolitan idealism. Revolutionary support for foreign 
radicals in France was limited to public rhetorical flourishes which signified moral support 
and little else. The revolutionaries were usually moved to take concrete measures or to 
snub foreign governments only when other principles, such as French sovereignty, were at 
stake. Should the foreign radicals themselves have done anything to upset French 
interests, the revolutionaries themselves were willing to act vigorously. On 14 September 
1790, Frangois Roullier's son was arrested for trying to distribute propaganda from the 
Club helvetique among the Swiss Guards. When the Constituent was informed of this 
affair five days later, de Noailles persuaded the Assembly to forbid all political clubs from 
corresponding with French, foreign or Swiss regiments, or for soldiers to participate in 
political societies. "" For the revolutionaries, subversive activity by foreign patriots not 
only undermined French relations with the cantons, but also further compromised 
discipline in the army. 
Some radicals were more fortunate than those in the Swiss club because they had 
influential contacts among the revolutionaries and could hope to influence French policy 
from within. The Genevans, for example, had long developed a symbiotic relationship 
with the cornte de Mirabeau, whose reputation as a publicist and orator in the National 
Assembly they hoped to harness for their own aims. For his part Mirabeau tapped the 
financial expertise of Clavi6re in order to attack Necker, while Dumont, Du Roverary and, 
occasionally, Reybaz, wrote both his speeches and his journal, Le Courrier de Provence. 
The Genevan exiles hoped to influence the reconstruction of France in such a way that 
Genevans in general would see in revolutionary France not a threat, but an inspiration for 
the reforms proposed by their own Representants. "o Such meddling in French affairs by 
foreigners gave rise to some hostility among the revolutionaries. Some particularly 
resented the Genevans because they acted as a channel for British ideas, namely those 
emanating from Lord Lansdowne's Bowood set, including Jeremy Bentham and Samuel 
Romilly. "I 
In contrast to the Genevans, the Li6geois sought to remedy their exile by measures 
which, in the period of 1789 - 179 1, were too radical for the revolutionaries to consider 
"'AP, xix, 67; Wautis, Le Club heUtique, 68. 
"'Dumont, Souvenirs surMirabeau, 60 - 61; B6n6truy, LAtelier de Mirabeau, 186 - 188. 
131 See, for example, Benthams proposals for legal reform in the Onirrier de Provence: 
Tarike: suite du Num6ro CXXXVIP(28 - 29 April 1790), 49 - 56 and 'Vari6t6'(n-d-), 
123-128. 
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seriously. Their recent defeat led them to run ahead of events and their leaders declared 
themselves in favour of nothing less than annexation of the bishopric by France. On 7 July 
179 1, admittedly in the wake of Varennes, Fabry wrote to Jarbe, the minister of 
contributions publiques, that'nous voulons 6tre le 846 [dipartement] en d6pit des 
Frangais m6me. "" He proposed the formation of Li6geois units which would be sent to 
the frontier in preparation for an invasion. Given the caution of the Constituent, Fabry 
would have to wait for nine months before his ideas would be taken seriously, but he was 
probably acting on signs, encouraging for those foreign exiles who hoped to return with 
the aid of French military muscle, that the international situation was deteriorating with 
the royal flight to Varennes and the sabre-rattling in the French left-wing press. 
By far the largest group of refugees, however, learnt quickly that the best tactics to 
gain French sympathy were to attach themselves as closely as possible to already existing 
political currents in the French Revolution. The problem for the Dutch Patriots was to 
identify which political colouring it was best to assume. Personal political conscience 
undoubtedly played a part in their choice, but they tended to associate with those groups 
or personalities whose policies best suited their aims and methods. This was complicated 
by personal rivalries within the Patriot camp, particularly between Valckenaer and van 
Beijma, who led different factions which associated with conflicting currents in French 
revolutionary politics, although this situation did not become fratricidal until the Terror. " 
The Valckenisten had taken the initiative in attaching their cause to the French 
Revolution. While van Beijma continued to defy the French government's demands for 
inspection of the cash registers until 1790, Valckenaer recognised that there would be no 
success in the United Provinces for the Patriots without the help - diplomatic or otherwise 
- of the new people running France. He also realised that the French were unlikely to help 
the Dutch if their principles, like those of the Li6geois, were too far astray from the needs 
and aspirations of the French revolutionaries. Valckenaer therefore proposed that the 
Dutch immerse themselves in the political life of the Revolution. In 1790 Valckenaer 
himself took a commission in the Watten National Guard, with Patriots filling the rank and 
file. He founded a Jacobin club - Les Amis de la Constitution - at Watten, becoming its 
first president. The Dutch Patriot press endorsed the French Revolution and its course in 
the journals and pamphlets published in places such as Dunkirk, Gravelines and Arras. 
Among such endorsements was Valckenaer's own plan for a new Netherlands 
"'Quoted in Rnhon, 'Les Rffigi6s Li6geoie, 217. 
"'Schama, Patriots andLiberators, 145 - 146 
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constitution: it rejected republicanism and envisaged instead the raising of the Stadholder 
to the status of King, while most of the legislative power would lie with an elected 
assembly ruling over seventeen provinces. Written in 1791, this project owed much to the 
example of the emergent French document ratified later that same year. "' 
Although Valckenaer's plan was greeted with horror by most of his fellow Patriots, 
who could bear no thought of compromise with the Stadholder, Valckenaer scored some 
success in winning the sympathy of the revolutionaries. He secured funding from the 
National Assembly to help the efforts of the Patriots to support themselves economically 
while in France. He even managed to persuade some of the van BeiJmanisten to sign the 
petition presented to the Constituent on 26 July 1790.1" The true strength of the address 
to the Constituent, however, was the tailoring of its language to suit the principles and 
interests of the revolutionaries. The Patriots expressed their political aims in French 
terms, rejecting the past (a trusty weapon of Patriot politics) as a precedent, speaking in 
terms of inalienable rights, meritocracy, opposition to aristocracy and the abolition of 
'feudalisnY. "' In the 1780s, the Patriots had been far more likely to refer to their historical 
and legal rights and customs asTree Batavians', combined with some references to natural 
rights. Even in 1790 their publications had overwhelmingly expressed themselves in terms 
of reshaping extant Dutch institutions into forms more acceptable to the Patriots. "' Seen 
in this light, the petitions rejection of the Dutch past as a justification was a deliberate 
effort to echo French revolutionary ideas and to stress the universal cause. Valckenaer 
was adapting Dutch Patriot politics to suit French forms. For their part, the 
revolutionaries could reject the wilder schemes for a war of liberation, but they could not 
brush aside foreign radicals who seemed to speak the same political language as the 
French. 
The association of the Swiss patriots with the French Revolution was also split along 
ideological fines, aggravated by clashes of personality. Roullier, pere etfils, were both 
considered too extreme in their methods by other leading members such as Castella. The 
older Roullier was a friend to Marat and was accused of setting the entire right-wing of 
the Constituent against the Club heMlique after the arrest of his son at Courbevoie in 
"Schama, Patriots wid Liberators, 142,147 - 148,152. 
... Simon Schama describes this petition asthe work of a group composed exclusively of 
"Valckenisten"' (Patriots andLiberators, 148), but the signatures included those of Jan 
Lambertus Huber, Johan de Kock and J. A. van Hoey, all outspoken members of the van 
Beijmanisten clique (AP, xvii, 374). 
136", 
xvii, 374 - 375,377. 137 S chama, Patriots and Liberators, 67,142. 
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September 1790. Roullier's radical connections led him and his supporters to join the 
Cordelier Club. On top of financial problems, these divisions contributed to the club's 
early demise in August 179 1. ` 
The problem with affiliating one's cause to the French Revolution, however, was that 
the shifting sands of political alignments could often leave stranded those not adept 
enough to move with the tide. As political orthodoxy became necessary for actual as well 
as political survival in 1793 - 1794, fluidity in one's political allegiances would be literally 
vital for foreign radicals. No one could have been expected to predict such developments, 
and at the end of the Constituent Assembly, it looked as if the orthodoxy might be 
swinging rightwards rather than leftwards. In 1791, this trend threatened to leave many 
foreign patriots without political influence, because many had associated with French 
radicals discredited in the wake of the Champ de Mars massacre. In July 1791, French 
revolutionaries and foreign radicals alike were suddenly faced with hard political choices. 
For those, such as Roullier and his followers who were evidently Cordeliers, there was 
little question that they would take the republican line. After 17 July 1791 they were 
watched closely by the authorities. So, too, was James Rutledge, the son of a Jacobite 
exile who had joined the Cordeliers and who had supported the admission of inactive 
citizens to the militia. "' Thomas Paine was a founding member of the Soditi 
Ripublicaine which placarded Paris on I July calling for a republic. In the Constituent, 
Malouet demanded his arrest and prosecution. After the Champ de Mars massacre, Paine 
and other foreigners such as John Oswald and Etta Palin d'Aelders, who were affiliates of 
the Cercle Social which had joined the Cordeliers in drafting the republican petition, were 
now suspect. Paine had left for Britain on 9 July, but d'Aelders and Oswald remained in 
Paris, to see the Cercle Social (or, more accurately, the Confidiration des Amis de la 
V&W) close down after the massacre. D'Aelders was arrested on 19 July. "' These 
foreign radicals suffered for their opinions and their activities when, briefly, a rightward 
shift in revolutionary politics left them exposed to surveillance and arrest. The wake of 
the Champ de Mars massacre was the first time in which foreigners' political attachments 
left them open to attack when the political orthodoxy became narrower. As it turned out, 
"'Wautis, Le Club heMlique, 47,49,54. 
"'Journal du Club des Cordeliers, No. 2 (Sgance of 29 June); Alger, Englishmen in the 
French Revolution, 19. 
140Conway, M. D., 7he Life of 7homas Paine with a history of his literary, political and 
religious career in America, France, andEngland (2 vols. ) (New York & London, 
1892), i, 308 -3 10; Philp, Paine, 15; Kates, 7he Cercle Social, 162 - 163,170; Erdman, 
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those beached for the time being would be rescued when the revolutionary tide resumed 
its leftward course, but not all foreigners had made the same associations as Oswald, 
Roullier, Etta Palm, Rutledge and Paine. 
A number of foreigners associated with the Jacobins, such as the Dutch Patriot 
Daverhoult and the former Prussian von Archenholz, joined the Feuillants. Daverhoult 
had the support of other Dutch Patriots, either because Lafayette had spoken out for them 
in 1787, or because they believed sincerely in constitutional monarchy. On the other 
hand, Oelsner and his friend, Schlabrendorff, remained with the Jacobins, as did Clavi6re, 
Cloots and others. While he disliked the radicalisation of the Jacobins, Oelsnees decision 
was based on his belief that the kings flight had made it impossible for the monarchy to be 
reconciled with the Revolution. "' In Bordeaux, Karl Reinhard, who up to now had 
remained ambivalent in his identity as an adoptive French citizen or as a German, took his 
choice on the news of the king's flight. He enrolled in the National Guard: 'I recorded my 
resolve to live and die a Frenchman. "12 
For as long as a relative freedom of political debate was allowed in France, the 
continued activities of foreign radicals were under no threat from the French authorities 
provided they were legal. If the surveillance of those caught out in the reaction after the 
Champ de Mars massacre was brief, it was however an ominous sign that orthodoxy in 
political language and behaviour was not merely a means of obtaining French sympathy, 
but that it could also be a matter of political and even personal survival. 
V 
The problems of such vacillations in politics also faced those foreign financiers who got 
involved in the politics of the French Revolution. If they remained outside such activity, 
which was no easy task given the underlying causes of the Revolution, foreign financiers 
in France remained more or less unmolested under the Consitituent Assembly. This was 
not for want of suspicions about their motives. While some orators such as Bar6re saw in 
foreign investment a source of prosperity and fiscal stability, a number of revolutionaries 
believed that financial speculation by foreigners, including investment in biens nationaux, 
"'Mathiez, La Revolution et les etrangers, 45; Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 15 1; 
Ruiz, Un regard sur le j acobinisme aflemand', 25 8. 
"'Quoted in Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution, 328. 
180 
sapped French financial and economic well-being. There was also suspicion that foreign 
investors had no real concern for the long-term future of France. Perhaps because they 
did not want to frighten away capital, however, the revolutionaries did little to protect 
private French economic interests. Commercial treaties, including the controversial one 
with Britain, were not reviewed. The fact that most foreign financiers and manufacturers 
kept a cautious distance from politics probably prevented the revolutionaries from 
circumscribing their activities despite some deeply-entrenched suspicions dating to the 
Ancien R6gime. A number of foreigners entered the thick of the debates over French 
finances, however, which gave occasion for their opponents to raise the spectre of the 
self-interested foreign speculator feeding off French indebtedness. 
The image was a familiar one to those who had taken an interest in the finance of the 
old regime. 'Agiotage, or speculation on the markets, was a theme which had recurred 
(with some justice) in the pamphlet wars between different interests tied up with French 
government finances in the 1780s. The fear of the entanglement of foreigners in business 
which came close to the affairs of the French state became a useful weapon in the hands of 
politicians in the debates on finance under the Constituent Assembly. 
Some deputies complained that the lifetime, interest-bearing bonds, or rentes viagires, 
held by foreigners were an unproductive expense on government finances, depleting 
advantages in the balance of trade and representing a loss of currency and even a form of 
'tribute' to foreign powers. It was estimated on 21 November 1789 that rentes viagires 
ate up between 20 to 25 million fivres in interest a year, which provoked a proposal to 
repay the capital on all such bonds. "-' It is possible that the ulterior target of this 
suggestion were the two rival Genevans, Etienne Clavi&e and Jacques Necker. Necker 
had been one of those responsible for establishing rentes viagires which a group of 
Genevan moneymen had bought and attributed to thirty young Genevan girls who had 
survived smallpox. Dupont de Nemours sarcastically spoke of 'ces immortelles 
demoiselles de Gen6vewhose youth and resistence to illness ensured a long return on the 
investment in the bonds. "" Clavi6re had been a major investor in these rentes viagires 
himself and, as such, was perceived to be linked to the same consortium of Genevan 
financiers. Necker, meanwhile, proposed to repay the capital on the bonds by offering the 
Genevans, nationalised church lands. Opponents of either Necker or Mrabeau (through 
"'See the opinions of the bishop of Limoges, d'Argentrd and of the baron de Cormere 
(AP, ix, 282 - 283; x, 172). 
"'Quoted in B6n6truy, LAtelier de Mirabeau, 115. 
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Clavi6re) could therefore chose their ammunition from this arsenal of apparent sell-outs to 
foreign speculators. On 25 June 1790, the abb6 Maury, taking delight in attacking both 
the Protestant 'usuriers de la ville de Gen&e' and Necker himself, used the scandal to 
denounce the sale of biens nalionaux. "I 
It is therefore little wonder that some deputies sought to exclude foreign investors 
from certain opportunities in France. In the long debate on Necker's proposal to promote 
the Caisse d'Escompte to the status of a National Bank, Custine reminded the Assembly 
on 20 November 1789 that foreigners had profited from France's financial misfortune 
through speculation in the very paper money which the Caisse dEscompte had created. 
He proposed stringent conditions and regulations for anyone who wished to make 
deposits with the Naitonal Bank. They were aimed specifically at excluding all but 
naturalised foreigners, who even then would have to wait fifteen years after their initial 
deposit before receiving interest payments. " The Assembly was not convinced about the 
commercial or financial wisdom of these suggestions, not least because two notable 
financiers involved in the debate over French finances were Genevan. 
The clash between Necker and Clavi&e showed how foreign financiers could influence 
French reform at the highest level. The origins of the protagonists meant that neither side 
could consider using the bogey of foreign agioteurs enslaving France to debt, Both sides 
had to paint foreign investors as a positive force in the restoration of French finances and 
they could both argue with some justice that the confidence of foreign investors was a 
crucial factor in sternming the flight of capital and specie from France. The difference 
between the two sides was how to remedy this faltering confidence. Ultimately, it was 
Necker who lost the argument, when the decrees of 19 - 21 December 1789 rejected the 
plan to create a National Bank from the Caisse dEscompte. " The course of this long 
debate was peppered with references to foreign financiers. Clavi&e made sure that on 6 
November Mirabeau drove home the point that it was Necker's beloved Caisse 
dEscompte which frightened off foreign investors because under the finance minister's 
proposals, it was claimed, the Caisse would be able to issue paper money without 
accountability to the state. Eight days later Necker retorted that the crisis of confidence 





14'Details on the struggle between Mirabeau and Necker over the Caisse dEscompte in 
B6n6truy, L Atelier de Mirabeau, 23 3- 246. 
148Ap, ix, 705; AP, x, 57. 
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Not nine months after the decrees of 19 - 21 December, Nfirabeau was pressing for the 
dismissal of Necker and the appointment in his place of none other than Clavi6re. By that 
time, however, Mirabeau was collaborating with the Court, and he regarded his Genevan 
collaborator as a malleable tool who was a'victime sans cons6quence s'il ne r6ussit pas; 
assez enfoncd dans les Jacobins pour en 6tre tol6r6, les connaissant trop bien pour se 
d6vouer i eux. ' He also recommended him as the man who invented the assignats. 149 On 
3 September, two days after this communication with the Court, Necker resigned, his 
credibility destroyed by his clashes with Mirabeau and by his failure to staunch the 
mounting tide of debt. He left France for Geneva. 
The revolutionaries, however, resisted the exclusion of foreigners from engagement in 
French finances at even the highest level. Few deputies in the Constituent would have 
opposed efforts to relieve France of the burden of indebtedness to foreign creditors, but 
many could not accept the means proposed. They were aware that a France isolated from 
the main sources of international finance would do long-term damage to the economy. 
Consequently, the Dutch banker and Patriot Balthasar-Elie Abberna could quietly take 
over the Parisian bank of the English Catholic John-Francis Lambert in 1788 and go about 
his business as the absolute monarchy collapsed. Jean-Baptiste Vandenyver, another 
Dutchman, steered clear of politics and his bank, one of the largest in Paris, continued 
unmolested under the Constituent, even though he had been closely associated with the 
financial affairs of both Necker and Calonne, with agents of the treasury and the Caisse 
d'Escomple since 1778. In fact, Vandenyver seems to have benefited from the changes 
brought by the Revolution, being appointed an administrator of the new Compagnie des 
Indes in 1790. "0 Nonetheless, the image of foreign financial adventurers out to make a 
fast profit without any sense of civic obligation to France was a potent and persistent one 
which would re-emerge with a vengeance a few years later. 
Foreign manufacturers and merchants, like their French counterparts, tended to hold 
themselves aloof from politics and appear to have continued undisturbed under the 
Constituent. Oberkampf, who had avoided politics before 1789, appears to have been the 
exception, being elected mayor of Jouy in February 1790.11is nephew, Samuel, took 
"'Letter of I September 1790, quoted in Wn&ruy, L'Alefier de Mirabeau, 294. 
Mirabeau's claim about Clavi&e's role in the creation of the Revolution! s paper money was 
not entirely unfounded: Mrabeau's proposal to issue paper money based not on silver but 
on national property was written by the Genevan. Wnkruy writes that if the assignats 
were, as Jaur6s claimed, TAme de la R6volution', 'iI est juste d'en restituer la paternitd au 
Genevois Clavi6re'(304). 
"Uithy, La Banque Protestante en France, ii, 320,322. 
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command of the local National Guard. "' Their status in the community as the chief 
employers no doubt accounted for their political success. Oberkampf certainly believed 
that entering politics was a means of protecting his business interests. In November 1789 
he wrote to his former collaborator, Maraise, that he was going to give 50,000 fivres to 
the contribution patriotique because 'il importe i mes int6r6ts que je paye i la 
menusipallitat [sic] de Jouy. ` None the less, the entrepreneur also wrote to his sister 
that he sincerely wanted to be relieved of his public duties, which shows that he was not 
involved in local politics out of a desire to serve the local community. 
The abolition of privileges accorded to industry by the state on 2 March 1791 did not 
elicit any protests from the foreign manufacturers who had originally relied so heavily on 
state subsidies. This was possibly because the most notable foreign manufactures had 
been long established by 1789 and were beginning to stand on their own feet. They may 
also have seen benefits in the abolition of such privileges, as the reverse side of the coin 
was the abolition of guilds and the subsequent Le Chapelier law which forbade 
combinations of workers. 
One foreign manufacturer, at least, saw an opportunity in the Revolution. An aptly- 
named British porcelain manufacturer, Christopher Potter, had moved to France in 1789 
after an unsuccessful career as a parliamentary candidate in East Anglia. The decline in 
the demand for luxury goods in the economic crisis of the late 1780s had forced the 
closure of the prince de Cond6's porcelain manufacture at Chantilly. Potter reopened the 
works and by January 4791 was employing fifty workers in experiments with new 
methods of colouring. "' The French remained painfully aware that they still lagged 
behind the British in industrial technology: a memorandum in the foreign ministry spoke of 
the need to have an 'industrial revolution' as well as a political one if France's global 
influence was not to be eclipsed by her old rival. "' Attempts by manufacturers to recruit 
"'Chapman & Chassagne, European Textile Printers in the Eighteenth Century, 121 - 
122. Chassagne suggests that Oberkampf entered politics only when circumstances 
seemed to threaten the future of his business and he felt the need to develop the skills of a 
political manipulator, but that he also showed some genuine sympathy for the Revolution 
(190-191). 
"'Quoted in Chassagne, Oberkampf. - un entrepreneur capitaliste au Sijcle des Lumieres 
(Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1980), 155 - 156. 153Ap, 
xxii, 279; Alger, Englishmen in the French Revolution, 56-57. 
15"According to Frangois Crouzet, this is the first known use of the term (cited in Harris, 
J., 'The Transfer of Technology between Britain and France and the French Revolution', 
Crossley, C., & Small, I., The French Revolution andBritish Culture (Oxford & New 
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foreign skills through the tried and trusted methods therefore continued, if not with 
government backing, then on private initiative. In 1791, Charles Albert, from Alsace, 
visited Britain for the Toulouse textile manufacturers Boyer-Fonfr6de and Le Comte in 
order to secure skilled artisans and technology. In December, he was arrested in Britain, 
fined and imprisoned. "' 
In France's primary industries, the outbreak of the Revolution seems to have actually 
encouraged a dramatic increase in the numbers of Nantucket whalers established at 
Dunkirk: by 1790, there were six or seven owners., all with largely foreign crews, mainly 
from Nantucket and Boston, but also from other maritime cities in the United States, 
Britain and Scandinavia. The reason behind this increase of interest from Nantucket 
whalers may be explained by the strong Quaker influence among them: although the 
absolute monarchy had guaranteed them their freedom to worship as they pleased, the 
extension of full civil equality to all citizens regardless of religion may well have removed 
any remaining misgivings. "' 
In the south, the French fishermen at Marseille seized the opportunity provided by the 
change of r6gime to seek redress on their long-standing grievances against the Catalan 
fishermen who used the port. The Catalans, said the Marseillais, had long refused to pay 
the same dues as French fishermen, they were not liable to service in the navy and their 
fishing methods destroyed stocks to such a degree that they could barely reproduce 
themselves. The prudhommes of Marseille petitioned the National Assembly on 28 
October* 1790 asking that either the Catalans be submitted to the same dues, practices and 
jurisdictions as the Marseillais, or else they be expelled from the port. In their own 
memorandum, the patrons-pecheurs claimed that the Spanish fishermen often arrived in 
Marseille without bothering to declare themselves to the bureau de santi. These 
foreigners could consequently Jeter dans le royaurne le fl6au de la peste. ' While the 
Catalans'ne pr6sentent i I'Etat ni esp6rances ni ressources, the French fishermen formed 
'la p6pini6re et 1'6cole permanente des matelots! for the navy and mounted guard at 
Marseille free of charge. 'Nous davons cess6 de demander contre les pecheurs 6trangers 
ggafitg de droit, igafiM dobligation', the patrons-pecheurs declared. They solicited a 
decree by which no one could run a fishing boat without French citizenship, without 
registering all their crew at the relevant bureaux and without both the owner and the crew 
declaring their intention to remain in France as French citizens. The Catalans replied that 
"'Henderson, Britain and Industrial Europe, 25,46. 
"'Pfister-Langanay, Ports, Navires et Mgociants, 270 - 272. 
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they merely provided healthy competition for the French, which kept prices low, and that 
they spent most of their profits in Marseille, supporting the local economy. "' 
The Marseillais expressed in these petitions a combination of patriotic and egalitarian 
language, a sense of usefulness to the state and xenophobia. The master-fishermen 
presented the Catalans as a privileged group who undermined the French fishing industry 
while their French counterparts both fulfilled their civic obligations and struggled against 
unfair competion. The Marseillais, whether consciously or not, adopted the exclusive 
implications in revolutionary egalitarianism: those who refused to abandon their privileges 
relinquished those rights which the patrie offered. In this case, the Spanish fishermen 
ought to be banned from Marseille unless they sacrificed their special treatment. As ever, 
the Constituent Assembly compromised and sought not to bar the Catalans from fishing 
out of Marseille, but rather to 'protect' the French fishermen by levelling the playing field. 
The regulations for both French and Catalans would henceforth be the same. On 8 
December 1790, the National Assembly decreed that the Catalans were to be permitted to 
fish along the French coast, to sell their fish in French ports and to harbour there. The 
condition attached to these concessions was that they follow the same rules and 
regulations and pay the same fees as their French counterparts, but they were also eligible 
for the same representation in the council ofprudhommes. ` This decision had 
diplomatic motives, as the Assembly had, in the wake of the Nootka Sound crisis, 
renamed the pacte defamille between France and Spain the pacte nationale. Byrefusing 
to side with the French fishermen and by imposing parity on both parties, the 
revolutionaries were both adhering to the destruction of privilege and enforcing the terms 
of the Spanish alliance. Thepacte defamille guaranteed the rights of French and Spanish 
subjects to fish in the waters of both monarchs, provided that they submitted to the same 
regulations and statutes as the fishermen of the host country. The Constituent gave a 
pragmatic solution to an economic dispute which had potentially difficult diplomatic 
consequences. 
In its treatment of foreigners at the bottom end of the economic scale, the Revolution 
had no more to fear from diplomatic fallout than the Ancien R6gime. For the poorest 
foreigners in France the Revolution meant little more than business as usual. The seasonal 
migration of the Savoyards continued and even intensified owing to the economic crisis 
which had caused so much misery in 1789. The fear caused by rumours of hordes of 
"'AP, xxi, 323 - 324,327,330,334. 158AP, xxi, 324. 
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foreign vagrants was nothing new, but the complaints were sometimes expressed in terms 
of exclusion. On 15 April 1790, the cur6 of Chaillot led a deputation from the commune 
of Paris to the National Assembly, complaining about the number of beggars teeming in 
the capital, including'une multitude des mendiants 6trangers enhardis par leur nombre'. 
The curate asked that the National Assembly expel all foreign beggars from the country 
for good measure, on the grounds that it was not for the city to bear the cost of their 
upkeep. The president agreed. While he expressed sympathy for the beggars, saying that 
'une bienfaisance 6clair6e en est le seul rem6de', he agreed that French charitable resources 
should be applied only to French indigents. "" No measures were taken, but the case 
shows that the cosmopolitanism of the Constituent Assembly was limited in its application 
to those who could contribute something to the economic or political well-being of the 
state. In these attitudes, the revolutionaries had much in common with their predecessors 
in the Ancien R6gime. 
vi 
Foreign enthusiasts saw in the French Revolution an event for all mankind, from which 
to draw inspiration, from which to learn and in which all people, regardless of nationality, 
were able to participate. The revolutionaries themselves did little to discourage this 
impression, partly because they sincerely believed it themselves and also because they 
were encouraged by the flattery of their admirers. As politicians, however, the 
revolutionaries were faced with the reality of the financial crisis, the diplomatic 
uncertainty in their relations with foreign powers and the breakdown of French 
institutions. In trying to resolve these problems, the revolutionaries had to take hard, 
political facts into consideration, which often meant shelving or compromising their 
principles. Sometimes, this meant not applying the abolition of privilege to foreigners, as 
it did in the reform of the army and the clergy. On other occasions, it meant reining in 
their cosmopolitan impulses, as it did in their dealings with foreign patriots. Ultimately, 
every decision taken by the Constituent over the status of foreigners was dictated by a 
pragmatic weighing of the diplomatic, financial, political and economic interests of France. 
Their decisions may have been couched in the cosmopolitan terms of natural rights or in 
the nationalising, exclusive terms of an order based on citizenship, but beneath the 
"'AP, xiii, 67 - 68, 
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rhetoric there was always a careful calculation of what the circumstances implied for 
French needs. 
This is not to suggest that the revolutionaries were insincere in their expressions of 
cosmopolitanism. The enthusiasm when they abolished the droit d'aubaine seems genuine 
enough. But they were also patriots, which meant putting the interests of the nation as a 
whole above those of individuals and groups. An egalitarian civic order implied the 
levelling of all privileges - including those of foreigners. The apparent conflict between 
the desire to welcome foreigners to France, to allow them to contribute to and participate 
in the life of the nation on one hand, and the desire to abolish their privileges on the other 
was resolved by the same careful balancing of the practical factors involved. In general, 
the revolutionaries seem to have been able to strike a satisfactory balance between 
conflicting interests. Although there were variations, the balance reached was one 
whereby foreigners could serve in the army and the clergy, they could fish in French 
waters, run banks and manufactures, provided they played by the new rules and accepted 
the new order. Occasionally, diplomatic, political or economic considerations led the 
revolutionaries to reserve special treatment for certain categories of foreigners. The 
Swiss regiments remained as they were, even after other foreign regiments were ordered 
to take French pay and regulations. The foreign clergy kept all their religious houses even 
though French contemplative orders were abolished. Such exceptions did not appear as 
inconsistencies, as the revolutionaries did not have any general formula to apply to all 
foreigners in France. In some cases, the revolutionaries were often driven by 
circumstances to follow the implications of their ideology through, as in the case of the 
abolition of distinct foreign regiments (except for the Swiss) in July 179 1. The balance 
which emerged in each specific case evolved from a weighing of diplomatic, economic, 
political and financial considerations. 
If cosmopolitan idealism played a very small part in the decision-making of the 
revolutionaries, then any retreat from such ideas would have relatively little impact on the 
conditions of foreigners in France. More important was the balance of factors which 
made it possible for the French to welcome or to tolerate certain types of foreigners in 
their midst. During war and civil strife, the conditions by which foreigners were allowed 
to contribute to the life of the Revolution became more exacting as political loyalty to the 
new order was at a premium. Under the Constituent Assembly, there was no political 
orthodoxy except a willingness to accept the reforms and to live under the law. 
Circumstances were such in the period 1789 - 1791 that most foreigners found ample 
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scope for their activities within the conditions laid down by the reforms of the Revolution. 
It was only in the wake of the Champ de Mars massacre that the net of political orthodoxy 
was pulled in tighter and a number of foreigners found themselves outside it. Although 
the reaction was brief, it was a taste of what was to come during the Terror. It had little 
to do with any retreat from cosmopolitanism, but the rules as to what was legitimate 
behaviour became more restrictive. Whenever political orthodoxy became more 
exclusive, it became easier for foreigners in pursuit of their own special needs and 
aspirations to fall foul of the revolutionaries. 
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Chapter Four. Foreigners, War and the coming of the Republic, October 1791 - 
March 1793. 
The period between the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the beginning of 
the series of defeats in March 1793 was a time of transition for the conditions of 
foreigners living in France. The frictions between the political needs of the revolutionaries 
and the aspirations of the foreigners began to heat up in a bellicose atmosphere which was 
sometimes characterised by fear or even panic. These rapidly changing circumstances 
ensured that the relatively broad net of political orthodoxy familiar under the Constituent 
would begin to shrink. Although there was still room for dissent within that net, it was 
becoming easier to appear as an enemy to the Revolution. This was especially true of 
foreigners. Those who retained any special privileges under the Constituent, such as the 
Swiss regiments and the foreign clergy, looked increasingly like survivals from the Ancien 
Regime, and therefore suspect. On the other hand, the revolutionaries abandoned the 
caution and political pragmatism of the Constituent and loudly proclaimed their support 
for foreign patriots, as allies in the war against European 'despotism'. As the overriding 
concerns of the revolutionaries no longer entailed the retention of peaceful diplomatic 
relations with other powers, so new factors emerged which dictated their policies towards 
foreigners. The political attitudes of foreigners and the role they played in French society 
became the most important factors in determining their fate. 
Despite the war fever which broke out in the wake of the flight to Varennes, the 
general conditions in which foreigners lived changed little until the actual outbreak of war 
and, more importantly, the second wave of defeats early in 1793. Until then and even 
afterwards it was hoped that foreigners with aspirations similar to those of the 
revolutionaries would associate themselves with the French struggle. This attitude can be 
seen in the revolutionaries' approach to the notion of citizenship, naturalisation and the 
political rights of foreigners. The underlying concern of the revolutionaries was not 
nationality on its own, but rather an adherence to the principles of the ýývolution, 
particularly a, #er the overthrow of the monarchy. Indeed, there were some suggestions 
that those foreigners who advanced the cause of 'humpity' were thereby French citizens. 
While the first military defeats in the summer of 1792 led the revolutionaries to impose 
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restrictions on the movement of foreigners through passports, it was only when the 
international situation of the French Republic deteriorated by March 1791 that the 
revolutionaries seriously considered concerted measures of surveillance. 
French citizenship was not only to remain open to all foreigners who fulfilled the 
conditions laid down by the Constitution of 1791, but it was also a propaganda tool. This 
was particularly true during the war when, denied the easy victory which they had been 
led to expect, the revolutionaries took solace in demonstrating that the French cause was 
that of all humanity. Empowered by the Constitution to naturalise any foreigner it saw fit, 
on 8 June 1792 the Legislative Assembly granted French citizenship to the son of Joseph 
Priestley, William, in recognition of his father's sacrifices in the name of liberty. ' 
A sense of diplomatic isolation after the overthrow of the monarchy led the 
revolutionaries to seek a further morale-boosting endorsement of their actions by adopting 
foreign thinkers and radicals as French citizens. The acceptance of the honour by such 
luminaries, it was hoped, would provide proof that some of the most enlightened figures 
not only associated with France's struggle, but also accepted the Republic. In this sense, 
the decree of 26 August 1792, which naturalised eighteen prominent publicists, 
politicians, reformers and radicals, ' was both an expression of the universalist principles of 
the rights of man and a nationalist statement of France as the fountainhead of those 
principles. Chabot neatly combined this sense of the universality of the French people 
when he described Joseph Priestley ascet homme cosmopolite etpar cons9quent 
Frangaie. This implied that the 'family of free men! (to use Guadet's phrase) was French in 
spirit and would soon be in fact. Nationality was not a matter of birth or culture, but a 
state of mind. On the other hand, such a proposal had its risks, as Lasource pointed out: 
if acceptance of French citizenship could be interpreted as an endorsement of the 
Revolution, then how would a refusal be interpreted? To give the title of French citizen 
to those who had not asked for it was to run the risk of humiliation in the case of a 
refusal. ' In the event, none of those named actually turned down the offer, " although 
some, such as Wilberforce, never bothered to reply. The revolutionaries were unfortunate 
'Mathiez, La Nvolution et les &rangers, 73 - 74. 
'Those honoured with French citizenship were Joseph Priestley, Thomas Paine, Jeremy 
Bentham, William Wilberforce, Thomas Clarkson, James Mackintosh, David Williams, N. 
Gorani, Anacharsis Cloots, Cornelius Pauw, Joachim-Heinrich Campe, N. Pestalozzi, 
George Washington, John Hamilton, James Madison, H. Klopstock and Thaddeus 
Kosciusko. The Alsatian deputy RiN had Schiller added to the list (AP, xlix, 10). 
3AP, x1viii, 689 - 691. 'Mathiez, La Nvolution et les &rangers, 77. 
191 
enough, however, to have their measure upstaged by the September massacres less than a 
week later. Consequently, some of those who accepted French citizenship, like Joseph 
Priestley, took the opportunity to condemn the atrocities as an aberration, while endorsing 
the Revolution and the Republic in general. ' 
The collapse of the constitutional monarchy raised the question as to whether or not 
the usual provisions for naturalisation. in the Constitution of 1791 still applied. Petitions 
for French citizenship were forwarded to the Conventiods comil& de Mgislation et de 
flodah1g. On 8 November 1792, the suggestion that these requests be shelved until a new 
constitution was drawn up was rejected by the committees on the grounds that 'il Etoit 
politique de ne pas Refuser d'admettre dans n6tre soci6t6, des Etrangers, amis de la libert6 
qui Desiroient en Devenir Membres. 
When the new constitution was finally discussed, the revolutionaries' own militant 
cosmopolitanism, as well as the extension of the suffrage to almost all adult males, 
encouraged a lowering of the formal barriers to naturalisation. The Girondin Constitution 
of 15 - 16 February 1793 brought down from five years to one the residence requirement 
for naturalisation. 1 As before, the process of naturalisation itself implied an acceptance of 
the new regime and the duties which it might impose. This contract had a new urgency, 
because the overthrow and execution of Louis XVI had brought both domestic and 
international opinion to question the legitimacy of the Revolution as never before. To 
accept French citizenship meant an implicit acceptance of the new Republic, symbolised 
by the civic oath. The radicalisation of the Revolution did not exclude foreigners on the 
basis of their nationality, but brought some foreigners to exclude themselves because they 
refused to accept the new order. 
Naturalisation in France remained assimilationist, but limited by the narrowing 
boundaries of political orthodoxy. The inclusive definition of French citizenship is 
illustrated by the elections to the Convention of the newly-naturalised citizens, Thomas 
Paine and Anacharsis Cloots. Priestley, also elected, turned down his seat in the 
Convention on the grounds that both his knowledge of French and of local circumstances 
was limited. ' On the other hand, the exclusive tendencies of political orthodoxy are 
'Moniteur, 30 September 1792. 
6AN, D/III/368 - 370 CExtrait du Procýs-Verbal de la S6ance du Comit6 de Ugislation 
Civile et Criminelte et de F6odalit6 de la Convention Ntle du jeudi huit novernbre 1792'). 
'Portemer, VEtranger dans le Droit de la R6volution frangaise', 544. 
sMoniteur, 30 September 1792. 
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demonstrated by the fact that all three foreigners were elected on the basis of their 
revolutionary or radical notoriety. 
Even more than their general adherence to revolutionary principles, Priestley, Paine 
and Cloots arguably owed their election to their connections with the Brissotins. While 
Cloots soon attacked them in his writings, his advocacy of war had brought him into an 
alliance with them in late 1791 and early 1792. Paine, meanwhile, had long been 
associated with Brissot and Condorcet. Priestley was a scientific colleague and 
correspondent of the latter and also tended towards the Brissotin side. Significantly, 
Priestley's candidature for Paris was vociferously and successfully opposed by Marat and 
popular militants. " He was eventually elected by the Puy-de-Dame. That elections of 
foreigners with honorary French citizenship may have been a partisan move by the 
Brissotins is suggested by the experience of David Williams, who was on friendly terms 
with Brissot and Ntion. On being naturalised, he was approached by a Brissotin agent in 
London prior to the nomination of candidates for the Convention. They discussed' the 
consequences of my being nominated and elected ... 
if I checked the rapidity of the 
revolution or commenced hostilities on the Jacobin Club. ' As it was, Williams refused to 
stand because he felt he had little knowledge of French affairs. " The election of 
foreigners may have been intended to increase the prestige of the Brissotins by 
demonstrating that they were the group endorsed by the greatest libertarian minds in 
Europe. By implication, they were also the group most able to lead the Republic to 
victory in the crusade for universal liberty. 
'Cosmopolitanism! in the old sense, of fitting chameleon-like into 61ite society across 
Europe, was, however, becoming increasingly unacceptable. Lally-Tollendal's claims to 
Irish and French'dual nationality' was rebuffed by the Legislative Assembly on 22 August 
1792. None the less, there was a political side to the refusal to recognise him as a foreign 
subject, because of his liaisons with'des personnes trop farneuses dans notre R6volutiorf. " 
The revolutionaries, however, had no objection to cosmopolites such as Paine travelling 
the world as a British subject, or as an American or French citizen, provided that they 
served the cause of the French Revolution. When the Legislative granted the foreign 
radicals and reformers French citizenship, they assumed that acceptance meant a 
'Coquard, 0., 'Le Paris de Marat', Vovelle, M. (ed. ), Paris et la R9volution (Paris: 
Publications de la Sorbonne, 1989), 179. 
"Williams, D. (ed. France, P. ), Incidents in my Own Life which have been thought of 
some importance (Brighton: University of Sussex Library, 1980), 26 - 27. 
"AP, x1viii, 616. 
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commitment to France and to the Revolution, while in the case of Lally-Tollendal an 
individual who had exercised full political rights in France now claimed to be a foreigner. 
For a Frenchman to claim foreign nationality implied a rejection of the new order. For a 
foreigner to request French nationality was an endorsement of it, particularly if the 
foreigner then used his acquired political rights in the service of the nation. 
The naturalised Dutch Patriot refugee Jan-Antonie Daverhoult sat in the Legislative 
Assembly. " The Genevan Etienne Clavi&e managed to secure his political rise by 
obtaining French nationality. While he failed to get elected to the Legislative Assembly 
except as a substitute, between 10 March and 13 June 1792 he served in the Brissotin 
government as finance minister. " These people, although legally French, could not be 
expected to shed all their concerns for their mother countries. Both Clavi6re and Lebrun, 
a French citizen who had participated in the Li6geois revolution, associated with the 
Brissotins because their policies seemed the most likely to achieve political change in 
Geneva and Liýge. In May 1792, Daverhoult joined the Fayettists in the Legislative, " 
because of the possibility that Lafayette would be a most useful ally in any'liberation' of 
the United Provinces. 
In practice, even non-naturalised foreigners could play a part in French politics. On 21 
August 1792, John Moore was ushered into the H6tel de Ville in Paris by a patrol of 
National Guards, one of whom wasEnglish'. 11 Doppet, the exile from Savoy, was briefly 
employed as a secretary by Aubert de Bayet, deputy to the Legislative for the Is6re. In 
Paris, he joined the National Guard, the Jacobins and the Cordeliers. ", From Bordeaux 
Karl Reinhard accompanied his fiiends Vergniaud and Ducos when they took their seats in 
the Legislative Assembly. He joined the Jacobin club and was secretary to the French 
embassy in London until the outbreak of war with Britain, when he was transferred to 
Naples. " The French sometimes used foreigners, or people with foreign background, on 
diplomatic missions because of their local connections. It was for this reason that in early 
March 1792 Talleyrand specifically requested the Genevan Duroveray for his mission to 
ensure British neutrality in the coming war. " When the French sought to avoid a final 
"Rosendaal, J., 'Qui 6tait Utre supr6me pour les r6fugies bataves? ', Annales Historiques 
de la Rivolutionftanqaise, Ixi (1989), 20 1. 
"B 6n6truy, LA telier de Mirabeau, 3 92,415 - 416,419. "Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 15 1. 
"Moore, A Journal during a Residence in France, i, 129. 
"Doppet, Mýmoires Politiques et Militaires, 23,3 4. 
"Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution, 3 28,3 3 0. 
'Wnkruy, LAtelier de Mirabeau, 406. 
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breach with Britain after the execution of Louis XVI, David Williams was sent over the 
Channel, although by the time he arrived in London, it was too late. " Foreigners could 
still find outlets for their political energies and could therefore still exercise influence in 
revolutionary politics. " The revolutionaries accepted these foreignere efforts on behalf of 
their own countries provided they coincided with French interests and for as long as they 
were ideologically committed to the Revolution. 
A measure of the continuing desire to assimilate foreigners in French life was a further 
reform in French civil law at the very moment when the Republic was plunging into its 
first major military crisis. The contrainte par corps for debts was abolished, without any 
specific mention of foreigners, on 9 March 1793. The reasons behind the abolition of 
imprisonment for debt are unclear, although Danton, who proposed the decree, described 
it as Ia destruction de la tyrannie, de la richesse sur la mis6re. On contracting debts, no 
one should have to give their person as collateral. " 
This was the only permanent legal reform affecting foreigners in this period. The 
imminence of war and then the conflict itself, ensured that the year and a half after the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly would be characterised instead by measures 
which were intended as temporary expedients. On 31 January 1792 the Legislative 
reintroduced passports for those crossing the frontiers. While passports were nothing 
new for foreigners travelling within and leaving France, they were now needed to enter 
the country. Deputies of the left stressed the dangers of indiscriminately allowing 
foreigners to enter France, while others argued that passports represented an assault on 
individual liberty. 22 Besides this measure, however, few precautions were taken against 
the possibility that some foreigners might genuinely attempt to subvert the Revolution. ' 
"Williams, D., Incidents in my Own Life, 29 - 30. 
"Mathiez noted his disapproval of this openess on the part of the Revolution: 'Confiante 
dans la puissance irr6sistible de ses doctrines, elle avait regardd comme des fr&es les 
6trangers qui les professaient et Ntat de guerre ne Vavait pas fait changer d'avis. ' (La 
R9volution et les etrangers, 8 1). 
" AP, lx, 13 - 14; Portemer, VEtranger dans le Droit de la R6volution frangaise', 549. 
'Mathiez, La Nvolution et les itrangers, 72. Mathiez found the measure'fort anodine, 
but to eighteenth-century minds the idea of needing a passport to cross international 
boundaries, if not unfamiliar, was still an anathema. If the eighteenth century threw up 
plenty of obstacles to the movement of goods, it was less obstructive to the movement of 
people. 
"Albert Mathiez wrote disapprovingly that 'les 6trangers iYont jamais 6t6 plus choy6s, plus 
exalt6s qu'i ce moment de notre histoire &i nous engagions un combat i mort contre leurs 
patries d'origine. 1 (La Nvolution et les etrangers, 72). 
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None the less, the ominous signs were emerging. When on 4 July 1792 the death 
penalty was proposed for those who woretoute cocarde, autre que celle de trois 
couleurs', only foreign ambassadors were made exempt. Discussing the patrie en danger 
decree, the revolutionaries were in no mood to respect the individual rights of foreigners. 
When a deputy asked that a foreigner who arrived in France wearing the cockade of his 
own country be spared, he was greeted by murmurs on the left. " 
Circumstances soon drove the revolutionaries to impose more restrictions on 
foreigners' freedom of movement. The day after the overthrow of the monarchy, all 
people were forbidden to leave Paris without a passport, and these could only be obtained 
with a certificat de civisme from the surveillance committees. In the fraught atmosphere 
which followed thejourn& of 10 August, it was clear that such passports were hard to 
come by. Gouverneur Morris was bombarded with panicked requests for the precious 
documents from people of all nationalities. John Moore recognised on 21 August that: 'it 
is difficult at this time to obtain passports: they have been refused to many strangers'. The 
predicament of British subjects was more difficult because Lord Gower had been recalled 
by London in response to the overthrow of the monarchy. While Pition, the mayor of 
Paris, refused to issue Moore and Lauderdale with passports on the grounds that such a 
refusal was temporary and for their own safety, it was Moore's own letter of introduction 
from Duroveray to Clavi6re which secured them. ' 
On 23 August, the Assembly restricted the issue of passports by the foreign ministry to 
foreign diplomatic personnel. This represented the greatest restriction on the movement 
of foreigners since the beginning of the Revolution. While it was mainly aimed at ' 
preventing emigration from France, the deputies were under no illusions that it would also 
restrict the movement of foreigners. When Guyton-Moreau of the comW diplomatique 
objected that 'vous ne pouvez pas sans injustice retenir des 6trangers pour partager les 
dangers d'une patrie qui dest pas la leur', he provoked widespread murmurs. Thuriot 
rejoined by insisting that the refusal of passports was a necessary, but temporary 
expedient: 'cet 6tat ne peut pas durer assez longtemps pour devenir i Ugard des 6trangers 
un itat doppression. 126 If it is possible to trace the mentality and rhetoric of the Terror to 
before 1793, the revolutionaries' own familiarity with concepts such as droit des gens and 
their ideals of individual liberty exerted a force in the opposite direction. Foreigners still 
24", XIVi, 116. 
"Morris, A Diary of the French Revolution, ii, 490; Moore, A Journal during a 
Residence in France, i, 127 - 13 7. 
26AP, x1viii, 661 - 662. 196 
succeeded in procuring passports despite the legislation. Heinrich Meister, the Swiss 
tutor and writer, understandably feared for his safety after the massacre of his compatriots 
on 10 August. After sweating for a few weeks, it was as news of the September 
massacres was spreading around Paris that he decided to flee. There were still wide 
loopholes which the law of 23 August left open, as Meister managed to persuade the 
officials of the Commune to issue him passport. " If the law had forbidden the issue of 
passports by the foreign ministry, it did not explicitly rescind the authority of the 
Commune to do so. 
Despite the loopholes and the evident reluctance of some revolutionaries to apply 
nothing more than the law as it stood, it was becoming clear that hostile attitudes towards 
foreigners were running ahead of legislation, which was evolving piecemeal, Foreigners 
were merely being subjected to the same laws on passports and mobility as French 
citizens. None the less, the structures of surveillance and control associated with the 
Terror were beginning to take a tentative, haphazard shape. From II August, Parisian 
sections had elected comitis de surveillance, whose duties included hearing reports on 
suspect individuals and foreigners. From 19 September, foreigners arriving in Paris were 
required to declare themselves at the local section. " 
These measures were however regarded as temporary. Like the proclamation of the 
'Patrie en Danger' itself, they were to remain in force only during the crisis. The 
exchanges between P6tion and Moore and Guyton-Moreau's reluctance suggests that 
some revolutionaries, immersed in their legal and intellectual inheritance from the 
eighteenth-century, were embarrassed by the restrictions. Although foreigners were being 
regarded with increasing suspicion, as befits the period known as the'First Terroe, there 
was not, as yet, any general legal measure taken against them. 
Even with the obvious reluctance of the Belgians and the Rhinelanders to accept the 
French version of liberty after the victories of Valmy and Jernappes, the revolutionaries 
did not single out foreigners for any special repressive measures. In fact, when the 
Convention declared war on Britain and the United Provinces on I February 1793, the 
issue of how droil des gens related to the treatment of enemy subjects was raised. Fabre 
Aglantine secured considerable support for a proclamation which would have placed 
British and Dutch subjects in France 'sous la protection de la loi'. While this measure was 
"Meister, H. (ed. Usteri, P. & Ritter, E. ), Souvenirs de Mon Dernier Voyage d Paris 
(1795) (Paris, 1910), 209 - 212. 'Portemer, UEtranger dans le Droit de la R6volution franqaise', 546. 
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not voted, the Convention did name a commission, which included Thomas Paine, to draw 
up an address to the British people and dismissed a further call, by Marat, to prohibit all 
foreigners from staying in maritime towns. '9 
Further measures against foreigners were not, however, long in coming. On 26 
February the Convention ordered all landlords, hoteliers, and hosts to appear before their 
local section or commune and declare within twenty-four hours, under pain of three 
months' imprisonment, any foreigners and strangers who were staying in their 
accommodation. Once those declarations were made, they were to be posted up at the 
door of the local section or municipality, with an invitation to all citizens to denounce any 
omissions or mistakes on the lists. " The immediate spark for this decree was a particular 
domestic crisis, in which food riots swept the capital the day before. None the less, the 
xenophobic manner in which the unrest was interpreted can only be explained by the war, 
in which the Revolution was once more facing a military crisis. The explanation offered 
for the disturbances was therefore not simply economic grievance, but agitation by 
foreigners. " The law of 26 February was a knee-jerk response to a domestic crisis behind 
which, in the midst of defeat on almost all fronts, the revolutionaries saw the machinations 
of foreign agents. Rumours of foreign complicity led to more intense surveillance of 
foreigners. 
The pattern of 25 - 26 February was almost repeated when a crowd smashed the 
Girondin presses at the instigation of the Cordeliers and H6bert on 10 March. Lasource 
declared that behind this violence lay'les agents de Pitt, de Guillaume ou de Frangois: ... 
les flayards de la Savoie, de Mayence et de la Belgique qui affluent dans Paris oa ils ne 
sont jet6s pour conspirer'. " Three days later, the Montagnard Duquesnoy seemed to 
agree with the Girondin Lasource, speaking of a comitj dinsurrection in Paris led by 
foreign agents. His proposal that foreigners be ordered to leave Paris in twenty-four 
hours, unless they were vouched for by'deux bons citoyens', still went too far for the 
Convention, even though he presented it as a measure of reprisal for the way French 
citizens were treated by enemy governments. Prieur de la Marne reminded his colleagues 
that the Alien Act was one of France's official motives for declaring war on the king of 
Britain in the first place. He insisted that those who loved liberty'ont dfi se rendre au sein 
de la France pour jouir de son heureuse r6volution. ' The Convention's reluctance to pass 
29Ap, lViii, 120 - 122. 30Ap, lix, 283 - 284. 
31 Mathiez, La Nvolution et les 9trangers, 122. 
31 Quoted in Mathiez, La Rivolution et les 9trangers, 123. 
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a blanket law against foreigners implies that it did not wish to follow the traditional path 
of the droit de reprisailles, which paid no regard to the universal rights of man. In fact, 
not to implement such measures might be a propaganda coup, showing France to be a true 
land of liberty, Prieur and most of his colleagues in the Convention were not so 
concerned with the surveillance of foreigners as with vigilance against 'ces hommes qu'il 
est utile de mettre sous les yeux de leurs concitoyens'- French and foreign alike. The 
manichean struggle between the Republic and despotism still cut across lines of 
nationality. " 
None the less, for as long as the war exerted its weight on the economic crisis and the 
political opposition it caused, so xenophobia would continue to rear its ugly head. On 18 
March Bar&e appeared before the Convention on behalf of the Committee of Public 
Safety and proposed that the Republic expel 'ces hommes sans aveu qui ne vivent que de 
Vor 6tranger, qui ont des relations avec nos ennemis, qui alimentent les troubles et les 
conjurations, alors Paris sera tranquille'. Bar6re's proposal was greeted enthusiastically 
and the Convention adopted the proposal that 'les 6trangers, sans aveu, seront chass6s des 
terres de la R6pubfique. "' In fact, the revolutionaries may have recognised specific 
individuals in Bar6re's description. The Belgian financier Proli and the Spanish financial 
speculator Andr6s Maria de Guzman did frequent the haunt of the militant sectional 
leaders in Paris, the caf6 Corazza, and both men were involved in radical politics. " The 
expulsion of such people, it was hoped, would weaken the militant Parisian movement. 
This law was not yet a general measure aimed at all foreigners, but only those 'sans aveu', 
who could not satisfactorily explain their purpose in France. 
None the less, the identification of foreigners 'sans aveu' required discriminatory 
surveillance against foreigners in general. Such surveillance, when it came, legitimised 
xenophobia by giving it an official channel. It made all foreigners legal targets of 
suspicion and denunciation. The implications of this logic were not lost when, the next 
day, the Convention discussed the Vend6e uprising. Cambon warned of the dangers of 
allowing France's external enemies to correspond with those in the interior and demanded 
that 'tous les 6trangers soient tenus de sortir du territoire de la R6publique'. He claimed 
the old droit de repr&ailles against enemy powers which punished French citizens 
because only six days previously the Convention had heard a report on the expulsion from 
33Ap, Ix, 222 - 223. 34A, p, Ix, 294. 
3'Mathiez, La Nvolution et les eirangers, 105,111,123. 
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Spain of French citizens. Cambon! s motion therefore drew vocal support but while the 
Convention agreed in broad terms that something had to be done with potentially hostile 
foreigners, it did not go as far as expel them all. Lasource and Boyer-Fonfr6de argued 
that there were plenty of foreigners who were useful to the Republic and took up Prieur 
de la Marne's notion that it would be wrong for the Republic to imitate its enemies. 
Boyer-Fonfr6de proposed that, instead of expulsion, surveillance committees be 
established to watch over foreigners. 36 
Two days later, the decree 'sur les 6trangers' gave legal recognition to the comil& de 
surveillance. They were charged with receiving the declarations of all foreigners within 
their jurisdiction, both residents and new arrivals, who would register within eight days. 
Those who failed to do so would be immediately expelled from the commune and from 
France within eight days. Significantly, these rules applied to all foreigners, not just those 
from countries at war with France. Those from enemy countries also had to prove either 
that they had a useful occupation or property in France, or that they had 'sentiments 
civiques' confirmed by six citizens. Those who failed to show such commitment were to 
be expelled. Foreigners who passed the test were granted 'un certificat d'autorisation de 
r6sidence'. In Paris, from 26 March, such cartes de sfiretý, as they were also called, were 
to be red for foreigners and white for French citizens. A foreigner who received such a 
certificate only on the basis of his civisme supported by six citizens was also bound to 
furnish a deposit of half his presumed wealth. The most draconian clause stemmed from 
the 'lessons' of 25 February and 10 March: 'tout itranger saisi dans une 6meute, ou qui 
serait convaincu de Vavoir provoquee ou entretenue, par voie d'argent ou de conseil, sera 
puni de mort'. ` 
It must be said of the comit9s de surveillance that all French citizens aged eighteen or 
over were also meant to make declarations similar to those of foreigners. "' The law, in 
short, may have reserved its harshest measures for enemy subjects, but its basic provisions 
applied equally to French citizens. As onerous and as sinister as the procedure must have 
been for people almost unaccustomed to such bureaucracy, it fell far short of the general 
expulsion committed by the Spanish government and proposed by Carnbon. On the whole 
the revolutionaries still believed that some, if not most, foreigners were innocent and even 
useful to the Republic. While they would watch enemy subjects, they were still unwilling 
`AP, Ix, 318 - 319, Mathiez, La Rivolution et les itrangers, 124. 37Ap, Ix, 389 - 390; Mathiez, La Rivolution et les Otrangers, 126. 
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to punish with expulsion or arrest those who had committed no obvious crime. 
Furthermore, they still saw both practical and propaganda value in retaining the services 
of those whom they saw as useful or as their ideological kindred. 
The xenophobia of some revolutionaries began to reach very shrill notes, apparently 
because of the sluggishness with which the law was enforced. On 27 March Duquesnoy 
urged the Convention to apply it quickly, crying 'tous les j ours il arrive des 6trangers a 
Paris' and that he himself had narrowly missed assassination. " Despite such outbursts, 
those foreigners who were actually arrested had long been suspected of links either with 
the recent Paris riots, or with the counter-revolution. The Commune put seals on the 
papers of certain foreigners and even arrested those who were deemed to be highly 
suspect, including Guzman and the Italian poet, Alfieri. " Grace Dalrymple Elliott was 
also arrested at her home in the dead of night. Her correspondence included a letter 
addressed to Charles James Fox. This was enough to incriminate her as a courier for 
enemy correspondence. None the less, the section visited her not simply because she was 
British, but because she had long been suspected of 'correspondence with the enemies of 
the Republic' and because of her ties with d'Orl6ans. She was released within a few days 
after the Fox letter was found to be full of praise and admiration for the French nation. "' 
The cases of Guzman, Alfieri and Elliott suggest it was not enough at this stage simply 
to be foreign to be harassed by the authorities. One had to have come to the attention of 
the authorities for suspicious activities or views, which was the whole purpose of the 
comilis de surveillance. Guzman was believed to have been behind the disturbances of 
February and March. Alfieri's poetic sympathies were increasingly with the counter- 
revolution (and the experience of arrest would more than confirm him in these views). 
Elliott was suspected because of her relations with d'Orleans. " While such treatment did 
not say much for the revolutionaries' tolerance of opposition, the authorities did release 
the prisoners once they were reassured that they posed no great threat. Moreover, the 
vast majority of foreigners remained at liberty. 
The surveillance and arrests of foreigners were due as much to a desire to weaken the 
domestic opposition as it was a product of xenophobia. While xenophobia was 
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strengthened by military defeat, it was the unrest in the interior of France which provoked 
its expression in legislation, because foreigners within the frontiers posed, it was thought, 
a more immediate threat than the defeats beyond them. The very fact that suspicion was 
institutionalised in the form of comiNs de surveillance and cartes de sfiretg was ominous 
for both French and foreigners alike. In this bureaucratisation of xenophobia it is possible 
to discern the first negative, discriminatory legislation against foreigners. Enemy subjects 
were subject to additional clauses in the law of 21 March, while foreigners carried a 
different colour of identity card from French citizens. Militant, revolutionary 
cosmopolitanism had been irretrievably damaged by the combination of defeat and civil 
unrest, and hostility to foreigners intensified in this period, but some revolutionaries did 
not relinquish the vision of a manichean struggle which cut across nationalities. 
While foreigners were singled out for particular attention by the revolutionaries in their 
rhetoric and their decrees, in practice the authorities were reluctant to do much more than 
interrogate and, if necessary, detain for a few days at the most. What mattered more, 
therefore, than nationality in the revolutionaries' approach to foreigners were their 
political loyalties. It was the radicalisation of revolutionary politics which excluded 
foreigners from France, as much as the response to military defeat. The foundation of the 
Republic made both the Revolution less acceptable to many foreigners and the activities of 
certain foreigners less acceptable to the revolutionaries. 
The extent to which foreigners were affected by changes in revolutionary politics 
depended to a great degree on their specific role in French life. An ability to contribute to 
the war effort through military service, economic activity or propaganda might have 
helped, but very often the two factors of political orthodoxy and usefulness were not 
mutually inclusive. The revolutionaries were sometimes faced with the awkward choice 
of either keeping in France those foreigners who provided useful services, but whose 
political commitment was suspect, or of expelling them, and then lose their skills. 
ii 
Among no other group of foreigners was this dilemma more pressing than with foreign 
soldiers in France. This period saw the demise of the Swiss infantry, but the rise of new 
foreign units, the legions. The difference was that the Swiss regiments were survivals of 
the Ancien R6gime whose commitment to the Revolution was suspect, while the foreign 
legions were made up of foreigners who were, in theory, ideologically committed to the 
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Revolution. The fall of the former and the rise of latter show that the revolutionaries, 
albeit with some misgivings, were still willing to accept foreigners within a branch of the 
French state, but that conformity to a narrowing set of political values was increasingly 
important. Yet there still remained the pragmatism which had dictated the maintenance of 
foreign regiments under the Constituent. Unwilling to lose the manpower and skills of 
highly-trained and seasoned troops, the revolutionaries quietly permitted some of the 
soldiers from the disbanded foreign regiments to join the legions or French regular units. 
Even as war approached, and despite the assumption by most foreign regiments of 
French pay and regulations, relations between French civilians and foreigners in the army 
were still strained. For many civilians, the changes brought by the law of 21 July 1791 
were cosmetic: they were still aware as to who the foreign. troops were and they still 
feared their counter-revolutionary potential and their iron discipline. In fact, it is not 
altogether clear that the foreign units obeyed the decree immediately. In April 1792, the 
77th (La Marck) Infantry was in Lyon en route from Avignon to Brest when their colonel, 
described by one of his men asun aristocrate', provoked a mutiny because he had failed to 
issue the regiment with French uniforms. " That the officers of the foreign regiments 
seemed so reluctant to forsake the foreign status of their units naturally put them under 
suspicion. These popular fears were compounded by the behaviour of foreign regiments. 
In March 1792 the La Marck regiment supported the royalist 'Chiffonistes' against the 
radical Monnediere in Arles, with the blessing of both the municipality and of Narbonne. 
At Neufchatel in January 1792, seven or eight officers of the 87th (Dillon) Infantry seized 
a billiard cue from a cafd and beat the limonadier's dog. Officers and soldiers were also 
accused of damaging hotel property. "' 
It was the Swiss regiments, however, who were the most despised for their discipline, 
for the fact that they were the most exclusively foreign in membership and retained their 
separate identity from French regiments. Fights broke out between soldiers of the 
Courten regiment and French soldiers in Douai in January 1792, over allegations that the 
Swiss were counter-revolutionaries. The worst incident before the outbreak of war, 
however, involved the Ernst regiment in Marseille. Isolated within a sea of popular 
hostility since 1790, the regiment became increasingly a target of loathing in the city. By 
February 1792, when the regiment's barracks were besieged by a crowd of Marseillais, the 
"Pardiellan, P. de, Mmoires dun Vieux Deserteur. Aventures de J Steininger (Paris: 
1898), 181. 
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commander was persuaded to pull out of the city. The canton of Berne recalled the 
regiment to Switzerland on 16 March and the Ernst regiment left France on 26 May-'s 
Such an affair naturally had diplomatic repercussions in French relations with the Swiss 
cantons. The Senate of Berne protested against the shoddy treatment of the soldiers and 
the failure of the authorities to respect the treaties signed under the Ancien R6gime. " For 
their part, the revolutionaries realised that the treatment of the Swiss sorely tried the 
alliance with the cantons. The author of a memorandum to the comW diplomatique of 
the Legislative Assembly, dated 3 April 1792, feared that themalheureuse affaire'would 
lead to a break with Switzerland. With war against Austria now inevitable, such a 
situation would simply compound France's difficulties. The author urged that other Swiss 
regiments be treated with special care. "' 
The needs of diplomacy should not be overstated. The Gardes-suisses were denied 
their traditional role of guarding the king on 13 November 1791. The decree stated that 
while the regiment's regulations would otherwise be unaffected, the role of royal 
bodyguard would be taken up by a French force. Moreover, when the constitutional 
guard took up its duties on 16 March 1792, the 61ite Cent-Suisses company was made 
obsolete and was disbanded. These changes were dictated by a need to ensure that the 
king would be guarded by troops who were not bound by loyalty to him alone. None the 
less, it did contradict the capitulations of the Swiss Guards and this grievance was, 
compounded by the arrears in pay which followed the change of paymaster from the civil 
list to the war office. In January and February 1792 no pay had been forwarded to the 
Swiss, a state of affairs which Narbonne was quick to take up with the Legislative. " In a 
political atmosphere more sensitive than under the first two years of the Constituent 
Assembly, a balance between the demands of the Revolution' s internal security and of the 
approaching conflict would be harder to achieve without breaking some Ancien R6gime 
agreements. 
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The approach of war and the slave rebellion in Haiti required every ounce of military 
muscle and the more seasoned the better. Successive ministries up to August 1792 
therefore tended towards the retention of foreign units rather than their disbandment. 
They sent the former Irish regiments to the colonies which was a continuation of an 
Ancien R6gime tradition. "' The Swiss regiments, meanwhile, were deployed mostly along 
the frontiers or in major provincial towns. " The fear that foreign powers would recruit 
those mercenaries relinquished by France made the revolutionaries still more determined 
to retain their services. The author of the memorandum on the Ernst regiment warned 
that Tor de 1'espagne pourra alors toumer facilement leurs armes contre nous. "' France 
could not afflord to fritter away its military strength under the pressure of hostility to 
foreign troops. 
The possibility of war therefore encouraged the Legislative Assembly to make gestures 
to consolidate the loyalty of foreign troops as against the dubious faith of their officers. 
In the case of the Swiss regiments, however, this policy brought new sources of tension 
between France and the cantons. While the forty-one Swiss soldiers imprisoned since the 
Nancy mutiny were increasingly regarded as the victims of aristocratic oppression by the 
revolutionaries, the cantons saw them as insubordinate soldiers who had failed in their 
duty to the king and, possibly, as subversives as well. On 26 December 1791 the cantons 
refused their consent to a request by the Legislative to secure the mutineere release from 
the galleys. In March 1792 they were freed anyway. 52 The revolutionaries had swept 
aside the objections of the cantons and enforced the policy which they considered to be in 
the national interest. Revolutionary faith in the loyalty of the Chiteauvieux soldiers was 
severely misplaced: days after the disbandment of the Swiss regiments in France in 
August, the men of Chiteauvieux considered desertion to the emigrd army. " 
The outbreak of war presented a new test of loyalty to the Revolution for foreign 
troops: they had to chose to fight for or against the new regime. In some foreign units, 
the hostility of the French population ensured a cohesion between officers and the ranks 
lacking in many other units in the French army. Such solidarity meant that when their 
officers chose to emigrate, their men followed, as was the case with the 15th (Royal- 
"Scott, 'The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France', 20. 
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Allemand) Cavalry regiment and the I st (Berchdny) and 4th (Saxe) Hussars in May 1792. 
Only in the Berchdny regiment was opinion seriously divided and it took a bitter fight 
before eighty hussars followed most of the officers to join the enemy in Germany. Sixteen 
officers of the 92nd (Walsh) regiment deserted in the same month. " 
The war not only forced foreign troops to express their loyalties, but also gave new 
cause for concern for their officers. The slaughter of General Th6obald Dillon (himself of 
Irish descent) on 28 April showed that even commanders of the highest rank were not 
immune from the indiscipline of their troops. " Furthermore, the rhetoric of patriotism 
aimed at inspiring French troops to fight for the new order may also have had implications 
of exclusion for foreign regiments. It certainly strained relations between French soldiers 
and troops of the Swiss Vigier regiment in Alsace in May and June 1792. The Swiss were 
involved in brawls with their French counterparts after being baited as 'mercenaries'. " 
Such aspersions cast on the patriotism of Swiss troops had some foundation in fact. On 
28 May, the Legislative Assembly heard from the municipality of Neuilly that Swiss 
Guards barracked there had been seen sporting white cockades. " 
Despite such ominous signals, foreign troops were too good an asset to lose in 
wartime. In July, a worried French envoy to Switzerland reported that the Spanish were 
trying to raise a Swiss regiment. " As conditions for the Swiss worsened in France, so 
Spain would appear proportionately more attractive for them. None the less, the 
revolutionaries were determined to ensure the loyalty of the army during the first 
disastrous months of the war and they prescribed a new oath. Although it was no more 
radical than any of the earlier oaths, the officers of the Swiss Sonnenberg and the Castella 
regiments were worried enough to ask for guidance from their home cantons in June. In 
the event, they took the required oath on Bastille Day, as prescribed, because they had 
little choice. "' The cantons still insisted on the capitulations, while the Swiss soldiers 
could not appear treasonous in wartime. 
Some Swiss officers did not make such compromises without a fight. The next day, 
the Legislative Assembly decreed that all regular troops remain at least thirty-six and a 
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half miles from Paris. Colonel d'Affry of the Swiss Guards protested to LaJard, the 
minister of war, that his regiment ought not to be included in the order, claiming that 
according to their conditions of service a third of the regiment should remain close to the 
king. Although Lajard suggested to the Legislative that the Swiss ought to be subject to 
the decree, the Assembly demurred, perhaps thinking of further diplomatic repercussions, 
and allowed a third of the regiment to remain in the Paris area. ' The battalion which 
remained perished on 10 August, 
The Swiss insistence on old r6gime regulations and a privileged status within the 
French army, their deference to orders from the cantons and their loyalty to the king all 
jarred with the revolutionary vision of a citizen army dedicated to the national cause. 
Moreover, the French ambassador to Switzerland, Barth6lemy, suggested that although 
the capitulations were nearly due for renewal, the cantons would prefer to maintain their 
troops in the French service under the same conditions as before, rather than adjust to the 
new order. "' Such issues were merely aggravated by the more militant, egalitarian 
atmosphere of the summer of 1792. With relations between the French authorities and the 
Swiss regiments already strained, they finally snapped on 10 August. 
On that day 650 Swiss were killed., 100 wounded and in all 250 officers and men were 
eventually imprisoned in the Abbaye, La Force and the Conciergerie. A further 200 were 
killed in the carnage of September. "' The role of the Swiss Guards in defending the 
monarchy even as they were massacred sealed the fate of all Swiss regiments in France. 
Popular hostility boiled over with the claims that the Swiss had fired on the patriots after 
luring them into negotiations. That night, for example, all but one of seven Swiss 
captured by citizens on the Champs-Elysdes were shot by the orders of the committee of 
the section du Roule. The next day, the nervous municipal authorities in Neuilly were 
confronted by a mob demanding that two Swiss being held prisoner be handed over to the 
'people'. When it was decided to hold the Swiss prisoners in the Abbaye, it was promptly 
attacked by a crowd. " 
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Official treatment of the Swiss Guards, while less bloodthirsty than that of the crowd, 
was no less dictated by hostility. On 11 August, the National Assembly imprisoned the 
officers and ordered their immediate trial, along with that of their surviving men. The jury 
was chosen from delegates of the forty-eight sections, which would hardly guarantee a fair 
hearing. Major Bachmann was condemned to death and guillotined on 3 September. 
D'Affy was acquitted in October because he was at home ill on the fateful day. At the 
end of the year, he returned to Switzerland, where he died soon after on his estate. ' On 
the other hand, both the American merchant James Price and Dr. Moore witnessed on II 
August revolutionaries such as P6tion and Gorsas haranguing the crowds to prevent them 
from indulging in the slaughter of yet more Swiss victims. The imprisonment of the Swiss 
was as much for their own protection as it was to prevent their escape. The Commune 
sent National Guards to defend those Swiss held at the Feuillants. Danton personally led 
fifty Swiss from the National Assembly to the Abbaye; thefl&res, declaring that they no 
longer saw the Swiss as enemies (and perhaps trying to ease their own consciences) 
offered to carry out similar duties. " 
10 August eliminated what little confidence the revolutionaries had left in the Swiss 
regiments. All the Swiss regiments were unofficially charged with complicity in the 
sinister projects of the king and the Swiss Guards. ' Rumours of a broader conspiracy 
involving the king and the Swiss appeared to have been believed by some deputies and 
were reinforced by the 'unpatriotic' behaviour, understandable in the circumstances, of 
officers of the Salis-Samade regiment in Rouen. ' 
Despite the diplomatic ramifications, the Legislative disbanded the Swiss regiments on 
20 August. The decree simply stated that it was necessary to deal promptly with the fate 
of the Swiss regiments and that most of their capitulations had expired anyway. There 
were of course other motives behind the decision. Brissot, who presented the decree on 
behalf of the Commission of Twelve, stated that the diplomatic committee had already 
written a report on the renegotiation of the capitulations, but that 10 August had changed 
all that. French blood had been spilled by the iron of the Swiss Guards. Besides, the 
treaties with the cantons were intended as much to defend the king against the French 
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people as to ensure the defence of the nation. Clearly the loyalty of the Swiss regiments 
to the king and their cantons now weighed more heavily against them. As well-trained 
and seasoned as they may have been, they were now too much of a danger to remain in 
France. This fear made the arguments for a citizen army more compelling. Varm6e d'un 
peuple libre, ' declared Brissot, Vest lui-mEme. " 
Brissot none the less told the Assembly that he and Servan, the minister of war, were 
worried about the possible collapse of the alliance with Switzerland. " On 17 October, 
Servan wrote to general Biron, commanding the army of the Rhine, warning him to be 
very sensitive to the manner in which the Swiss regiments were allowed to return home, 
so that it could not be cited as a cause for hostility by the cantons. " Biron and other 
generals none the less had their hands tied by the decree of 20 August, which had insisted 
that Swiss returning home could only do so without arms and in detachments of no more 
than twenty men. In September Palavicini, lieutenant-colonel of the Vigier regiment, 
protested to Biron against this condition, likening it to the treatment given to criminals. 
The Swiss diet defiantly ordered their regiments to ignore the law and to return in a style 
compatible with'l'honneur NElitaire', with their arms and their colours. Lebrun replied on 
14 September, insisting that the blame for the slaughter on 10 August lay with the Swiss 
officers and so the privileges of the Swiss regiments could no longer apply. " 
The fall of the monarchy and the disbandment of their units certainly led some Swiss 
troops to rebel. A hundred Swiss Guards who had been sent to Dieppe days before 10 
August eventually enrolled in the rebel army in the Vendee under a non-comn-dssioned 
officer named Keller. " Officers of the Chiteauvieux regiment flirted with the attentions of 
the comte d'Artois, who was attempting to seduce them into joining the imigtýj army. On 
25 August the regiment crossed the frontier into the duchy of Zweibriicken, but on 3 
September the Bile government angrily ordered its subjects to return home without 
delay. " 
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Now that the capitulations were broken and the diplomatic furore was unleashed, the 
revolutionaries had more freedom for manoeuvre over the way they treated the Swiss 
troops, short of doing anything which might provoke the outright hostility of the cantons. 
In his letter to the Swiss diet, Lebrun could now explicitly place the sovereign rights and 
interests of the French nation over the privileges of the Swiss regiments. To the 
complaint that the imprisonment of the (now massacred) Swiss Guards was a breach of 
their special judicial rights, he replied curtly that 'on ne contestera jamais i une nation le 
droit d'arrestation et de jugement sur des 6trangers pr6venus de conspiration contr'elle. ' 
The diplomatic dispute did not amount to much beyond the straining of relations between 
France and the cantons. Servan, while not entirely optimistic about the outcome, believed 
that the Swiss diet was as worried about incurring French wrath as the revolutionaries 
were about the military and diplomatic consequences of the loss of the Swiss regiments. 
Such optimism proved well-founded, because in November Barth6lemy wrote of the 
failure of Spanish efforts to recruit a Swiss regiment. " 
The details of the disbandment continued to dog the French authorities in the autumn 
and the presence of hundreds of disgruntled Swiss troops in towns across France was 
naturally a cause of concern. " By the end of October all those Swiss troops who had 
chosen to return to Switzerland had done so and were eligible for French pensions. The 
loose ends, such as the return of the regimente papers and funds, were still being tied well 
into 1793. " On the other hand, the revolutionaries were reluctant to lose such good 
soldiers and were willing to retain their services, provided they could be assured of their 
loyalty to the new order. Some Swiss provided evidence of that loyalty. As early as II 
August some Swiss Guards were greeted with applause in the Legislative when they 
offered to fight on the frontiers. That same month in the Seine-Inf6rieure soldiers and 
"AN, F/7/4400 (Letter of Lebrun, 14 September 1792; 'Extrait dune lettre de Luceme, 
15 November 1792); SHAT, X930 (Letter of Servan to Biron, 17 October 1792). 
"SHAT, X930 (Letters of the provisional executive council to the department of the 
Seine-Inf6rieure and the municipality of Cuny, 17 September 1792; letter of Servan to 
Biron, 17 October 1792; letter of Servan to lieutenant-colonel of the Sonnenberg 
regiment, 12 October 1792); AN, F/7/4401 (Letter of Biron to Servan, II September 
1792; Notte present6e a messieurs les Commissaires de I'Assembl6e nationalle par le 
Regiment Suisse de Sonnenberg, et conformes au Decret qui en. ordonne le Licentiement', 
2 September 1792). 
"SHAT, X930 (dossier for 1793); Bodin, Les Suisses au Service de la France, 271. 
210 
non-commissioned officers of the Salis-Samade regiment deserted rather than return to 
Switzerland because they had'Vintention de Continuer leurs Services en France'. ` 
The decree of 20 August accordingly offered a bounty of 150 - 300 fivres to any Swiss 
soldier who joined a regular French unit. Naturally, the soldiers were required to take the 
new civic oath of 10 August. Even before the precise regulations for incorporation were 
lain down, however, Dumouriez formed compagniesfranches out of the Swiss Diesbach 
regiment. " On 12 September, the Swiss were allowed to join any of the fourteen light 
infantry battalions under the same conditions as their French counterparts. "' Sixty-seven 
Swiss enlisted with a French regiment in Strasbourg, just a fraction of the 3,000 to 4,000 
Swiss soldiers who joined the French army between 20 August and the beginning of 
October. 'o By November, Barth6lemy was already proposing the recruitment of 
'compagnies franches' in Switzerland from officers and men who were dedicated to the 
principles of the French Revolution, but no Swiss units were to be raised for French 
service until November 1798. " 
The Swiss regiments were not the only foreign units to suffer from the crisis of the 
summer and early autumn of 1792. With the fall of the monarchy, the 6th (Lauzun) 
Hussars suffered the loss of seventy hussars who followed some of their officers into 
emigration. The entire 92nd (Walsh) Infantry was arrested by a battalion of gendarmes 
after the capitulation of Verdun in September and were held until their patriotic 
credentials were verified. On 9 September, the 101st (Royal-Li6geois) regiment was 
disbanded after general Montesquiou complained of its'mauvais esprit' and 'conduit 
incivique'. The dismissal of the Royal-Li6geois brought to twelve the number of foreign 
regiments disbanded in 1792, a strength of 12,000 men in all. " 
With the additional loss through emigration, the year was not a good one in terms of 
the retention of foreign military muscle. The revolutionaries, however, offset such losses 
by allowing those who remained to join French units and, above all, by recruitment of 
French soldiers, either into the ranks of the fine army or by enrolling volunteers in separate 
"AP, x1viii, 25; SHAT, X930 (Letter of the provisional executive council to the directory 
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battalions. Although they would have preferred not to let them go, by August 1792 the 
revolutionaries could afTord to dismiss foreign regiments because what they lost in quality 
and experience could be made up for in numbers. The recruitment of large numbers of 
French citizens together with the dismissal and emigration of foreign troops diluted the 
importance of the latter. In the surviving foreign regiments such as the Irish, death, 
desertion and emigration of foreign troops further reduced their number, as they were 
replaced by French recruits. By February 1793 only 4% of the manpower in the line army 
was foreign, a substantial reduction from the 15% in 1789. "' 
The dilution of the foreign element in the regular army was enhanced by the creation of 
legions for foreign 'patriots' and deserters who sought to fight for the Revolution. The 
idea of foreign legions predated the outbreak of war. As early as December 1791 
Li6geois, Belgian and Dutch patriots made separate requests to the Legislative Assembly 
to form legions. The issue was adjourned, but the Li6geois and the Belgians began to 
organise their units anyway, with the unofficial compliance of the Brissotin ministry 
appointed in March 1792. Dumouriez, as foreign minister, released secret funds to arm 
and equip both a Li6geois legion, which was ready a mere eight days after the declaration 
of war, and a Belgian corpsftancs. Both legions, numbering 1,150 men in all, - were 
formally recognised with the decrees of 20 July providing equipment and 28 July granting 
84 half a million fivres for their expenses. A Dutch legion was also decreed on 26 July. 
Dumouriez had already released 700,000 fivres from his ministerial funds to a'cornit6 
hollandais! charged with its organisation. The decree now provided additional funds from 
the treasury to pay for its first year of recruitment, equipment and upkeep. "' The first 
Dutch legion was joined by a second seven months later, while Dumouriez was engaged in 
his doomed invasion of the Netherlands. This second 19gion batave, officially known as 
the corps de chasseurs-firailleurs nationaux bataves, was established on 5 March 1793, 
under the command of the Dutch Patriot Makketros. " 
What the three first legions had in common was, firstly, that they were initially 
recruited from those groups of political refugees who had substantial reserves of men with 
"'Scott, 7he Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution, 185; Scott, 'The 
French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France, 23. 
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military experience and who had tasted the bitterness of defeat. These groups would 
naturally be the first to respond to the crusading rhetoric aired by bellicose 
revolutionaries. Secondly, they were all initially funded by money released by Dumouriez 
when he was minister of foreign affairs, which raised doubts among some revolutionaries. 
When Dumouriez! s formation of a Batavian legion was made public on 8 July, Brissot 
expressed astonishment that the general should have raised troops without consulting the 
National Assembly. Marat explained that Dumouriez wished to become the duke of 
Brabant. " About a month later the government's agent to Belgium, Rutteau, proposed 
that the funds forwarded to the legions be investigated. " 
Despite these suspicions, the notion of foreign legions spread. The Club des Patriotes 
&rangers, organised in the first days of 1792 from both Swiss and Savoyards in Paris, 
sought to recruit their compatriots as well as Piedmontese for a Legion des Allobroges. It 
was decreed and provided with funds on I August. "' There were plenty of Savoyard 
migrant workers in Paris and Swiss soldiers who, after 10 August, found themselves 
despised and without a regiment. Ironically enough, the legion fought alongside the 
fidiris on 10 August, yet some surviving Swiss soldiers did join the unit, which left for 
Grenoble on 22 August. ' In July 1792 Anacharsis Cloots and the Saxon doctor, 
Freymuth Saiffert, mooted the idea of the ligionprussienne for German and Austrian 
patriots and deserters. They organised a steering comn-dttee which included themselves; 
Dambach, a Prussian colonel who had fought under Frederick the Great; an Austrian, 
Schwartz, and two others. "' On 12 August, Cloots petitioned the Assembly for a German 
legion, which was finally decreed on 4 September. "' 
Unlike the other legions, the Ligion gennanique did not have the same pool of 
refugees or immigrants from which to draw recruits, which meant that it reluctantly made 
up its numbers with Frenchmen. By 17 December 1792 it had 1071 men under arms, 
many of whom appeared to have been French. Nonetheless, it certainly enrolled career 
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soldiers who had served in the former 'German! regiments of the old regime, or in the 
armies of the Empire. "' 
The idea of legions of foreign patriots did have some appeal among the French 
revolutionaries in 1792. The declaration of war on 20 April included an invitation to 
foreign sympathisers to range themselves under French banners. On 27 August, Lasource 
supported Cloots' request for a German Legion, drawing parallels with the granting of 
honorary French citizenship the previous day. Just as foreign philosophers fought tyranny 
with reason, so foreign soldiers fought it with bayonets. " There were equally practical 
reasons behind the appeal for foreign patriots to join the struggle. On 8 July the war 
minister LaJard stressed Ia n6cessit6 instante d'augmenter nos forces' and the avantages'de 
faire une nouvelle lev6e aux d6pens d'une puissance 6trang6re'. These arguments were 
identical to those used by Ancien R6gime generals for raising foreign troops. This time, 
however, there would be no question of their loyalty because they had fled persecution in 
their own countries. " 
The recruitment of foreign legions raised some diplomatic problems. When Lajard 
proposed the recognition of the first Batavian legion on 8 July, Brissot poured cold water 
onto his enthusiasm. The United Provinces were still neutral and, he said in a masterful 
understatement, it would be'very impolitic'for the French to recognise the Dutch legion. ' 
None the less, the proposal was voted in its entirety by the National Assembly when it was 
re-presented on26 July. With the patrie being declared endanger only four days 
previously, the deputies were in no mood to consider the diplomatic ramifications of 
raising a Dutch legion if it could help plug the widening holes in the French army. The 
only concession to diplomatic sensibilities was in the change of name from ligion des 
bataves to the Mgionfranche jtrangýre. The consed d'administration of the legion, 
however, left no doubt as to who was intended to fill its ranks: its leaders were the Dutch 
Patriots Abbema, de Witt, de Boetzelaer, Huber, de Kock and van Hoey. ' 
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Beyond diplomatic difficulties, there was still much hostility to the recruitment of 
foreigners in the French army. Foreign legions, no matter how ideologically motivated, 
were still too reminiscent of Ancien Rdgirne foreign regiments. If diplomatic and military 
necessity had originally persuaded the revolutionaries to retain their services, it seemed 
foolish to make the eventual task of 'nationalising! the army still more difficult by 
recruiting yet more foreign units. On 21 April, Carnot opposed the recruitment of 
foreigners on these very grounds. " There was also a suspicion that foreigners would not 
be the most dedicated of recruits to the cause of the Revolution. When on 29 May 
Coustard proposed the adoption of four foreign officers who would raise a corps of 
British soldiers, Servan cautiously suggested to the Assembly that these officers be 
permitted to recruit only French citizens. " On 29 January 1793 Brdard bitterly observed 
that 'des 6migrds sont venus s'y engager; vous les avez payds, habill6s, equip6s, et ils ont 
ensuite ddsert6. '1' Attempts to forestall these problems had been made. Recruits to the 
German Legion were screened for ideological suitability. All officers had to be 'munis de 
bons repondane and were subject to approval by the minister of war, who could also 
propose people'qu'il croiroit digne de la conflance Nationale. 1101 
No doubt there was an element of national pride in the caution of Carnot, Servan and 
Br6ard. They were breathing life into the questions raised in the cahiers de doliances and 
the Constituent: could those who were not French citizens seriously be asked to defend a 
nation which was not theirs? Should non-citizens defend the patrie when they did not 
have the same stake as citizens in the national community? 
For the time being, the foreign legions were accepted as useful tools in the war of 
propaganda and as welcome additions to the hard-pressed French forces. While foreign, 
they were also the antithesis of the Ancien R6gime's foreign regiments, being in theory 
supporters of the Revolution. The problem was that the aspirations of those who formed 
the foreign legions led them to associate with particular political groups. In the shifting 
sands of revolutionary politics, such ties could be perilous. The Batavian, Belgian and 
Li6geois legions were closely associated with Dumouriez because his personal ambitions 
made him their most sympathetic protector and the one man the most likely to support 
their national claims. " Having been established with the considerable assistance of the 
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general, however, Dumouriezs desertion early in April 1793 tainted the legions with 
suspicion. Furthermore, all legions relied on the continuing faith of French politicians in 
the revolutionary potential of France's European neighbours. Once both Dumouriez and 
the 'war of propaganda' were discredited, so too the whole purpose and even the good 
faith of the legions were called into question. The Belgian and Li6geois legions 
disappeared as independent units precisely because of the apparent success of the 'crusade 
for universal liberty'. On 26 January 1793, they were subsumed into the French army in 
anticipation of the absorption of Belgium by the French Republic. 10' The others, however, 
were disbanded under a cloud of suspicion during the Terror. 
A further difficulty which the legions faced was that, although meant to be destined for 
specific nationalities, they often found that to make up numbers they had to draw on 
others, including Frenchmen. Such a mix of nationalities could cause problems. A French 
government agent claimed at the end of July 1792 that the 'aristocratic' members of the 
Belgian committee in Lille imposed'un despotisme affrewe on the Belgian legion 
barracked at Los, 'notamment contre les frangais qui sy sont enr6l6s'. 1` The German 
Legion included Dutch and Frenchmen, among whom was Augereau, who later became a 
mar&hal de France. "' On 10 December 1792, Dambach angrily wrote to Pache, saying 
that among the cavalry officers 'presque tous sont frangois, tandis que la capitulation dit 
express6ment que les officiers seront 6trangers ou de p6re 6tranger. " 
The recruitment of French officers and soldiers into the ligion germanique may have 
been the cause of internal divisions. In the spring of 1793 Saiffert claimed that French 
officers sought to seize control of the legion by encouraging insubordination in the ranks. 
He accused Marat of encouraging two French officers to denounce their comrades - 
French and German alike - as aristocrats. "' The two French officers in question told a 
different story, complaining of financial corruption in the Conseil d'administration. " 
They were not alone in bearing grievances, as the rejoinder to this accusation secured only 
thirty-one signatures, mainly of German officers, which was far from the majority of the 
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officer corps. " The dispute continued into the spring and summer of 1793, when the 
legion was disbanded. It appears, therefore, that this schism played an important part in 
the early dernise of the ligion germanique. 
The same cosmopolitan rhetoric applied to the adoption of foreign soldiers was also 
used when the revolutionaries discussed the treatment of foreign deserters and prisoners 
of war. On 4 May 1792, the National Assembly's decree on prisoners of war stressed the 
human rights of those captured and the 'principes de la justice et de Mumanit6'. Prisoners 
would live in district chefs-fieux and fortresses at least twenty miles from the frontier. 
There, they would receive the same pay as their French counterparts in the army. They 
would be entitled to take an engagement dhonneur before the municipal officers whereby 
they undertook not leave the town, 'et dans ce cas Hs auront la ville pour prison' and 
would only be submitted to roll-calls three times a day. Such prisoners Jouiront ... 
du 
droit commun des Frangaie, which meant that they could engage in any profession and 
were subject to the same laws as French citizens, including, as the decree said pointedly, 
those applied against revolt. 110 
Such relatively liberal terms had causes other than cosmopolitan ideals. First of all, 
they were intended to undermine the discipline and strength of enemy forces. Secondly, 
they were meant to show that the French fought for humane principles. The Brunswick 
manifesto provided the revolutionaries with a coup in this respect. When the dukes 
declaration had been read to the Assembly on I August, the principles behind the law 
voted on 4 May were reasserted by the deputies, but with one exception. The new decree 
added that while enemy soldiers from the ranks would always be well-treated, 'dans les cas 
oa les lois ordinaires de la guerre seraient viol6es par les puissances ennen-des', their 
nobles and officers would be treated in the same manner as the enemy treated French 
prisoners. "' The decree served as a warning to their officers not to carry out the threats 
in Brunswick's declaration, but it was also meant to reassure the men who made up the 
phalanxes of the Austrian and Prussian armies that it would still be safe to surrender. 
To stress this last point, and to encourage desertion, the Legislative put into practice 
112 
an idea which had been mooted immediately after the outbreak of war. On 2 August, 
enemy soldiers and NCOs - and not commissioned officers - who defected to the French 
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would receive a tricolour cockade as a symbol of adoption. Once they had declared their 
intention'de vouloir embrasser la cause de la libet-W, they would immediately receive a 
bounty of fifty livres, followed by a life pension worth a hundred livres a year. "' The 
decree was translated into German and Latin to seduce the Prussians, Austrians and 
Hungarians and was posted on walls and trees along the Rhine and on roads near the 
frontier. "' The cosmopolitan rhetoric and intentions were not always applied in the field. 
The officers of the Mauconseil battalion of Parisian volunteers reported that on 15 
September 1792, some of their men at ChAteau-Thierryont voulu 6gorger cinq 
prisonniers'. "' On 5 October, men of that very same battalion were implicated in the 
massacre of four deserters from the Imperial army, who enlisted in the I Oth Dragoon 
Regiment at Rethel. "' 
Moreover just before Valmy the revolutionaries had already seemed to admit defeat by 
resorting to the traditional practice of exchanges of prisoners of war. "' The unfavourable 
tide of war, where more French troops were surrendering to the invaders than vice versa, 
and the failure to persuade hordes of Austrians and Prussians to give themselves up 
willingly probably stood behind this change of direction. Besides, the cost of the upkeep 
of prisoners was high, an expense which could be eliminated with their exchange for 
French prisoners. Finally, the decision to enact such exchanges also shows that, despite 
the revolutionariesý claims of a war based on new principles, the old practices persisted. 
That the revolutionaries could still believe that the enemy forces would keep to their word 
and not reincorporate their returned prisoners into combat units suggests that eighteenth- 
century rules of warfare were yet to Mutate beyond recognition. Distrust between 
revolutionary France and the European monarchies was perhaps not as wide as the 
rhetoric might suggest, 
The first exchanges also resurrected another Ancien R6gime concept, the droit de 
reprisailles. On 5 January 1793, the Convention heard complaints of bad treatment from 
returned French prisoners. Br6ard argued that there should be reprisals, but limited to 
enemy officers. Even now, however, the Convention was reluctant to condone the 
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practice. Instead, the issue was exploited for propaganda purposes. The complaint of the 
soldiers was printed and Pache seized the opportunity to show that the French retained 
the moral high ground. He told the Convention that he would write to the generals asking 
them to remind the enemy'que leur propre intdr6t exige qu'ils aient pour nos prisonniers 
Vhumanit6 dont nous leur donnons 1'exemple. ""' 
The approach and outbreak of war put the French army under pressure to increase its 
strength and to stop the haernorrhaging of its best troops through emigration. Despite any 
desire to the contrary, the revolutionaries found that these new considerations demanded 
that they retain the foreign regiments. On the other hand, the maintenance of these units 
became increasingly hard to justify as they failed to meet the tests of loyalty posed by the 
outbreak of war and the fall of the monarchy. Exactly four months into the conflict, the 
revolutionaries dismissed by far the largest foreign contribution to the French army, the 
Swiss regiments. Fear of the counter-revolutionary potential of the Swiss now 
outweighed reluctance to upset diplomatic relations with the cantons. The deiriise of the 
foreign regiments came not from any impulse to nationalise the army, as potent as it may 
have been, but rather because at last the revolutionaries decided that whatever the 
advantages of foreign troops, they were now outweighed by the threat which they posed 
to the internal safety of the Revolution. 
None the less, if the Revolution could not tolerate foreigners who were clearly hostile 
to the cause, such was the need for troops that the revolutionaries overcame their 
misgivings about creating new foreign units and permitted the establishment of legions. 
This decision sat uneasily with the protests, heard since 1789, that the French nation 
should only be defended by French citizens. The adoption of foreign patriots to fight for 
the Revolution could be justified, however, in cosmopolitan terms: the recruits were men 
dedicated to the cause of liberty. They underscored that the French cause was just and 
universal. Moreover, they had practical use as the spearhead when revolutionary forces 
began to liberate France's neighbours. The problem with such a justification was that 
when the crusade for universal liberty and the people who stood to gain from it were 
discredited, so the use and even the desirability of foreign legions were open to question. 
The legions of foreign patriots were therefore as vulnerable to shifts in revolutionary 
politics as the older foreign regiments. 
'"AP, Ivi, 223 - 224. 
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In other respects, the revolutionaries! adoption of foreign troops had similarities with 
the practices of the Ancien Regime. Ideological differences aside, the revolutionaries saw 
similar advantages in recruiting foreign legions as generals under the absolute monarchy 
saw in raising foreign regiments. They increased French strength at the expense of foreign 
powers., Much the same reasoning underpinned the revolutionaries' attempts to encourage 
surrender and desertion. The continuity in practices from the absolute monarchy were 
disguised by the cosmopolitan pretences of the Revolution. 
III 
Anticlericalism increasingly found support in official circles after the dissolution of the 
Constituent Assembly. With the outbreak of war animosity against those clerics whose 
commitment to the Revolution was already suspect became more acute. The privileged 
position of the English, Scottish and Irish clergy made that hostility still sharper. The fear 
among the foreign clergy may have been acute, and justifiably so, but until official 
measures were actually taken against their institutions, or against British subjects, the 
question of legal survival still remained uncertain, but not hopeless. In this period, 
therefore, the most pressing problem remained that of finance. 
The upturn in anticlericalism made life unpleasant for the foreign clergy, although it is 
hard to tell from the evidence whether the antagonism was due more to their profession or 
to their nationality. By March 1792 John Naylor, confessor to the English Benedictine 
nuns in Paris, had complained of harrassment by the inhabitants of the Faubourg Saint- 
Marcel. "' The situation only got worse when the main obstacle to legislation against 
refractory clergy, the king, was overthrown in August. With the decree against non-jurors 
and the arrests of priests by Parisian militants, the foreign clergy felt very vulnerable. 
Their structures and activities had remained almost immune from the reforms of the 
Constituent, but that sharpened their appearance as privileged survivals from the Ancien 
R6gime. MacSheehy, an Irish student at the college in Paris, stated that after 10 August 
'tous les eleves ont et6 obliges de sortir flartivement de leurs maisons parce que 
l'indignation publique 1'avait design6 a la Vengeance du peuple. "" In the climate of fear 
which enveloped Paris towards September, Mary Ursula Stafford, an English 
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Conceptionist nun in Paris, wrote to Naylor that 'our Nuns, at least some of them, are 
affraid they will soon be killed'. "' The September massacres ensured that fear would 
linger. On 3 October, she proposed to visit Naylor, saying that she could'put on a 
coulourd Peticoat, &a Capote over our Habit'when walking through the streets. She 
soon considered fleeing France for good. " 
Until the overthrow of the monarchy the relevant ecclesiastical authorities were 
unsympathetic to plans for flight. In a meeting in February 1792, the Scottish bishops 
Geddes and Hay and some leading French clergymen reviewed Alexander Gordon' s 
suggestion that the Scots College in Paris sell all its property and effects and move to 
another country. Far from accepting the need to flee, the meeting admonished the bishops 
to send as many students to the college as its finances allowed. 113 In the spring, Mary 
Kirby, an English Benedictine in Paris, applied to a sister convent in Ypres for a refuge 'in 
these dismal times of persecution, but from the safety of the Low Countries the abbess 
re*ected her request, saying that such a refuge 'can only be sought for in the last 
extremity'. "' 
It was only after August, with the first harsh measures against the refractory clergy that 
the situation became pressing. For the many foreigners among the secular clergy, the 
decree against refractory priests on 26 August 1792 signalled the end of their 
ecclesiastical career in France, as it did for their French counterparts. Foreigners naturally 
responded to the measures in the same way as their French colleagues. At Dieulouard, 
Richard Marsh pragmatically decided of the new oath that 'in my opinion it has nothing at 
all against Religiod. "' In Bordeaux, Irish non-jurors fled to Spain, like their French 
colleagues, their integration into the fabric of church and society probably dictating their 
decision, although a minority did embark for Ireland. Some refractories took their 
chances: Martin Glynn, of the cathedral chapter of Saint-Andr6, remained in Bordeaux, 
eventually being executed for his non-compliance with the law. For the time being, those 
who did take the oath developed their careers: by 1793 George Jennings was the 
constutional curate at Saint-Seurin; Baptiste OHennessy became the constitutional priest 
of Saint-Germain du Puch and Myler Prendergast received the prestigious parish of Saint- 
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Dominique in Bordeaux. " In the autumn of 1793, these constitutional priests would 
suffer, less for their profession, than for the fact that they were subjects of the king of 
Great Britain and Ireland. 
The approach of war with Britain intensified fears of persecution. Daniel O'Connell 
and his brother, attending the English College at Douai, were called home by their uncle in 
late January 1793 after Daniel had written that reprisals would be 'almost inevitable' 
should war break out between the two countries. " With the actual outbreak of war, 
official persecution became more likely and flight naturally became a more attractive 
option. Naylor wrote to his agent in Britain, asking him to find a suitable position for 
him. "' Until any measures were actually taken specifically against British subjects, 
however, the foreign orders were allowed to subsist in a manner which French orders had 
been denied since 1790. They were only subject to the whole panoply of laws regarding 
the clergy if they wished to minister to French citizens. This at least is what the 
municipality of Bordeaux advised Dr. Everard, the vice-rector of the Irish seminary, on 12 
February 1792. "" 
The greatest threat to the continued existence of foreign clergy in France was not legal, 
but financial. Admittedly, the Revolution contributed greatly to the difficulties of the 
foreign clergy: the uncertainty of the future discouraged people from giving money and 
from attending the religious houses. On 22 February 1792, Gordon complained that there 
were merely two students at the Scots College in Paris, which severely affected its 
revenue. "' Eleven days later, Richard Marsh fretted that it was almost impossible to get 
people to forward funds for rentes viagires because 'they seem afraid of the consequences 
of the Revolution'. Many of the houses had already been in difficulties before 1789, but 
religious policies since the Constituent Assembly had aggravated them further. Marsh 
complained of the impositionfondire on the land held by the English Benedictines at 
Dieulouard. No tax relief could be granted, because the local commune had a tax quota 
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to reach. By the time war had broken out between Britain and France, inflation had wiped 
out any econornising made by the clerics. "' 
The response of these houses to the ever-increasing financial pressures soon involved 
measures which, to Catholic clergymen, were unpalatable. Initially the administrators of 
the establishments tried to tap existing resources, or tried and trusted methods. Naylor 
suggested that the monastery at Dieulouard, for example, contract rentes viagires, but 
owing to the uncertainty over the future, no one was willing to risk such an investment. 
The brewery at the same house suffered from low prices and competition. A few friends 
of the establishments did give donations as before and some orders, such as the English 
Benedictines, had funds in Britain which could be transferred to France. With the fall in 
value of the assignals and consequently the favourable exchange rate, this last resort 
could be a cheap way to pay off some debts for those houses which had the available 
funds in Britain. "' 
On the whole, however, these existing sources of revenue were not sufficient to keep 
the foreign establishments afloat. Some administrators even began to think about buying 
nationalised church lands, a step which they were naturally loath to take. Marsh was 
aware of their potential value, but was equally aware that 'the purchasers are look! d upon 
with an evil eye'. By December, however, Marsh was overcoming his scruples, 
particularly when the opportunity for consolidation of existing holdings arose. He had his 
eye on a small farm which would consolidate the monastery's current holdings, but the 
plan brought little fruit because the Benedictines were easily outbid in the sale of the biens 
nationaux. They managed to salvage something from the set back when the successful 
bidder immediate sold off the farm in smaller parcels, some of which went to the 
monastery. "' 
When war broke out between Britain and France, the fate of the foreign religious 
houses was not sealed, as no laws were passed against British subjects until the autumn. 
Moreover, the revolutionaries themselves were still reluctant to close down institutions 
which might yet have been of some public use. On 9 February 1793, Fouch6 presented a 
report for the comW dinstructionpublique, suggesting that the law suppressing secular 
orders should not include those establishments which were involved in education. On 14 
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February, the Convention adopted this proposal without discussion. "' This decision 
applied to the foreign insitutions, because the Convention also decreed that all English, 
Irish and Scots colleges would continue to receive the revenues due to them for the first 
six months of 1793 . 
13' The decrees of 8- 12 March 1793 confirmed the foreign colleges 
in the possession of their property, with management remaining in the hands of the college 
administrators. "' If the Convention was still reluctant to seize foreign property, this did 
not stop local authorities from confiscating what they could. Daniel O'Connell described 
how the municipality of Douai swooped on the college and seized the silver. "' 
The situation of the foreign clergy became more exposed and more precarious in the 
period between the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the two months after the 
outbreak of war between Britain and France. For many secular priests, the legislation of 
26 August 1792 signalled either the end of a career, or continued defiance of the 
revolutionary authorities. The position of those who were willing to take the clerical oath 
was, for the time being, secure. In other words, the fate of the foreign secular clergy in 
this period mirrored exactly that of their French colleagues. It was their status as priests, 
rather than as foreigners, which mattered. On the other hand, for the foreign regulars it 
was the very fact that they were foreign which ensured the continued existence of their 
institutions long after French houses had been closed down. The main condition for the 
authorities' tolerance was that they restricted their activities to people of their own 
nationality. As they were protected by the revolutionaries' respect both for the property 
and for their role as educators, the foreign clerical establishments were in reality 
threatened more by their financial problems, which admittedly emanated in large part, but 
not exclusively, from the Revolution. General anticlerical measures not aimed specifically 
at foreign clergy none the less discouraged recruitment and investment. By the spring of 
1793 the Convention had recognised the legitimacy of the property and activities of the 
foreign establishments, but the outbreak of war with Britain created an atmosphere which 
made their continued existence increasingly precarious. None the less at the end of March 
1793, neither the ecclesiastics nor the revolutionaries had decided to end their uneasy co- 
existence. 
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IV 
Those foreign radicals who had tried to conform to French revolutionary ideology 
faced new challenges in republicanism and the leftward march of revolutionary politics. 
Some who were attached to specific French political groupings could find themselves 
stranded once the revolutionary tide had passed over them. Others were disgusted or 
disenchanted by the course of the Revolution and consciously abandoned the cause. 
Some found their hopes rekindled with the outbreak of war, while others found their 
position made more precarious by the conflict. From the French revolutionaries' point of 
view, foreign 'patriots' could be of some use in their diplomatic and propaganda efforts 
during the war, but in some instances proved to be more of a liability than a help. 
The period saw new arrivals, or the return, of foreign radicals, some driven out of their 
own countries for their activities. Three patriots from Lausanne, Karpe de Gers, J. I Cart 
and Ferdinand Rosset were proscribed in March 1792 for their role in Bastille Day 
celebrations the previous year. While Rosset and Cart later moved on to the United 
States, Karpe was commanding a battalion of volunteers at Bitche by November. "' 
Thomas Paine fled Britain for good in mid-September 1792 because his trial for seditious 
libel had been postponed until December, and because he continued to express his views 
publicly, leading William Blake to advise him to flee to avoid yet more confrontations 
with the authorities. There were also good reasons to go to France, as Paine was elected 
to the Convention and Pinckney, the American minister in London, suggested that he 
might be of some use to the United States as a French deputy. "' Mary Wollstonecraft 
may have decided to leave for France because of the mounting difficulties faced by 
radicals in Britain towards the end of 1792. Like Paine, Sampson Perry fled prosecution 
for seditious libel in Britain, arriving in Paris in January 1793.1' Georg Forster, the 
librarian of the Elector of Mainz, arrived in Paris in March with Adam Lux and Potocki, 
not as refugees, but as the delegates from the Rhineland Convention which requested 
13"AN, F/7/4400 (Letter of sieur Cart to directory of the department of the Ain, 14 
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annexation by France. They were stranded when the tide turned once more and the 
coalition forces drove the French from Germany. 141 
The first major development to affect foreign radicals in this period was the 
radicalisation of revolutionary politics. Opposition to the monarchy, only temporarily 
suppressed after Varennes, left the aspirations of some foreign patriots looking distinctly 
conservative. While Can-fille Desmouslins had given the Belgian Statists his support in 
1789 and 1790, by the spring of 1792 the Statists were considered unworthy of such 
backing, composed as they were, in the words of Robespierre in May that year, 'du clerge, 
de la noblesse et de la bourgeoisie aristocratique. French principles corresponded more, 
he argued, with those of the rival Vonckist party. 142 With the establishment of the first 
Girondin ministry in March 1792, the fate of the Statists in France was sealed. More 
sympathetic to the Vonckists, the government scattered the Statists from their refuge in 
Douai. "" 
The outbreak of war provided the next challenge. For the Li6geois, the war was an 
opportunity to achieve their aims of a democratic republic, either through absorption by 
France or the formation of an independent state under French protection. The Vonckist 
Belgians began to think in the latter terms and they entered into negotiations with the 
Lidgeois to form a common policy. As they all sought to be treated as equals by the 
French, however, they realised that they would have to play an active part in their own 
liberation. For this reason Pierre Lebrun embarked on a political career in Paris and 
Li6geois and Brabangons alike formed their own legions which would march in the van of 
the French armies. "' For those German radicals who accepted the crusading rhetoric of 
the Brissotins, the war was also an opportunity, the trumpet call for a general uprising. 
Doctor Saiffert, Eulogius Schneider, Friedrich Cotta and the Prussian lawyer Karl Clauer 
all launched propaganda tracts, pamphlets, leaflets, songs and poems from Alsace into 
Germany, with Strasbourg as the most important centre of activity. "' 
A few of the Genevan exiles also saw the war as an opportunity to bring the blessings 
of the French Revolution to their city, but they were a minority. After the fall of the 
monarchy Clavi6re and Grenus were almost alone among the exiles in envisaging the 
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annexation of Geneva to France. This plan put them at odds with the other Genevan 
exiles, such as Reybaz. In fact, Clavi6re seems to have 'gone native'. Ms political career 
in France offered more possibilities than Geneva ever could and he lost sight of the 
original goals of the Genevan exiles. "' Rather more Swiss radicals from the cantons 
anticipated opportunities in the war ahead. If the Club heUtique had collapsed, they 
found willing allies among the Savoyards. The Savoyard club was founded by Doppet 
and Desaix, one of the editors of the Correspondance des Nations, early in 1792. 
Originally called the Club de Propagande des A 1pes, the club's aim was 'de porter la 
libert6 en Savoie', although before long Swiss patriots were admitted and so its name was 
changed to the Club des Patriotes &rangers. The title was also sufficiently vague not to 
cause too many diplomatic problems for the French authorities. It was however from this 
society that sprang the Ligion des Allobroges and propaganda aimed at Savoy. With the 
downfall of the monarchy and the first victories of the French Republic, times seemed 
auspicious enough to merit a change to a more explicit name and the club became known 
as the Club des Allobroges, 141 
For their part, the revolutionaries not only hoped that foreign radicals would spread 
propaganda abroad, but that they would also provide a ringing endorsement of the French 
Revolution at home. It was for the second reason that on 13 April 1792 the Jacobin club 
in Paris invited James Watt, son of the steam innovator, and the pharmacist Thomas 
Cooper to attend all the meetings of the society for as long as they remained in Paris, 
Despite the onset of the 'crusade for universal liberty', however, the Jacobins were still 
cautious enough towards neutral powers to resist the alarmist blandishments of John 
Oswald, who on 4 June claimed that Cooper had been imprisoned on his return to Britain. 
In a blistering attack on the British government, Oswald demanded an address of support 
to the Manchester Constitutional Society. 148 
, Such caution was cast aside, however, firstly with the overthrow of the monarchy and 
then with the triumph of the French armies in the autumn of 1792. The first event further 
radicalised revolutionary politics and challenged the basis of foreign patriots' loyalty to the 
Revolution. This change in attitude towards foreign radicals is illustrated by the warmer 
reception given by the Jacobins to another of Oswald's proposals. On 22 August, the 
Jacobins accepted his idea to send all the radical societies in Britain an address explaining 
`B 6nitruy, LW telier de Mirabeau, 415,418 - 419,421 - 424. 
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Ia conspiration du traitre Louis XVI, et tous les outrages qui ont provoqu6 la sainte 
insurrection du 10 aofit'. 149 
For some foreign radicals, the transition to a republic was smoothly made. Thomas 
Paine's republican credentials were already well-established and on II October he joined 
the Convention's constitutional committee, while David Williams presented his 
observations in January 1793. "0 Mary Wollstonecraft arrived in France in December 
1792. That autumn she had told a fiiend that she approved of the idea of a truly 
democratic republic and nor was she dissuaded by the September massacres, drawing a 
line between the 'immutable principles' of the Revolution and the elements in the Paris 
crowd who were'too sharp'. "' The German Oelsner believed that Louie flight in 1791 
made the monarchy irreconcilable to the Revolution. He declared for a republic as the 
only alternative to anarchy as early as April 1792, even though he withdrew from the 
Jacobin club a month later out of revulsion for Robespierre. Like Oelsner, Reinhard was 
repulsed by what he saw as the demagogy of the Jacobins, but since the flight to Varennes 
had made little secret of his desire to see the throne overturned. "' Among the Genevan 
exiles, Clavi6re was among the few who did not appear to undergo any soul-searching as 
Louis XVI teetered on the brink of a second revolution in 1792.153 
The radicals who as a group were the most able to overcome the first challenges of the 
Republic were the Li6geois, because their aims, ideology and methods were already 
radical for the time, and those Belgians who joined them in the Comiti des Belges el 
Liggeois Unis. As early as January 1792 this organisation was thinking in terms of a 
united Belgian republic, while Lebrun attacked hereditary monarchy in his Manifeste des 
Belges et Degeois Unis. The constitution eventually drafted by the committee 
anticipated the 'Jacobin! Constitution of 1793 by over fifteen months, with provisions for 
universal manhood suffrage, for the recall of deputies by the people, for progressive 
taxation and the duty of a people to rebel against oppression. " 
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For other foreign patriots the challenge was how far they could remain transfixed by 
the liberating example of the French Revolution without tarnishing themselves with 
republicanism and popular violence. In November 1792 the Lausanne patriot Cart 
revealed the painful discrepancy between the aims of his colleagues and the ideology of 
the French Republic. While Cart and his fiiends wanted to restore the Estates as a legal 
barrier to the aristocracy of Lausanne, the French would not even countenance the 
existence of such a traditional institution. "' 
Failure to adapt to the new political orthodoxy in France forced foreign patriots out of 
revolutionary politics. Duroveray, for example, had been reintegrated in the Genevan 
Council of Two Hundred in November 1790, from where he vehemently opposed Jacques 
Grenus'ýgafisateurs. While Talleyrand secured his services in the French diplomatic 
mission to London in March 1792 Duroveray was recalled on 12 October because of 'des 
observations et des d6nonciations tr6s pressantesý, some of which had been made by his 
compatriot, Clavi6re. Dumont also fell out of step with the Revolution because of the 
overthrow of the monarchy and the September massacres, despite his fiiendship with 
leading republicans such as Brissot. After a brief return to Geneva, he settled in Britain in 
March 1793. "' 
Archenholz of the Paris Minerva was a supporter of Lafayette, became affiliated to the 
Feuillants and made no secret of his dislike of the Jacobins. After the overthrow of the 
monarchy, he was persecuted by Anacharsis Cloots, who denounced him as an agent of 
counter-revolution, and he fled the country for Hamburg. "' Dutch exiles with Feuillant or 
Fayettist sympathies such as Daverhoult and Marie-Antoine Urisier likewise found their 
revolutionary careers abruptly cut short. "' Daverhoult fought with the palace guard on 
10 August and committed suicide when he was arrested as he tried to follow Lafayette 
into exile. "" A German supporter of the constitutional monarchy, Georg Kemer flew to 
the Tuileries on 10 August in order to defend the king. Escaping unscathed, he became 
further disenchanted by the September massacres and the execution of Louis. On the 
other hand, he separated the ideals of 1789 from the people and the events who, in his 
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eyes, twisted and abused them. For that reason, he could not renounce the French 
Revolution altogether, chosing to remain loyal to a Revolution which had good principles, 
even if the power to implement them was in the hands of those he detested. " 
Those radicals who survived the shock from the tumbling edifice of the monarchy and 
the September massacres were rapidly confronted with new choices with the apparently 
complete victories of the revolutionary armies. Not all patriots from Brabant and Liýge 
sought Wunion! with the French Republic, but the French feared that an independent 
Belgium would be too vulnerable to counterattack from Austria. The patriots therefore 
faced the uncomfortable choice between bowing to the strategic interests of the French 
and turning their backs on the French Revolution. While Li6geois patriots persuaded their 
fellow-citizens to vote for 'r6union' with France, the Brabangons were less keen. The 
Vonckist Walckiers, for example, envisaged an independent federal republic of Belgium 
and Li6ge. ` Those who sought independence had to concede to the superior strength of 
the French and go along with the votes for annexation. The representatives from the 
Rhine Convention in Mainz, Forster, Lux and Potocki, had fewer doubts. Although 
Forster knew that the vast majority of his fellow-countrymen resented the French 
invaders, he and his colleagues rejected the goal of independence on the grounds that a 
small state could not defend itself. At the end of March 1793, Forster presented the 
Convention with the request for annexation. "' 
Although their country was still at peace with France, British and Irish radicals 
established in Paris were affected by the French victories and the two 'Propagandist 
Decrees'. On 24 November fifty-two of these radicals signed an address which was 
presented to the Convention four days later. It encouraged the French in their feats of 
arms and, in the wake of the Edict of Fraternity, its ambiguous language could be read as 
an invitation to the French to provide 'fraternity and help' to their neighbours across the 
Channel. " There can be little doubt that some of the signatories were willing to call for 
measures which their counterparts actually in Britain or Ireland dared not, or would not, 
countenance for the time being. John and Henry Sheares, who were later closely 
associated with the United Irishmen, were members of the Paris Jacobins. Both had 
joined the National Guard. Edward Fitzgerald, also in Paris, discussed with Paine the 
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possibility of French support for a revolution in Ireland even before the United Irishmen 
accepted violent means. Paine passed on Fitzgerald's views to Lebrun. " Thomas 
Christie, the radical Scottish Unitarian minister, had moved to Paris in the early autumn of 
1792. Although not a signatory of the address, he hoped that widespread local protests in 
Britain would coincide with the peaceful establishment of a Convention by the radical 
organisations. " The impact of these radicals in exile on French revolutionary policy was 
out of all proportion to their scanty numbers. Along with other addresses from societies 
in Britain, the French were given the impression that the British people were quivering on 
the edge of insurrection. " Such an interpretation erroneously strengthened the case for a 
declaration of war on Britain. " 
The final test of loyalty to the Revolution in this period was the execution of Louis 
XVI, particularly for the British radicals in Paris, for whom the problem was compounded 
by the outbreak of war between France and Britain. This problem was of less concern to 
the Dutch, who had already rebelled against the Stadholder. Not all British patriots in 
France were as radical as Fitzgerald, Sheares or Oswald. Captain George Monro, an 
unofficial British agent in Paris, reported to the Foreign Office on 27 December that many 
of the exiles had become Iiiends of royalty, which probably meant they were opposed to 
the execution of Louis XVI. Paine, Helen Maria Williams and the Scottish radical 
Thomas Muir all exerted themselves in trying to save Louis's life. Under pressure of the 
pace of events, the society began to split up. On II January 1793 Paine and John Frost 
came to blows over the question of sending a second address to the Convention. Paine 
was in favour, Frost passionately against. "' For the majority of the society members, the 
watershed was the outbreak of war on I February. A large number of British radicals 
were not willing to appear as traitors, particularly when, for all their support of the French 
Revolution, their main concern was the cause of reform in Britain, not France. Among 
those who suffered from such divided loyalties was John Hurford Stone, president of the 
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British club. When France went to war with Britain, he and forty other British sailed for 
home. " 
Despite their claims of unity of purpose with the Revolution, all foreignpatriots'had 
their own agenda to follow, which naturally meant that they would fall in with those 
revolutionaries whose interests or aims would best serve their own. Symbiotic 
relationships developed between groups of foreign radicals and French politicians. Early 
in 1792 tensions within the ComiM des Belges et Liegeois unis led to a split between 
moderates, such as Lebrun, Bassenge, Fabry and the Belgian Walckiers, who forged ties 
with the Brissotins, and extren-dsts who after the fall of the monarchy would associate 
closely with the Montagnards. "O Those Dutch Patriots who sought the assistance of 
French military muscle to liberate the United Provinces from the Stadholder also made 
associations similar to the Li6geois moderates. Joannes de Kock, for example, cultivated 
links with Lebrun and Dumouriez. ` Such ties would put these radicals under suspicion 
after the general's treason. The moderate Dutch, Belgian and Li6geois patriots in Paris 
were left open to attack from their extremist rivals, who like the Montagnards suspected 
the general's motives towards the Low Countries. 
After the fall of the monarchy, with exceptions such as Oswald who supported the 
Mountain, those British radicals who remained in Paris were drawn to the Girondins. "' 
Drawing on a tradition of constitutionalism, the British admired the Girondins because 
they appeared to be less willing than the Mountain and the Jacobins to appeal to the mob. 
Moreover, many of the exiles had personal ties to the Girondins. Helen Maria Williams, 
returning to Paris in August 1792, attended the salons of Manon Roland. In turn, 
Williams introduced Mary Wollstonecraft to her Girondin fiiends. "' Paine had long 
collaborated with Brissot and Condorcet in the Cercle Social. His political association 
with the Girondins did not appear to be sealed until, having voted for the guilty verdict on 
Louis XVI, he then opposed the death penalty. His position in these debates brought him 
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into conflict with Marat, against whom he testified in his trial before the Revolutionary 
Tribunal in April 1793.1" 
Among the German patriots in France, Anacharsis Cloots did not think of himself as a 
Girondin, but those who heard him describe the war in his expansive, internationalist way 
certainly associated him with them. The Girondinjournalist Gorsas recommended him 
during the elections to the Convention as worthy of the confidence of the nation. In 
response, Marat described Cloots on 30 August 1792 as aMouchard Berlinois'who 
sought to'servir la faction des ennemis de la libert6'. "' Karl Reinhard had known 
Vergniaud, Guadet and Ducos since his days in Bordeaux. Ultimately, Kerner supported 
the Girondins, possibly because of his friendship Reinhard, but also because he saw them 
as the lesser of two evils when the alternative was the Jacobins. "' Among the Genevans, 
Clavi&e unambiguously associated with the Girondins, being the Brissotin finance 
minister between March and June 1792 and again after the fall of the monarchy. On 8 
September, he was the target of Marat's venom, as'd6vou6 i la faction Brissot, qui I'a 
remis en place!. "' 
Some foreign radicals came to be associated not with the Girondins, but with the other 
extreme - the Cordeliers. Doppet, the Savoyard exile, was a member of both the Jacobin 
and Cord, elier clubs, so there were times when he could not win either way. While serving 
as president of the former, he praised Dumouriez after his appointment as foreign minister 
in March 1792. On the other hand, just before 10 August, he was accused in the Jacobins 
of extremism, of being overly influenced by the Cordeliers club and of preaching 
'democracy'. 17' The defeat of the French in the Alps in December 1792 led him to believe 
that the Girondins were incapable of protecting the Republic, which by now included 
Savoy, and he became a Montagnard. It was to prove a wise choice for his military 
career. 179 
The defeats of early 1793 and the hostility or indifference with which 'liberated' peoples 
met the French invaders discredited Brissot's 'crusade for universal liberty'. For the time 
being, however, the foreign radicals who remained in France were not yet treated with the 
"'Conway, Ae Life of 7homas Paine, ii, 7-9,48 - 49; Claeys, 7homas Paine, 26 - 27. 
""Marat, L'Ami du Peuple, aux amis de la Patrie! (30 August 1792), Vellay, C. (ed. ), Les 
Pamphlets de Marat (Paris: 1911), 310 -3 11. 
""Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution, 328,342. 
177'Marat, VAmi du Peuple, aux Bons Frangais'(8 September 1792), Vellay, Les 
Pamph le is de Mara t, 322. 
"'Doppet, Mmoires Politiques et Militaires, 45 - 46,48. 
"'Mathiez, La Nvolution et les &rangers, 47. 
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same disdain as their indifferent countrymen. They were the enlightened spirits who might 
still spread the gospel. Between October 1791 and March 1793, foreign patriots were 
faced with a series of rapid political changes which presented them with some stark 
choices. While the decisions they made in the face of the outbreak of war, the overthrow 
of the monarchy, the first French victories and the execution of Louis XVI were 
determined in a large part by their own principles, interests and aspirations, they were also 
aware that the choices they made might affect their political survival in France itself As 
the net of political orthodoxy was pulled tighter, foreign patriots could not remain aloof 
from the internal political battles in France. Their association with particular political 
groups were determined by their specific aims and aspirations, but revolutionary politics 
were still in flux. The choices made in this period would come back to haunt foreign 
radicals in the Terror. 
V 
The greatest single challenge to those foreigners who participated in French economic 
life in this period was the war. For some, the conflict presented no immediate problems, 
particularly if they were neutrals or engaged in trades which were deemed vital to the war 
effort. The American merchant James Price successfully completed a business trip in 
August 1792. "0 None the less, merchants of all nationalities found, as always, that even if 
they were not enemy subjects, the war was disruptive of their trade and their livelihood. 
This was particularly the case when France went to war with the two major maritime 
powers of Europe, Britain and the United Provinces. It was not until the autumn of 1793 
that the Convention decreed the confiscation of enemy property and a navigation act 
excluding all enemy ships from carrying goods into and out of French ports, but the 
conflict could present other problems. The maritime tradition of arming corsairs which 
would seize enemy shipping naturally did not disappear because the war was meant to be 
'revolutionary'. The rules of maritime prizes still applied and this was a feature of warfare 
used against the British and the Dutch as it was in conflicts before 1789. 
18OChew, A Bostonian Merchant Witnesses the Second French Revolution, 12 - 13. He 
was possibly the same'Mr. Price'to whom Gouverneur Morris issued a passport on 13 
August (Morris, A Diary of the French Revolution, ii, 490). 
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Furthermore, an embargo on British and Dutch goods was imposed early in the war. 
On I March 1793, the Convention received from the Jacobins in Bordeaux a donation 
from British and Dutch merchants who offered their thanks for the exemptions for vessels 
loaded with grain and other vital commodities. "' None the less, other British and Dutch 
ships were seen as fair game. At the trihunal de commerce at Dunkirk later that month, 
the proprietors of four British ships, apparently used for smuggling goods from France 
across the Channel, unsuccessfully brought legal action against the owners of a Gravelines 
corsair which had seized their vessels. 182 
The welfare of foreign merchants was not necessarily j eopardised by the behaviour of 
the revolutionaries, but by the response of foreign governments to the Revolution and the 
war. Britain, Spain and Russia each made proclamations and laws which, while intended 
as prophylactics against the contagion of revolutionary propaganda, also made trade and 
commerce between their subjects and French citizens highly suspect if not actually illegal. 
Like the more moderate foreign radicals, merchants who found their governments hostile 
to France found in these measures a test of loyalty to their sovereigns. 
While foreign merchants could relocate with relative ease by finding new ports and new 
trading partners, manufacturers, with their workshops, factories and labour forces, were 
more inert. The radicalisation of revolutionary politics, the war and the economic crisis 
presented foreign manufacturers with extraordinary pressures. Oberkampf, for example, 
was faced with the problems of growing militancy. While the organised action by his 
workforce in March 1792 had purely economic origins, as owner of a former manufacture 
royale with foreign origins and with nine percent of his workers recruited from abroad, 
Oberkampf was understandably keen to maintain his revolutionary credentials. He had to 
preclude any insinuations about his patriotism, both as a foreigner and as a one-time 
beneficiary of royal favour. The difficulties of balancing these pressures of political 
conformity with his private business interests are made clear by his response to the decree 
of the patrie en danger. When ten of his workers enrolled as volunteers, Oberkampf gave 
them 300 livres each and promised them as much again on their return. By September 
1792, however, he was grumbling privately that labour was becoming scarce because of 
the war. 183 
"AP, fix, 500 - 501. 
182Ap, Ix, 223 - 224. 113 Chassage, Oberkampf, 17 1; Chapman & Chassagne, European Textile Printers in the 
Eighteenth Century, 122 - 123,178. 
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Unlike Oberkampf, the Dutch banker Vandenyver and his two sons did not show 
political tact in the running of their business. When Madame du Barry visited London 
between 1791 and 1793, he underwrote the letters of credit which ensured her stay there 
was comfortable. The Vandenyvers would come to regret this association. "' He was not 
alone among foreign bankers to draw venom from revolutionaries who feared the 
influence of foreign money. On 15 December 1792, taking up an attack by Marat, Carra 
wrote in his Annalespatriotiques that the Belgian Walckiers was an agent of Austria. 
Nine days later, he accused him of handling the money and gold'que Marie-Antoinette 
volait i la nation frangaise! and that, while pretending to be a Belgian patriot, he was using 
Austrian funds to ensure that Brabant would be returned to the Habsburgs. "' Such 
attacks on foreign bankers were to become more commonplace in the following year. 
If the Revolution disrupted the lives of foreign merchants in France it was due to a 
combination of the embargo against Dutch and British goods, the activities of corsairs and 
the response of foreign governments to the perceived threat of revolution. While foreign 
merchants could respond to these conditions with some flexibility, manufacturers and 
bankers could not. If they were to protect their investments and business in France, they, 
like other types of foreigners, had to show increasingly that their patriotic credentials were 
sound. While Oberkampf, long established in the community of Jouy, easily immersed 
himself in local politics to protect his livelihood, bankers such as Vandenyver and 
Walckiers did so less easily. As the Revolution and the war intensified, they found it hard 
to explain both their relations with some of their existing clients and their financial ties 
with foreign banking houses, many of which may have had dealings with enemy 
governments. With the deepening political crisis in 1793, such associations would 
become still more compromising. 
vi 
The period between October 1791 and March 1793 saw, on one hand, the increasing 
militancy of revolutionary cosmopolitanism and, on the other, the development of the 
more exclusive implications of revolutionary patriotism. The former encouraged 
foreigners to participate in the political fife of the Revolution through naturalisation, 
"'Uthy, La Banque Protestante en France, ii, 323. 
"'Mathiez, La Rivolution el les etrangers, 109 -I 10. 
236 
membership of political societies, consultation on the new republican constitution, 
employment in diplomatic missions and in government departments and even election to 
the Convention. It also permitted foreigners to fight alongside their French brothers in 
specially-organised legions and encouraged foreign patriots to take on a propaganda role 
in the war which, by the end of March 1793, had engulfed all of western Europe. Such 
militant cosmopolitanism represented the abandonment of the diplomatic caution shown 
by the Constituent, but this was due less to the revolutionaries' attachment to abstract 
principles than their assessment of their own political interests. Until the first victories in 
the autumn of 1792, it was hoped that the success of French arms would be assisted by 
peoples who would welcome the French as liberators. For those Eke the Girondins and 
Dumouriez who pinned their political careers and their personal aspirations on such a 
triumph, the use of foreigners in most branches of the revolutionary state was not only a 
propaganda tool, but also a viable means of achieving their aims. 
On the other hand, as the Revolution became increasingly radical, the political 
credentials of those foreigners had to be screened if their role in French life was not to be 
counter-productive. The Swiss troops were finally cast aside, not because the 
revolutionaries sought to exclude foreigners from the armed forces, but because after 10 
August their skills, discipline and experience were offset by the apparent threat they posed 
to the internal safety of the nation. Such political failings, and not foreign nationality, 
were becoming the criteria for the exclusion of foreigners from the life of the Revolution. 
As the revolutionaries alienated more strands of political opinion, and as the fortunes of 
war fluctuated, so they became increasingly worried about their own security. Such 
concerns began to override diplomatic considerations in their treatment of foreigners. The 
general measures enacted against foreigners, such as the imposition of passports and 
surveillance, reflected this shift and gave xenophobia both legal form and official channels 
through which it could be expressed. None the less, French citizens were subjected to 
similar infringements on their civil liberties and, for the time being, the political 
associations and activities of foreigners and French people alike were of primary concern. 
If this does not say much for the revolutionaries' tolerance of political dissent, it does 
suggest that they did not regard civic virtue as an exclusively French trait. 
If the revolutionaries' concern for domestic stability made them more willing to err 
from the early diplomatic caution of the Revolution, they were not yet ready to repudiate 
measures taken by their forerunners in the Constituent Assembly if there was no urgent 
need to do so. While the dismissal of the Swiss regiments was dictated by fears of their 
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counter-revolutionary potential, the foreign clergy remained a privileged group, with their 
property intact and their institutions remaining independent of state control. Their status 
as foreigners still protected them from revolutionary legislation out of diplomatic 
necessity, until Britain entered the war, and because the Constituent had recognised the 
legitimacy of their property. To have rejected this decision would have been to repudiate 
this founding principle of the Revolution. Yet this period witnessed the exile of foreign 
secular priests who refused to take the oath. With Irish priests as with other foreigners, it 
was failure of loyalty to the Revolution - and not nationality - which led to their exclusion. 
If the fate of foreigners in France was increasingly linked to their political reliability, so 
they would be at the mercy of the political tides which swept through the Revolution. 
Not only were revolutionary politics still fluid at the end of March 1793, but for fifteen 
months thereafter the Republic would be fighting for its very survival in the international 
conflict. Patriotism was to become increasingly focused on the survival of France itself, 
but foreigners would still be able to pursue their activities provided they remained 
politically orthodox. The problem was that many foreigners in France had already become 
associated with specific factions who seemed to serve their interests best. In the case of 
foreign legions and foreign patriots, such politicians were the very people whose policies 
and behaviour were to be discredited by defeat and betrayal, namely the Girondins and 
Dumouriez. Those foreigners who had set much in store with them would themselves be 
tarnished with defeat and treason. As the crisis deepened over the course of the following 
year, the circle of political orthodoxy would be drawn narrower still, increasing the variety 
of proscribed ideals and activities. In turn, foreigners who subscribed to them and 
participated in them would be excluded from the life of the Republic. 
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Chapter Five. The Terror. 
On 28 December 1793, at three o'clock in the morning, Thomas Paine was disturbed in 
White's Hotel in the passage des Petits-P6res. Two commissioners, three officials and a 
witness from the section Guillaume Tell, all escorted by a squad of four National 
Guardsmen and a corporal, had come to arrest him. He was expecting them, as he had 
been scribbling desperately only six hours before in his permanent lodgings in the 
faubourg Saint-Denis, finishing the first part of his next work, the Age ofReason. He 
deliberately left the manuscript in his quiet, suburban apartment for fear that it would 
otherwise be destroyed. -He had then walked to the passage des Petits-P6res because that 
was still his listed address in the Convention's almanach. It was there that he knew they 
would look for him. Now that they had arrived, the officials searched White's Hotel. The 
day was already well advanced by the time this alarming group of people marched up to 
No. 63, rue du Faubourg Saint-Denis where they finished their search and inspection of 
Paine's papers at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. - Nothing suspicious was found and Paine was 
allowed to entrust his manuscript to the American radical Joel Barlow. After the gruelling 
process of the search, Paine was marched through the darkened and cluttered city streets 
to the Luxembourg prison. There he stayed incarcerated for over ten months. If the 
guillotine did not kill him, the illness contracted in the squalor almost did. He was finally 
released on 4 November 1794. ' 
Thomas Paine's predicament neatly symbolises that of many foreigners during the 
Terror. The legal motive for his arrest was that his original British nationality made him 
an enemy subject. He himself was certain that it was because he was a foreigner, despite 
his honorary naturalisation as a French citizen in August 1792. Significantly, Paine was 
only released when his United States citizenship was acknowledged by James Monroe, the 
American ambassador to Paris. ' Paine may have suffered therefore from the retreat of the 
Revolution from its earlier cosmopolitanism and the development of a xenophobic, 
exclusive patriotism. The Thennidorians certainly explained that Paine had aroused 
Robespierre's hostility because'il avait travailI6 i fonder la liberte dans les deux mondes. " 
'Conway, 7he Life of 7homas Paine, ii, 10 1-I 10. 
'Conway, Ae Life of 7homas Paine, ii, 136 - 13 8. 'Courtois, E. B., Rapportfail au nom de la commission chargie de 1examen despapiers 
trouWs chez Robespierre et ses complices, par E. B. Courtois, Wpulj du Wpartement de 
lAube, dans la seance du 16 niv6se; an Iffe de la Republiquefranýaise, une el indivisible 
(Paris, an 111), 39. 
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Subsequent historians have also suggested, in a more balanced fashion, that foreigners 
suffered during the Terror because the revolutionaries began to regard with suspicion the 
cosmopolitanism represented by the likes of Paine. ' 
On the other hand, the statements of the revolutionaries themselves suggest that two 
political motives lay behind the arrest. On 25 December Bourdon de I'Oise remarked that 
Paine had not set foot in the Convention since the Brissotins had been expelled, which 
suggests that Paine was both denied his seat as a deputy and arrested because of his 
sympathy for the Girondins. The next day, Thuriot cited Paine's opposition to the death 
penalty for Louis XVI and the fact that he voted'toujours avec les hommes reconnus 
tra1tres A la patrie'. When a deputation of Americans led by Joel Barlow sought his 
freedom in the Convention on 27 January, the president, Vadier, paid tribute to Paine's 
achievements, but 'son g6nie jYa point aperqu celle qui a r6g6n6r6 la France; il Ifen a 
aperqu le syst6me que d'apr6s les prestiges dont les faux amis de notre r6volution Vont 
environnV In other words, it was not his nationality which mattered, but the fact that his 
conformity to the current political orthodoxy was suspect. ' 
On 25 December Bourdon, also added that je sais qu'il intrigue avec un ancien agent 
du bureau des affaires 6trang6res'. ' This was the hidden but probably the most potent 
reason behind Paine's arrest. It was a misguided attempt by the government to control 
any damage which Paine might have caused to France! s relations with the United States. 
The American ambassador to Paris, Gouverneur Morris, was hostile to Paine's democratic 
republicanism and suggested that Paine supported the efforts of France's wayward envoy 
to the United States, Edmond GenEt, to'revolutionise'the Mississippi valley. Gen& was 
the agent referred to by Bourdon and so it was implied that Paine was severely damaging 
relations with France's only ally. ' After Paine had been incarcerated, Robespierre wrote in 
his notebook, Demander que Thomas Payne soit d6cr&6 d'accusation, pour les int6r8ts de 
I'Am6rique autant que de la France. " Paine, it seems, did not only fall foul of the 
'Mathiez, La R&olution et les etrangers, 137; Soboul, Les Sans-Culottes, 208; Cobb, R., 
The Police and the People. French Popular Protest 1789 - 1820 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1970), 130. 
'AP, 1xxxii, 303,339; Moniteur No. 130 (10 Pluvi6se 11/29 January 1794). 
'AP, lxxxii, 303. 
'Conway, The Life of 7homas Paine, ii, 80 - 96. Morris's personal enmity for Paine went 
back to the War of American Independence. He did not hide from Paine the fact that it 
was he who was responsible for Paine's dismissal from the continental Committee of 
Foreign Affairs in 1779 (Morris, A Diary of the French Revolution, ii, 159). 
'Courtois, Papiers trouvis chez Robespierre, 211. 
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government because of his associations with the Girondins, but also because it was 
apparently expedient for France's diplomatic relations. 
The period from April 1793 to July 1794 witnessed the most acute measures taken 
against foreigners. They can be explained by a decline of revolutionary cosmopolitanism 
and the heated expansion of a xenophobic patriotism, but they were not the only 
ingredients in the pot. Paine's experience suggests that the revolutionaries' treatment of 
foreigners was not always dictated by xenophobia, but, firstly, by considerations of their 
loyalty to an increasingly demanding political regime and, secondly, by pragmatic 
concerns about the potential benefits or damage a particular foreigner or group of 
foreigners could bring to the Republic. Just as Paine's arrest seems to have been dictated 
by diplomatic motives, so conversely the revolutionaries were practical enough to protect 
foreigners whose liberty would not threaten the government, but whose skills and services 
might be of use in the war effort. 
The renunciation of the two 'Propagandist Decrees' on 13 April and the overthrow of 
the Girondins on 2 June had potentially sinister implications for foreigners in France. The 
first represented a retreat from the militant cosmopolitanism of the previous year and a 
patriotism focused more exclusively on the nation itself The second narrowed the scope 
of what was regarded by the revolutionaries as legitimate political opinion. Yet initially 
under the Montagnards, foreigners in France were still encouraged to adopt France as 
their patrie. The fundamental principles which defined citizens as French and which 
permitted the assimilation of foreigners into the national community remained almost 
unaltered. The Montagnard constitution voted through on 24 June 1793 reduced the 
residence requirement from five years to one, like its Girondin predecessor. Economic 
barriers to naturalisation were lowered with the stipulation that a foreigner must simply 
live in France by the fruits of his own labour, in marked contrast to the more demanding 
provisions of the Constitution of 179 1. Marriage to a French citizen and the acquisition 
of property remained as optional conditions, but broader social contributions by foreigners 
were also encouraged with the additional alternatives of the adoption of a child or the 
support of an elderly citizen. The cosmopolitan pretensions attached to French nationality 
were retained in a clause which would allow the legislature to grant citizenship to any 
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foreigner who hadbien m6ritd de Vhumanit6'. It also offered'asile aux 6trangers bannis de 
leur patrie pour la cause de la liberW. ' There was some opposition from Mazuyer, who 
saw perils in giving away French citizenship in such a profligate manner, 'O but for the time 
being most revolutionaries clearly thought that an assimilationist approach to 
naturalisation was to be one of the building blocks of the Republic. " 
Such openness to foreigners was however regarded as something to enact once the 
immediate military and political dangers had been destroyed. The spectacular and 
apparently complete reversal of French military fortunes, the desertion of Dumouriez and 
renewed domestic troubles inspired paranoid fears that collusion with the enemy was to 
blame. The coup against the Girondins on 2 June expelled from the scope of 
revolutionary orthodoxy a substantial body of opinion, which made vigilance and 
surveillance more necessary than before. On 6 June the Convention discussed a general 
law against foreigners, but the proposal was sent to the Committee of Public Safety for 
further consideration. " Most revolutionaries still believed that the foreigners responsible 
for disorders in France were a minority identifiable through the existing system of 
surveillance and that a general expulsion would be counter-productive. They had already 
resurrected the Ancien R6gime practice of holding 'hostages' when French commissioners 
fell into the hands of the coalition and certain prisoners of war were designated as the 
guarantee for their safety. " The broadest measure of hostage-taking came after the 
surrender of Toulon to the British. From 9 September, all British subjects arrested in 
France were to be considered hostages who would answer for the conduct of Admiral 
Hood. Workers, artists'et autres citoyens utiles' would be exempt from this law. " 
"AP, 1xvii, 145,150. 
'Nathiez, La Revolution et les efrangers, 13 5- 13 6. 
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The Convention was finally persuaded to overcome its initial squeamishness about 
overstepping traditional practices by the mysterious activities of a British agent in Lille in 
the summer of 1793. The Convention voted on I August to arrest all subjects of enemy 
powers, and not just the British, who had arrived in France since 1789. " The law went 
beyond the reprisals traditionally accepted as part of the droit des gens. For this reason, 
doubts were raisedabout the applicability of such a sweeping measure only days after it 
had been voted, although such backpedalling was not popular with some deputies. "' 
Local authorities meanwhile immediately implemented the law, but took on board the 
objections expressed in the Convention, as the Observatoire section in Paris did between 3 
August and 21 October. The section arrested twenty-four foreigners and left five at large. 
Of those arrested, three were subsequently released. Leniency was shown to enemy 
subjects who did not appear to pose any serious threat to domestic security, such as an 
Irish cleric from Douai who was vouched for locally and two Piedmontese residents of a 
hospice venirien. The comiM de surveillance proved even more reluctant to arrest 
foreign patriots and allowed seven British subjects to live under house arrest because an 
inspection of their papers'iYa offert que des preuves du plus pur civisme'. " 
Elsewhere, authorities took similar initiatives to soften the impact of the law. On 19 
August, two repHsentants en mission to Alsace issued an arret which exempted from 
arrest all foreigners who worked in manufactures useful for the war effort, provided they 
were not suspected of incivisme and were vouched for by two good citizens in their 
municipality. "' When the Convention reviewed its measures with the decree of 6 
September, " Garnier-Saintes persuaded his colleagues to pass precisely the same 
exceptions as permitted in Alsace. In the Observatoire section, Nicholas Joyce and 
Christopher White, both associates in a cotton manufacture, were denounced as British 
subjects on 16 September, but left at liberty by the comiM de surveillance because of their 
occupation. " Foreigners in France for their education were also exempt, provided the 
people with whom they lodged vouched for their civic virtue, as one of Jacques-Louis 
David's pupils found early in October . 
21 The new law also protected from arrest any 
foreigner who could proviae evidence of 'civisme et d'attachement i la R6volution 
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"Mathiez, La Rivolution et les itrangers, 145 - 146. 
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frangaise'. These wide loopholes were remarkable because only days earlier news of 
Toulon's surrender to the British on 27 August had arrived in Paris. 
As many as the exemptions were, the new law went further than that of I August, as 
neutral subjects were required to prove their civisme. Those who did so received a 
certificat dhospitaliM, while those who failed were to be expelled as suspects. In 
practice, some were imprisoned, because on 7 June 1794 the Committee of Public Safety 
had to order the release of neutrals who had been arrested under this law, on the grounds 
that they should have been expelled instead. ' Institutionalised suspicion was now aimed 
at foreigners of all nationalities, and not just at enemy subjects. The law of 6 September 
also permitted French citizens to challenge any declarations or proofs of civisme 
submitted on behalf of foreigners and to denounce those they believed suspect. The new 
decree encapsulated a blend of pragmatism which recognised that many foreigners were 
useful to the economy and the war effort, but also of the growing phobia of foreign 
subversion. Revolutionary rhetoric was increasingly identifying certain nationalities, 
namely the Spanish and the British, as the nemesis of the Revolution. 
Even so, the first measure aimed at a specific nationality was less a step towards 
'nationalising' the war than a resort to repr&ailles. The first seizures of property were 
inflicted on the Spanish in reprisal for the behaviour of their government. The expulsion 
of French citizens from Spain, the Spanish government's confiscation of their property and 
sale 'au profit des Espagnols qui ont souffert de la R6volution frangaise and stories of the 
relentlessness with which Spanish creditors were pursuing their expelled French debtors, 
all combined to persuade the revolutionaries to overcome their reluctance to seize Spanish 
property. Expulsion of enemy subjects and the confiscation of their property were 
employed in wars prior to the Revolution. None the less the revolutionaries believed that 
the coalition powers took such measures with more abandon than they might have done if 
they were waging war against a'legitimate'European sovereign. The French response on 
16 August 1793 was a deliberate mirroring of the Spanish measures. All property 
belonging to Spanish subjects in France would be seized and sold for the benefit of those 
French citizens who had been expelled from Spain and lost wealth in the process. All 
debts owed by these individuals to Spanish creditors would be frozen until further 
notice. ' What followed, however, was certainly a departure from past practice. On 7 
"MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 8 ('Rapport pour le Con-dte de Salut Public 
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September sequestration was extended to include the property of all enemy subjects. 
None the less, the revolutionaries were uncertain about the legitimacy and consequences 
of this measure, which was repealed on 13 September, only to be reimposed the next day 
after protests from the Paris Jacobins. 1' 
The contrast between the revolutionaries' resolve over the decree of 16 August and 
their wavering over that of 7 September is revealing. While the one could be justified on 
the traditional basis of repr9sailles, the other was more novel. The revolutionaries were 
reluctant both to abandon their cosmopolitan pretensions and to take unprecedented 
measures whose commercial and political consequences were unpredictable. When 
Delaunay d'Angers of the Finance Commission reported back on the confiscation of 
property on 20 September, he said that the committees of finance, commerce and Public 
Safety were reluctant to implement the law against all enemy subjects because it would be 
contrary to the Revolution's own principles of the sanctity of property. British and Dutch 
subjects who had acquired property in France tended to be 'des v6ritables amis de notre 
r6volutiod. The Convention was clearly given food for thought, as it delayed discussion, 
for three days. ' 
By the time they reconsidered the measure, however, events had outpaced Delaunay's 
considerations. Frustration at British tactics in the war had been mounting since the 
summer when, on 8 June, the British government's Orders in Council allowed the Royal 
Navy to seize any ship bound for France. On 9 October, news arrived in Paris that 
Beauvais, the captured reprisentant en mission to Toulon, had been executed. The 
rumour was false, but it hardened attitudes towards the British, who were by law already 
considered hostages. On the same day, the Convention decreed the arrest of British and 
Hanoverian subjects and the seizure of their property in France. " The fact that both 
measures had already been decreed on I August and 6-7 September suggests that the 
revolutionaries believed that the earlier decrees had been only partially enforced and that 
they wanted no exceptions to the law. Among the victims was Walter Boyd, the banker, 
who had fled the country and whose house at Boulogne was searched and sealed, while all 
food and livestock found on the property were seized by the commune on 19 October. " 
NAP, lxxiii, 491; lxxiv, 46; lxxiv, 106 - 108. 25Ap, lxxv, 362 - 365. 26Ap, lxxvi, 286 - 288. 
"AN, BB/3/72, dossier 14 (Comite de Surveillance de la Commune de Boulogne prýs 
Paris: Proc6s Verbal de visitte et autres chez le C. Boyde', 28 Vend6miaire 11,19 October 
1793). 
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Even those whose credentials suggested loyalty to the Revolution suffered. Thomas 
Clarke, from Limerick, had served in the French navy during the War of American 
Independence, though he was never formally naturalised. His sons were serving 
revolutionary France, one in the army, the other as a corsair. Nonetheless, his commercial 
establishment at Bordeaux was confiscated. Other British subjects therefore had no 
chance of escaping the seizure of their property, whether they were merchants like James 
MacCulloch at Roscoff and the Galway brothers at Nantes, or landowners such as the 
Irish peer Lord Trimbleton, whose house in Toulouse and land in the Haute-Garonne and 
the Lot were seized. ' 
Arrests began promptly, too. As Sir William Codrington put it, he was arrested 
because 'it was taken much amiss that my countrymen should accept of a town that was 
very kindly offered to thenf. ' For the first time, the students at the English, Scots and 
Irish Colleges, who up to now had been explicitly exempted from laws against foreigners, 
were incarcerated. In the Observatoire section of Paris, nine students, a doctor and a 
tutor of the Irish College were arrested on 10 October. Artisans who had been working in 
France for at least six months were however exempt. In Le Havre on 12 October, 
representants en mission supervised armed citizens who scoured the city and arrested all 
British subjects who remained there. The next day the comiti de surveillance of 
Boulogne, near Paris, arrested all British subjects living in the commune. In Paris at least 
160 and perhaps as many as 250 British subjects were arrested by virtue of the law of 9 
October. " Even those Britons whose politics had previously protected them were now 
exposed. John Hurford Stone was arrested and held for seventeen days in the 
Luxembourg before being released. The seven British subjects who in the Observatoire 
section had been placed under house arrest in August because of their 'patriotism' were 
now sent to the former English Benedictine monastery. " As even those Britons who 
repudiated their government were affected by this law, accident of birth became more 
important than individual virtues. 
"Vidalenc, J., 'Quelques cas particuliers du cosmopolitisme en France au XVIIIe siMe', 
Annales historiques de la RivolutionfranVaise, xxxv (1963), 203 - 204. 
29QUoted in Alger, Englishmen in the French Revolution, 292. 
IOAN, F/7*/2514 ('Section de I'Observatoire: Comit6 de Surveillance, proc6s-verbau)e); 
BB/3/72 (Cornit6 de Surveillance', Boulogne, 22 Venddmiaire 11,12 October 1793); AP, 
IxKvi, 286 - 288,318 - 319,599; Gerbod, 'Visiteurs et r6sidents britanniques dans le Paris 
r6volutionnaire', 339; Alger, Englishmen in the French Revolution, 334-3 49. 
31 Alger, Englishmen in the French Revolution, 65; AN, F/7*/2514 ('Section de 
I'Observatoire: Comit6 de Surveillance, proc6s-verbauie). 
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Such a development did not go unopposed. Pons de Verdun suggested on 13 October 
that the British were ready to overthrow their government and so the measure would be 
counterproductive. " Saint-Just none the less returned three days later to defend the 
policy of the committees. Rather than revoke the law, he proposed to extend the arrests 
to all enemy aliens, but at least restricted the sequestration of foreigners' property to 
Spanish and British subjects. The property of all other nationalitigs remained untouched, 
as the government sought to maintain commercial relations at a time when France was 
otherwise dangerously isolated. Numerous demands for exemptions from arrest for 
foreign patriots were however brushed aside by Robespierre and Bar&e. The latter 
replied that the arrest of such victims of tyranny would be temporary and for the security 
of the Republic. Moreover, 'beaucoup d'6trangers sont venus pr6cisement sous le masque 
de patriote pers6cutds, afin de mieux nous tromper et par U s'introduire partout. Ainsi, 
point d'exception! ' None the less, the Convention charged the Committee with 
considering just that. " 
The government's determination might have stemmed from an urge to lock up anyone 
who might have posed a danger of conspiracy in the wake of Fabre Aglantine's 
denunciation of a'foreign plot' on 12 October. One exemption admitted was that on 
workers and artisans who had been in France for more than six months, a rule which could 
be very widely interpreted. On 17 October, a Dutch shipbuilder, Matther, protested his 
patriotism and his usefulness to the Republic to secure exemption from arrest. " John 
Hurford Stone and his wife secured their freedom because they both worked as printers. 
James White, who was working on navigation methods for river boats, was also set free. " 
On 3 November, Desmoulins persuaded the Convention to vote that doctors were not 
liable to arrest'comme ouvriers de la sant6'. "' The Observatoire section therefore released 
an Irish doctor named MacSheehy, who was given a carte dhospitalW. The same section 
had also lent its support to the petition of his son, Roland, and Bartholomew Murray, both 
students at the Irish College, for their release in order to join the French navy. " Such 
32 AP, lxxvi, 49 1; Mathiez, La Rivolution et les &rangers, 15 6. 
33A, p, IxKvi, 63 8- 63 9; Mathiez, La Rivolution el les itrangers, 15 7- 15 9. 
MAN, AFAI/61, plaquette 447 (Petition of Matther to the Committee of Public Safety, 26 
Vend6miaire 11,17 October 1793). 
MAP, lxxxi, 704; lxxxiii, 48. 
MAP, JXXViii, 
. 3'AN, AFAI/61, plaquette 447 (Revolutionary Committee of the Section de I'Observatoire 
to the Committee of Public Safety, 29 Pluvi6se 11,17 February 1794); AN, Fn*/2514 
('Section de rObservatoire: Comitd de Surveillance, proc6s-verbau)e). 
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initiative by local authorities reflects the lethargy with which the Committee of Public 
Safety approached the task of considering general exemptions to the law. The 
Convention issued it with a reminder on 10 December, which went unheeded. " 
That foreigners may have been increasingly regarded as incapable of the kind of 
patriotic virtue required to serve the Republic is suggested by the decree of 25 December. 
This law excluded all foreigners from the right to 'repr6senter le peuple frangais', which 
sealed the fate of Thomas Paine and Anarcharsis Cloots. "' Denied their immunity as 
deputies, they were arrested soon afterwards. None the less, more important than an 
exclusive patriotism may have been an urge to reduce to impotence those whose political 
views and associations were regarded as dangerous. Paine, of course, was considered a 
Girondin and his other activities seemed to harm France's relations with the United States. 
Meanwhile, Cloots provided a very different political target. It was his presence in the 
Jacobins which had also provoked the expulsion of foreigners, bankers, priests and nobles 
from the club on 12 December. Robespierre instigated what appeared to be a general 
measure, but the real target was Cloots for his role in dechristianisation and for his 
association with political extremiStS. 41 The foreign nationality of Paine and Cloots was, 
arguably an excuse for the exclusion of two potentially damaging opponents of the 
revolutionary government. 
Otherwise foreigners retained positions in French administration at all levels. In Paris, 
a Neapolitan teacher of Italian named Tosi was president of the comW Hvolutionnaire of 
the Bonnet-Rouge section, on which the Milanese Piccini also served. Italians were still 
more numerous on the committee of the La Fontaine-de-Grenelle section. The Genevan 
Sandoz was active in politics in the section de Wnit6, while the Swede Lindberg was 
closely associated with Vincent and Momoro in the section Marat. Outside Paris, the 
commissaire de subsistances of Saint-Denis was an Englishman named Devonshire and in 
Cahors, the mayor who held office throughout the Year II was Swedish. " The Irishman 
Nicholas Madgett, a former student of the Irish College in Paris, was head of the bureau 
de traduction attached to the Committee of Public Safety. " Those foreigners still 
considered patriotically sound by the government were protected. As the law of 25 
38 Mathiez explains the Committee's silence by suggesting that, for the time being, it had 
got what it wanted: a breach of commercial relations with Britain, but the maintenance of 
them with the rest of Europe (La Nvolution et les etrangers, 160). 
39", lxxxii, 303. 
'Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, 247 - 250. 
"Cobb, 'Quelques aspects de la mentalit6 r6volutionnaire', 109. 
4'Elliott, Partners in Revolution, 60. 
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December was passed, Robespierre spoke out for those Belgians and Li6geois who 
performed their public duties honourably. " 
Once it had destroyed the Dantonists and the H6bertists, the Committee of Public 
Safety presented a decree on'police g6ndrale'to consolidate its hold on the country. 
Among its main targets were foreigners and the ex-nobility. The law of 27 Germinal 11 
(16 April 1794) included in its provisions the expulsion of enemy subjects from Paris, 
frontier towns and ports for the duration of the war. They were forbidden to attend 
political clubs, to sit on comitis de surveillance or in the assemblies of communes and 
sections. Nonetheless workers employed in the manufacture of arms, women who had 
married French patriots, foreign retailers and those aged below fifteen and above seventy 
years old were exempt from the law. Furthermore., the Committee of Public Safety was 
empowered to 'requistion' whomever it saw fit, which entailed exceptions from the rules. 
Immediately, the Committee used this power to exempt all soldiers from the law. The 
next day, Couthon secured further exemptions for those foreigners who had lived in 
France for twenty years, or for six years if they had married a French citizen. On 25 April, 
the Committee informed the Convention that it had also exempted patriot refugees from 
Belgium, Li&ge, Mainz and the United Provinces. The next day, it bowed to commercial 
motives and exempted citizens of all Hanseatic towns. Trumpeting its own 
humanitarianism, it also forbade officials from separating women and children from their 
husbands and fathers and exempted pregnant women. " 
The Committee also used its powers of requisition to exempt a wider range of 
foreigners. There were those who were not engaged in the manufacture of arms, as the 
strict letter of the law required, but whose work still contributed to the war effort, such as 
manufacturers of sails. A British manufacturer of soap in Calais named Rush and his 
workers were requistioned. Eventually the Committee took under its wing any merchant 
or manufacturer who had practised their trade for at least six months in a list of ports and 
frontier towns from Saint-Omer and Sedan in the north to Agde and Marseille in the 
south. When it was discovered that the printer and his workers responsible for the 
publication of the General Maximum prices in Calais were Dutch, the Committee 
promptly requisitioned them. "' Far from any direct involvement in the war effort were the 
Italian and German musicians of the 7hidire du Lycie des Arts and Lazzari, the Italian 
43Ap, lxxxii, 303. 
44Ap, lxxxviii, 649,711; lxxxix, 347,401 - 402. 
4'AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 445 (Riquisitions of 29 Germinal 11,18 April 1794; 10 Flor6al 
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owner of the 7WIre des Vari&is Amusantes on the boulevard du Temple, whose 
petition was supported by eighty-seven signatures . 
4' Foreigners who had the backing of 
their sections could make a strong case, as the Italian Piccini found when his colleagues 
on the comW de surveillance of the Section du Bonnet-Rouge defended him asun 
r6publicain sans-culotte'. "' Other individuals were given special dispensation to live in 
Paris for a limited period while they concluded their affairs. 48 
The exemptions suggest that the decree of 27 Germinal was not applied as widely as its 
sweeping provisions at first suggest. " It was limited in effect by the two factors which 
made the Terror less exclusive and less xenophobic than the rhetoric might imply. Firstly, 
foreigners who showed a clear commitment to the Revolution and, more precisely, to the 
government, were sheltered from the law. Secondly, the revolutionaries were reluctant to 
expel from its main centres of manufacturing and commerce all those foreigners who 
could contribute to the war effort. 
The legislation aimed at foreigners during the Terror cannot be explained only by a 
retreat from cosmopolitanism. The 'nationalisation' of the war certainly owed much to the 
evolution of a more exclusive patriotism and the decree of I August 1793, placing all 
enemy subjects under arrest, went beyond traditions of reprisailles. The law suggested 
that the war was being waged against whole peoples, and not just against their 
governments. This seemed to be confirmed by the still more uncompromising law of 16 
October, which admitted no exceptions except for artisans. 
The reasons for this development might be explained by developments in revolutionary 
ideology, which, focusing increasingly on the survival of France itself, implied that 
patriotism could only be the reserve of French people. None the less, more traditional 
prejudices were also at play. Revolutionary ideology gave novel expression to fears of 
foreign subversion and xenophobia but it did not create these anxieties. What brought 
them to a new pitch was the unprecedented intensity and adversity of the war combined 
with the internal political conflict and civil strife. These circumstances brought out some 
of the exclusive tendencies in revolutionary ideology and more traditional phobias. The 
'AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 448 ffh6itre du Lycde des arts, Jardin Egalit6% 3 Flordal 11,22 
April 1794; Lazzari to the Committee of Public Safety, n. d. ). 
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measures against foreigners were therefore responses to the various political and military 
crises, but responses conditioned by ideological developments and deep-rooted prejudices. 
However serious the implications of a retreat from the expansive cosmopolitanism of 
1792 were, some revolutionaries were reluctant to abandon altogether the universalist 
claims of their ideology. If during the Terror patriotism increasingly meant loyalty 
focused on the government, in much of the rhetoric the work of the Committees still 
represented the best hope of mankind to enjoy liberty. If only for purposes of motivation 
and propaganda, some revolutionaries still implied that the rights of man - and therefore 
patriotism - were not the reserve of any specific nationality. So foreign individuals and 
groups whose loyalty to the government was unquestioned were protected from the laws 
against foreigners. 
The problem was that such demands for loyalty made the circle of true patriots, French 
or foreign, an increasingly exclusive club, even though it cut across lines of nationality. 
Far more important, therefore, than exemptions based on political ideology were those 
based on more pragmatic grounds. Most revolutionaries were not blind ideologues led 
only by their principles or prejudices. The Terror was increasingly justified by an appeal 
to unbending revolutionary ideals, but some revolutionaries were painfully aware of the 
scale of the difficulties faced by the government. In need of the skills and commerce 
which foreigners offered, the authorities at all levels sought to protect those who were of 
some use to the war effort. A similar pragmatism ensured that the confiscation of 
property was limited to use either as a reprisal, as in the case of the Spanish, or from 
economic calculation, as in the case of the British. As in every regime since 1789, 
pragmatism ensured that the revolutionaries did not always live up to the implications of 
their rhetoric. 
ii 
Pragmatic as some revolutionaries were in their approach to foreigners, the war and 
domestic political confrontations led many to be extremely sensitive to evidence, no 
matter how spurious, of enemy subversion. Fear of conspiracy was present in 
revolutionary thinking as early as 1789 (and even before that), but it was the intensity of 
the war and of revolutionary politics, both of which were life-and-death struggles in the 
Year 11, which made revolutionaries so ready to believe - and to use - the allegations of a 
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'foreign plot'which emerged in the autumn of 1793. The conspiracy was denounced on 
separate occasions by two deputies: by Fabre Aglantine around 12 October 1793, and by 
Frangois Chabot a month later. It gave rise to some of the most bitter feuding among the 
revolutionaries during the Terror. It eventually provided the revolutionary government, 
and Robespierre and Saint-Just in particular, with the spurious evidence necessary to 
condemn both wings of the opposition, the 116bertists and the Indulgents, with complicity 
in a wide-ranging plot inspired and funded by Austria and, in particular, by William Pitt. 
At the core of the 'conspiracy' was the attempt by five deputies to the National 
Convention to blackmail the East India Company. They allegedly threatened its closure 
on ruinous terms unless the company directors were willing to pay substantial bribes in 
order to secure a more favourable decree of liquidation. It has been suggested that there 
was more to the conspiracy than just financial corruption and that there was also a 
political dimension behind the behaviour of those involved. " Fabre certainly claimed that 
the plot was a political one against the republic by extremist revolutionaries who were in 
the pay of foreign agents. The extremists involved were the 1-16bertists Desfieux, 
Dubuisson and Pereira, while the foreign agents were three Belgian bankers, the Swiss 
radical Grenus and, above all, the Belgian financier Proli and the Austrian Frey brothers. 
In addition, Fabre claimed that the foreigners involved were being protected by the 
deputies Chabot, Julien de Toulouse (both until 14 September on the Committee of 
General Security) and 1-16rault de S6chelles (who was also a member of the Committee of 
IOMathiez claims thatTaffaire d'agiotage se doublait d'une intrigue royaliste', behind which 
were the British and Austrian governments ('Le Comit6 de Salut Public et le Complot de 
I'Etranger (octobre - novembre 1793)', Annales historiques de la Rivolutionfrangaise, iii 
(1926), 318). Norman Hampson accepts that there was more to the plot than the false 
decree, but is more cautious than Mathiez in his approach to the evidence. He merely 
suggests that Chabot's description of a 'vast double plot ... was probably 
largely fictitious, 
but that its ramifications went further than Chabot himself imagined. (Trangois Chabot 
and his Plot', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series, xxvi (1976), 13 - 
14). Michel Eude, however, separated the East India Company scandal from other 
'conpiracies', implying that it should be treated strictly as an affair of financial corruption, 
in isolation from any'foreign plot' or royalist intrigue (Une Interpr6tation "non- 
Mathidzienne" de I'affaire de la Compagnie des Indee, Annales Historiques de la 
RgvolutionftanVaise, lifi(1981), 239n. ). This, however, is to ignore some of the strange 
behaviour of the denouncers, the denounced and the revolutionary government alike 
during the inquiries into the allegations, behaviour which has been carefully considered by 
Hampson. Hampson suggests, tentatively, that some members of the government were 
protecting the royalist baron de Batz; that certain members of the government may have 
been involved in corruption of their own; and that Mert, the vocal, extreme left-wing 
journalist, kept'surprising company, including that of royalists and foreign agents 
('Frangois Chabot and his Plot', 6,8,13). 
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Public Safety). The foreign agents were paying these people to'hand over government 
secrets to the enemy. " 
In Chabot's version, given on 14 November to Robespierre personally and then to the 
Committee of General Security, there were two branches of the plot, one involving the 
corruption of deputies and the other entailing the slander of those who could not be 
bribed. Ultimately, the objective was to destroy the Convention through internal purges 
and bring about the restoration of the monarchy. The mastermind of the plot was the 
baron de Batz, a known royalist who had made a daring attempt to rescue Louis XVI on 
his way to execution, and behind him was British gold obligingly supplied by Pitt. 
According to Chabot, those involved in the corruption side of the plot were the deputies 
Delaunay d'Angers and Amar, a member of the Committee of General Security; the , 
duchess de Rochechouart, another known royalist, and Benolit, an agent of the baron de 
Batz. - Those involved in the slanderous side were the artist Jacques-Louis David, who 
was also a member of the Committee of General Security; Men and his wife; Lulier, the 
procurator of the Department of Paris. Most sensationally of all the defamatory side of 
the plot also included men in the Commune, the ministry of war and the 'revolutionary 
army', in other words, the sources of Hdbertist influence and power, which, claimed 
Chabot, were ridden with British agents. As evidence to support his accusations, Chabot 
deposited 100,000 fivres with the Committee of General Security, money which Chabot 
claimed was intended to bribe Fabre for his signature. " 
The evidence substantiating both men! s claims is flimsy indeed and it seems that Fabre 
and Chabot both made their denunciations to throw up smokescreens behind which they 
could hide their own financial speculations involving the East India Company. At the 
same time, they sought to discredit their individual political opponents, some of whom 
had been violently persecuting Chabot in particular. Three things are certain. Firstly, five 
deputies, including Fabre, Chabot, Delaunay d'Angers, Julien de Toulouse and Basire 
were implicated in the falsification of a decree which would be published as the definitive 
version of a law made by the Convention. What these deputies, except Basire, had in 
common was that they were members of the Convention! s Commission of Finances, 
established in July 1793 to examine the state of the Republic's finances. Secondly, on the 
suggestion of this Commission, the Convention voted on 8 October 1793 to liquidate the 
"Details of Fabre's denunciation may be found in Mathiez, A., La Conspiration de 
Ittranger (Paris, 1918), 1- 13; Mathiez, La Rivolution et les elrangers,, 164; Mathiez, 
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East India Company. Delaunay d'Angers, who presented the bill, suggested that the 
CompanyWould be responsible for its own liquidation. Fabre Aglantine and 
Robespierre, however, persuaded the Convention to vote an amendment so that the 
Company would be wound up under the supervision of government representatives, to 
ensure fair play with the remaining funds. Carnbon, another member of the Commission 
of Finances, had a further amendment passed which would ensure that the government 
would not have to take responsibility for the debts of the Company. These two 
amendments made the law less favourable to the Company than Delaunay's original bill. 
Thirdly, when the decree voted by the Convention was published, it was not the amended 
version voted by the Convention, but one which suppressed the essence of Fabre's 
amendment, although it retained Carnboes. It also added two provisions favourable to 
the East India Company. " 
There is absolutely no concrete evidence of foreign involvement in the scandal and it 
may have been no more than a case of financial corruption. This, at least, was what 
Amar, who was put in charge of the investigation by the Comn-dttee of General Security, 
concluded in his reports to the Convention on 13 January 1794, after Fabre's own arrest, 
and on 16 March, after the arrest of the Hdbertists. Amar may have had his own personal 
reasons for skirting around the issue, but on 16 March, Robespierre had the Convention 
send Amar's report back for amendment to include Touvrage de 1'6tranger. " The'proof 
of the involvement of foreign agents was provided only by Fabre in his denunciation and 
by the circumstantial evidence which surrounded the characters implicated. Even fewer 
details of foreign influence were provided by Chabot. None the less, circumstances 
worked in at least four ways to make their denunciations believable to the government and 
to the people at large. 
First of all, the main foreign protagonists mentioned by Fabre had already given cause 
for suspicion. Proli had a chequered background. Believed to be the illegitimate son of 
the Austrian chancellor, Kaunitz, he had acted as an agent for the Emperor until the 
French Revolution, where he had hurled himself into radical politics to such an extent that 
by 1793 he was closely associated with the H6bertists. Along with the Spanish adventurer 
Guzman, he met with militants from the Parisian sections in the caf6 Corazza in the first 
few months of 1793. After the riots of 10 March, both Proli and Guzman were 
"AN, W/342 (plaquette 6483, pike 14), reproduced in Eude, 'Une Interpr6tation "non- 
Mathi6zienne" de I'affaire de la Compagnie des Indes', 259 - 261. 54Ap, bcxxiii, 289 - 292; Lxxxvi, 553 - 557; Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, 379 - 380. 
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denounced for their roles by Girondins and Montagnards alike. The Frey brothers were 
born Siegmund and Emmanuel Dobruska in Moravia, had been agents of the Emperor 
Joseph II and were ennobled under the title Sch6nfeld. They arrived in France in April 
1792 with their sister, Uopoldine (whom Chabot married), changing their name to Frey. 
Like Proli, they associated themselves with left-wing politics. " Fabre was therefore 
believed by the government, and by Robespierre in particular, not least because his claims 
seemed to confirm that the extremist opponents of the government and the militant 
leadership were acting with sinister, ulterior motives. 
Secondly, Fabre's charges against the extremists were merely confirmed by the 
subsequent behaviour of some of those he had denounced. Proli and Pereira, for example, 
joined that other foreigner, Cloots, in the Parisian dechristianisation campaign in the last 
months of 1793. When Fabre's denunciation was apparently confirmed by Chabot's on 14 
November, the, involvement of these foreigners in dechristianisation suggested that there 
was a movement by the enemies of the Revolution to alienate the vast majority of French 
citizens by attacking their religious beliefs. Dechristianisation, Robespierre and his closest 
colleagues assumed, threatened to broaden the Vend6e into a more generalised revolt. 
For some members of the government, dechristianisation was therefore bound up with the 
foreign plot. On 21 November, Robespierre denounced dechristianisation as 'le piege que 
nous tendent les ennemis de la R6Publique et les liches imissaires des tyrans etrangers'. 
He named some of these agents, including Dubuisson, Proli ('1e v6ritable chef de la 
clique'), Desfieux and Pereira. " These were the very people whom Fabre had denounced 
in October, but who also happened to be both leading H6bertists and involved in 
dechristianisation. There was no concrete evidence that they were the agents of foreign 
powers and it does seem that Fabre was merely using this accusation as a device to 
weaken his opponents. If these were his intentions, he was for the time being successful. 
Robespierre secured the expulsion of all foreigners from the Jacobin club on 12 
December, although the main target was Cloots himself. " 
Thirdly, there were genuine enemy agents at work in France, such as d'Antraigues and 
the baron de Batz, the latter of whom Chabot implied was the mastermind of the whole 
scheme. " If Chabot's evidence is of dubious value, the British themselves were certainly 
"Mathiez, La Rivolution et les itrangers, 10 1- 106,111 - 117,123,157; Hampson, N., 
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engaged in admittedly limited activity. The Lille portfolio allegedly belonging to a British 
spy and presented to the Convention on I August was probably a fake. The period of the 
Terror witnessed only the small beginnings of operations of the British secret service in 
France. None the less, by October 1793 the British secret service, for all its limited funds, 
had developed a weekly mail service between Jersey and royalist rebels on the Breton 
coast. " Revolutionary phobia about foreign espionage during the Terror was not entirely 
unfounded. ' As the government knew something, if only rumour, of genuine intrigue by 
the royalists and the British, they were more likely to accept that there was some 
substance to the accusations of both Fabre and Chabot. 
Fourthly, the Committee of Public Safety had independent, if spurious, evidence that 
Wrault de S6chelles was, as Fabre claimed, handing secrets over to the enemy. From 2 
September 1793 to 22 June 1794, an alleged secret agent sent twenty-eight bulletins to 
Francis Drake, Grenville's agent in Genoa. They claimed to be reports on the 
deliberations of the Committee of Public Safety and Drake forwarded these bulletins to 
Grenville in London. The French government was aware of them through its agent in 
Constantinople, Henin, who was given copies of two of the reports by his friend, Las 
Cazas, Spanish ambassador to Venice. " The reports are riddled with obvious 
inaccuracies, and should not have alarmed the government. "' None the less, Wrault de 
S6chelles had already been accused by Fabre in October as one of those selling secrets to 
the enemy. As a Committee member he had employed as agents none other than 
Dubuisson, Proli, Desfieux and Meira, all of whom were also denounced by Fabre. The 
seeds of suspicion were already sown among his colleagues on the Committee. The 
government was not above using such equivocal evidence as the bulletins to support their 
case against him, particularly when it believed him to be guilty anyway. Las Cazas's first 
"Cobban, A., 'The British Secret Service in France 1784 - 92', Aspects of the French 
Revolution (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968), 227; Mitchell, H., 7he Underground War 
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Today xii (1962), 160 - 162. 
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Life and Opinions ofMaximilien Robespierre, 214 - 215 and Hampson, Danton, 173. 
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letter to Henin, incorporating the first bulletin, was read before the Revolutionary Tribunal 
when H6rault was tried along with the Dantonists. " 
These four factors provided what passed for substance to the 'foreign' dimension of the 
conspiracy. After hearing Chabot's denunciation on 14 November, the government put 
Fabre himself and Amar in charge of the enquiry. Arrest warrants were issued for three 
members of the Commission des Finances, Chabot, Basire and Julien de Toulouse; for 
Chabot's fiiends Proli, the Frey brothers and their Danish secretary Diedrichsen; for the 
baron de Batz; for the Belgian bankers Simon and Duroy; and for the Fl6bertists Desfieux, 
P6reira, Dubuisson and Du Busscher, who had of course also worked as agents abroad for 
Wrault de S6chelles. All but Batz, Proli and Julien de Toulouse, who escaped, were 
imprisoned. '4 When the false decree itself was examined by the Committee of the 
General Security on 4 January 1794, Fabre's part in the falsification became known and his 
turn for arrest arrived eight days later. H6rault de S6chelles himself was not arrested until 
17 March, after the H6bertists and before the Dantonists, probably because he was too 
powerful a figure to touch any earlier. 
In the end, both wings of the opposition suffered for the'foreign plot'. While this affair 
provided the justification for the government's destruction of both the 116bertists and the 
Dantonists, the actual confrontations were still trials of political strength. On both 
occasions, the Committees struck only when they felt strong enough to do so: the rhetoric 
of conspiracy was not enough to dispatch their opponents. It was only when the 
government had successfully destroyed its most vociferous critics that conspiracy could 
became the tool by which the government sought to impose its own authority on the 
Revolution. It could cow the surviving revolutionaries by linking all opposition into the 
same, overarching plot, implying that to criticise the government was to tread down the 
same dangerous path to oblivion as the 1-16bertists and the Dantonists. Thelawof'police 
g6n6rale' of 27 Germinal, for example, targeted foreigners and aristocrats in particular, 
implying that if France still faced a severe crisis, it was not due to the shortcomings of the 
government, but of hidden conspirators. In turn, this stressed the continuing need for the 
Committees and the system Of centralised Terror. In was also in this atmosphere of 
paranoia, made all the more pressing owing to the apparent abundance of evidence 
justifying it, that the infamous laws of 7 and 22 Prairial (26 May and I June) were passed. 
"Mathiez, La Rivolution et les &rangers, 
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In urging the Convention to pass the second decree without delay, Robespierre again 
painted a sinister picture of foreign conspiracy in France: 'cette multitude innombrable 
d'agens 6trangers qui abondent sur sa surface'. "' The foreign conspiracy therefore came to 
justify not only the elimination of identifiable opposition, but also the intensification of the 
Terror. 
The obsession with foreign conspiracy cannot be laid solely at the door of 
revolutionary ideology. In the first place, the fears both of foreign interference in French 
politics and of conspiracy itself can be traced back to the political culture of the Ancien 
Rdgime. Nor was the evidence available, however circumstantial, entirely the product of 
the paranoid imaginations of the revolutionaries. Furthermore, if the vagueness of 
conspiracy theories allowed them to be amorphous and therefore all-embracing, the 
foreign conspiracy of the Year Il was murky not because it was imaginary, but because 
there was corruption which its protagonists did their best to hide. That revolutionary 
politics were accompanied by such hidden, backroom dealings suggests that recent 
historiographical trends in examining the Revolution in terms of the very public sphere of 
ideology, 'discourse' and other forms of 'political culture' may only provide part of the 
explanation as to what happened and why. To explain the Revolution's radicalisation, its 
descent into Terror and the nature of the Terror solely in terms of the public world 
assumes that we know everything needed to explain the course of the Revolution. If the 
foreign conspiracy of 1793 - 1794 tells us anything, it is that we do not. 
III 
The same suspicions which had confronted regular foreign regiments in 1789 now 
shadowed foreign generals and legions in the Republic's service. Generals as a whole had 
long been considered warily by civilian politicians in Paris and Robespierre demanded the 
expulsion from the Jacobins of all foreign generals 'auxquels nous avons imprudernment 
confie le commandement de nos armdee. ' Without much evidence to support mistrust of 
foreign generals, nothing came of this request for the time being. It did not take long, 
however, for respectability to be lent to Robespierre's suggestions. When general 
Dumouriez slipped away into the night and across the lines to the Austrians on 6 April 
"Robespieffe, Oeuvres, x, 485. 
'Quoted in Mathiez, La R9volution el les 9trangers, 127. 
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1793, two foreign generals were implicated. Count Joseph Miaczinsky, who had fled 
Poland in the summer of 1792, was charged with complicity and Francisco del Miranda 
with misconduct during the entire campaign in the Low Countries. Miaczinsky was 
executed on 22 May 1793, but Francisco del Miranda was more fortunate. Paine, Joel 
Barlow, Thomas Christie and John Hurford Stone testified in his favour before the 
revolutionary tribunal and he was acquitted on 16 May. Nonetheless, he was rearrested 
on 9 July, suspected of being one of Pitt's agents because of his friendship with Stone. In 
the spring of 1794, he was accused of complicity in aprison conspiracy' to free the 
Dantonists, allegedly hatched by Arthur Dillon, for which that Berkshire-bom general was 
executed on 14 April. "' At the other end of the political spectrum, Karl von Hesse- 
Rheinfels, who boasted of the title 'General Marat' during the siege of Lyon, was relieved 
of his command on 13 October 1793 for his aristocratic background. He was imprisoned 
on II November for his ties with the Hdbertists and there he remained for more than a 
year. 68 
Miaczinsky, Miranda, Dillon and Hesse-Rheinfels all fell foul of the government for 
their failure to keep in step with the narrowing political orthodoxy in this period of the 
Revolution. It was this, rather than their foreign origins, which condemned them to death 
or imprisonment. In the desperate climate of the Terror, military failure could also be 
defined as treason, as Miranda had discovered and which Dublin-bom general Charles 
Jennings Kilmaine, general James O'Moran from Elphin and the aged marshal Luckner 
discovered to their cost. Military reverses brought a long spell in prison for Kilmaine and 
his wife from August 1793 to July 1795, while Luckner was executed at the end of 1793, 
with O'Moran following in his footsteps on 6 March 1794. ' Foreign generals suffered for 
the same failings as their French counterparts, such as alleged betrayal, their lack of zeal 
and their failures. 
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Xenophobia also was only one of many factors which led to the demise of foreign 
legions. Reports of confrontations between these troops and the local French citizenry, 
allegations of financial mismanagement and, worst of all, of lack of political zeal if not of 
outright counter-revolutionary intent dogged these units. These problems, piled on top 
of logistical issues such as recruitment and desertion, led the revolutionaries to believe, as 
they had done with the Swiss regiments not a year before, that having foreigners in 
separate units was more of a liability than an advantage. They were made obsolete as the 
vanguard of liberating French armies when the Propagandist decrees were revoked on 13 
April 1793. Worse, this militant crusade had been associated with Dumouriez and the 
Girondins and their links to both reinforced the impression that they were politically 
suspect. Dumouriez had been one of the prime movers in the recruitment and supply of 
the legions and his personal ambitions in the Low Countries made the Dutch, Belgian and 
Li6geois legions seem a party to them. His defection naturally left their commanders 
embarrassed. Matters were to get worse with the fall of the Girondins. The explicit role 
of the legions to help 'revolutionise' neighbouring peoples bound them irrevocably to 
'Girondid war policies. After 2 June, the legions were not only irrelevant to the defensive 
war now being fought, but highly suspect because in both their conception and their 
purpose, the legions could be regarded as the creatures of the discredited Dumouriez, the 
Girondins and the foreign policy which they espoused. 
These suspicions were promptly acted upon. Marat supported a campaign by French 
officers serving in the Ligion germanique against the commanders and twenty-four 
officers who were arrested and imprisoned in Tours on I May. The official reason was 
that they had creamed off the legion's funds into their own pockets, but it was not long 
before political elements were added to the charges. " The German officers were accused 
of mistreating 'patriot' soldiers. The Jacobins, of Troyes and Montargis had already joined 
their voices to the chorus by accusing them of incivisme. Prieur de la Marne, the war 
commissioner at Tours, added his own ingredients to this incriminating cocktail by saying 
that the legion recruited German-speaking prisoners of war: 'Des Frangais peuvent-ils se 
reposer sur des capitulations faites avec des hommes pris les armes i la main contre la 
"SHAT, Xk3 (Rapport G6n6ral i la Convention Nationale ainsi qu'a ses Comit6s de Salut 
Public et Mlitaire r6uni concernant I'Affaire de la Ugion Germanique Msent6 
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Rdpublique? ' The Convention decreed an investigation on the recruitment and finances of 
the legion. " Matters were made worse when the Vend6ans took Saumur on 9 June and 
footsoldiers in the legion deserted to the rebels. " On 26 June, the brigade commander, 
general Fabrefond, was ordered to disband the Ligion germanique. " 
Lack of faith over their political commitment led the revolutionaries to imply that the 
foreign legions did not have the patriotic fervour required to fight for the patrie. On 10 
November 1793 Gossuin, speaking for the comW de la guerre, advised that the legions 
henceforth be used solely in the interior 'afin de rendre la d6sertion moins facile'. 74 As 
foreigners, they were unlikely to be squeamish about deployment against the French 
population and in fact most legions had been used since the summer not at the front, but 
in the provinces. The Li6geois, Savoyard, Dutch and German legions were variously used 
for requistioning grain, repressing the Federalist revolts in Lyon, Marseille and Toulon 
and against the Vend6e . 
75 Such a use of foreign troops in a counter-insurgency and 
policing role led to accusations of brutality towards the French population. Immediately 
after Prieur had made his damning report on the Ligion gerinanique on 3 May, Couthon 
rose and denounced the Ligion Kellermann, Wi se trouvent bien peu de Frangais, for 
murder and pillage. The Convention ordered the Comn-dttee of Public Safety to gather 
information on all foreign legions with a view to taking relevant security measures. " The 
legions were rapidly stimulating the same hostility and distrust as the old foreign 
regiments. 
Besides the questions of loyalty and discipline, there were difficulties of recruitment 
which made questionable the viability of the legions as independent units. Many of them 
were incapable of recruiting enough men from among the nationalities for whom they 
were intended and had to resort to recruiting French citizens. The Deuxijme Legion 
balave reviewed at Saint Omer on 31 May 1793 had a total strength of ninety-nine men, 
of whom six were absent without leave. While eleven of its thirteen officers clearly owed 
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their origins to the Low Countries, the nationality of the sixty-four riflemen is not clear. 
None the less, it was not disbanded until after the Terror. " Makketrosý chasseurs- 
tirailleurs nationaux bataves were not so fortunate and were disbanded on 12 October. 
When the Convention abolished the first Ligion batave on 6 November, there were 
precious few Dutch Patriots swelling its ranks, but substantial numbers of French, 
Prussians, Austrians and Britons. " Four days later, Gossuin told the Convention that a 
regular Belgian regiment raised during the French invasion of the Low Countries had 
merely thirteen men in the ranks. " 
If the revolutionaries were suspicious of the legions as autonomous units, they were 
reluctant simply to get rid of soldiers whose experience and numbers, however small, 
might still prove useful. A decree of I August 1793 had already provided for the 
incorporation of depleted Belgian regiments into regular French corps. Now the law was 
implemented. The decree of 10 November suppressed all Belgian and Li6geois units, but 
ordered all troops from the Low Countries to assemble at P6ronne by 25 November. 
There they would be reorganised into new hataillons de firailleurs and identified by 
numbers. In other words, there were to be no references to their separate nationality and 
the foreign element would be gradually diluted by French recruits. " In the event, five 
battalions were raised, each commanded by a Belgian or a Li6geois and composed of 
Dutch, Belgian and Li6geois troops. " Even the disgraced L40on germanique was not 
washed off the hands of the revolutionaries. The infantry were redesignated as the 22nd 
Light Infantry and the cavalry as the II th Hussars, but they were no longer to recruit only 
German-speakers. 
As the Terror progressed, so the demands for the right political loyalties became even 
more urgent. Any officer whose political orthodoxy was in doubt was refused a position. 
Since its disbandment in June, those officers of the German Legion who were not actually 
arrested were dismissed and found it difficult to obtain new positions. " When on 4 
October 1793 Makketros presented a list of seventeen officers to be approved by the 
"SHAT, Xk46 CInfanterie: 2e, e Ugion Batave. Extrait de la Revue faite i Saint Omer 
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ministry of war for commands in the Dutch chasseurs-tirailleurs, the ministry disapproved 
of every one of them, quite possibly because Bouchotte saw in them the proteg6s of 
Dumouriez and the Girondins. Eight days before the legion was actually disbanded, the 
officers were still protesting 'du patriottisme [sic] le plus pur'. " A few days after the 
disbandment the legion, Makketros was suspended, which elicited protests from nine of 
his officers who attested to their colonel's credentials as a 'brave Patriote hollandais, qui 
meritait un meilleur sort'. "" In fact, Makketros had already been denounced to the 
Committee of General Security as an'homme de mauvaise fbiby the comitj de 
surveillance of the Paris Bonconseil section on 16 September for his lack of zeal in 
suppressing brigandage in the Meaux area. " The problem was that a good republican to 
the 1-16bertist war ministry was not likely to coincide with the government's view, 
particularly when Robespierre and his allies began to lash out against extremism towards 
the end of 1793. Those who survived the ideological screening of the ministry were less 
likely to meet with the same success once the government had decided to curb the 
116bertists. On 20 January two of the leading officers of the I Ith Hussars, Avice and 
Haindel, were dismissed by the Committee of Public Safety. More than two and a half 
months after his patron Ronsin was guillotined along with other H6bertists on 24 March, 
Avice was still asking the Committee for his position back. 16 
As with the regular foreign regiments, the revolutionaries were concerned less about 
the foreign nationality of the legions than about their loyalty to the cause. Some of the 
evidence certainly suggests that the revolutionaries believed foreign troops incapable of 
the same patriotism required of French soldiers. None the less, the use of foreign legions 
in the interior and their redistribution into new units once they were disbanded shows that 
the revolutionaries were still not opposed to the use of foreign troops. The Convention 
naturally remained reluctant to shed experienced troops and the French army was always 
in need of numbers. The government was willing to retain foreign officers and foreign 
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soldiers provided that their revolutionary credentials remained unimpeachable. The 
disbandment of the foreign legions occured less because of revolutionary xenophobia (the 
continued use of foreign officers, generals and troops distributed among French units 
testifies to that), but because their leadership and their purpose were associated with the 
Girondins. Their credibility as independent units was shattered by their inability to recruit 
enough foreigners of the relevant nationality. With the war of propaganda now 
discredited, their main function as the vanguard of the liberating French armies was now 
irrelevant. The war now focused on the defense of the patrie and to ensure that the 
remaining foreign troops identified with that struggle, they were denied separate units 
with a foreign identity. 
The suppression of foreign legions raised the question as to what to do with foreign 
deserters. Foreign deserters had been allowed to join the French army, and the legions in 
particular. It was becoming clear, ý however, that many enemy deserters had crossed the 
lines less out love of the French Revolution than because of an understandable desire to 
escape military discipline, mutilation and death. 'German and Austrian deserters sent to 
fight in the L6gion de la Moselle were accused of indiscipline and bad behaviour by 
general Custine in May 1791" Robespierre went so far as to suggest that deserters might 
have been planted in France by enemy powers as spies and saboteurs. On 29 July, he 
persuaded the Jacobins to re ect the appeal of an Austrian officer to obtain permission for 
him and his comrades to march on the Vendee. " 
The behaviour of deserters, the cost and the problems of dealing with them ensured 
that the bounties offered when they joined the French army began to grate with the 
revolutionaries, who were well aware that French volunteers were given no such 
enticement. On 2 December Gossuin reported on the daily abuses caused by the 'affluence 
des d6serteurs dans nos arm6es, et des avantages qui leur sont accord6s'. The Convention 
not only withdrew the bounties offered in the decree of 2 August 1792, but also denied 
deserters the right to enrol in the French army. Instead, they were to be employed in 
some other useful task. " 
On 20 December, the Executive Council issued instructions to the commanders of each 
army to march the foreign deserters serving at the front to the rear, disarmed and under 
"AP, 1xv, 53 - 54. "Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, 43 - 45. "AP, lxxx, 562. 
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escort if necessary. There, departmental and municipal authorities were asked to '6tablir 
un r6gime qui puisse empEcher que la chose publique ne regoive aucune atteinte de 
Vhospitalit6 accord6e aux d6serteurs. " What this meant was that the freedom which 
deserters had been given was severely curtailed, although conditions varied from place to 
place because of the latitude which the order gave to local authorities. In Poligny in the 
Jura, foreign deserters were simply locked up in a maison d'arret on 21 December and 
were still there twenty months later. Henceforth, even if deserters were to be allowed to 
wander freely in their allocated town, there is clear evidence of hardening attitudes. 
Before the law of 2 December, only two Spanish deserters had been imprisoned in 
Quigney in the Doubs. - and they were only held overnight. Between 24 January and 22 
September 1794, however, no less than 105 deserters were held, before being conducted 
elsewhere. "' 
Deserters were to be employed in public or private works because 'le produit servirait i 
d6frayer de leur entretien. "' In practice, work was not always found, especially when they 
were sent to live in small, agricultural villages: two deserters who arrived in the commune 
of Villedommange near Rheims on 19 July 1794 did not find work until the grape harvest 
began on 22 September. None the less, the Committee of Public Safety ordered on 17 
July 1794 that those deserters or prisoners of war who refused to work would be 
imprisoned until the end of the war. ' Those who could not fend for themselves through 
illness, injury or want of opportunities were, however, to be given ten sous a day for their 
subsistence, and a 24-ounce ration of bread, which was the standard ration for the French 
army. 94 The freedom allowed to foreign deserters since 1792 had certainly been reduced 
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by the beginning of 1794, but the order of 17 July 1794 meant that in monetary terms 
deserters who could not work were actually better off than before, as the daily allowance 
amounted to 182 livres 10 sous a year. None the less, the conditions in which they lived 
now converged with those of prisoners of war. 
The original freedoms offered to prisoners of war were circumscribed. They were now 
held in depots designated by the local authorities and penned in by National Guardsmen or 
the gendarmerie. They still received subsistence money according to rank and offered the 
same rations of bread as soldiers in the French army. "' In some localities, they were 
allowed some freedom to roam. In Moulins, the comW de surveillance gave money and 
thanks to some Prussian prisoners who played music during local balspatrioliques. The 
authorities at Montpellier may have feared that Spanish prisoners were sowing the seeds 
of Tanaticism! amongst local women, and at Valence a British captive may have got into 
hot water for 'des propos tendant a semer la terreur et le d6couragement', but these fears 
are no less an indication of the freedom allowed to prisoners of war in the Year IL" 
Exchanges of prisoners continued as before, and new guidelines for French 
commanders were set down on 25 May 1793. The law still allowed prisoners surplus to 
those exchanged to be repatriated provided they gave their word of honour that they 
would not rejoin the enemy army. Their names would be recorded by both sides and 
counted against any future exchanges. Despite their public rhetoric, therefore, the 
revolutionaries still retained a belief - at least until the summer of 1794 - that certain rules 
of war would be followed by the oppositions generals. The urgency for such exchanges 
was voiced in terms of the expense of keeping prisoners of war: on 2 December, Merlin 
de Thionville warned that serious delays in repatriating enemy prisoners had its toll on the 
war effort. He reported that the administration of the Seine-et-Marne had complained of 
these 'nombreux esclaves'who'consomment aux environs de Paris des subsistances qui 
sont n6cessaires aux d6fenseurs de la patrie'. 1' 
Econon-dc motives, however, were not the prime mover behind the terrible decree of 7 
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hanovrierf. " The British had long been accused of violating the conventions of ý 
eighteenth-century warfare - and with some good reason. They had been the first to forge 
French currency and prevent food from reaching French ports. The Convention had heard 
stories of British atrocities: on 11 September 1793, after the first French victory of the 
year at Hondschoote, Bentabole, the commissioner attached to the army of the North, 
wrote to his colleagues of the massacre of French prisoners of war by the British and of 
the killing of a child near Lille. 'Hitons-nous donc, Bentabole concluded, Vemployer 
tous les moyens pour exterminer ces barbares indignes du nom d'hommes'. " Such rhetoric 
attempted to dehumanise the enemy by placing them outside the human race and therefore 
beyond the rules of normal warfare, in much the same way that political opposition in 
France was con-dng to be regarded by some revolutionaries as outside the nation and 
therefore not protected by the usual legal guarantees. The law of 7 Prairial sprang from 
the same logic as that of the equally notorious law of 22 Prairial. " 
There was not, however, a natural or inevitable line of development and continuity 
from Bentabole's letter of September 1793 and the decree ordering the murder of 
surrendering British and Hanoverian troops, for two reasons. Firstly, many 
revolutionaries still clung to the belief that the British people were mostly opposed to Pitt 
and the war. This changed in February 1794 when Robespierre brought the Jacobins to 
their feet by condemning the British people as well as their government. Conformity now 
demanded the use of similar language from all revolutionaries, although the response of 
the Jacobins also suggests that a deep-rooted anglophobia was being tapped. From then 
on, the sort of language employed by Bentabole months earlier was given more 
respectability. Secondly, anglophobia was turned from words into deeds with the 
assassination attempts on Collot dHerbois and Robespierre on 20 and 23 May. On 26 
May Bar6re tied these attempts to the British and drove the Convention into a frenzy by 
listing atrocity after atrocity committed by the British government and armed forces. 
Some deputies began to cry out 'Gueffe i mort a tout soldat anglais ou hanovrienl' 
Bar6re had no difficulty in having the decree voted through. "' 
The enthusiasm with which civilians received the decree is, however, no indication as 
to how far the order was actually carried out. Fear of reprisals no doubt weighed on the 
"AP, xci, 4 1. 
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troops in the field, but so too did a revulsion at killing men who had thrown down their 
arms. The effectiveness of the decree was limited, therefore, with the army ignoring it. 
The law was certainly carried out at least once, when the frigate La Boudeuse captured a 
British merchantman - in other words, a civilian vessel. The captain reported that he had 
transferred the crew to his ship and had them shot. '02 This appears to have been the only 
recorded instance of the law being literally executed. 
In the period of the Terror, official revolutionary attitudes towards foreign troops 
swayed between pragmatism and the depths of nihilistic xenophobia. The cosmopolitan 
appeal of 20 April 1792 for foreigners to range themselves under the banners of the 
French Revolution had been all but forgotten. The repudiation of the Edict of Fraternity 
rendered separate foreign legions obsolete and problems of recruitment and desertion 
underscored their impracticality. Some revolutionaries even suggested that foreign troops 
were not capable of the ideological commitment to the patrie which was demanded in 
such trying times. It was perhaps in answer to this suspicion that the political loyalties of 
the officers were closely monitored. If such scrutiny signalled the end of a career for 
many foreign officers, it did imply that patriotism, meaning loyalty to a particular 
republican orthodoxy, was still not an exclusively French virtue even if it was restricted to 
a select few. At one and the same time, such surveillance allowed the revolutionaries to 
calm their own fears about foreign counter-revolutionaries in the army, while justifying the 
retention of some foreign troops and officers on the grounds that they were politically 
reliable. A certain pragmatism underlay this logic, as the war demanded supplies of 
cannon-fodder as well as experienced troops. The revolutionaries did not, therefore, 
dogmatically exclude foreigners from service in the French army simply because they were 
foreign. Even after they disbanded the legions, they distributed the remaining troops 
among regular units. Officers, however, needed political credentials which fitted the 
exacting demands of political orthodoxy. It was this last factor, more than the ideological 
retreat from the universal pretensions of revolutionary principles, which determined the 
fate of many foreign troops. If it was not incompetence or failure, what doomed certain 
foreign soldiers to death, imprisonment or inactivity was their failure to show loyalty to 
the government. Those officers and units who were tied too closely to patrons such as 
Dumouriez, the Girondins and then the H6bertists were cast under suspicion. 
"Hampson, 'The idea of the nation in Revolutionary France, 25. 
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On the other hand the revolutionaries gave more expression to xenophobia when they 
dealt with foreign deserters and prisoners of war. This can be seen in the ban on foreign 
deserters from joining the ranks and in the law of 7 Prairial. The dangers of disorder in 
the countryside and in frontier towns lay behind the decision to demobilise foreign 
deserters, march them to the rear and closely guard them in the interior. This obsession 
with security was driven by a fear of foreign spies and conspiracies. The withdrawal of 
deserters from the front was a repudiation of the optimistic invitation given in 1792 to 
enemy troops to taste the fruits of liberty in France and to support her cause. The 
intensity of xenophobia was not the exclusive product of revolutionary ideology, but 
ideology gave it an expression peculiar to the Revolution. The tendency to regard the war 
as a manichean conflict between reason and darkness suggested that those who ought to 
have known better - the relatively enlightened British - were guilty of betraying the , 
legitimate aspirations of the human race. None the less, xenophobia - and particularly 
anglophobia - also grew from more traditional attitudes dating to long before 1789. If 
revolutionary ideology lay behind the law of 7 Prairial, the power and acceptability of its 
logic (if it can be called that in this context) was provided by anglophobia which stemmed 
from deeper cultural and political roots. Whatever its origins, the law of 7 Prairial was the 
negation of revolutionary cosmopolitanism. 
IV 
Before any laws were passedto change their increasingly isolated status as aberrant 
remnants of the old regime in France, the foreign clergy remained in the uneasy situation 
of not knowing whether they would survive either as an institution or as individuals in 
France. While their clerical status made them targets for hostility and harrassment it was 
their nationality which, in total contrast to most foreigners, decided their fate. None the 
less, certain clergymen and seminary students could still escape imprisonment and 
persecution if they had the right political credentials. For the revolutionaries even a 
foreign clergyman was capable of patriotism, if only very rarely. 
The law of 6 September 1793 decreeing the arrest of the subjects of enemy powers 
exempted all students under sixteen years old. Those over that age had to prove their 
civisme by the testimony of one good citizen. "' The students of the Irish College in Paris 
103Ap, lxxiii, 463. 
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took no chances, however, and two days later petitioned the Convention for exception to 
the law anyway, They argued that Irish Catholics had suffered proscription for many 
years, which was enough to be treated in the same way as Dutch and Belgian refugees. 
They added that the Irish people wished to follow the example of the French Republic. 
The Convention waved the petitioners away by saying that the law had already provided 
the exemption they requested. "' 
The pressure was not off, however, because when the Convention decreed the 
confiscation of enemy property on 7 September, Rdhl (who would later lead anti-clerical 
festivities in Rheims) suggested that the property of the foreign clergy in France be 
included in the decree. " The proposal was sent to the Committee of Public Safety for 
consideration, but any relief which the British and Irish clergy may have felt was 
shortlived, because on 15 September a bitter assault on the University of Paris and the 
Paris colleges was launched by the department of Paris. While it did not name the Irish or 
Scots colleges, both of which were affiliated to the university, it denounced all the 
colleges as barbaric remnants of the Middle Ages, 'le repaire des prejug6s entasses depuis 
des si6cles'. " The more positive aim of the petition was to have the Convention adopt 
the plans for education publique mooted by the comile dinstruction publique. Both 
elements of the petition came close to a direct attack on the Scots and Irish colleges. 
Both sent students to study in the university and both were religious establishments which 
would have no place in a secular, national education system. 
In the end, it was not their clerical status which destroyed the foreign colleges, 
monasteries and convents, but their nationality. The irony was that it was precisely this 
same factor which had protected them from the measures which had radically changed the 
French clergy since 1789. On 9 October the Convention ordered the arrest of all British 
and Irish subjects and the confiscation of their property. " The arrests began immediately, 
but many of the foreign houses were simply placed under guard in their own buildings 
rather than marched off to prison, as the students of the Irish College on the rue du 
Cheval-Vert and the English Augustinian, Conceptionist and Benedictine nuns in Paris 
discovered. " Elsewhere, however, British and Irish clerics and students were faced with 
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squalid conditions in capitivity. The English Benedictines of Cambrai suffered the deaths 
of four nuns and their confessor in January, 1794 while being held at Compi6gne. " The 
students and staff of the English College of Saint-Omer, which was closed down on 10 
October 1793, joined their colleagues from Douai in the citadel of Doullens in May 1794, 
where they lived without fuel, sleeping on straw and eating the daily ration of bread 
provided by the authorities. Some died in this state. "' The Irish clergy were treated with 
more leniency by the authorities, possibly because they were thought to be hostile to the 
British goverment. The students and clerics of the Irish College in Bordeaux were not 
arrested until December 1793, while the students and staff at the Irish College of Nantes 
were repatriated to Ireland., On 24 April 1794, ten of the remaining Irish students from 
the college in Paris were released from custody and given 500 livres each to defray the 
cost of their journey home. When they arrived at Dunkirk, however, the government had 
second thoughts and they were imprisoned in Arras for five months instead. "' 
It was no longer enough to be a constitutional priest to be protected from arrest as a 
British or Irish subject. In the diocese of Bordeaux, the decree of 9 October hurt even 
those who had taken the oath. In other words, nationality became the prime determinant 
of their fate. None the less, political orthodoxy could still protect even those who broke 
the law from the harshest penalties. Alexander MacDonald, a juror priest from the parish 
of Audenge, found himself hiding in Bordeaux to avoid arrest, but was captured and 
deported. He owed his arrest to his nationality and his deportation to his profession as a 
priest. The fact that he had been a constitutional priest probably saved his life, as Martin 
Glynn, a non-juror, also went into hiding, but was arrested and brought before the military 
commission of Bordeaux. On 7 July 1794, he was sentenced to death and guillotined. "' 
The contrast between the fates of the two priests who had broken the same law shows 
that signs of adhesion to the Revolution could still mitigate the worst penalties. 
This point is underscored by the experience of James Burke who had not only taken 
the ecclesiastical oath but had publicly expressed enthusiasm for the Republic and even 
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bought biens nationaux at Saint-Jacques d'Amb&s. As politically sound as he may have 
been, he could not change the original sin of his birth as an Irish subject and was duly 
arrested on 19 October 1793. Nonetheless, he was released twelve days later by the 
comiM de surveillance, probably for two reasons: his function as a farmer and evidence of 
his civic virtue. The former was clearly important for economic reasons, while the latter 
provided a guarantee of his good behaviour. Burke was shrewd enough, and perhaps 
sincere enough, to strike up a fiiendship with the repr&enlant en mission Ysabeau and he 
was not rearrested until after 9 Thermidor. "' Two Irish students in Paris, Bernard 
MacSheehy and Murray, were released on 13 October 1793 so that they could join the 
French navy, 'considdrant que le Patriotisme et le R6publicanisme de ces j eunes Citoyens 
ne sauroit parolitre douteux d'apr6s la correspondance trouv6e dans leurs papiers lors de 
leur arrestation. " Even a priest and seminary students who were subjects of an enemy 
monarch could remain at liberty if they showed enough civic virtue and had some luck 
with the authorities. It was no longer enough, however, merely to have taken the clerical 
oath for foreign clergy to escape persecution as British or Irish subjects. They had to 
demonstrate active enthusiasm for the Republic. 
If the arrests and imprisonment of foreign clergy provided the drama of persecution 
and suffering on a human scale, the real threat to the long-term survival of their 
institutions was the confiscation and sale of their property. The first steps coincided with 
the fever of dechristianisation in Paris. In October and November, the Commune sent its 
delegates from its commission of biens nationaux to take inventory of the property and 
rentes of the foreign establishments. "' The actual confiscation of property followed. 
Movable property as well as real estate was seized. In November 1793, sometime after 
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their convent had been converted into a prison; the English Benedictine nuns of the 
Faubourg Saint-Marcel saw their rentes stopped and their silverware confiscated by the 
section. At the end of the month, their copper and brass followed and the church was 
stripped of its fittings and furnishings. Apparently joining the fervour of 
dechristianisation, the militiawith joy n-dxed with fury ... kicked up and 
down the church 
what they threw down. "" At Saint-Omer, the English College saw all its property, 
including its buildings, rentes, furniture, silver and linen confiscated on 10 October 
1791"' The Scots College library was confiscated, although the principal Alexander 
Gordon had spirited some volumes back to Scotland in 1792. The college buildings and 
its farm at Grisy were seized. "' In December 1793, the buildings of the Irish College of 
Bordeaux were taken over by the president of the military commission, Jean-Baptiste 
Lacombe, for use as his offices and home. The right wing became a boarding school for 
children. "' 
The next phase was the actual sale of the confiscated property as biens nationaux, 
which was decreed on I February 1794. The principals of both the Irish and Scots 
colleges protested, but for the time being the sale did not go ahead. "' The fact that, like 
many former French convents and monasteries, some of the foreign clergy's buildings 
were being used as prisons and government offices may have been instrumental, but once 
the sales did go ahead, as they certainly did under the Thermidorians and the Directory, 
the re-establishment of the institutions was an uphill struggle for the foreign clergy. 
The fate of the foreign clergy under the Terror was determined by their nationality. As 
subjects of the king of Britain and Ireland they were liable to arrest and the confiscation of 
their property. The same factor which had shielded them from the force of revolutionary 
legislation now ironically made them doubly condemned to imprisonment and penury. 
The sin of their birth as British or Irish subjects made the fact of being a juror or non-juror 
almost irrelevant as far as the authorities were concerned, although the penalties imposed 
on a juror who broke the law might be less harsh than those which struck non-jurors. To 
avoid imprisonment, however, it was no longer sufficient simply to have taken the clerical 
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oath. To win their freedom, foreign clerics had to contribute actively to the political, 
economic or even military life of the Republic, These were the proofs of civic virtue 
which purchased certain clergymen and students their liberty. Otherwise the experience of 
imprisonment and the loss of their property led the foreign clergy to feet an acute sense of 
alienation from a country and a people which had formerly offered them asylum, but 
which had turned hostile. Such an experience certainly contributed to the failure of the 
foreign clergy to re-open their institutions in France, but even those who attempted to 
salvage something from the debris failed, with a few exceptions. Dramatic and terrible as 
the Terror was for the foreign clergy, what actually destroyed their institutions was the 
confiscation of their property. In the Year 11, this sequestration was not irreversible, 
because most of the buildings were used by the revolutionaries for official purposes. 
Once the Terror was dismantled, however, there was less need for these buildings and so 
their sale as bjens nationaux became more likely. For the survival of their houses in 
France, the worst was yet to come for the foreign clergy. 
V 
On 13 April 1793, the Convention revoked its Propagandist decrees and on 17 
November, Robespierre spoke on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety to outline its 
foreign policy. He confirmed the renunciation of revolutionary expansion and wars of 
liberation. The period between the end of March 1793 and 9 Thermidor 11 has therefore 
been characterised as the dark period for foreign patriots in France, in which the 
government was hostile to them and persecuted them because of the retreat from 
cosmopolitanism to a more exclusive nationalism. The revolutionary government, it is 
suggested, blamed foreign radicals for dictating an expansive foreign policy which had led 
to the over-extension of revolutionary forces and their disastrous defeats early in 1793. 
Their interests in such policies had led them into suspect if not treasonous associations 
with Dumouriez and the Girondins. When the crusade for universal liberty and the people 
who espoused it were discredited, it is argued, foreign patriots were left exposed to 
persecution by the revolutionary government. "' 
121For variants of this point of view, see, for example, Mathiez, La R&olufion el les 
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There is much to this viewpoint, but it begs the question as to whether foreign patriots 
suffered because of the retreat from cosmopolitanism or because of their political 
loyalties. In fact, behind the rhetoric, the treatment of foreign radicals by the authorities 
suggests that the revolutionaries' approach was a pragmatic one. While publicly 
disavowing the policies in which foreign radicals had set so much in store, there is 
evidence to suggest that both the Convention and the government recognised some 
obligation to the foreign refugees and envisaged some future use for them. Foreign 
patriots certainly suffered imprisonment and even execution, but usually for the same 
reasons as French citizens. They fell out of the ever-tightening net of political orthodoxy, 
because they failed to show sufficient loyalty to the revolutionary government. Those 
who had associated with the Girondins, with Dumouriez and later with the 116bertists 
were in trouble if they failed to renounce them in time. Even then, some could be 
protected by powerful figures, including Robespierre. Despite the 'nationalisatiod of the 
war, the important factor determining such protection seems to have been loyalty or 
usefulness to the government. 
It is certainly true that their environment was becoming increasingly hostile. The arrest 
of British subjects decreed on 9 October 1793, extended to all enemy subjects a week 
later, made no exception of foreign radicals. Nationality now threatened to cut across 
considerations of loyalty to the Revolution. This did not prevent some individuals from 
appealing to the revolutionaries' sense of universal values in order to secure exemptions, 
as four British patriots did in vain on 10 October in a petition to the Convention . 
122 
Among those arrested under this law was Samson Perry, who spent fifteen months 
between the Madelonnettes and the Luxembourg. Helen Maria Williams, arrested with 
her mother and sister on II October 1793, was held in the same prisons until her release 
two months later. Henry Stevens, author of Les Crimes des Rois dAngleterre, found that 
his work did not ingratiate himself to the authorities and he was arrested on 10 October 
1793 and held until 27 January 1795.11 Mary Wollstonecraft escaped imprisonment 
because her American lover, Gilbert In-day, registered her as his wife and, therefore, as an 
American citizen. "' On 21 October, the landlord of British patriots under house arrest in 
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the Observatoire section of Paris complained that they could no longer pay their guard 
and so they were transferred to the English Benedictine convent. "' 
These arrests show that nationality was beginning to count for more than political 
loyalty. When the law was extended to include all enemy subjects on 16 October, 
Robespierre accepted that lelle pourra atteindre quelques philosophes amis de ffiumanit6; 
mais cette esp6ce est si rare, que le nombre des victimes ne sera pas grand. "" In practice 
the revolutionaries backpedalled from the 'nationalisation' of the war, even if the rhetoric 
and the letter of the law suggested otherwise. The authorities, including Robespierre 
himself, protected some foreign radicals, particularly those whose sympathies were not 
obviously with the Girondins or with opponents of the revolutionary government. Helen 
Maria Williams was released after two months on the orders of Chaumette, procureur of 
the Paris Commune, despite her known Girondin sympathies. It is possible that she, her 
mother and her sister were not regarded as a danger. "' John Hurford Stone, who had 
returned to France in May 1793 to act as a witness in favour of general Miranda, was 
arrested as a British subject on 13 October, but was released with his wife after seventeen 
days, which suggests that political celebrity of the right kind could still ensure some 
Britons their freedom. Moreover, foreign patriots from the continent seem to have been 
treated with less rigour than their British counterparts. Throughout the Terror, there 
were German, Dutch, Belgian and Li6geois patriots at large in the capital and the 
provinces. While the Belgians, Li6geois and Mainz patriots were theoretically French 
citizens by virtue of the annexations decreed earlier that year, that Dutch Patriots such as 
Joannes de Kock and Johan Valckenaer should remain at liberty for months after the 
decree shows that even radicals of unequivocally enemy nationality were not harrassed 
simply on the basis of their country of origin. 
Despite the rhetoric and the letter of the law, the government was willing to harbour 
foreign exiles provided they were loyal and of some use. Although some were 
undoubtedly arrested and harrassed for their nationality, others found that the real 
problem was proving their fidelity and their usefulness to the cause. That meant matching 
up to the increasingly stringent demands of conformity. It was failure to meet tl-ds 
challenge, rather than their nationality, which brought the harshest penalties onto certain 
foreign patriots. The revolutionary government did not persecute foreign patriots on 
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principle. In fact, throughout the Year II the authorities provided subsidies or 
employment to six to seven thousand Belgian and Li6geois refugees and to six hundred 
German patriots, while maintaining the subsidies granted the Dutch Patriots since before 
1789. " Far from being reduced as the Terror developed, subsistence payments were 
systematised on 4 March 1794. The Convention put twenty million fivres at the 
disposition of the commission des secours for those patriots forced out of communes 
invaded by the allies. "9 Most of the handouts were given to French refugees but from 15 
March until 9 Thermidor, Li6geois, Belgian and Rhenish refugees received a total of 
220,620 livres, of which the vast majority Oust under 98%) were given to Belgians and 
Li6geois, with the remainder going to Germans. "o 
The exiles were also encouraged to find positions in the French civil administration or 
the military. On 14 June 1793 the Convention had asked the Committee of Public Safety 
to provide a list of civil or military posts which the refugees might usefully have filled. "' 
In September 1793 the department of the Meurthe gave several Mainz patriots jobs as 
guards in a maison nationale in Nancy. "' When on 25 December 1793, foreigners were 
excluded from representing the French people, Robespierre reminded the Convention that 
'vous avez ici des Belges et des Li6geois qui exercent avec; honneur les fonctions 
publiques, il serait peut-Etre injuste de les d6placer'. 1" The salaries of the administrators 
of the department of Jernappes, taking refuge in Paris, were drawn from the subsidies 
voted on 4 March 1794.134 
This suggests that despite the repudiation of the Propagandist decrees on 13 April 
1793, the French still felt obliged to those refugees who had stood up and welcomed their 
armies in 1792. Both the refugees and the Convention' s own committees claimed that the 
foreign patriots remained victims of their response to the French promise of fraternity, 
even if now that promise had been rescinded. M The sense of obligation to political 
refugees remained a heavy weight on the consciences of the revolutionaries, who kept 
paying the subsidies up to 9 Thermidor and beyond. Such support also implies that the 
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revolutionary government, despite its official statements on foreign policy, envisaged 
some future use for the foreign radicals. If 'Robespierrist' foreign policy publicly entailed 
the abandonment of any plans to liberate other peoples, this may well have been because it 
was forced upon the government by defeat. None the less, the revolutionaries certainly 
retained the hope that fresh victories might bring, if not a return of the over-zealous 
crusade for universal liberty, at least tremors within the political structures of enemy 
powers. "" Once the French reoccupied neighbouring territories, the foreign radicals who 
had been sheltered in France might provide a core of administrators and suppliers who 
knew the locality better than the invading French, but who might also be suitably grateful 
for their refuge during their exile. The government made use of foreign patriots in this 
way long before Thern-ddor: The Pisan radical Filippo Buonarroti met Robespierre and 
Saint-Just in Paris in 1793 and on 22 April 1794 he was appointed commissioner to 
Oneglia by the representatives on mission, Augustin Robespierre and Saliceti. Oneglia, 
where Piedmont had its outlet on the Mediterranean, had been invaded by the French and 
Buonarroti was chosen for his knowledge of Italian affairs and for his revolutionary 
sympathies. "' 
The revolutionary government did not, therefore, persecute foreign patriots as such, 
but rather struck at those whom it deemed suspect, which was admittedly an increasingly 
broad category. While some foreign radicals, especially the British, were certainly 
arrested for their nationality, some were released within weeks, while others remained at 
large. Radicals who were also enemy subjects were certainly still living freely in Paris by 
the spring and thereafter because the Comn-dttee of Public Safety issued exemptions from 
the law of 27 Germinal to Dutch, Belgian, Liegeois and Mainz patriots. "' When Helen 
Maria Williams and her mother were expelled from Paris by that same law, they were 
promptly recalled to the capital by the commissaires of their section. These officials had 
vouched for their civisme before the Comn-dttee of Public Safety, who requisitioned them 
for the Republic. "" 
These foreigners owed their freedom either to their usefulness to the revolutionary 
government or to the fact that their political ideas and activities did not appear to 
"'See, for example, Deforgues' reply to the Dutch Patriots on 25 February 1794 
(Godechot, La Grande Nation, 78). 
"'Godechot, La Grande Nation, 220 - 221; Blanning, Yhe French Revolutionary Wars, 
171. 
"'AP, lxxxix, 347. 
"'Williams, Letters containing a Sketch of the Politics ofFrance, ii, 11. 
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challenge its authority. The goverment's urge to impose orthodoxy in turn engendered a 
need to appear orthodox on the part of the foreign patriots, a need which had been 
developing since the spring of 1793 with the defection of Dumouriez. The Dutch Patriots 
Jan van Hooff had defied Durnouriez's orders to surrender at Breda in March 1793, but 
was arrested on his return to France for his ties to the general and was not released until 9 
Thermidor. "' The pressure to conform became more acute when the Girondins were 
purged. When on 17 July Georg Forster penned a petition from the 'Convention rh6no- 
germanique!, asking for'reuniod with France, he sought to underline the republican 
orthodoxy of the Mainz patriots by pron-dsing that when the city was relieved and the 
Prussians driven back the mqyenýais would send a deputation to Paris to celebrate the 
first anniversary of the overthrow of the monarchy. "' Although his sympathies lay with 
the Girondins, he showed enough acumen to run missions to the provinces for the new 
government, staying in Arras between August and November 1793. He died in Paris, 
disillusioned, on 10 January 1794.142 Adam Lux, an academic who accompanied Forster 
to Paris as part of the Mainz delegation, was less circumspect. After his horrified friends 
dissuaded him from committing suicide at the bar of the Convention as a means of 
bringing it to its senses, he published a pamphlet in which he accused the Jacobins of 
being responsible for the September Massacres and the downfall of the Girondins. He 
then pushed his luck too far when, despite Forster's advice to the contrary, he refused to 
destroy his manuscript eulogising Charlotte Corday, which was found when he was 
arrested. Lux was executed early in November 1793.143 
To be associated with the Girondins was to court the enmity of the purged Convention 
and the government. Paine's connections and the reasons for his arrest have already been 
discussed. "' Count von Schlabrendorff and Paul-Jeremie Bitaub6, both known for their 
I'Schama, Patriots atulLiberators, 159 - 160. 
141, ALP, lXiX, 175 - 176. 
"Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution, 313 - 314; Ruiz, 'Un regard sur le 
jacobinisme allemand', 263. 
143 Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution, 3 43 -3 44. 
144 See the beginning of this chapter. Also of interest in his fall from grace is the letter 
received on 18 June 1793 by the Convention from the citizens of Arras, which amounted 
to a timely renunciation of their'Girondid deputies for the Pas-de-Calais, among whom 
was Thomas Paine. The instigator of this move against Paine may well have been Joseph 
Lebon, who was Paine's suppliant, which meant that should anything have happend to the 
deputy, Lebon would take his seat (AP, 1xvi, 664; Conway, Yhe Life of 7homas Paine, ii, 
79 - 80). On 5 August, he was denounced in the Jacobins for 'des corespondances trais 
grandes [sic] en angleterre' and for being among the 'agens de Pitt' (AN, BB/3n2, dossier 
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fiiendships with leading Girondins, were arrested and held until after 9 Thermidor. Karl 
Reinhard, who owed his position in the ministry of foreign affairs to the Girondins, was 
fortunate enough to have been overlooked and was not arrested until days before the fall 
of Robespierre and his associates. "" Etienne Clavi&e, the Girondins' minister of finance, 
was among those arrested by order of the comiti insurrectionnel on 2 June. He remained 
in the Conciergerie until 8 December, when he was formally accused of financial 
corruption. That night, he committed suicide. His ffiend, Reybaz, was protected by 
diplomatic immunity, as he was now minister of the Republic of Geneva in Paris and he 
remained in that position until 1796.1' The few Spanish patriots in France, including 
Marchena, Hevia and Santivahez, were too closely associated with the Girondins to 
escapearrest. They had hoped join the two comilgs despagnols dinstructionpublique 
organised by Lebrun to spread propaganda in Spain on 25 April 1793. With Lebrurfs 
arrest, all were discredited and spent time in French prisons, where SantivAftez died. "' 
Organised groups of foreign radicals mirrored the Montagnard-Girondin divide. With 
Pierre Lebrun at the ministry of foreign affairs, the Li6geois naturally found the easiest 
corridors of communication leading to the Girondins, who along with Dumouriez had 
been the champions of their interests. None the less, in Paris twenty-three exiles from 
Franchimont were more radical than the rest - and had been since 1789. When Lebrun 
was purged from his office on 2 June, the Franchimontois minority celebrated by declaring 
their'enti6re adh6sion aux principes r6volutionnaires de la Montagne. Although the 
moderate Henkart wrote a letter protesting against Lebrun's arrest, from 6 June, the 
Li6geois tactfully disavowed their ties with the Girondins. Those members of their 
assembly who had publicly declared their support for Lebrun were purged. Now led by 
the radicals, the Li6geois effected a reconciliation with the Franchimontois in July, 
creating the Assemblie ginirale populaire des d-devantspays de LMge, Franchimont, 
StavelotetLogne. They proceded to denounce Ies Brissotins, Rolandins, girondins- 
Li6geois brulans partisans de I'Ex-ministre Lebrun' for'leurs sentimens perfides, inciviques 
et anti-Republicains. The thirty-eight strong 'Gironde li6geoise', as the moderates were 
known in Paris, were denied allocations of French subsidies. Henkart, the Fabrys and 
16 ('Extrait du proc6s verbal de la Soci&6 fraternelle seante au jacobins St Honnor6 
seance du 5 aoust 17931)). 
"'Ruiz, Un regard sur le jacobinisme allemand', 271 n. 42. 
14'136nkruy, LAtelier de Mirabeau, 436,438 - 439,442 - 443. 
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Lesoinne felt threatened enough to leave Paris with other moderates, leaving only 
Bassenge in the capital. "' 
Like their Li6geois counterparts, the Belgians sought to wash their hands of the 
Girondins. On 18 July 1793, the Assemblie des Belges in Paris declared its'adh6sion 
solemnelle ... i 
la Sainte insurrection du 31 may'. On 9 August, it declared its hatred of 
aristocracy and federalism, swore to defend to the death the new constitution and wept 
'des Larmes Sinceres i la mdmoire des Lepelletier et Marat'. Between 19 October and 17 
December, the assembly also underwent a scrutin epuratoire, in which four of ninety-five 
members were arrested, one rejected, two suspended and six simply declined to attend. 
The eighty-two orthodox members and the eighteen new members who subsequently 
enrolled received certificats de capaciM, which followed a format proposed by the 
ministry of the interior. The club was also obliged to submit its list of members to the 
municipality's department of police. " The Belgians were not only striving to conform to 
the dominant orthodoxy, but were being encouraged to do so under pressure from the 
authorities. 
The moderates and radicals among the Dutch Patriots were literally miles apart. The 
socW9 populaire des sans-culottes hollandais at Saint-Omer denounced the comitj 
rivolutionnaire batave at Boulogne to Deforgues as'des mod6rds, des hommes d'Etat et 
des cam6l6ons' on 27 October 1793. "' Deforgues became distinctly icy towards the 
latter, claiming on 6 November when approached by its members that he had not even 
heard of the comitg r6olutionnaire batave. The secretary, Dumont-Pigalle, wrote to his 
colleagues that it was dangerous for that committee to meet when the government did not 
even recognise its existence. "' It was fear, as much as arrest and execution, which 
paralyzed the activities of foreign patriots in France. 
Remaining within the net of political orthodoxy was not an easy feat in the autumn and 
winter of 1793 - 1794, as revolutionary politics remained fluid. Foreign patriots were left 
trying to anticipate where the current might flow, while at the same time certain 
revolutionaries and factions seemed to offer them more hope than others. Some patriots, 
"'AN, BB/3/72, dossier 99 CDu ci-devant Palais Cardinal ce 7 7bre 1793'); Harsin, La 
R&olution Digeoise de 1789,173; Raxhon, 'Les Rffigi6s Li6geois a Paris', 219 - 22; 
Delange-Janson, Amhroise, 36-37. 
"'AN, F/7/4420 (Trofession civique des Belges refbgi6s', 9 August 1793; 'Scrutin 
Epuratoire des Membres de I'Assembl6e generale des Belges refugi6s en France; Troc6s 
Verbaux de I'Assemblee des Belges i Paris'). 
"Mathiez, La R9volution et les eirangers, 3 8. 
"'Godechot, La Grande Nation, 79. 
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in their zeal to shed the blemishes left on their credentials by relations with Dumouriez or 
the Girondins, went to extremes. Anacharsis Cloots, for example, associated increasingly 
with the Mertists. Joannes de Kock had maintained, as a founder of the comitJ 
r9volutionnaire batave, close relations with Dumouriez and Lebrun. After 2 June, he 
swung all the way over to Mert, Cloots, Vincent and Ronsin. 152 The Belgian financier 
Proli, who had been close to Danton and Dumouriez until the spring of 1793, was drawn 
increasingly to extreme left-wing politics and was associated with the Mertists by the 
time the Girondins were purged on 2 June 1793. "' The AssemblJe des Belges, seeing in 
Cloots a vocal ally in the Convention who might keep the ideological war on the agenda, 
praised him highly in their meeting on 6 October 1793. Two members were sent to thank 
Cloots'et seffer avec lui des noeuds d'amiti6 & de fraternit6'. The Assembly was also 
affiliated to the Comitj central des sociMs populaires, one of the nerve centres of the 
popular movement in Paris. The Belgian assembly therefore placed itself on the radical, 
popular edge of revolutionary politics. On 29 October it subscribed to the 
dechristianisation which was blowing through the capital when, by acclamation, it adopted 
the arretj of the Comitj central which expelled all priests unless they formally retracted 
'les Effeurs qu'ils ont enseignes jusqdaujourd'hui. "" 
Such associations proved increasingly difficult to sustain as political orthodoxy came to 
be focused more on loyalty to the government. When the fracture of revolutionary 
politics between Indulgents and Mertists culminated in the revolutionary government 
asserting its authority in a double bout of political trials and executions, those associated, 
however tentatively, with one or other faction were exposed to persecution. Foreign 
radicals were particularly vulnerable because to some in the government, the struggle 
between the factions was tied to the mysterious 'foreign plot'. The first foreign victim of 
the backlash against dechristianisation and the foreign conspiracy was Eulogius Schneider, 
a leading member of the Strasbourg Jacobin club and now the public prosecutor at the 
local revolutionary tribunal. He was only one of many German radicals who had settled in 
Alsace, but he was the most notorious. As bishop Brendel's vicar, he abjured the 
priesthood in the cathedral on 20 November and adopted extreme policies akin to those of 
the Mertists in Paris. When the government condemned dechristianisation, Saint-Just 
and his colleague Lebas, on mission in Alsace, had Schneider arrested, exposed on the 
"'Rosendaal, 'Qui 6tait Vetre supreme pour les r6fugi6s bataves? ', 202. 
"'Mathiez, A., La Rivolution el les efrangers, 10 1- 106; Hampson, Dantoll, 10 1- 103. 
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scaffold next to the guillotine and dispatched to the revolutionary tribunal in Paris, where 
he was executed on I April 1794. He was accused by Robespierre of being Time du 
complot d'6trangee in Alsace. One of his followers, Johann Friedrich Butensch6n from 
Holstein, followed him to the Conciergerie in July, but was saved from the guillotine by 
the coup of 9 Thermidor. "' 
It was never more dangerous to be a foreign patriot involved in revolutionary politics 
than at this time. None the less, those such as de Kock and Proli who were actually 
executed died less because they were foreign, than because they were too implicated in 
opposition to the government. The xenophobic language engendered by the'foreign plot' 
certainly contributed greatly to the sense of unease among foreign radicals: Helen Maria 
Williams felt plagued by a fear of rearrest and in the spring of 1794 she left France for 
Switzerland, returning only after 9 Thermidor. 111 Those who had connections with the 
two 'factions' fell over themselves in an effort to disavow them. On 18 March, five days 
after the arrest of the 1-16bertists, the Li6geois radicals congratulated the Convention 
Vavoir encore une fbis sauvd la patrie', protested their 'coeurs r6publicains' and expelled 
from their assembly their extremist leadership. "' The Belgians had also indulged in their 
own factional struggles and were silenced by the arrests. "" 
With the destruction of the opposition, the pressure on foreign patriots to appear as 
orthodox supporters of the government was greater than ever before. In *June, the Dutch 
Socijtj des Montagnards organised a Festival of the Supreme Being, despite the 
misgivings of the Dutch Patriots. Johann Valckenaer, who had fled Paris to Bi6vres to 
avoid the possibility of persecution in the capital, withdrew from the Jacobin club there 
when the mother society in Paris expelled foreigners, In April he none the less obtained a 
testimony to his civisme from the local Jacobin club which applauded his manufacture of 
saltpetre and stated that his speeches were 'remplis du plus ardent patriotisme, de la 
morale la plus saine' and urged 'I'adoration d'un Ifttre Supr8me. It certainly helped that 
eighteenth-century Dutch Protestants frequently used the term 'Supreme Being' in 
reference to the Christian God. ` There were some who could not keep up the 
"'Mathiez, 'Les Citra et les Ultra!, Annales hisforiques de la Nvolutionfranvaise, iii 
(1926), 515; Hampson, Saint-Just, 155 - 157; Ruiz, 'Un regard sur lejacobinisme 
allemand', 264 - 265. 
"'Williams, Letters containing a Sketch of the Politics of France, i, 174 - 175,206. 
`AP, lxxxvi, 627; Raxhon, ! Les Rffigi6s Li6geois A Parie, 22 1. 
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"'Rosendaal, 'Qui dtait Ntre supreme pour les rdfugi6s batavesT, 203 - 205; Schama, 
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appearances of loyalty. The Dutch Patriots Abberna and Jan Bicker fled France, to 
Hamburg and Switzerland respectively. "' In May 1794, Oelsner fled Paris after a tip-off 
that he had been denounced. Georg Kerner, whose sympathies for the Girondins earned 
him a place on a proscription list in the summer of 1794, escaped to Switzerland with a 
passport issued through the good offices of Karl Reinhard at the foreign ministry. "' 
With its authority consolidated, however, the government could protect those foreign 
patriots whose credentials were not impeccable but for whom the government may have 
had some use. The moderate Li6geois officers Fyon and general Ransonnet were released 
from captivity in January and February respectively and remained at large throughout the 
spring and into the summer. When Fyon was accused by the Li6geois extremist Briart of 
'mod6ratisme', it was Robespierre who rose to Fyon's defence in the Jacobins on 7 April. "' 
On 25 April, the Committee of Public Safety exempted Belgian, Li6geois and Mainz 
patriots from the law of 27 Germinal expelling enemy subjects from Paris. That same 
date, Dutch Patriots were given a similar exception, provided they had arrived in France 
before 1790.1" The United Irishman Archibald Hamilton Rowan, escaped from prison in 
Dublin and sailed into Roscoff in Brittany, where he was promptly arrested. He was 
eventually released in June on the orders of the Committee of Public Safety, his 
credentials as a fugitive from an enemy power firn-Ay established. Conducted to Paris, he 
was lodged at the expense of the Republic while he was questioned on the political state 
of the British Isles. " John Hurford Stone, who had remained free since the end of 
October 1793, was rearrested on 24 April 1794, but released on condition that he left 
France, whereupon he joined Helen Williams in Switzerland. It was Robespierre who 
obtained him a passport, despite his alleged links to Julien de Toulouse, who was 
implicated in the financial side of the'foreign plot'. " When Benjamin Vaughan fled 
Britain in May 1794 his identity was initially protected by a handful of revolutionaries, 
including Gr6goire. When the Committee of Public Safety discovered his true identity, he 
"Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 160. 
"' Gooch, Germany in the French Revolution, 339,3 42. 
"'Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, 430; Raxhon, 'Les Rffigi6s Li6geois a Paris', 222; Mathiez, 
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was arrested on 2 June and held in the Carmes until the end of the month. Like Stone, 
Vaughan was released on condition that he left France and he took the road to Geneva. 
Both men had been cited by the British government for their connections with France. 
Herman, after interrogating Vaughan twice on the Committee's orders, accepted that 
Vaughan was threatened with a charge of high treason in Britain and recommended his 
release. " 
As news from the front at last became brighter in the summer, some members of the 
government may have been more convinced of the use of foreign patriots. While Fyon 
was re-affested on 18 July 1794, Bassenge, who was imprisoned in June, was released 
after pressure from Robespierre. Bassenge was due to meet with Robespierre on 8 
Thermidor to discuss the French liberation of Li6ge and Belgium. After Fleurus, members 
of the Committee of Public Safety actually opened discussions with Dutch Patriots, whose 
committee the government had refused to recognise only six months previously. '17 
While the retreat of revolutionary cosmopolitanism and the corresponding 
nationalisation of the war certainly led to the arrest of foreign patriots for their nationality, 
and particularly the British, many were subsequently released and large numbers remained 
at large. Those who did suffer on the scaffold were not executed simply because they 
were foreign patriots, but because of their compromising political connections. Rightly or 
wrongly, they were perceived as threats to the stability of the government. 
Despite the rhetoric which made all enemy subjects suspect, the revolutionary 
government remained surprisingly pragmatic in its approach to foreign patriots. The 
government supported foreign refugees throughout the period of the Terror, with 
subsidies and positions in the administration and army. Despite the uncompromising 
terms of the law of 16 October, most foreign radicals remained at large. They were 
explicitly exempted from the decree of 27 Germinal. It was as if the revolutionaries 
recognised an obligation to those who had declared themselves in favour of French 
principles and who were now suffering for that. More importantly, the government itself 
seems to have realised that, once the French armies triumphed again, they would need 
these people to help in the supervision of those territories which were occupied anew. 
The main condition for their freedom and for financial support was that their loyalties 
focused on the government alone. Those who successfully disavowed their former 
"Mathiez, La Conspiration de Egiranger, 262 - 264. "'Raxhon, 'Les Mugi6s Li6geois i Paris', 222; Godechot, La Grande Nation, 79. 
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connections with discredited revolutionaries remained at liberty. Even those who were 
arrested and who were deemed to be of no threat, or of some use, could be released. The 
Li6geois Fyon, Ransonnet and Bassenge, all with links to the Girondins and Dumouriez, 
benefited from this clemency in 1794, as did the British radicals John Hurford Stone, 
Benjamin Vaughan and Helen Maria Williams. Those patriots such as the Dutch, the 
Belgians and the Li6geois who successfully changed political colour apace with political 
developments, however, stored up problems for the future. If their ideology and their 
aspirations had to conform strictly to those of the Paris government, then foreign patriots 
were now more distant than ever from their native political culture and traditions. When 
they returned home, they might be aliens in their own land. 
vi 
For as long as the revolutionaries regarded the war as being one of the French people 
against despotic governments, foreigners who engaged in economic activity in France 
would remain unmolested. The declaration of I February, which placed British and Dutch 
subjects and their property under the protection of the law, remained in force until 
August. Gradually, however, the revolutionaries overcame their misgivings about 
disrupting trade. By the late summer of 1793 suspicion that foreign merchants and 
bankers were profiting from the decline 'in value of the Msipwts, speculating on 
exchange rates and exporting primary produce, either to make money or to destroy the 
French economy, led the government and the Convention to take measures to restrict their 
activities. Among the people who found their livelihood most disrupted were foreign 
merchants. 
For much of the summer of 1793 the plunging value of the assignat encouraged 
merchants to head for French ports to acquire cheap exports. As the vast majority of 
deputies to the Convention believed in the freedom of commerce, a controlled economy 
emerged only gradually in response to the crisis and under pressure from the Paris 
crowd. " The revolutionaries had to decide, firstly, whether or not the war was still one 
of peoples against governments, or one of nation against nation. In the former case, they 
could not make foreign merchants suffer for their nationality. In the latter case, the 
"'Lefebvre, G., 'Le commerce ext6rieur en Van 11', Etudes sur la RivolutiollfranVaise 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 241 - 242. 
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revolutionaries had to decide if disruption of trade was economically viable and of benefit 
to the war effort. 
At first, the revolutionaries sought to distinguish themselves from their enemies by 
stressing the freedom of commerce. When a British merchant named William Trqllope 
was seized by a French corsair and taken to La Rochelle, he was released by order of the 
municipality on 20 March 1793 and given a passport by the Convention on 8 April. On 4 
May the Convention ordered the return of three Dutch vessels taken by the Sans-Culotte 
de Jemappe. The revolutionaries were particularly sensitive to the treatment of neutral 
merchants. When, ten days later, a Danish ship was seized, the Convention agreed to 
lr6parer et A punir toute atteinte port6e au droit des gens par des citoyens franqais ... et i 
donner au commerce des nations neutres un t6moignage de son respect pour les droits des 
peuples'. On 10 April, the tribunal of Le Havre declared that the American merchantman 
Lawrence had been unjustly seized by a French corsair and the captors were ordered to 
pay compensation and a fine of 3,000 livres. 169 
The increasing scale of the war and pressure from certain militants led the 
revolutionaries to consider measures which slowly embraced economic warfare. When 
the losers in the Lawrence case appealed to the Convention's comili de marine, the decree 
of 9 May permitted French corsairs to seize neutral ships which carried cargo to or from 
enemy countries. American vessels were eventually made exempt from this provision on I 
July after vehement protests by the United States ambassador. "' 
The revolutionaries were unclear as to how far they wanted to restrict overseas trade. 
On one hand, they understood that poor treatment of neutral merchants was both 
politically and econon-dcally damaging. On the other hand, French trade was being hurt by 
the embargo imposed by the British on war materials. On 8 June, they extended their 
blockade to include foodstuffs and other essential produce and she received the support of 
Russia and Prussia, and put neutral powers such as Denmark and Genoa under pressure to 
conform. "' Moreover, with exchange rates favourable to exports, merchants and 
manufacturers in enemy countries might benefit from the purchase, resale or finishing of 
cheap French merchandise. The self-proclaimed leaders of the popular movement in 
Paris, particularly Mert in his Nre Duchesne, thundered against foreign merchants, 
"9AP, Ixi, 42 1; 1xv, 23 8; lxx, 69. 
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including neutrals, who were exporting food from France while sans-culottes went 
hungry. 172 
Foreign merchants, especially those who were enemy subjects, were among those who 
were not always able to do business without being denounced or suspected of 
correspondence with the enemy. In August 1793, three Belgian merchants were 
interrogated by the department of Paris's committee of public safety on being denounced 
for'coffespondance avec nos ennemis'., One of them was further 'soubsonn6 [sic] d'en 
itre Vespion'. They were arrested and sent to the Sainte-P61agie. These three men had 
been suppliers to the French army and were in Paris to claim payment from the 
government. As subjects of the Austrian emperor who were not refugees but 
businessmen, they could easily be pictured as enemy agents. While suspicion of this kind 
was not enough to arrest them, the discovery of a blank passport was. 173 In the 
atmosphere produced by the intense international conflict, what might have been normal 
behaviour in peacetime now seemed highly suspicious. 
The Convention, however, remained reluctant to stifle trade, especially when foreign 
vessels were bringing vital goods into French ports., The revolutionaries tried to restrict 
enemy shipping and to prevent the export of necessary produce, while keeping channels 
open for imports. On 1 August, the Convention revoked its order for the release of the 
three Dutch ships taken by the Sans-Culotte de Jemappe and banned foreign merchants 
from exporting of basic foodstuffs, fuels and fabrics a fortnight later, Meanwhile, on 3 
September the Convention allowed neutral ships which imported essential goods to leave 
with certain cargoes originally banned from export. A navigation act was adopted on 21 
September, which permitted foreign vessels only to import cargo which came from the 
ship's country of origin. The law was strictly applied, even to neutrals, On 9 October, the 
Convention heard a complaint from foreign merchants who had chartered a Danish ship to 
deliver wine and olive oil - clearly not Danish products - to a French trading company in 
Cette. It was seized by a French ship which disregarded its neutral status. The cargo was 
declared bonne prise and confiscated. "' While the seizure of Spanish property decreed on 
16 August was intended mainly as a reprisal, a similar measure aimed against the British 
on 9 October was also motivated by a desire to stifle British trade in France. A week 
"'Cobb, 'Quelques aspects de la mentalitd rdvolutionnaire', 104. 
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later, Saint-Just defended these measures, pointing out that the British had already 
imposed a food blockade and were printing forged assignats to undermine the French, 
economy. None the less, he recommended an embargo on Spanish and British goods, but 
rejected the extension of property seizures to other enemy subjects. Trade with Britain, 
he argued, brought in British manufactured goods and luxuries, imports which France 
could do without. Meanwhile, an embargo on British imports would protect French 
industry. On the other hand, trade with the rest of Europe provided essential materials for 
the war. "' 
Much as the revolutionaries hoped to maintain the flow of vital imports, in practice the 
combined effect of the French restrictions on exports, the seizure of enemy property and 
the British naval blockade scared off foreign merchants who envisaged little gain for high 
risk. Up to 9 October 1793, decrees against foreigners had exempted foreign merchants, 
but now British merchandise was barred and British merchants were liable to arrest. 
Thomas Collow, a Scot who had moved to Le Havre in 1785 to set up a trading company, 
was arrested despite his record over recent years for importing much-needed foreign 
grain., The municipal officers of the town signed his petition to the Convention for his 
release on 24 November. They reminded the deputies that such a sweeping law as that of 
9 October meant that there were plenty of British people 'dont le civisme est g6n6ralement 
reconnu' who languished in irons and that Collow's own merchandise, destined for North 
America, was festering in his warehouses. 171 Similarly, a Dutch timber merchant from 
Delft named Matther petitioned the Committee of Public Safety for an exemption to the 
law when it was briefly extended to all enemy subjects. His Parisian section vouched for 
his conduct. 171 Moreover, the General Maximum of 29 September 1793 destroyed any 
incentive to foreign merchants to import produce into France, as they could not sell at a 
profit. "' If at Bordeaux neutral merchants never seemed to be in short supply, at- 
Marseille, Italians were understandably reluctant to run the British blockade, especially 
when the enemy held Toulon and Corsica. Neutral merchants from southern Europe also 
appear to have been discouraged by news of the excesses of dechristianisation. 1" 
"'Hampson, Saint-Just, 137 - 139; Lefebwe, Le commerce ext6rieur en I'an 11', 245; AP, 
lxxvi, 63 8- 63 9. 
"'Collow, T., Le Citoyen Aomas Collow d la Convention Nationale (Paris, An II). 
"'AN, AF/11/61, plaquette 447 (Petition of Matther to the Committee of Public Safety, 26 
Venddmiaire 11,17 October 1793). 
"'Lefebvre, 'Le commerce ext6rieur en I'an Il', 245. 
"'Cobb, 'Quelques aspects de la mentalit6 r6volutionnaire, 104; Lefebvre, 'Le commerce 
ext6rieur en Van 11,261,264 - 265. 
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In the end, foreign merchants proved too useful to the French to be excluded from 
French commerce. Those based in French ports proved to be one of the most important 
means by which imports still flowed into the country. In Bordeaux towards the end of 
October, a Commission des approvisionnements et du commerce was established, of 
which fifteen members had German names. That these individuals had abstained from 
local politics, both Federalist and Jacobin, probably helped the German mercantile - 
community in the city to maintain an important hold on its commercial activity throughout 
the Terror. Moreover, their personal and trading ties with northern Europe were , 
invaluable to Tallien and Ysabeau, the two representants en mission to Bordeaux, who 
sent German merchants as contacts with neutral trading powers. One Zimmermann was 
sent to Paris to obtain the blessing and collaboration of the Commission des subsistances 
in the search for imports of prime necessity. Another, Pohls, was dispatched to Hamburg. 
Merchants with English names were also used, including the American Jonas Jones, who 
accompanied Zimmermann to Paris, and the American Gernon, who was sent to the 
United States. Nantes and Le Havre followed Bordeauxs example. Such localised 
initiatives did not last long, as the Committee of Public Safety was alarmed at their lack of 
co-ordination. On 18 November, it forbade any such missions without its permission. In 
some cases this centralisation of commercial initiative simply meant that foreign merchants 
thus employed were now accredited by the Committee rather than the municipality. Pohls 
continued his work in Hamburg and was given credit on II January 1794 to make his 
purchases on behalf of the government. This development did not prevent continued 
localised initiatives, however, as on 5 December Tallien and Ysabeau established a Comitj 
des neutres with the blessing of the Commission des subsistances. With three merchants 
representing the interest of neutrals, the committee was to deal with foreign merchants 
willing to import food and raw materials into France. Marseille appointed a similar 
committee on 4 May 1794. "0 
The importance of the role of merchants, and particularly neutrals, in maintaining 
French commerce and imports was recognised by the Convention in a series of decisions 
which protected their interests. On 17 January 1794 a deputation of Americans claimed 
compensation for losses during the embargo and were promised an investigation. 
Indemnities for all neutral merchants who had suffered confiscation of their cargoes were 
finally decreed on 3 April. Meanwhile, the curtain of restrictions on exports was lifted 
slightly in a series of measures. On 26 February, neutral consuls succeeded in having the 
"'Lefebvre, 'Le commerce ext6rieur en I'an Il', 247 - 248,251,266. 
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embargo on exports lifted at Bordeaux. On II March the Convention decreed that all 
merchandise which the Commission des subsistances had decided was not of prime 
necessity could be exported by French, neutral or allied merchants. The Commission 
accordingly revised its list of primary goods and issued export certificates to individual 
merchants. Commercial agencies were set up by the Commission in the major ports to 
oversee the issue of certificates. The Bordeaux agency included Zimmermann and Jonas 
Jones. On 17 May, Garnier de Saintes, who had replaced Ysabeau at Bordeaux, 
established a committee of twelve merchants who would organise exports so that they 
could be shipped en masse. Not only would this make the cost of carrying the produce 
cheaper, but also the flow of exports would be easier to control. Most importantly, the 
merchantmen could travel in convoy and with a naval escort. To make its task easier, the 
committee appointed twenty chefs dexportation, most whom came from the German 
colony. "' 
The combined effects of the war, popular hostility and economic laws and measures 
against foreigners certainly put foreign merchants under pressure during the Terror. 
Some suffered because the very nature of their business aroused suspicion or anger. On 
the other hand, the Convention showed that it was reluctant to restrict trade. While they 
arrested enemy merchants and broke off trade with Britain, the revolutionaries remained 
sensitive to the needs of neutral merchants, for both political and economic reasons, and 
were pragmatic enough not to disrupt commerce with other enemy countries. Neutrals, in 
particular, often provided France's most secure links to the outside world and the 
Convention was receptive to their complaints. The services and goods which foreign 
merchants offered prevented the revolutionaries from pursuing the policies of autarky 
which would have excluded foreigners from French commerce. 
Like merchants, bankers and financiers suffered from popular hostility and suspicion on 
one hand, while being saved by the services which they might offer to the government on 
the other. The flight of capital and the low value of assignats brought much suspicion to 
bear on foreign moneymen. "' Many were believed to have disproportionate political 
influence, for which there was some evidence: the Dutchman de Kock and the Belgian 
Proli were in league with the H6bertists, while the Dutch Vandenyvers were bankers to 
Madame du Barry and Anacharsis Cloots. Others, such as Walckiers and Boyd, were 
'8'AP, boodii, 410; Lefebvre, Le commerce ext6rieur en I'anII', 250 - 251,253 - 254,260. '8'Lefebvre, 'Le commerce ext6rieur en I'an 11,244. 
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implicated in the 'foreign plot', with the latter having ties to both Chabot and William Pitt. 
Jean-Frangois Perregaux from Neuchatel furnished Proli with money when he fled to 
Boulogne in November 1793. "' Bankers and financiers were sometimes suspected of 
speculating on exchange rates on behalf of enemy governments and of being the channels 
for their subversive funds. Boyd was arrested in June 1793 after being accused of being in 
correspondence with Pitt and of distributing money for the counter-revolution, but he was 
released within a month. "' Such fears about the machinations of bankers and their 
international network were not produced by the Terror, but were already of a ripe age and 
could trace their roots deep into the eighteenth century. "' 
The problem for financiers and bankers, foreign and French alike, was similar to that of 
merchants. Foreign connections and correspondence were an integral part of their 
activities. Perregauxs main operations were in Paris, but for a long time he had lines of 
credit extending across western Europe, including London banking houses. Swiss and 
Genevan bankers almost monopolised the role of financial intermediary between London 
and Paris, with Boyd, Ker and the Vandenyvers sharing in this lucrative business. "' Boyd 
was banker to the British government. In April 1790 Walckiers, although apparently'a 
Vonckist, undertook missions to London on behalf of Marie-Christine, sister to Leopold 
11 and regent of the Austrian Netherlands. 117 In peacetime, and even in the early months 
of the war, such relations were considered perfectly legitimate and desirable. By the 
autumn of 1793 they seemed subversive. They would become increasingly incriminating 
as the war, the Terror and the political conflict in Paris intensified. Not all of the 
revolutionaries' suspicions were mere fantasies, for there is evidence to suggest that some 
foreign bankers, such as Boyd, Ker and Perregaux, did use their connections for 
subversive means. "' 
By the autumn of 1793, the developing revolutionary phobia for foreign financiers was 
finding expression in legislation. On 7 September, during discussion of the decree 
confiscating the property of enemy subjects, Danton asked for a measure which would 
'atteindre les banquiers r6sidant en France qui, par les plus criminelles manoeuvres, dont 
"'Hampson, Ae Life and Opinions ofMaximilien Robespierre, 239. 
"'Mathiez, La Rivolution et les itrangers, 142. 
"'See, for example, Jarrett, Ae begetters ofRevolution, 197,203,211 - 212. 
"'Uthy, La banque protestante en France, ii, 3 18; Mathiez, La Revolution et les 
etrangers, 102. 
187 Mathiez, La Nvolution et les etrangers, 107. 
"'Hampson, Yhe Life and Opinions ofMaximilien Robespierre, 214 - 215; Hampson, 
Danton, 173; Mathiez, La Rivolution et les itrangers, 100,152 - 153. 
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cess6 de conspirer contre la patrie et de travailler i la contre-r6volution. "9 That night the 
governing committees placed seals on the papers of all foreign bankers. 190 Two days later 
the Convention lifted the seals and released into house arrest those being held in maisons 
d'arrit. " This about-turn was based on arguments presented on 8 September by Ramel 
of the Commission des Finances, who warned that foreign businessmen owed more to 
French citizens than vice versa, so that to freeze the accounts held by foreign bankers in 
France would be to deprive French manufacturers and merchants of the payment of their 
debts. '9' This wavering by the Convention was not surprising, because the revolutionaries 
remained unclear about the economic and political effects of the unprecedented measures 
they were taking. None the less, the suspicion towards foreign financiers was deep- 
rooted, as the Vandenyvers discovered. 
On 8 December, Jean-Baptiste Vandenyver was sent to the guillotine with his sons and 
associates, Edme-Jean-Baptiste and Antoine-Augustin. The most sensational part of the 
charges was their association with Madame du Barry, who had been their client since 
1771 and to whom they had extended some substantial credit during her four journeys to 
London between 1791 and 1793. Although the Vandenyvers may simply have been doing 
their job as her bankers, they were accused of correspondence both with an gmjg7, ýj and 
with the enemy. None the less, they could not control what du Barry did with the money 
while she was in London. She was entertained by Forth, a British agent known to the 
French government, she met William Pitt and lent the imigre cardinal de la 
Rochefoucauld 200,000 livres. These indiscretions were enough to condemn the 
Vandenyvers to death. "" 
Suspicion of bankers finally gelled into more general action on 25 December 1793, 
when Robespierre persuaded the Convention to put on trial those bankers, many of whom 
were foreign, who were charged with treason or conspiracy with the enemy. "' This was 
clearly in response to the thickening foreign plot, but can also be seen as the extreme 
"'AP, Nxiii, 491. 
"Mathiez, La Revolution et les etrangers, 149 - 150. 
19'AP, Nxiii, 598. 
"Mathiez, La Rivolution et les &rangers, 150. 
"Wallon, Histoire du tribunal rivolutionnaire, ii, 221 - 230; Lfithy, La banque 
protestante en France, ii, 323; Hampson, 7"he Life and Opinions ofMaximilien 
Robespierre, 213 - 214. '94AP, Ix)odi, 299. 
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outcome of suspicions towards foreign financiers which had existed since before 1789. It 
was at this time that Perregaux had his papers seized and inspected. " 
Foreign bankers whose dealings did not incriminate them were safe from persecution if 
they could be of service. Lack of foreign exchange dogged the government in the Year 11 
and on 26 February 1794 all Parisian bankers were obliged to subscribe to a banker's draft 
which permitted the government to exchange 50 million livres for foreign currency. The 
chairman of the committee overseeing the subscription was Perregaux, whose contacts 
with Switzerland were useful in this exercise. 196 
ý As with merchants, foreign bankers were cast under suspicion for connections which 
might have been considered uncontroversial outside the extraordinary circumstances of 
war and Terror, but which now seemed suspect. The Vandenyvers paid the ultimate 
penalty for serving one of their clients. Others, such as de Kock and Proli, were 
embroiled in revolutionary politics and died because they were on the losing side. 
Bankers as a whole suffered for the specific animosity which was directed in the Year 11 
against financiers. This was nothing particularly new, as agiotage and international 
banking networks had long aroused hostility, particularly for their alleged influence in 
French domestic politics. What was new were the circumstances, in which hostility and 
suspicion could be translated into charges of subversion, and where such charges could 
lead to the scaffold. On the other hand, the revolutionary government like all others 
needed money and credit, which dictated a certain pragmatism. For all their shady 
transactions, Walckiers and Perregaux remained at liberty. Perregaux probably survived 
because his connections with international money markets were useful to the French 
government in securing foreign exchange. 
Pragmatism also ensured that those foreigners employed in manufacturing were the 
most sheltered from revolutionary legislation. It was not even necessary to have skills 
which were directly related to the war effort in order to be protected. When in 1793 a 
group of clockmakers from Neuch&tel arrived in Besangon, the representatives on mission 
to the Doubs sold the craftsmen a maison nationale and paid them indemnities for the 
travel costs incurred by their apprentices. The hope that these foreign artisans would 
disseminate clockmaking skills throughout France was shared by the central government. 
As more foreign workers arrived over the course of the Year II, the Besangon 
"Hampson, Ihe Life and Opinions ofMaximilien Robespierre, 213. 
"Lefebvre, 'Le commerce ext6rieur en Van IP, 253,264. 
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manufacture was offered 60,000 livres, a concession for fifteen years, another maison 
nationale to house fifty artisans rent free and a three-year promise by the government to 
buy the clocks at a price set by experts. The practices of the Ancien R6gime in attracting 
foreign technology and craftsmen into France were still being used by the Republic of 
Virtue. "' 
Those already in France were protected from the worst of the legislation aimed against 
foreigners. On 28 August 1793, the commissioners at the armies of the Rhine and the 
Moselle exempted all foreign workers manufacturing arms and military equipment from 
the law of I August 1793 ordering the arrest of all enemy subjects. "' Such workers were 
not easily replaced. In response to the same law, " the Unite section in Paris sent out 
commissioners to list those to whom it may have applied. If the fifty-eight names crossed 
out from the 266 entries can be considered to have left the section, of the remaining 208 
enemy subjects, the nationalities of 143 are known: 
Place of origin Quantijy %200 
Empire" 76 53 
Belgium and Liýge 14 9.8 
Prussia 11 7.6 
Britain and Ireland 10 7 
United Provinces 8 6 
Piedmont and Sardinia 7 5 
Austria 6 4 
Others" 11 7.6 
Total 143 100 
The majority of enemy subjects living in the section therefore came from the smaller 
German states, but a substantial minority (42, or approximately 29.6%) came from the 
I'Monifeur, No. 98 (8 Niv6se 111/28 December 1794). 
198AP, lxxiii, 119. 
"AN, F/7/4779 ('Section de Wnit6: liste des Etrangers domicili6s dans Htendue de la 
section', n. d. ). The dossier includes a list of French citizens willing to act as guardians 
over the seals placed on foreigners' papers. The law of I August provided for seals to be 
placed on the papers of foreigners arrested. Those of 6 September and 16 October, which 
also pronounced the arrest of enemy subjects, and the law of 27 Germinal, which expelled 
foreigners from Paris, did not. 
"Percentages are approximate. 
"'Excluding Prussia and Austria. 
... Italy (apart from Piedmont and Sardinia), Spain, Peru and Poland (this last was hardly 
an enemy power). 
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main belligerent powers in Europe. By the application of most laws between I August 
and 27 Germinal, most of those enemy subjects who remained stood a good chance of 
remaining at liberty because even the sweeping terms of the laws of 9 and 16 October 
were only vigorously applied to the British and Irish, who made up only 7% of foreigners 
in the section. 
By far the most important factor in their survival, however, was not their nationality, 
but their occupation. Of the 208 enemy subjects listed, the occupations of 135 are 
known: 
Occupation " Quantity % 03 
Tailor 57 42 
Shoemaker 33 24 
Bootmaker 4 3 
Cabinetmaker 4 3 
Mason 4 3 
Saddler 3 2.2 
Hatter 3 2.2 
Furrier 3 2.2 
Locksmith 3 2.2 
Joiner 3 2.2 
Goldsmith 2 1.4 
Watchmaker 2 1.4 
Cane-maker 1 0.8 
Stocking-maker 1 0.8 
Broom-maker 1 0.8 
Carpet-maker 1 0.8 
Engraver 1 0.8 
Wig-maker 1 0.8 
Cutler 1 0.8 
Pinmaker 1 0.8 
Currier 1 0.8 
Apprentice tinmaker 1 0.8 
Skinner 1 0.8 
Printer 1 0.8 
Apothecary 1 0.8 
'Marchand' 1 0.8 
Total 135 100 
If the tailors, shoe-makers, boot-makers and saddlers could all make direct 
contributions to the equipping of the army, then almost three-quarters (approximately 
71.2%) of artisans who were enemy subjects performed tasks which might plausibly have 
"'Percentages are approximate. 
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contributed to the war effort. Another twenty-three (approximately 17.4%) might also 
have had potential, either because their skills may have been of direct relevance, or 
because they were transferable to military use: the cabinetmakers, masons, hatters, 
locksmiths, joiners, the cutler, currier, apprentice tinmaker, skinner, printer and 
apothecary. In all, 120 (about 88.6%) of the artisans had skills which might have been 
useful to the war effort. The fifteen others (around 11.4%) worked in those luxury trades 
which appear to have been difficult to put to use for the war (it is not clear what product 
the'marchand'was selling). This small proportion might be explained mainly by the 
collapse in demand for their services which the Revolution and the war brought. ' 
What these figures suggest is that, up to August 1793 at the earliest, many enemy 
subjects in Paris had chosen to stay where they were and to continue in their profession 
rather than migrate elsewhere. Secondly, the skills which the vast majority of foreign 
artisans offered suggested that they stood a very good chance of surviving the decrees 
against foreigners because of their usefulness to the war effort. Those foreigners making 
their contribution in workshops and manufactures were exempt from the law of 7 
September, provided their sound principles and behaviour were vouched for by two 
worthy citizens of their commune. " Among those who benefited from this exception 
were Nicholas Joyce and Christopher White, both merchants and manufacturers of cotton. 
Denounced to the con; W de surveillance of the Paris Observatoire section as British 
subjects on 16 September, they were allowed to remain free because of their 
occupation. " 
Even with the uncompromising decrees of 9 and 16 October, which admitted of few or 
no exceptions, such foreigners had a reasonable chance of remaining at liberty because of 
their skills. Ramel criticised the decree of 16 October because'on ify a pas distingu6 les 
ouvriers occupds dans les ateliers et vivant du pr6s de leur travail' . 
2' The law of 9 
October excepted those British subjects working in manufactures, which could be loosely 
or strictly interpreted by local authorities. In Toulouse, the brother of the Girondin 
deputy, Boyer-Fonfrede, was deprived of his prized Manchester weavers who had been 
introducing new looms into his manufacture since 1791. ' In Choisy-sur-Seine, however, 
204 AN, F/7/4779 ('Section de Wnit6: liste des Etrangers dornicilids dans Utendue de la 
section', n. d. ). 
205Ap, lxxiii, 463. 
MAN, F/7*/2514 ('Section de I'Observatoire: Conýt6 de Surveillance'). 
'AN, AFAI/61, plaquette 446 CR6sidences et r6quisitions: Messidor - Fructidor Il). 2"Lyons, France under the Directory, 187. 
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James White was released by an order of the Convention, dated 6 January 1794, because 
of his occupation. He was employed by two American citizens developing a means of 
making French rivers more navigable. " In Normandy, where small colonies of British 
artisans in textiles had remained largely unmolested, municipal authorities protected them 
by citing clauses which exempted those who worked in induStry. 210 Such evidence ought 
to be balanced by the observations of Meister, who returning to Paris in 1795, noticed the 
change in the capital's working population: there were fewer foreign craftsmen, most of 
whom had fled in order to work in the peace and plenty of their homelands. 2" In Paris, 
the personal well-being of foreign artisans probably varied from section to section and, in 
the provinces, from one municipality or commune to the next. 
It is, however, clear that substantial numbers of foreign artisans and manufacturers, 
even those from countries at war with France, remained at liberty because they were 
craftsmen, Of 7810 cartes de Aretj issued by three of the four sections of the Faubourg 
Saint-Marcel in the Year II, those given to foreigners remained a small proportion of the 
total, but what is significant is the nationalities represented. Among the most numerous 
were people of unequivocally enemy nationality, including the Netherlands, Austria and 
some of the Italian and Imperial states. Naturally, there was also a heavy presence of 
those who might be considered French, the Belgians in particular, and those from neutral 
countries such as Switzerland. "' In Tarare, an Irish prisoner of war who had once 
worked under a Glasgow weaver introduced local muslin-weavers to more advancd 
looms. These machines were gradually adopted in the region. "' 
The law of 27 Germinal explicitly excluded from its provisions workers employed in 
arms manufactures and 'les 6trangers ouvriers vivant du travail de leurs maine, provided 
they had worked at their trade since before August 1793, and 'les marchands d6taiflans', 
214 
provided they had been established in France since May 1789. The Committee of Public 
Safety also exempted any foreigner involved in the manufacturing of sails and all ý 
'marchands, fabricants, chefs de manufactures, d'atteliers, d'usines, les citoyens employes 
dans les fabriques manufactures et usines' in nineteen different towns, mostly on the coast 
209 AR, 1xxxiii, 48 - 49. 
21'Cobb, 'Quelques aspects de la mentalit6 rdvolutionnaire', I 10. 
"'Meister, Souvenirs de mon dernier voyage 6 Paris, 78 - 79. 
212 Burstin, H., Le Faubourg Saint-Marcel a Fipoque revolutionnaire. Structure 
konomique et composition sociale (Paris: Socidt6 des ttudes Robespierristes/CNRS, 
1983), 81 - 82,318 - 319. 
2"Henderson, Britain and Industrial Europe, 26. 
214Ap, IxKxviii, 649; IxKxix, 29 - 30. 
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or the frontiers, provided they had worked there for at least six months. There was, 
however, one condition attached: representatives on mission were to keep track of their 
civisme and their utility. "' The committee also placed under its wing individual 
manufacturers and artisans whom it considered to be of use, because they provided 
employment or because their products were of benefit to the public at large. In Calais, 
among the foreigners who enjoyed such exemptions were a British soap manufacturer and 
the Dutch printers whose tasks included the publication of the maximum prices. In Paris, 
the government requisitioned a Dutch or German printer charged with the work 
emanating from the Committee of Public Safety. "' 
Some still thought it prudent to show that they had patriotic credentials. Oberkampf 
used his money and his position as the largest employer in Jouy-en-Josas to maintain an 
image of political orthodoxy. In May 1794 he bought biens nationaux, showing a 
personal, economic commitment to the Revolution. He also gave or loaned large sums of 
money for the war effort, including 160,000 fivres to the first forced loan, decreed on 20 
May 1793. Late in February 1794, he was summoned by Perregames Commission A 
commerce et des approvisionnements aimed at buying foreign currency. Oberkampf 
added his signature to those of forty-one merchants and bankers to raise 50 million fivres 
for this purpose. A month later, he presented a full set of equipment for a cavalryman to 
the local Jacobin club, at a cost of 3,192 fivres which came from his own pocket. His 
status as a large employer alone brought him recognition from the revolutionary 
government. On 23 June 1794, Couthon visited the manufacture and gave him a title of 
recognition on behalf of the Nation, Vavoir entretenu 1,100 ouvriers des deux sexes'. 
The number was an exaggeration, but Oberkampf was not about to argue with the 
Committee of Public Safety when it was congratulating him. 217 
His engagement with local politics was also a means of protecting himself and his 
business. He joined the Jacobins of Jouy-en-Josas on 30 December 1793, one month after 
the club had been established. With his patronage as a large employer Oberkampf soon 
controlled the society. Oberkampf and his employees made impressive patriotic 
"'AN, AF/Il/61, plaquette 445 CR6sidences et r6quisitions arret6s Vend6miaire - Prairial 
an IP, arr6t6s of 29 Germinal, 19 Flor6al). The towns included in the general exemption 
were Marseille, Cette, Agde, Bayonne, Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Nantes, VOrient, Saint 
Malo, Le Havre, Rouen, Boulogne, Abbeville, Amiens, Calais, Dunc-Libre (Dunkirk), 
Saint Quentin, Sedan and Saint-Omer. 
""AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 445 ('Residences et requisitions arr8t6s Vend6miaire - Prairial 
an 11', arrWs of 10 Flor6al, 22 Flor6al, 26 Flor6al). 
"'Chassagne, Oberkampf, 171,174 - 175,176,184 n. 65. 
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contributions at the meetings. His nephew Samuel Widmer used his skills as a chemist to 
extract elements which could be used to make saltpetre from ferns collected by young 
citizens in the forests. Every dicade, Oberkampf funded the club's distribution of 400 
livres'worth of bread to the towns poor and sick. While such activities might be 
regarded as the paternalism of a great manufacturer, it was paternalism with a political 
face. By behaving as a good patriot Oberkampf effaced the sins of his recent ennoblement 
and, perhaps, shielded himself and his associates from suspicion over his foreign origins. 
If it was merely a ploy, it paid off. When Christian-Henry Vodt, a Prussian engraver who 
worked at Oberkampf s plant and who was also an agent national, denounced his 
employer to the Committee of General Security, it was his reputation, and not that of 
Oberkampf, which was ruined. The Committee could not believe that he was 'enticM de 
mod6rantisme, de royalisme et suspect d'accaparement' and in May 1794, Vodt was 
expelled from the Jacobin club. Oberkampf himself gave him his old job back. "' Some 
were not as shrewd or as fortunate as Oberkampf Pierre and Louis Badger, two silk 
weavers and sons of the British entrepreneur who had set up a weaving operation in Lyon, 
were shot in the city on 28 November and 4 December 1793, condemned for their part in 
the Federalist uprising. "" As with other foreigners in France, artisans and manufacturers 
who fell from the net of political orthodoxy paid the ultimate price. 
The treatment of foreign artisans, manufacturers, bankers and merchants shows that 
the revolutionaries were pragmatic when they dealt with the economy during the war. It 
is true that hostility to foreign merchants and bankers created an atmosphere in which 
many of their activities suddenly seemed suspicious and treasonous. Some merchants and 
financiers certainly fell foul of the authorities for no other reason than their everyday 
activities involved foreign correspondence, which could be construed as contact with the 
enemy. For the most part, however, the revolutionaries recognised the importance of 
foreigners in the French economy and were reluctant, for both economic and political 
reasons, to exclude them totally. Just as they developed price and wage controls under 
pressure and with much reluctance, so the revolutionaries dallied when it came to cutting 
off commercial and financial ties. 
'"Chassagne, Oberkampf, 173 - 175; Chapman & Chassagne, European Textile Printers 
in the Eighteenth Century, 122. 
21'Alger, Englishmen in the French Revolution, 350, 
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Not only did they adhere to the principles of free trade, but they were also uncertain 
about the economic and political consequences of protectionism. Foreign merchants 
brought cargoes which fed, clothed and supplied the French armed forces and which 
ensured some social stability in the larger cities. The networks of foreign bankers opened 
lines of credit and allowed the purchase of foreign currency. Foreign artisans and 
manufacturers created employment and produced the uniforms and equipment needed to 
wage the war. Reluctance to close the door on these contributions explains the 
exemptions offered to foreigners and the indecision with which the Convention and the 
authorities often approached the role of foreigners in the French economy. 
In the end, the revolutionaries did not establish a'commerce national' or subsribe to a 
'nationalisme 6conomique!, because they never entirely excluded foreigners from French 
commercial and economic life. It is true that British merchants were prevented from 
trading in France because they were subjects of an enemy government, but this was the 
furthest the French economy excluded on the basis of nationality alone. The 
revolutionaries were pragmatic enough not to break off commercial relations with other 
enemy countries, including the Dutch. Above all, neutral merchants were treated with 
sensitivity as the Convention sought to encourage them to import vital supplies. It is true 
that trade was 'nationalised' in the sense that the government sought to control and co- 
ordinate it, but foreign merchants and bankers played a part in the administration of this 
control because the revolutionaries recognised their potential in attracting capital and 
merchandise. Other enemy subjects, including some British, continued their activities as 
artisans and manufacturers in France. Most of the laws against foreigners excluded them 
from imprisonment or expulsion because the revolutionaries assumed that they had 
something to contribute to the war effort. Where the law did not explicitly exempt them, 
local authorities often demanded protection for them and vouched for their usefulness, or 
else the revolutionary government itself used its powers to requistion them for the 
Republic. 
All this was done, however, on the understanding that foreign merchants, bankers, 
manufacturers and artisans did not abuse their freedom. The Badgers were executed for 
their part in the Federalist revolt in Lyons. The Vandenyvers were unfortunate enough to 
have as their client an indiscreet, if generous, former royal mistress. De Kock and Proli 
died not because they were bankers, but because they were associated with a political 
faction which dared to oppose the revolutionary government. As so many other 
foreigners discovered, failure to remain within the increasingly exclusive club of the 
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politically orthodox had a high price. Oberkampf therefore went out of his way to prove 
his civisme and enjoyed the confidence of the government, but for the vast majority of 
merchants, manufacturers and artisans, the safest policy was to avoid revolutionary 
politics altogether. 
Vil 
The period of the Terror was marked by xenophobia, with the fear of spies and of 
malign foreign influence producing sweeping measures against foreigners. The fears and 
suspicion of foreigners were certainly produced in part by revolutionary ideology. Some 
rhetoric did equate patriotism with the exclusion or even the death of certain foreigners. 
The decree of 7 Prairial, for example, stemmed in part from the logic which placed all 
opposition to the government hors la nation and even hors nature. Xenophobia, 
however, was not the exclusive product of revolutionary ideology. Distrust and scorn of 
the British, Austrians and Spanish, in particular, were rooted in prejudices which predated 
the Revolution. Revolutionary ideology merely gave novel, immediate expression to these 
hatreds, which in turn were intensified by the unprecedented scale of war and internal 
crisis. - 
Many of the measures taken against foreigners were however dictated less by 
xenophobia or patriotic ideology than by practical concerns. The disbandment of foreign 
legions may finally have realised Dubois-Cranc6's vision of a citizen army, but the actual 
reasons behind the measure, such as concerns over their loyalty and their viability, were 
more pragmatic. Likewise the first general measures against foreigners were taken either 
as reprisals or, however misguided, for the domestic security of the Republic. 
Revolutionary pragmatism, however, tended to limit most of the laws against foreigners. 
The treatment of foreign radicals, for example, showed that despite the sweeping terms of 
the decrees against enemy subjects, ideological conformity could still cut across 
nationality. Those foreign troops who were arrested and denied postings fell into that 
predicament not because they were foreign, but because their political loyalties and 
competence were suspect. Even a few clergymen and seminary students escaped arrest 
when there was unequivocal proof of their republican credentials and their usefulness. 
As well as political orthodoxy, utility was an important criterion for the survival and 
freedom of foreigners during the Terror. Soldiers disbanded from the legions were 
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distributed to regular units rather than sent away, potentially to the enemy. Foreign 
patriots remained at liberty, unless they were too embroiled with the losing sides in 
revolutionary politics, because the revolutionary government envisaged a future use for 
them once the French annies advanced across the frontiers again. If certain foreign 
bankers and merchants could fall foul of the authorities because the very nature their 
activities entailed 'correspondence with the enemy', the revolutionaries also realised that 
they had important potential in supplying the beleaguered Republic with foreign exchange, 
materials and food. Above all, artisans were protected from every law on foreigners, and 
these exemptions were sometimes loosely interpreted to include even those whose 
contributions to the war effort were not immediately apparent. The pragmatism of the 
revolutionaries limited the translation of both xenophobia and ideology into the exclusion 
of foreigners. 
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Chapter Six. Foreigners between Thermidor and Campo Formio. 
Si vous rapportez le sdquestre, vous rendrez aux dtrangers, et les dtrangers ne vous rendront pas. 
Ccst donner A nos cnncmis obdrds les moycns de faire la campagne prochainc. 11 existe, pendant 
la guerre comme pendant la paix, un droit des gens. It faut qu! on nous rende dcu pour dcu, 
prisonnier pour prisonnier, million pour million. 
- Thirion, deputy to the Convention, 9 Niv6se IIV 
Huit jours apr6s la proclamation de la loi, soixante & deux n-dlle dtrangers s'dtaient prdscntds 
devant le bureau de la Police & le Directoire, pour en etre exemptds, & avoir la permission de 
rester A Paris. Mais aprýs un examen sdvcrc, il ny cut pas la, dixieme partie de ces sollicitcurs qui 
obtient une rdponse favorable. 
- Friedrich Meyer, witnessing repressive laws against 
foreigners in May 1796.1 
The period after the Terror has been described as a period in which conditions for 
foreigners in France improved. Cosmopolitanism flourished once more and the repressive 
measures against foreigners, and enemy subjects in particular, were steadily repealed. The 
assumption has been that the more draconian measures taken against foreigners were 
related to the system of the Terror. Once the Terror was dismantled, so too, the laws 
against foreigners would be lifted? The repeal of the law of suspects, the law of 22 
Prairial and the reduction in number of the comitis de surveillance benefited foreigners as 
well as French people. The Thermidorians, however, proved more reluctant to repeal the 
specific laws against enemy subjects than they were those which pressed down on French 
citizens and foreigners alike. Thirion was not an isolated politician in stressing the need 
for caution. The very fact that he cited older precedents of reciprocity and the droit des 
gens suggests that some revolutionaries were yet not ready to accept a return to the 
cosmopolitan ideas associated with the earlier years of the French Revolution. 
If the Thermidorians decided not to take Thirion's advice and repealed the decree 
ordering the sequestration of foreigners' property, along with other laws such as that of 27 
Germinal and 7 Prairial II, there was no guarantee that they would not re-emerge in a new 
'Moniteur, No. 10 1 (11 NivOse/31 January 1794). 
'Meyer, Fragments sur Paris, i, 276. 
'Mathiez, La R&olulion et les &rangers, 183. 
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form, as Friedrich Meyer discovered in 1796. This was because the laws against 
foreigners were bound up less with the Terror than with the same force which had lain 
beneath the Terror, the war. Despite the success of the French armies, the Thermidorians 
and the Directory retained the same fears about foreign conspiracy and espionage as 
before. This was less because of any logic inherent in revolutionary ideology (the period 
actually witnessed a return of cosmopolitan rhetoric) but for the very fact that for as long 
as the war continued, the domestic pressures it aggravated still threatened the stability of 
the Republic. When real 'conspiracies' with some foreign involvement such as the royalist 
landings at Quiberon and the Babouvist plot actually emerged, the reflex of the post- 
Thermidor regimes was to enact measures controlling foreigners in France, naturally using 
as their model the laws of the Year 11. The return of cosmopolitan rhetoric did not in 
reality herald the return of the civil freedom which foreigners had enjoyed before the war. 
Instead, it shrouded in attractive packaging the expansionist and exploitative policies of 
the post-Thermidor revolutionaries towards their neighbours. This pragmatism was also 
turned inwards and applied to foreigners inside France. Whenever the authorities felt 
threatened by foreigners, they naturally reverted to the practices of the Year II. 
If the measures taken against foreigners in the years 1793 - 1794 were intimately 
bound up with the Terror, then the laws could be expected to have been razed as the 
Terror itself was dismantled. This did not happen: if the machinery of the Terror was 
disassembled, most of the measures against foreigners remained in place for longer. The 
revolutionaries sometimes allowed their residual cosmopolitanism some expression, but 
the xenophobia which had flourished in the acidic soil of the Terror never disappeared. 
The revolutionaries were still too likely to see foreign agents behind internal upheavals, 
but at least they seem to have regarded the measures taken against foreigners as 
temporary. Looking forward to more tranquil times, the Thermidorian civil code 
guaranteed foreigners the same civil rights as French citizens. ' 
French suspects were released from the beginning of August, but foreigners were freed 
only in a trickle. The contrast is neatly illustrated by Sir William Codrington, who wrote 
to a friend that 'my habitation became so thinned of its inhabitants that they transferred us 
'Moniteur, No. 79 (19 Frimaire 111/9 December 1794). 
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to another prisoif. He was released on 2 December 1794 only because a friend secured 
him an apprenticeship with a French printer, officially making him an artisan. ' The three 
Belgian army suppliers arrested in Paris in August 1793 were not freed until 30 
September. " Thomas Paine was only released on 4 November because his American 
citizenship was recognised by James Monroe, MorrWs more sympathetic replacement as 
7 
ambassador of the United States. The decrees arresting all enemy subjects were never 
formally repealed and British subjects, in particular, only gained their freedom on an 
arbitrary basis, depending upon how much of a threat they were thought to pose. Guards 
were not withdrawn from the English Conceptionist and Benedictine nuns in Paris until 
March 1795. The unfortunate Elizabeth Pitt, believed, wrongly, to be the niece of the 
British Prime Minister, was not freed until June 1795. Henry Stevens, a British radical, 
was more fortunate, leaving the Luxembourg at the end of January that year. Most 
British subjects, however, seem to have been released between September 1794 and July 
1795, unless, like Edward Barnston, they had been arrested for additional reasons: 
Barnston had been charged with possession of counter-revolutionary drawings and was 
not freed until November 179V Once released, large numbers of British and Irish 
subjects understandably applied for passports to leave the country. 9 - 
It was not just British subjects who were affected by Thermidorian reluctance to 
release foreigners from captivity. Karl von Hesse-Rheinfels had to wait until 13 
November 1794 for his freedom while Miranda, despite his former ties to the Girondins, 
was not freed until 16 January, by decree of the Convention. ` Meanwhile, enemy 
subjects newly arrived in France could still be arrested. Mathieu Ivanovich, a Hungarian 
subject, was arrested on 10 June 1795 shortly after his arrival in Paris. " 
The law of 27 Germinal was not repealed until 8 December 1794. Until then, it was 
rigorously enforced. On 4 August 1794 William Stone had to petition for permission to 
'Alger, Englishmen in the French Revolution, 298 - 299. 
"AN, BB/3/79 (Note of Frangois von Wron, n. d. ). 
'Conway, The Life of Thomas Paine, ii, 142 - 149. 
'Alger, Englishmen in the French Revolution, 150,152,160,162,163,334 - 349. 'AN, D/III/368 - 370 ('Cornit6 de Sfiret6 G6n6rale et de Surveillance de la Convention 
Nationale aux Repr6sentants du Peuple, Composant le Cornit6 de Ugislation', 25 Flor6al 
III). 
"Mathiez, La Rivolution et les &rangers, 186 - 187; Robertson, 7he Life ofMiranda, i, 
148-149. 
"AN, D/III/368 - 370 ('Aux Citoyens Repr6sentans, Membres du CoMit6 de Ugislation', 
6 Messidor III), 
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live in a commune unaffected by the decree. 12 The Committee of Public Safety reiterated 
its commitment to executing the law on 19 September, although it still used its powers of 
requistion to protect certain foreigners, just as the 'Terrorist' Committee did. " 
The Thermidorians were keener to release property from sequestration than foreigners 
from imprisonment, exile or surveillance. The motives appear to have been less any 
benevolence towards foreigners than the revolutionaries' beliefs in free trade and 
economic individualism, which they believed would be a better means of supplying the 
Republic with the goods it needed than the controlled economy of the Terror. On 29 
December, the Convention lifted the sequestration on all foreign property save that of 
enemy princes, but only after intense debate. 14 Once enemy property was decreed free 
from confiscation, the way was open for a shower of claims for compensation from 
aggrieved foreigners. " The repeal of sequestration was also driven by a belief that French 
merchants and businessmen were on the whole the creditors, not the debtors, of 
foreigners. To release foreign property from confiscation could therefore only benefit the 
Republic's balance of trade. That the revolutionaries were motivated by French economic 
interests rather than any belief in the global benefits of free trade is shown by the 
restoration on 14 March 1797 of contrainte par corps for debt. The terms of the new 
law made no specific mention of foreigners, but the preamble spoke of giving'au 
commerce de la R6publique la splendeur et la Sup6riorit6 qu'il doit avoir'. Imprisonment 
for debt was to be applied in civil matters in precisely the same way as was before its 
abolition. In other words, foreigners were liable. "' 
If there were any illusions immediately after Thermidor that the revolutionaries were 
becoming more lax in their surveillance of foreigners, they were soon shattered in the 
bitter winter of 1794 - 1795. In the killing cold of nonante-cinq, food prices spiralled 
upwards to unprecedented levels. Anticipating trouble, Armand warned the Convention 
on behalf of the Committee of General Security on 16 January 1795 that'les 6trangers et 
les intrigans! had obtained cartes de surW. In response, the Convention decreed the issue 
IIAP, xciv, 176. 
"AN, AFAI/61, plaquette 446 (Rdsidences et r6quisitions: Messidor - Fructidor 11). A 
poverty-stricken and blind foreign musician named Fridzery who had a family to feed was 
exempted from the law after a recommendation from the comiM dinstruction publique. 
"Moniteur, Nos. 95 (5 Niv8se 111/25 December 1794), 99 (9 Niv6se 111/29 December 
1794), 101 (11 Niv6se 111/31 December 1794), ý102 (12 Niv6se III/I January 1795). 
"AN, DAII/368 - 370 CComit6 de Ldgislation: Etrangers: Demandes de Mainlevde de 
Sequestre et Mclamations particuRres). 
"MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 7, Dossier 167 CExtrait du Bulletin des 
Loix, No. 112, an V). 
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of new cartes de suretJ for everyone living or arriving in Paris. Those who arrived 
henceforth had to go to the comiti civil of their section within twenty-four hours, where 
their passports would be given a visa after a brief questioning. If the committee's 
suspicions were aroused, they could arrest the newcomers. This was not much different 
from the surveillance imposed on foreigners during the Year II. Some of the 
Thermidorians objected on grounds of individual liberties, but the Convention chose to 
put order and stability before such considerations. " In his travelogue of his journey to 
Paris in 1796, Friedrich Meyer described at great length the inconvenience and time 
involved in complying with the law. " In the summer of 1798 another German traveller 
more sympathetic to the Revolution, Johann Heinzmann, noted that without a carte de 
sfireti, a foreigner could be arrested, but that this was necessary because of the possibility 
of disturbances. " 
It was precisely this reasoning that led both the Thermidorian Convention and the 
Directory to enact laws of surveillance and even expulsion against foreigners. The 
insurrection in Paris during I-4 Prairial 111 (20 - 23 May 1795) and the royalist landing at 
Quiberon on 27 June combined to stir the old fears of espionage and of foreign 
subversion. On II July 1795, ten days before the royalist bridgehead was crushed by 
Hoche, Mariette had the Convention decree that all enemy subjects who had arrived since 
I January 1792 were obliged to leave within eight days. Neutrals were required to stay at 
their port of entry while their passport was sent to the Committee of General Security to 
be stamped, which could mean a long wait. In an attempt to nullify any ill-effects such a 
provision might have had on trade, the decree permitted communes to issue temporary 
authorisations for merchants. Any foreigner found in a seditious meeting would be tried 
and punished as a spy, with the maximum penalty of death (a provision reiterated after the 
royalist uprisings of Venddn-daire III). " When it appeared that this, the law of 23 
Messidor Ill, had not been executed, the Convention decreed that any foreigners found in 
contravention of the decree would also be punished as spies. ", If the provisions of the law 
"Moniteur, Nos. 119 (29 Niv8se 111/18 January 1795). 
"Meyer, Fragments sur Paris, i, 3-7. 
"Heinzmann, J. G., Voyage dun A Remand 'i Paris, et retour par la Suisse (Lausanne, 
Paris, Strasbourg, 1800), 14. 
"Moniteur, No. 19 (19 Vend6miaire IV/1 I October 1795). 
"ProcJs-Verbal de la Convention Nationale (72 vols. ) (Paris, 1792 - an IV/1 795), 1xv, 
85; Moniteur, Nos. 297 (27 Messidor 111/15 July 1795), 320 (20 Thennidor 111/7 August 
1795); Mathiez suggests that the law was never put into operation (La R&olutjon et les 
etrangers, 184n. ). 
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were not relaxed even with the defeat of the royalists at Quiberon and the apparent 
triumph of revolutionary arms on the continent, it suggests that the revolutionaries 
regarded the measure as temporary only in the sense that it would be repealed when the 
Republic had achieved complete victory over all its opponents, foreign and domestic. If 
this is so, then in respect to foreigners at least the ghost of the Terror lived on long after 
its corpse had been buried by the Thermidorians. 
Thefeuilles de travail of the minister of police, Cochon de Lapparent, between 27 
March and I May 1796 reveal the law at work. On different occasions, he issued the 
district police commissioners or the bureau central of Paris with orders which included, 
firstly, the investigation of specific foreigners to see if they had obeyed the law of 23 
Messidor; secondly, the surveillance of those who had, but who had aroused the suspicion 
of the authorities and, thirdly, the expulsion of others. On I May, he wrote to the bureau 
central'pour l'inviter i redoubler de z6le dans 1'ex-. des lois contre les Etrangers qui 
affluent i Paris'. Meanwhile, every three days the bureau central addressed to the 
minister lists of foreigners lodging in h6tels garnis. Occasionally, the bureau central 
reminded certain hoteliers of their obligation to inform foreigners that they had to have 
their passports endorsed. The minister was helped, as before, by denunciations. On 27 
April 1796, Cochon received word of 'beaucoup d'anglais qui dinent tous les jours i Ncu 
d'Orl6ans, rue d'enfer, et qu'on soupgonne d'Etre des aventuriers et des ennen-ds de la 
R6publique'. Such surveillance only failed to reach the intensity of the Year 11 because the 
institutions were not so localised as they were during the Terror. 1 
As with much legislation during the Terror, however, the bark of the law was often 
worse than its bite. The passports belonging to neutral or allied citizens were, on the 
whole, endorsed by the ministry with little or no investigation. Only those whose 
behaviour or reputation aroused suspicion were treated with wariness. Cochon granted 
exemptions based on their individual merits, particularly to foreign radicals and refugees 
(mainly from Italy) and even to British subjects who appeared to be harmless. As before, 
a degree of republican commitment ensured that some foreigners escaped the vigour of 
the laws. ' 
Suspicion of foreigners was even carried into the debates on naturalisation and 
citizenship in the Constitution of the Year III. Pierre Daunou proposed that foreigners 
22 AN, F/7/3081, dossier I CPasseports et ttrangers: Analyse du Travail: Germinal - 
Messidor, an IV). 
"AN, F/7/3081, dossier I (Passeports et ttrangers: Analyse du Travail: Germinal - 
Messidor, an IV). 
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over twenty-one years of age, who had lived in France for seven years, paid direct 
taxation and in addition possessed property, a farm, or a commercial establishment could 
be naturalised once they had declared their intention to spend the rest of their lives in the 
country. " Like the civic oath required in the Consitution of 1791, this last declaration 
showed a commitment to France. With their more restrictive conditions, the terms of 
naturalisation of 1795 owed more to the Constitution of 1791 than to that of 1793. Stress 
on property ownership showed that the Thermidorians, like the Constituants, were 
determined that foreigners have a stake in the country before being admitted to 
citizenship. The only concession to those who were not wealthy enough to own property 
was, as in the Constitution of 1791, the alternative of marriage to a French citizen. 
Moreover, the Thern-ddorians omitted a clause which allowed the legislature to award 
citizenship to any foreigner deserving the honour. This decision reflected an absence of 
cosmopolitan idealism in the revolutionary application of citizenship. 
The residence period of seven years was a reaction against the year-long requirement 
of the Constitution of 1793, but it was still longer than the five-year period prescribed by 
the Constituent Assembly. Behind this was a will to be absolutely certain that no ill- 
intentioned foreigner could easily gain the rights of citizenship. On 14 July 1795, Mailhe, 
criticising the new law for not going far enough to restrict access to naturalisation, said 
that the Constituent Assembly had made it easy to be naturalised because 'elle davait pas 
appris i connaitre toute la perfidie des gouvernements qui nous environnent. As for the 
'anarchists' who wrote the Constitution of 1793, 'ils 6taient d'accord avec les 6trangers 
pour rendre odieux, avilir et dissoudre le gouvemement r6publicaid. He was especially 
dismissive of marriage to a French citizen as a precondition, as that made naturalisation 
too easy. Lakanal agreed, saying that a long period of residence was required because 
political rights could only be given to a foreigner once Ia r6publique a acquis 1'enti6re 
certitude de leur amour pour elle' and when those concerned had acquired a profound 
knowledge of French laws, customs and government 'or, cette 6tude est le fruit du temps 
et de 1'exp6rience'. " Thermidorian stringency in the assimilation of foreigners into French 
citizenship reflected a sense that foreigners were to be watched. They were no longer the 
'pilgrims of liberty' of 1789. No matter how much they sought to avoid a return to the 
Terror, both the Thermidorians and the Directory remained alert to foreigners. The 
"Monifeur, Nos. 298 (28 Messidor 111/16 July 1795), 340 (10 Fructidor 111/27 August 
1795, suppl. ), 
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continuing war combined with the dual threat of Jacobinism and counter-revolution 
ensured that xenophobia never lurked far from the surface. 
That legislation and attitudes towards foreigners were linked to political circumstances 
is shown by the law of 25 February 1796, - Foreigners already needed the permission of 
the bureau central of Paris in order to live in the capital, but a resurgence of Jacobinism 
alarmed the government. Although fed in part by a drift into Paris of French Jacobins 
fleeing harassment in the provinces, the revival was regarded as the product of more 
sinister, alien forces by some in the Directory. Three days before the government closed 
down the Club du Panth6on, a Directorial edict bemoaned the number of foreigners who 
wandered freely in Paris, despite the laws against them, and called upon the laws on 
passports to be'rappel6es ileur prenii6re ex6cution. It revoked all the resident permits' 
issued beforehand by the bureau central or the commission de police. Although the 
foreigners affected could obtain renewals, they would only be for 'des d6lais fort brefs'. 
Those who were refused new permits were ordered to leave Paris. In a reinforcement of 
surveillance, the bureau central'd6ploiera la plus grande vigilance sur toute Ntendue du 
canton de Paris! and was commanded to arrest any foreigners who were found breaking 
the law. Without the sectional comiNs de surveillance of old, such a task was probably 
not as vigorously prosecuted as the Directory may have wished. Moreover, there 
remained a degree of pragmatic flexibility, for the edict exempted those who could show 
'des causes dutilit6 et justice'. " 
Once the Club du Panth6on was suppressed, the fear inspired by the pushing of 
opposition underground led the Directory to reinvigorate the laws of surveillance when it 
returned to the issue on I March. In a message to the Council of Five Hundred, the 
Directors requested a special law to allow the police to keep an eye on foreigners staying 
in private homes and not just in inns and maisons garnies, whose obligatory registers 
were already open to official inspection. It was convinced that 'les plus dangereux ont 
evit6 ces domicilee. " In other words, the Directory sought a return to the intrusive 
vigilance of the Terror, at least against foreigners. Moreover, unlike most legislation 
during the Year II, no distinction was made between enemy subjects, neutrals or allies, 
possibly because the government imagined that foreign Jacobins dedicated to the 
overthrow of the constitution were unlikely to be only from enemy countries. 
'Moniteur, No. 166 (16 Vent6se IV/6 March 1796). 
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On 12 March, the Council of Five Hundred addressed the Directory's concerns by 
adopting a bill concerned both with French citizens who were not normally domiciled in 
Paris and with foreigners. It declared that 'I'affluence des 6trangers qui se rendent dans la 
commune de Paris exige des mesures qui activent la surveillance du gouvernement'. All 
those who had arrived in Paris since I Fructidor 111 (18 August 1795) were required to 
present themselves at their arrondissement, to state the address of their lodgings in Paris 
and to present their passports, all within three days. In addition, those citizens putting up 
foreigners in any way were responsible for making a similar declaration. ' 
Some revolutionaries shared the Directory's fears of foreign influence in Paris, while 
others suggested that such police measures were not only counter-productive, but a 
dangerous extension to the powers of central government. The fears inflamed by the 
Jacobin revival divided the revolutionaries between those who sought to exclude 
foreigners and those who did not. Both sides of the argument, however, revealed a fear 
of popular uprising and Jacobin-inspired Terror. Showing his nervousness about the 
insurrectionary potential offered by a combination of hunger and political radicalism, 
Ludot claimed that foreigners should not be tolerated in France at all, because they were 
'bouches inutiles! when there was a disette de subsistances and depreciation of the 
assignats. Echoing Robespierre, he warned that foreigners had always played a part in 
the Revolution and that 'la France a retenti du parti de Utranger'. Others such as Cadroy 
argued that foreigners were not a threat to the Republic, but brought benefits to the 
country. To limit their freedom would be to deny France the wealth and skills which they 
brought. If Cadroy and Ludot shared a fear of Jacobinism, the former was enlisting the 
cosmopolitan principles of the early Revolution to support his arguments. He also 
suggested that while the government had targeted the Club du Panthdon, the proposed 
law was wrong to assume that other unknown people also had hostile intentions. 'En 
parlant vaguement des 6trangers dans Paris, de leurs intentions prdsumees et de la 
suspicion, ' he warned, 'ne craignons nous-memes de ne poursuivre que Vombre! Above 
all, he feared that the extension of powers to the police over foreigners and new arrivals 
to Paris would not be the end of the story, that the revolutionaries stood once more at the 
top of the slippery slope which led down to the police state of the Terror. "' Despite such 
"Monifeur, Nos. 172 (22 VentOse IV/12 March 1796), 177 (27 Ventase IV/17 March 
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views, the Council of Five Hundred adopted the proposals and they passed through the 
Council of Elders on 17 March. 10 
Nine days later the same council rejected a proposal which obliged neutrals and allies 
to renew their passport visas every three months. Its members were not opposed to the 
idea of passport controls, but they believed the law to be inexecutable. Deputies in both 
chambers certainly saw a need for surveillance of foreigners, and it remained tied to fear 
of Jacobin conspiracy in the wake of the ban on the Club du Pantheon. On 21 March, the 
Council of Five Hundred heard that while circumstances demanded 'une plus grande 
surveillance a Ugard des voyageurs frangais', it was still more important to keep a strict 
watch over foreigners. The continuing conflict also convinced the revolutionaries of the 
need for strict controls over foreigners. Dumas told the Council of Elders that 'ce dest 
qu'A la paix que vous pourrez vous d6barrasser de vos lois de police'. Until then, France 
must maintain these measures which restricted individual liberties in order to defend 
liberty. None the less, Dumas gave the first indication that passports and visas might 
become a permanent part of the bureaucratic paraphernalia which cluttered the lives of 
travellers. Travel documents should become, he suggested, 'un principe de droit public ... 
vous poserez ainsi les bases dune police respective entre les nations'. " 
Despite the rejection of this particular measure, existing legislation - such as the law of 
17 March - proved onerous enough for some visitors. Friedrich Meyer arrived in Paris in 
the night of 31 March and early next morning the law-abiding h6telier warned Meyer and 
his fellow-travellers that their first duty was to exchange their passports for what he called 
caries detrangers. Likewise the host had to declare his guests and he accompanied all 
five, including servant§, to the committee of the Mont-Blanc arrondissement, where they 
had to get their visas., Besides complaining about the filth in the offices, he complained 
that the law was so vague that the officials were confused over its execution. They were 
passed from one office to another, in the manner still familiar to those who have had 
occasion to deal with state bureaucracy. They finished up at the bureau central of the 
municipality at the Palais de Justice, where, over the course of an hour and a half, their 
documents were stamped, signed and exchanged in three different offices for 'les cartes, le 
palladium de la sfiret6 de pariS1.32 
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Another crisis provoked yet more measures against foreigners. On 10 May 1796, the 
day Babeuf and his'Equals'were arrested, the Directory called for the expulsion from 
Paris of a variety of people. The legislative councils obliged that same day by excluding, 
among others, all foreigners not attached to consulates and who had arrived in Paris since 
1789. The penalty for non-compliance with this, the law of 21 Flordal, was deportation. 
The fact that the Italian Filippo Buonarroti was among the conspirators undoubtedly 
secured the inclusion of foreigners in the measure, but such treatment had almost become 
a reflex anyway. " On 3 September the law was extended to include Vend6me, the seat of 
34 the high court oflustice specially assembled for the trial of the Babouvists. 
When on II May Meyer complained to Siey6s about a measure which could only have 
been prompted by a handful of foreigners, the revolutionary shrugged: 'Que voulez-vous 
faire, me dit-il, quelques coquins en sont la cause, & beaucoup d'honnetes gens en 
souffrent. ' Meyer was not the only person to object, as foreign ambassadors showered the 
Directory with protests. In the wake of the Babeuf conspiracy, the Directory and the 
Councils clearly saw order rather than individual liberties as the priority. Meyer reported 
that the law was rigorously applied. Using the registers of foreigners collected by the 
arrondissements from the issue of cartes de sfireN, foreigners living in the capital were 
sent a letter informing them of the law. Immediately, the Luxembourg and the ministry of 
police were besieged by foreigners and others clamouring for exemptions. Those who 
were fortunate enough to receive such dispensation had to renew their cartes de salreti. 
Meyer secured permission to remain in Paris from the minister of foreign affairs, Charles 
Delacroix. 1' Theobald Wolfe Tone received his dispensation from the Director Carnot on 
20 May. " Eventually, the expulsion of all foreigners from Paris and Vend6me was 
revoked on 29 June 1797 after the Spanish patriot Marchena had complained that he had 
been harrassed on account of his foreign birth, despite his naturalisation as a French 
citizen. " With the Babouvists safely tried and convicted a month earlier without a tremor 
in the streets of Paris, the immediate stimulus behind the law had also disappeared. 
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The end of the Terror certainly signalled an improvement in the conditions of 
foreigners. The vast majority imprisoned under the laws of 9- 16 October 1793 were 
eventually released and others felt safe enough to return from exile. After 9 Thermidor 
there was never another law decreeing the arrest of enemy subjects and the confiscation of 
their property. -When legislation was levelled against foreigners, as in the Terror the 
authorities used their discretionary powers to exempt those whom they believed to be 
useful or politically sound. Revolutionary pragmatism lived on. The demise of the Terror 
none the less begs the question as to why life for foreigners did not improve more than it 
actually did and why they were still subject to surveillance, passport controls and even 
expulsion. The police measures against foreigners in the Year II were not tied inextricably 
with the apparatus of the Terror, because while the Terror was dismantled, the fear of 
foreign intrigue remained. 
The end of the Terror, the change in atmosphere and military success allowed some 
revolutionaries to vent their cosmopolitan idealism once more, but this hid the continuities 
in the treatment of enemy, neutral and allied subjects. To many revolutionaries, foreigners 
remained potential spies and agents of domestic subversion. Each new crisis, from the 
royalist landings at Quiberon to the Babouvist conspiracy, provoked laws against 
foreigners. In a time of international conflict, it was easy for both the Thermidorians and 
the Directory to see foreign conspiracy behind such domestic instability. In such 
circumstances, the revolutionaries usually came down on the side of order rather than on 
the individual liberties of foreigners. The war ensured that the revolutionaries would still 
respond to their internal crises with expressions of xenophobia, conspiracy theories and 
the exclusive implications of their ideology, often through legislation. The repression of 
foreigners was not bound inextricably to the apparatus of the Terror but, firstly and 
foremost, to the war. 
ii 
Foreign troops, scattered as they now were among regular French units, no longer 
gave the revolutionaries real cause for soul-searching. The Thermidorians were well 
aware of the spectacular lack of success with which some foreign legions were met when 
they tried to recruit their compatriots. Bourdon de I'Oise ren-dnded a war ministry 
commission that the DeuxMme Mgion batave was still on the payroll, despite the 
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disbandment of the other foreign legions. It had probably survived that fate precisely 
because it had been overlooked due to its very ineffectiveness and small size: it Vequivaut 
pas i une simple compagnie. Paying their salaries, argued Bourdon, was a waste of 
money. Orders were issued for its disbandment on 23 December, and its men were 
distributed among regular units of light-infantry and riflemen. " The Terror may have been 
over, but the Thermidorian policy towards foreign legions remained the same as before. 
When the Polish refugee general Dombrowski and generals Wielhorski and Wyzkowski 
submitted their separate plans for the creation of a Polish legion in 1795, the 
Thermidorians were cautious. The arguments which the Poles used were the same as 
those employed by the founders of other national legions: they would deprive enemy 
armies of recruits now that Poland had disappeared as an independent state; contact with 
the French army would nourish Polish refugees and deserters with republican principles 
and it would form the nucleus of a Polish republican army which would liberate its people 
and spread the gospel of the French Revolution. Despite the fall of Robespierre, however, 
both the Convention and Committee of Public Safety remained wary of encouraging 
foreign ventures which brought no immediate benefit to France. The first seeds of the 
Polish legion fell on rocky ground. 39 
To pre-empt any further embarrassment or difficulty with the recruitment of foreign 
regiments or legions, Article 287 of the Consitution of 1795 simply forbade the 
employment of foreign troops by the French Republic. In some cases, however, there was 
little difficulty in using foreigners in the French army when they were redefined 
unequivocally as French citizens through annexation. When Belgium and Li6ge became 
new departments of the Republic on I October 1795, recruits were inducted into existing 
French regiments, preempting the development of units which might have a separate 
'Belgiarf character. ' If they would not recruit new foreign legions, the French were not 
about to dismiss foreigners who were already serving with regular French units. Visiting 
Paris during the last months of the Convention, Meister noted that the deputies' military 
guard were drawn from the 61ite of the line regiments and that'le plus grand nombre 
cependant est 6tranger: Suisses, Allemands, Su6dois'. " On 17 August 1794, captain H. 
11SHAT, Xk46 (Letter of Bourdon to the Conunission de Vorganisation du mouvement 
des arrades de terre, 30 Thermidor II; letter of Gilles to Pichegru, 3 Niv6se III). 
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Nagtglas, a Dutch soldier formerly of the German Legion, petitioned the Committee of 
Public Safety to be allowed to join the Dutch officers in the Nord, where (he had heard) 
they were 'en r6quisition pour une exp6ditiod. 42 
Other officers of the former Looon gennanique sought redress of injuries inflicted 
during the Terror. They secured the support of Tallien in favour of compensation for the 
loss of their personal property, horses, equipment and papers, a claim for which they 
submitted on 12 October 1794 to the Committee of Public Safety. They further 
demanded their rehabilitation at the same rank and pay as on the day of their arrest. " It 
was not until 21 June 1795 that they were formally reintegrated into the army and until 
then they received no pay. In February 1796, some were still looking for posts. " 
As the revolutionary armies became more extended across Europe, French strategic 
needs demanded greater numbers of troops. The establishment of sister republics 
provided the means of circumventing the Constitution of the Year III and allowing the 
recruitment of foreign regiments or legions. Controversy was avoided in France because 
the units raised in the sister republics were officially the armies of allied powers, even if 
they were under the supreme command of the French, used for French strategic interests 
and sometimes even paid for by the French government. " 
By such means, the Poles finally raised their own legion. On 30 October 1796, Petiet 
wrote to Dombrowski informing him that nothing prevented the Poles from's6tablir chez 
les peuples avec lesquels la R6publique est en bonne intelligence', and that the French 
Directory would be willing to provide 'indirect' help to the Polish patriots working for the 
'regeneration! of their homeland. As Dombrowski and his colleagues were living in exile 
in northern Italy, the two-thousand strong Polish legion raised at Mantua by the 
"'SHAT, Xk3 (Letter of Nagtglas to the Committee of Public Safety, 30 Thermidor II). 
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n. d.; 'Extrait dune lettre du Nfinistre de la Guerre adressd aux Chefs et Conseil 
d'Administration de la Ugion Germanique', 28 Pluvi8se IV). 
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convention of 9 January 1797 was officially in the service of Lombardy and then of the 
Cisalpine Republic. ' 
Ostensibly foreign units raised in France had only a scattering of foreigners in the 
ranks. When on 2 November 1796 the Directory authorised Hoche to help the United 
Irishmen with several battalions of the armýe de FOcian, Hoche formed the brigade 
etrangire which owed its title less to the fact that some Irishmen served in the ranks than 
to the Irish commanders of two of the infantry regiments within it, Lee and Thomas 
O'Meara. The latter had served in the Irish regiments before the Revolution and recruited 
Irish prisoners to serve in Hoche's invasion force. Camot and Hoche also employed 
Nicholas Madgett to recruit Irish prisoners of war in March 1796. He was, in Tone's 
words, to 'propagate the faith amongst the Irish soldiers and seamen' and then to exchange 
them against British prisoners. Their actual use was not yet decided: Madgett suggested 
that they land in Ireland in advance of the French invasion to prepare hearts and minds, 
while general Clarke thought of using them to stir up a chouannerie in either Ireland or 
England. In the end, the government decided on the latter and general Humbert was 
ordered in April 1796 to prepare a force of 1,000 to 1,500 men to land in Cornwall and 
Wales. In November Irish prisoners of war, along with French deserters, mutineers and 
convicts, were marched to Brest, from where they were embarked on two frigates under 
the command of an American, William Tate, and set sail on 13 February 1797, after the 
Bantry Bay expedition had been scattered by the bitter winter winds. With Hoche's 
expedition shattered, Tate's famished, motley band landed on the Pembrokeshire coast and 
pillaged food and livestock shortly before surrendering. " 
The fall of the revolutionary government on 9 Thermidor did not, at first, herald 
brighter days for prisoners of war. The law of 7 Prairial was extended to include Spanish 
troops on II August 1794. This decision was hidden in a decree which dealt with other 
aspects of the war with Spain and was in response to the failure of the Spanish to honour 
the terms of an exchange of prisoners of war. 'Cet exemple est n6cessaire pour 6clairer les 
soldats qui composent les arm6es coalis6es, ' explained Bar6re, who presented the decree, 
"Godechot, La Grande Nation, 483; FieM, Histoire des troupes etrangires au service de 
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'et pour leur d6montrer le cas que les g6n6raux font de leur sang et de leur existence'. The 
more obvious conclusion which Spanish troops might draw, of course, was that it was the 
French who were willing to waste human fife. None the less, Bar6re curiously concluded 
that executing Spanish prisoners would stir up the Spanish people against their king. " 
The decree does not seem to have been applied in the field, although Bar&re indulged 
himself in his own rhetoric by describing, on 22 August, the massacre of two and a half 
thousand Spanish troops by the army of the Pyr6n6es-Orientales after Dugommier routed 
a small force near the village of Terrade. '9 As the apparatus of the Terror was dismantled, 
the war continued to exert its ugly weight on revolutionary attitudes towards foreigners. 
Such attitudes were not helped by the numerous complaints which the Convention had 
received about the behaviour of foreign prisoners and deserters in France since 9 
Thermidor. On 6 August the Convention heard the demand by the Jacobins of Chaumont 
in the Haute-Mame for severe measures against foreign prisoners and deserters. In 
response, several deputies added their own complaints, Beauchamp describing how 
deserters and prisoners of war 'divaguent dans les d6partemens pour piller, menacer et 
assassiner'. It was also reported that Spanish deserters had murdered two dýfellseurs de 
lapatrie returning from leave in the Lot. " 
None the less, the decrees of 7 Prairial and 24 Thermidor were finally repealed on 30 
December 1794'au milieu des applaudissements'. Brival rose to condemn the laws as 
9contraires a toutes les lois; efles contrarient le droit des gens et de la guerre ... ces lois 
sont m8me en opposition avec les sentiments qui animent nos brave militaires, qui savent 
vaincre nos ennemis, et jamais assassiner les vaincus'. A mixture of embarrassed national 
honour and humanitarianism was behind Brival's motion to repeal the decrees, but there 
was also shame from the fact that the Convention had voted for them in the first place. 
Brival excus6d his colleagues by explaining that the laws'ont 6t6 enlev6es par une surprise 
faite a la Convention'. " What was left unsaid may have been important, too: French 
soldiers might be subject to brutal reprisals if the law were ever rigorously enforced., 
The repeal of the laws of 7 Prairial and 24 Thermidor did not mean that the regime for 
prisoners of war already held in France was to be relaxed. Further news that prisoners 
had abused their liberty by leaving the communes in which they had been quartered, 
"AP, xciv, 492; Monileur, No. 326 (26 Thermidor 11/13 August 1794). 
"Moniteur, Nos. 336 (6 Fructidor 11/23 August 1794), 337 (7 Fructidor 11/24 August 
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coupled with the ever-lurking fear of espionage and sabotage, provoked a further 
draconian decree on 28 May 1795. Merlin de Douai reported to the Convention that 
some prisoners of war had filtered into Paris and that, only days after the Prairial uprising, 
Ie motif pour lequel on les y attirait ne peut etre doutelve. The Convention decreed that 
any prisoner who left his place of detention or billeting without permission of the 
government would be tried before a military commission and punished with six years in 
irons. Prisoners found in the capital would be put to death unless they left within twenty- 
four hours. Those in Paris, argued Merlin, were not simple soldiers but 'des lords, ce sont 
des officiers qui entendent trýs bien le frangais, et qui espionnent toutes les d6marches du 
gouvernement, toutes les op6rations de la Conventiod. As harsh as this decree was, it did 
not materially affect the everyday living conditions of those prisoners of war who 
remained in their assigned communes or prisons. Those who worked in the local 
community were considered to have government dispensation to move freely from their 
living quarters to their place of work. 52 
Exchanges continued as before and the Committee of Public Safety accepted petitions 
from individuals asking for repatriation. As under the Terror, those enemy soldiers sent 
home surplus to those in the exchange cartels were simply counted against future 
exchanges. Enemy officers sent home were asked to ensure that a French counterpart 
held by their countrymen was repatriated, and to swear that they would not bear arms 
against France or her allies. Those who could not fulfil these conditions were honour- 
bound to return to France within three months. In some cases, the French government 
permitted such exchanges on humanitarian grounds, for example to officers who were 
dangerously ill or wounded. " Soldiers in the ranks, meanwhile, had to rely on exchange 
cartels negotiated between their generals. The evidence suggests that the honour system 
for officers worked. On 29 June 1795, four French officers who returned from captivity 
in Britain petitioned the Committee of Public Safety and secured the release of two British 
prisoners in partial fulfilment of their'parole d'honneur'. " The persistence of the honour 
system among officers suggests that, despite the rhetoric, both sides still observed some of 
the older customs and practices of eighteenth-century warfare. 
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For those prisoners who remained in captivity in France, the orders given during the 
Terror that they should be confined and guarded closely were not strictly observed, even 
before 9 Thermidor. After the Terror, the regime under which prisoners of war lived did 
not change. Many were undoubtedly incarcerated in guarded barracks, but others were 
allowed some latitude to work and socialise locally. In May 1795, after peace with 
Prussia had been signed, Prussian prisoners of war working in the mines asked the 
inspector of glassworks, Daguilbel, if they might be permitted to remain in France 'en 
slunissant i des frangoises'. Daguilbel passed on the query to the Committee of Public 
Safety, which on 10 July replied that the law permitted them to do so. " Marriage 
between prisoners of war and local women is indicative of the freedom which the former 
had to form relationships and the request of the Prussians was not an isolated case. In 
July, the law-abiding citizen Andoyer asked the Committee if he might give his daughter 
in marriage to Joseph Jabonesqui, a prisoner of war. On 28 July the Committee 'arrEte 
que tout prisonnier de guerre 6tranger est libre de s'6tablir en France et d'y contracter 
mariage. " These conditions were dictated by the persistence of eighteenth-century 
practices, which in turn survived out of necessity. Certain communities did not have the 
resources to impose a restrictive regime on prisoners of war, while in others the 
authorities sought to put them to productive use, working in manufactures, workshops 
and agriculture. Prisoners who were locked up idle wasted resources while those who 
worked earned their own keep and contributed to the economy. 
In the minds of many revolutionaries, deserters were no better than prisoners of war. 
On 6 September 1794 the Convention received a request from the Jacobins of Perpignan, 
who spoke of 'ses craintes relatives a cette classe d'hommes que le royalisme vomit parmi 
nous, sous le nom de d6serteure. " No doubt that frontier town had received a fresh influx 
of frightened, hungry men fleeing the war zone as Dugommier marched into the northern 
periphery of Spain. On 25 August 1795 the administration of the Eure heard foreign 
deserters described as'des f6n6ants, des ivrognes, des indociles, des volleurs, des 
destructeurs d'Effets de Cazernes, ils vendent leur pain quinze A vingt francs la livre, et se 
repandent dans les campagnes oii ils se sont delivrer de force du pain et du cidre. 
"SHAT, YJ 1 (Trisonniers de Gueffe 6trangers: extraits des registres des ddliberations du 
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Districts had been forced to take measures to stifle any disorder. " Deserters were no 
longer men who had come to share in the fruits of liberty and to contribute to its growth, 
but were a nuisance, a menace and, probably, spies. 
Such hostility and suspicion could be translated into action. In response to the report 
heard on 25 August, the department of the Eure decided to collate all foreign deserters in 
tvreux, the chef-lieu. There, they were placed under the surveillance of the procureurs- 
spidics, who were empowered to reallocate them to other municipalities. They could 
only send deserters to work in rural communes if they received written requests for such 
labour from the farmers, who would then be held responsible for any misdemeanours 
committed by the deserters. Anyone employing a deserter was to register him with the 
municipal authorities, who would keep watch over him. Those deserters who sold their 
bread, or who forcibly seized food or drink, were to be imprisoned. " The department 
used the latitude permitted by the law to increase surveillance over foreign deserters and 
to limit their activities. Above all, by discouraging their employment in rural areas, the 
department sought to restrict as many deserters as possible to the towns, where they 
might be more easily watched and controlled. 
In other departments, however, deserters were encouraged to earn their keep as 
before. The order of the Committee of Public Safety issued on 17 July 1794 to arrest any 
deserter who refused to work still applied. This also meant, however, that those who 
could not work either through injury or lack of opportunity were still subsidised by the 
local authorities, who reclaimed their expenses from the commission des secours publics. 
By the same order, deserters unable to make ends meet were still owed the daily handout 
of ten sous and the inflation-proof bread ration of twenty-four ounces. ' 
The success of French arms between 9 Thermidor and the treaty of Campo Formio did 
not persuade the Thermidorians and the Directory to make dramatic changes in the 
conditions of foreign troops, prisoners of war and deserters. The opposition which had 
emerged in 1793 to recruiting foreigners in separate units remained much the same and 
was encapsulated in the ban on such recruitment in the Constitution of 1795. If during the 
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Terror foreign legions were discredited because of their alleged political allegiances to 
Dumouriez and the Girondins, the return of the surviving Girondins to revolutionary 
politics did little for them. For both the regime of the Terror and the post-Thermidor 
revolutionaries alike, a major flaw in the legions was their failure to recruit enough of the 
nationalities for which they were destined. For this very reason, the Thermidorians 
finished what the Convention had all but completed in 1793 and disbanded the last 
surviving legion. 
Perhaps also military success from 1794 made redundant the extra manpower offered 
by foreign legions, at least until the French arn-fies were overstretched. With Article 287 
of the Constitution of 1795, the vision of Dubois-Crancd expressed in 1789 for a truly 
'national' army was at last fulfilled - at least on paper. Requests by Polish officers in exile 
for their own legion, which might have been greeted enthusiastically in 1792, were met 
with cold indifference in 1795. 
None the less, foreigners still served in the French army, although not in separate 
foreign units, and the revolutionaries' familiar pragmatism soon obliged them to 
circumvent the constitutional ban on foreign troops. When French military resources 
were stretched across Europe, sister republics were urged, as nominally independent 
states, to raise troops. It was in this way that the Poles finally got their legion early in 
1797. Such recruitment was indicative less of a revival in the cosmopolitan exuberance of 
1792 than of a practical response to the strategic needs of the French Republic. The 
French needed men to wage their campaigns which were being fought ever-further from 
home and across a wider range of territory. 
A similar disregard for the earlier universal pretensions of the Revolution can be seen in 
the post-Thermidor treatment of prisoners of war and deserters. Very little changed in 
their day-to-day conditions. In some areas, both deserters and prisoners remained 
incarcerated, while in others they were free to work towards their upkeep. If the laws of 
7 Prairial and of 24 Thermidor were repealed at the end of 1794, humanitarian impulses 
were certainly among the reasons, but so too was shame and embarrassment that the 
Convention could have voted such decrees in the first place. 
Even if the conditions in which they lived were a far cry from the ideal outlined in the 
original laws in 1792, both prisoners and deserters still retained a degree of freedom 
which is unfamiliar to late twentieth-century observers. The fact that the Committee of 
Public Safety received requests for permission to marry from prisoners shows that they 
were able to establish close personal ties with their neighbours. If prisoners and deserters 
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were forced to work, it was in a small workshop or in the fields alongside local people 
rather than in labour camps and local administrators tried to find them tasks which 
corresponded to their skills. Such conditions were due less to any cosmopolitan ideals 
than to the persistence of eighteenth-century practices in the treatment of prisoners. 
Perhaps most surprising of all for politicians whose rhetoric was so full of hatred for the 
enemy, the central authorities still accepted the word of honour from enemy officers who 
sought repatriation. Nothing could illustrate better the weight of tradition among men 
who claimed to be waging a national war based on new principles. 
III 
On 2 October 1794, the staff and students of the English College of Saint-Omer were 
released from the citadel of Doullens and allowed to return to their town, but found that 
their buildings were being used as a military hospital. " On 17 October the Convention 
decreed that the Irish students and priests at the colleges were free to return to Ireland, 
perhaps because the revolutionaries were convinced that some of the Irish clergy retained 
some seeds of hatred for the British and Irish governments. In Bordeaux, the fifty-odd 
Irish priests and students were released, embarked on an American ship and sailed for 
Ireland. " The guards at the English Augustinian and Benedictine convents in Paris, where 
the nuns from all three orders in the capital had been held, were withdrawn in March 
1795. The English Benedictine nuns from Cambrai regained their liberty in Compi6gne, 
after the local mayor led a petitioning campaign for their release. ' 
The foreign clergy may have gradually regained their freedom, but until the authorities 
decided what to do with their property, the foreign clergy suffered penury. In December 
1794, Walsh wrote to the Convention asking for help for the twenty-two Irish students 
and priests who still remained in Paris. On 2 March, the commission des secourspublics 
told the Committee of Public Safety that it would furnishle secours et Vindemnite 
provisoires' until a decision was made on their property. The commission pointed out that 
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the Irish clergy deserved such support because, in the first place, for three years the 
students had not studied theology, but literature, medicine and surgery, while some'sont 
employ6s dans les h6pitaux et dans les arm6es de la R6publique'. Others were ready to 
volunteer for the army. Such patriotism on the part of students who had been imprisoned 
by the authorities showed their dedication to the Republic, which was in turn spurred by 
their alienation from the existing order in Ireland. A list of the Irish students and clerics 
claiming financial support clearly impressed the commission with their republican 
credentials. " In fact, between 21 April 1795 and 16 September 1796, the Irish students 
and administrators of the Paris college were given monthly subsidies totalling over 23,235 
livres taken from the funds made available by the Convention on 4 March 1794 for 
foreign patriots and refugees in France. This suggests that the authorities accepted the 
argument that the Irish clergy who remained in France were republicans. "' Some 
ideological conformity still helped the foreign clergy in their struggle for survival, but it 
was not strictly necessary, as the Thermidorians seem to have recognised some obligation 
to those who had suffered from imprisonment and the confiscation of their property in the 
Terror. On 14 April 1795, the Convention voted to provide all English nuns in France 
with a daily allowance of 40 sous each from the funds of the commission des secours 
publics until a decision had been reached over the fate of their property. " 
If the Terror was over, the anticlericalism now irrevocably linked to French 
republicanism was not. James Burke, who had been released from prison in Bordeaux 
during the Terror, was actually rearrested and jailed shortly after 9 Thermidor, as he put it 
'comme pr6tre, comme aristocrate et agent de monseigneur de Cic6', formerly archbishop 
of Bordeaux and monarchien in the Constituent Assembly. ' As the Directory veered 
between the Scylla and Charybdis of Jacobinism and royalism, Walsh, superior of the Irish 
College in Paris, felt threatened enough in March 1796 to write to the foreign n-dnister, 
Delacroix, asking for his protection. He had heard that he'vient d'etre comprise dans les 
Mandats d'arret d6cern6s contre les Ecclesiastiquee. Having regained the college's 
'MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, Dossier 233 (Letter of Walsh to the 
Convention, NivOse 111; report of the Commission des Secours Publics, 12 Vent6se III). 
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confiscated property for the administrators, Walsh complained of Ies craintes qui 
paralysent leurs op6rations' and which stemmed from official persecution of the clergy. ' 
The persistence of anticlericalism, the experience of imprisonment and persecution 
certainly convinced many of the foreign clergy that they had had enough of life in 
revolutionary France. Meanwhile, developments in the British Isles promised brighter 
days for Catholics, who were being regarded with less suspicion than before 1789, partly 
thanks to the fact that French ýmigrj clergy had made an impression as opponents of 
French republicanism. This combination of stick and carrot was of great importance in 
the demise of the foreign ecclesiastical institutions in France. On their release, the English 
Benedictines in Paris sold what remained of their linen and furniture to get enough money 
to travel to Britain in June, giving up all hope of regaining their property. Like their 
counterparts in Paris, the Cambrai Benedictines decided not to struggle for the return of 
their convent, which they considered 'much-beloved but now lost'. They applied for 
passports and received money, via Hamburg, from a sympathiser in Britain. They sailed 
from Calais on 23 May. Meanwhile the staff and students of the English Colleges of 
Saint-Omer and Douai petitioned for permission to return home. " 
For the British and Irish clergy who remained in France, the most serious threat to the 
survival of their institutions was not anticlericalism, but the sale of their property which 
had been confiscated. This did not go ahead without resistance from certain foreign 
clergymen, who were confronted by ambiguities in the legislation passed by the 
Thermidorians and under the Directory. The release from confiscation of foreigners' 
property on 3 January 1795 gave the foreign clergy some leverage, but there was some 
confusion over whether or not the property of the foreign colleges, convents and 
monasteries could be retained and sold by the state as ecclesiastical wealth, or whether it 
ought to be defined as private property belonging to foreigners. 
Different interest groups, from potential beneficiaries of the sales to the superiors and 
their supporters who hoped to reopen their houses in France, took their different 
interpretations to the authorities. On 21 February 1795, the Irish clerics of the college in 
Paris petitioned the comn-dssion of domainesnalionaux claiming that the law of 3 January 
applied to their property. They stressed that'ils sont aux droits de ces hommes qui, 
"MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, Dossier 233 (Letter of Walsh to 
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chassds de leur pays, ont mis sous la sauve garde de la loyaut6 frangaise les d6bris de leur 
fortune pour fournir i Veducation de leurs parens'. This tried and trusted argument did 
not immediately work, because the Irish did not regain possession of the college until a 
year later. " This was not the end of the troubles, because when the Directory established 
a new military academy, the legislative councils also ruled on 13 July 1797 that the 
bursaries of all the former Paris colleges were to be administered by the new institution. 
On the basis of this law, the academy claimed the property of the English, Irish and Scots 
colleges in Paris. Walsh, former superior of the Irish College, and Alexander Innes of the 
Scots College naturally objected, and the ensuing battle was not resolved until 1802, when 
the Consulate decreed that the former Irish, Scots and English colleges should form one 
single establishment with Walsh at its head. " Innes, meanwhile, struggled to retain one of 
the foundations of his institution, the Scots farm at Grisy. He succeeded in enlisting the 
help of the British government in preventing the sale of both the farm and the college 
buildings in Paris and in 1801 he received formal acknowledgment of the Scots possession 
of its property. This saved the college. " 
Other foreign houses were not so fortunate. When the Directory finally ordered the 
sale of the property of the foreign houses in May and July 1798, the English 
Conceptionists in Paris saw some of their buildings scattered around the rues de la 
Roquette, de Charonne and de Lappe auctioned off, while the English Augustinians and 
the English Benedictine friars lost their main buildings to buyers. " The losses almost 
drove the Augustinians to leave France, but for the intervention of the Second Consul, 
Charles Lebrun, in 1802. The Conceptionists fled to Norfolk. " The Scots College of 
Douai was found by Innes in 1801 to have been parcelled out to buyers of biens 
nationaux. 'Only the college walls remain unsold; all our landed property, amounting to 
near 500 acres of excellent ground, beside 5 houses, have been sold and resold', " which of 
course made future claims more difficult. In Bordeaux, the Irish College's church of 
Saint-Eutrope was sold to a manufacturer of saltpetre on 22 February 1795. The other 
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buildings on the rue du Ha were still national property, but being rented. From prison, 
James Burke took upon himself the task of saving the college from sale and of reopening 
it as a seminary for Irish students. He drew up a petition and used his contacts outside the 
maison d'arret to help him in his campaign, including several Protestants in the 
departmental administration, which suspended the transfer of the deeds to the 
manufacturer. Burke was released shortly after this first victory, but he had a long 
struggle ahead of him. It took him another eight years before he succeeded in definitively 
preventing the sale of the buildings, but he never managed to reopen the college. The 
other Irish colleges in the provinces were similarly never resurrected. "' 
Perhaps the most important reason for the failure of the Irish colleges to rise from the 
ashes was the establishment of Maynooth college in Ireland in 1795. Some of the Irish 
clergy remaining in France voiced opposition to this development, particularly as the 
government in Dublin encouraged the Irish establishments on the continent to sell their 
property and transfer the wealth to Ireland. As Walsh wrote to Delacroix, the French 
foreign n-dnister, on 21 March 1796, 'les administrateurs des Etablissements de Paris 
s'opposent formellement a cette mesure comme contraire I" aux voeux des fondateurs 20 
aux interets des Irlandais qui auroient le plus grand tort de r6unir tous leurs fonds sous la 
main du Gouvernement Brittannique' . 
17 There was of course some understandable self 
interest in WalsWs reasoning, having worked so hard to restore the property of the Paris 
college, but the French Revolution and the foundation of a Catholic college in Ireland 
together signalled the end of an era for the British and Irish Catholic institutions in France. 
The prospects for the survival of the foreign clergy in France as human beings were 
undoubtedly made brighter after Thermidor with their release from the squalid conditions 
of imprisonment, but the struggle for their institutions was only just beginning. The 
Terror disgusted and intimidated some of the foreign clergy to the extent that some of the 
houses, such as the English Benedictines of Paris and Carnbrai, did not even attempt to 
recover their property and emigrated to Britain at the earliest opportunity. As unpleasant 
as incarceration and anticlericalism were, what made the prognosis for the survival of the 
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Coll6ge Irlandais de Bordeaux!, 26; Loup6s, 'Les Eccl6siastiques Irlandais dans le Diocese 
de Bordeaux, 96; Loup6s, 'The Irish Clergy of the Diocese of Bordeaux, 37; Simms, 'The 
Irish on the Continent', 652. 
"MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, Dossier 233 CM6moire'of Walsh to 
Delacroix, I Germinal IV). 
328 
foreign houses unsure was the actual or potential sale of their property. The dual status of 
this property as clerical and as foreign wealth meant that the authorities were ambiguous 
over its release ftom confiscation. Before October 1793, its foreign status had protected 
it from the ecclesiastical reforms of the Revolution. Once the revolutionaries had broken 
the glass wall which sheltered foreign wealth ftom the revolutionary whirlwind, however, 
the authorities came to regard it increasingly as ecclesiastical wealth, liable to 
nationalisation and sale. It was because of this equivocal status that the foreign clergy 
found themselves embroiled in complex legal battles to save their property. As Walsh, 
Innes and Burke discovered, such struggles could grind on for years and by the time they 
had made progress, developments in the British Isles favourable to Catholics ensured that 
interest in the institutions in France would never reach pre-revolutionary levels. 
IV 
Most foreign patriots were relieved to see the Terror collapse. Those who had been 
imprisoned were freed, while some of those who fled returned to taste the new freedom. 
Some foreign patriots certainly felt unwelcome after the experience of imprisonment, 
expulsion or harrassment during the Terror. Paine, ill from almost a year in the disease- 
ridden Luxembourg, refused a pension and Monroe petitioned the Committee of Public 
Safety on his behalf on 4 January 1795, asking for him to be entrusted with a mission to 
the United States. The Committee replied that 'the position he holds will not permit him 
to accept it'. "' Paine, having been denied his seat in the Convention and imprisoned as an 
enemy subject at the end of 1793 was now being prevented from returning to his other 
adopted country on the grounds that he was, after all, a deputy. Mary Wollstonecraft 
returned to Paris from Le Havre in the late autumn of 1794. She returned to Britain in 
April 1795, possibly because, as Archibald Hamilton Rowan implied, laws against 
foreigners were being more rigorously enforced than during the Terror. She was also 
penniless and disillusioned with Paris. "' 
Among those who, on the other hand, returned directly to political activity was Karl 
Reinhard, who was released from prison and appointed diplomatic envoy to the Hanseatic 
"Conway, Me Life of Thomas Paine, H, 154 - 15 5; Claeys, Momas Paine, 31 -31 
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towns, with Georg Kerner as his secretary. In 1799, he became the Directory's last 
foreign minister. Oelsner returned to Paris from Switzerland with Zschokke, who wanted 
to study the Republic. Refusing the post of French envoy to Switzerland, on the grounds 
that he did not wish to serve a foreign country, Oelsner remained in Paris in 1796 as 
Frankfurt's representative. " His vision of a league of Rhenish states under French 
protection was at odds with the demands of the German patriots gathered around Reubell, 
who wanted annexation. The Spanish patriot Marchena took French citizenship despite 
his imprisonment during the Terror, and, with the advent of the Directory, settled in 
France. " 
Many foreign patriots, burned by the Terror, now avoided the unpredictable flame of 
politics altogether. It is not surprising that the most notable of them all should have been 
German, many of whom saw the importance of the Revolution not so much in political as 
in moral terms. Bitaub6, also freed from capitivity, remained in France and successfully 
engaged in literary and philosophical pursuits. He was elected to the Institut national des 
sciences et des arts created by the Directory on 25 October 1795, to which foreign 
associates could be admitted. When Friedrich Meyer, professor of law at Hamburg, 
visited Paris in March 1796, he found that Bitaubd had become an established member of 
the intellectual cream of French society. 82 Schlabrendorf, released from prison after 
Thermidor, lived among his books, devoting as much attention to his interests in literature 
and philosophy as he did to politics. " Helen Maria Williams, Benjamin Vaughan and John 
Hurford Stone returned safely to France, but kept a low profile: Wolfe Tone ran into 'my 
old friend Stone of Hackney, walking with Williams in the Tuileries on 19 July 1796. 
While Wolfe Tone was formally in Paris incognito, it is a measure of Stone and Williams's 
removal from political activity that they had been completely unaware of his presence in 
France, unlike the American ambassador and several Irish radicals in exile, with whom 
Tone dined publicly on several occasions. " 
The post-Thermidor period also saw the arrival of new radical faces in France, often 
fleeing persecution. Karl Cramer, a professor of rhetoric at Kiel, was dismissed from his 
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post and from the city by the Danish government in 1794 due to his sympathies for the 
French Revolution. At the end of 1795, he was in Paris, employing Mainz refugees in his 
printshop. Georg Rebmann had fled Saxony after his biting attacks on the existing order. 
Tracked from one German state to another by the police, he finally emigrated to Paris in 
1796. Bitterly disappointed by the realities of life under the Directory, corruption and 
immorality in particular, he none the less took up a position as a judge at the tribunal at 
Mainz when the left bank of the Rhine was occupied by the French after Campo Formio. 
He described himself as a'citoyen allemand de la R6publique frangais'. " Thomas Muir, 
escaped from Botany Bay, ended his odyssey when he arrived at Bordeaux to a triumphal 
reception in 1798. " Besides individuals such as Cramer, Rebmann and Muir, whole new 
groups were drawn to France for refuge, namely the United Irishmen after the 
catastrophic uprising in 1798 and 5,200 Italian Jacobins when the Austrians and Russians 
swept through Italy in 1799. " 
If the demands for political conformity were no longer as stringent as they were during 
the Terror, foreign radicals who once applauded the Revolution for its political freedom 
and its democratic promise found themselves facing a leadership hostile to some of the 
more radical propositions which had once caused so much excitement. On 7 July 1795, 
Paine made his only appearance in the Convention after his release. Still a proponent of 
direct representative democracy, he warned against restrictions of the male suffrage and a 
powerful executive and roundly condemned the proposed constitution. Murmurs arose 
from around the chamber and when the printing of his comments was proposed, some 
deputies opposed it'avec force'. His opinions brought an onslaught from Merlin de Douai 
two days later. " The Convention sought order and feared a return to the 'anarchy' of the 
early Republic. Paine was out of step with mainstream revolutionary opinion. After the 
dissolution of the Convention, he would have nothing to do with the organisation of the 
Directory, which he had so eloquently attacked. He remained in France until 1802 
working with Monroe in protecting American interests, rather than with the French 
government. The experience of the Terror had made Paine unequivocally an American. " 
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As a rightward shift in revolutionary politics, Thermidor also exposed to suffering 
those foreign radicals who had succeeded in attaching themselves too closely to the 
regime of the Terror. Archibald Hamilton Rowan, who had been freed from captivity by 
orders of the revolutionary government at the height of its power, chose to leave France 
for the United States after the Grenelle explosion ensured that 'the Jacobins were 
considered to be the evil genii of the French nation!. He was also disillusioned with the 
'distracted state of Paris', which meant that no attention was being given to Irish affairs. ' 
The German doctor Saiffert, an associate of the 1-16bertists and a founder of the German 
Legion, who had enjoyed an acquittal before the Revolutionary Tribunal, returned to 
Germany after Thermidor and tried to shed his extremist past. "' Even Valckenaer, who 
had only escaped arrest during the Year II by keeping a low profile and embracing the cult 
of the supreme being, was watched along with others of his kind as 'intrigants adroite, 
who shared 'toutes les iddes d6sorganisatrices qui ont d6sol6 la France'. His alleged 
'intimacy' with Robespierre would later implicate him in the conspiracy of Equals. 2 
The Robespierrist Filippo Buonarroti was recalled from his mission in Oneglia on 14 
March 1795 and arrested after a subject of a neutral country complained of the 
confiscation of his property and its distribution among 'sans-culottes'. He was not 
released until October 1795, when the Convention sought the help of the Jacobins to 
offset the surge in royalist and monarchist sympathies which had culminated in the 
Vend6miaire uprising, Buonarroti was no repentant Terrorist, however, and was later 
implicated in the Babeuf conspiracy. "' Buonarroti was not simply caught, accidentally, on 
the 'wrong' side as the revolutionary tide moved away. Heat least actively conspired 
against the Directorial regime. Others seem to have been accused of complicity in the plot 
because of their suspected political ties with Jacobins, as the Directory shifted rightwards 
in reaction to the conspiracy. Valckenaer was passing through Paris on his way to take up 
the post of Batavian ambassador to Madrid when the French government warned him on 
12 June 1796 that it was best that he did not stay for very long. The French then 
demanded of the Batavian Directory that it actually recall Valckenaer and Jacob Blauw, 
Dutch ambassador to Paris, who was also suspected of links with the Equals. On I 
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December 1796 the Directory secured the expulsion from Paris of the Genevan radical 
Janot, whom the French ambassador described as closely linked to the'anarchists'. At the 
same time, it refused to recognise the credentials of the Genevan ambassador to France, 
Delaplanche, whom it suspected of Babouvist ties. " 
Embroiled in a war and buffeted by real or imagined conspiracies, the Directorial 
regime did not give foreign patriots the same benefit of the doubt as the revolutionaries 
might have done prior to the Terror. On 27 March 1796 Friedrich Cotta, a WOrttemberg 
patriot and editor of the Gazette allemande du Rhin came to the attention of the 
authorities in the Bas-Rhin for his repeated journeys between Strasbourg and Basle. The 
minister of police ordered his expulsion if he was liable to the law of 23 Messidor III. An 
Italian refugee named Cetto was ordered to leave France in accordance with the same law, 
only being allowed to stay on 23 April after he had appealed to the Directory. "' Far from 
resurrecting the proselytising exuberance of 1792, the post-Thermidor regimes remained 
hard-nosed, usually - and ironically - adopting the 'Robespieffist' policy of serving French 
interests in their dealings with foreign patriots. The resurgence of cosmopolitan language 
merely veiled the continuities. 
The earliest group of patriots to discover this was a delegation of Polish exiles seeking 
French help for their beleaguered country on 14 August 1794. Speaking the cosmopolitan 
language of 1792, they reminded the French that while other nations were either 
spectators or enemies in France's struggle, the Poles stood up to fight despotism. This 
common cause formed Ies noeuds sacr6s qui lient deji les destin6es presentes et futures 
des Frangais et des Polonois'. Such language merely brought a useless assurance from the 
president that the French people 'sait qu'en combattant pour sa propre liberte il combat 
aussi pour la liberte polonaise. ' It was clear that the Poles would receive no help from 
the French. Not even the restoration of the surviving Girondins to the Convention on 8 
December resurrected to its former exuberance the militant cosmopolitanism of 1792. 
Nfilitary success certainly reinvigorated French cosmopolitan rhetoric, but as before the 
policies of the Thermidorians and the Directory were dictated by French strategic 
concerns. 
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It was for this reason that the Thermidorian Convention and the Directory paid 
subsidies to foreign refugees. This was no re-emergence of cosmopolitanism, but a 
continuity from the decree of 14 Vent6se 11 (4 March 1794), which allocated twenty 
million fivres for the subsistance of foreign patriots in France. Handouts were entered on 
the same register as before 9 Thermidor, up to 16 September 1796. The motives behind 
the payment of subsidies are illustrated by the gradual disappearance of Belgians and 
Li6geois from the register. They were the main beneficiaries until 23 February 1795, 
taking 97% of the 182,7 10 livres, 7 sous distributed, with the rest going to refugees from 
the Rhineland. Between 24 February 1795 and 16 September 1796, however, Belgians 
and Li6geois received only 14.5% of the 85,901 fivres distributed. All their allocations 
were towards the 'frais de route' decreed on 25 September 1794 for those refugees 
returning home to the Low Countries. " Mainz patriots in Paris, Alsace and Lorraine now 
took a much larger proportion than before, 42%, reflecting not a new influx of Germans, 
but the departure of their more numerous counterparts from Brabant and Li6ge. "' As 
before, the revolutionaries supported foreign refugees because of the role they would play 
in the occupied territories. The payment of travel costs for the Belgians and Li6geois 
returning home suggests that foreign patriots were expected to take up positions in the 
new pro-French administrations. 
French interests, however, did not always coincide with the aspirations of the foreign 
patriots. Such differences could lead to acrimonious disputes between the revolutionaries 
and the foreigners. After Fleurus, the French lent their support only to those Belgians and 
Li6geois who actively supported the annexation of Belgium and Liýge by France. " Those 
suspected of opposition were sidelined. Immediately after the annexations were 
pronounced on I October 1795, Lefebvre de Nantes warned that'il existe i Paris des 
individus des diff6rents partis qui ont divis6 la Belgique'. None of them, he warned, 
should be allowed to carry the news of annexation to their homeland and he persuaded the 
Convention to send the decree by courier instead. " 
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When the Dutch Patriot Herman Daendels, formerly of the Batavian Legion and now 
serving as a general in the French Army of North, issued his own proclamation to the 
Dutch people in September 1794, his French superiors were stunned because this 
behaviour smacked of Dumouriez-style adventurism. Such independence of action by a 
Batavian commander would also undermine French claims that they were the virtually 
unaided liberators of the United Provinces. Daendels was arrested and he was only 
released when one of the representatives on mission insisted that it was over-enthusiasm, 
not sabotage, which explained the general's behaviour. 'O' It was in vain that foreign 
patriots in France warned the French that, while they may have adopted French forms and 
ideology, their people sought reform in tune with their own traditions and on their own 
terms. On 15 August 1794, Dumont-Pigalle, the secretary to the comiM batave, wrote to 
Carnot saying that only a handful of Patriots wanted 'de tout leur coeur la libert6 
frangaise'. "' It was a plea which, in their concern to safeguard their own strategic 
interests, the French would ignore. 
The Vaudois exile La Harpe, who saw himself as the spokesman of the French- 
speaking Swiss in Paris, was listened to by Bonaparte and the Directory in September 
1797 only because his proposals for an independent state of francophone cantons under 
French protection coincided with the strategic perspectives of the general and his 
government. For this, he found himself in conflict with the recognised leader of the 
German-speaking radicals, Peter Ochs, who did not envisage French intervention, but a 
spontaneous uprising of the Swiss people, who would form their own National Assembly. 
In the end Ochs was invited to Paris, where he was persuaded to accept La Harpe's point 
of view. "' 
Italian patriots were similarly prey to the hard-edged pragmatism of French policy 
towards their neighbours. Buonarroti understood this and sought to ensure that Piedmont 
would avoid military rule by France. He knew that both the strategic concerns of the 
French and their common prejudices towards Italians might lead to Italy's treatment as a 
bargaining chip for territorial concessions in Germany. From his position among the 
Jacobin Amar committee after the closure of the Club du Panth6on on 27 February 1796, 
Buonarroti sought to show, firstly, that the Italians were ready for liberty and, secondly, 
that they were able to have a revolution to achieve it. The rapidity of Bonaparte's 
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advance into Italy that spring put paid to such illusions. Meanwhile, the discovery of 
Buonarroti among the Babouvists ensured that the Italian patriots became almost 
synonymous with Jacobin conspiracy: A few days after the arrest of the Equals, Reubell 
was warned that other Italian patriots in Paris, Selvaggi, Celentani, Serra and Sauli were 
in Paris 'sous les auspices du conspirateur Buonarroti'. "' 
Pragmatism naturally led the revolutionaries to support foreign patriots in their 
aspirations where those suited French interests. The problem was that interpretations of 
French interests could vary with both changes in the political colour of the revolutionary 
regime and the personal ambitions of individual generals. After the French armies spilled 
into Germany the previous October, the Mainz patriots in Paris launched a press campaign 
in favour of 'reunion! in the summer of 1795 and lent their weight to Reubell's arguments 
for lesfronWres naturelles. The campaign finally petered out in March 1796, but the 
shifting of Directorial politics also brought disappointment a year later with the royalist 
success in the elections and the nomination of Barth6lemy as a Director. A rapid peace 
with concessions to Austria seemed to be on the table with this political shift in Paris, 
which did not bode well for those who hoped that Austria would be bludgeoned into 
ceding the Rhineland to France. Moreover, Bonaparte sought to protect his own interests 
in Italy at the peace preliminaries at Leoben on 18 April 1797, which guaranteed that the 
subsequent negotiations would be based on the'integrity' of the Holy Roman Empire. The 
Rhenish exiles switched, therefore, to the goal of a Cisrhenan sister republic, which 
coincided more with the aims of Carnot and Barth6lemy, the Directors who were in 
favour of a peace based on les andennes limites. It also suited general Hoche, the plan's 
main proponent, who sought to imitate Bonaparte in establishing a sister republic as his 
own personal fiefdom. This scheme sank in turn when the coup of 18 Fructidor V (4 
September 1797) destroyed the right-wing landslide and when general Hoche died a few 
weeks later. "' 
Irish patriots were equally prey to shifts in Thermidorian and Directorial politics. 
Archibald Hamilton Rowan left France in the autumn of 1794 partly because he believed 
the revolutionaries 'were too busy with their own intestine divisions to think of assisting 
104 Wolff, A History offtaly, 161 - 162; Lyons, France under the Directory, 29 - 31,206 - 
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Ireland'. "' Theobald Wolfe Tone arrived in France on I February 1796, seeking to 
convince the Directory that a French invasion was necessary to spark an uprising in 
Ireland. That French strategic concerns would be paramount in any such support for Irish 
independence was made clear on 14 March when Tone met general Henri Clarke of the 
war ministry. Clarke asked 'what security could I give, that in twenty years after our 
independence, we might not be found engaged as an ally of England against France? ' On 
10 April Clarke insisted to another Irish patriot, Aherne, that Ireland should consult Paris 
on the form of government she chose, which cast the shadow of the Second Propagandist 
decree over the procedings. It was not altogether certain that the French even sought 
Irish independence, but rather to turn Ireland into a festering wound for Britain: on 2 
April Clarke asked Tone for a planTor a system of chouannerie in Ireland'. Tone 
recognised that it might have the suited aims of the French, but not the aspirations of the 
United Irishmen. " 
The conflict of interests which sometimes afflicted relations between the French 
government and foreign patriots may be illustrated by two experiences of Irish exiles in 
France. First of all, while the French naturally hoped that an independent Ireland would 
be a republic attendant to their strategic needs, they disregarded ideological compatibility 
in their search for allies among the Irish people. Richard O'Shee was sent by the 
Directory to Ireland to discover the strength and intentions of the Catholic Defenders, an 
underground organisation whose sectarianism had little in common with French 
republicanism. Tone was kept in the dark about this overture: the French wanted an 
uprising in Ireland and it did not matter who was involved. On the other hand, from the 
point of view of the United Irishmen in France, the ideological makeup of the Directory 
did matter. Monroe pleased Tone shortly after his arrival when he said that the Directory 
and the whole people'were most violently exasperated against England'. Any change of 
government might therefore have upset the plans of the United Irishmen. When Babeuf s 
conspiracy was exploded, Tone commented with a shiver, 'as an Irishman, I cannot but 
rejoice at the discovery of this complot. Had it succeeded, what would have become of 
us? "08 
The politics of the French government were particularly important when Britain made 
peace overtures to France in October 1796 and when negotiations opened in Lille in June 
"Rowan, Autobiography, 240. 
"Tone, Life, ii, 51,80 - 82,93. 
"Elliott, Partners in Revolution, 88- 90; Tone, Life, ii, 24,110. 
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1797. The Irish exiles were naturally alarmed as they were depending on the war for their 
plans to come to fi-uition. Tone was happy on the first occasion to see that relations 
between Malmesbury and Delacroix were chilly. The second negotiations at Lille, 
however, were more serious. They came after the royalist success in the legislative 
elections that previous April, which made the political balance look more favorable to 
peace than previously. Tone feared that a treaty might be inevitable and so towards the 
end of July, when he heard that Hoche had been appointed to a post in the Nfinistry of 
War, he asked the general to exert his influence to ensure that Ireland was given 
independence as part of the settlement. When the coup of Fructidor overthrew the 
peacemakers in the Directory and replaced them with less compromising republicans, 
Tone sensed a good omen. The negotiations at Lille collapsed in the wake of this change 
of political colour and Tone celebrated this 'excellent news. The entire affair underlined 
the fact that foreign patriots were dependent on French support. They were therefore 
prey to the shifting character of Directorial politics, which led Tone to remark that 
'wretched ... 
is the nation whose independence hangs on the will of another'. " 
The rejection of the Terror in France on 9 Thermidor brought about a new flourish in 
political activity. The release of political prisoners, the restoration of press freedom and 
the repeal of the law of suspects encouraged foreign patriots to re-emerge and participate 
once more in the Revolution. Renewed French advances into neighbouring countries, 
accompanied by a resurgence of the old cosmopolitan rhetoric, created an atmosphere in 
which the 'crusade for universal liberty' seemed to have been rejuvenated after the 
apparent stagnation under the revolutionary government. In fact, the flowering of 
proselytising expectations and language hid the continuities between 'Robespierrist' 
attitudes towards foreign patriots as they were emerging in 1794 and the post-Thermidor 
approach. Like every government since the Propagandist Decrees of 1792, the 
Thermidorians and the Directory put French security and French strategic concerns above 
international fraternity. Foreign patriots in France found themselves negotiating with a 
French government whose motives were at least partially concealed by a veil of secrecy 
because the French had their own plans for the countries concerned. Most patriots 
understood this sooner or later and tried to adapt their own aims accordingly, which 
meant that, as both Wolfe Tone and Reubell's circle of Rhenish patriots discovered, their 
aspirations were tied to the fickle barometer of Directorial politics and military fortunes. 
"Tone, Life, ii, 100,225,409,424,447. 
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Foreign patriots in France therefore sought not only to adopt French language and 
ideology in order to ingratiate themselves with the government of the day, but they also 
showed an increasing interest in French strategy after 9 Thermidor. This was the main 
change in their concerns in this period, but it first stiffed in the last months of the Terror, 
as French armies began to spill back over the frontiers. None the less, the law of 22 
Prairial ensured that this arousal would be hidden beneath the more pressing, individual 
concerns of personal survival. It was with the dismantling of the Terror and the 
continuing progress of French armies that the strategic concerns and the negotiations 
between foreign patriots and the French government could take precedence over concerns 
about political orthodoxy. 
Political orthodoxy did not, however, disappear as a consideration altogether. The old 
fears over espionage and conspiracy still existed. They were stiffed by the exposure of 
genuine plots such as that of the Equals in which at least one foreign radical was involved. 
Foreign radicals seemingly sympathetic to the Terror or to Jacobinism could still provoke 
surveillance or expulsion, as Buonaffoti, Valckenaer and Blauw discovered. Rowan felt 
uncomfortable enough during the Thermidorian backlash against Jacobinism to leave 
France. Others whose activities simply looked suspicious could still be threatened with 
punitive action, as Friedrich Cotta discovered. Despite the rhetoric, the period between 
the fall of Robespierre and Campo Formio did not see the emergence of a cosmopolitan 
era of fraternity between foreign patriots and revolutionary France. Post-Thermidor 
French governments did not need political equals, but adminstrators in the territories they 
occupied, to help them exploit local wealth, to protect French interests and to place those 
interests above local aspirations. They hoped, as the revolutionary government had done 
in the last months of its existence, that foreign patriots would fulfil this role. While their 
own personal freedom to express their views gained greater latitude after the Terror, 
foreign radicals discovered that the peoples whom they claimed to represent shared the 
same rights only in so far as their desires coincided with French strategic needs. 
V 
The uncertainty of the direction which the Revolution should take immediately after 9 
Thermidor is illustrated in the Conventiods treatment of those foreigners who contributed 
to French economic life. The Thermidorians did not immediately dismantle the controlled 
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economy and until they lifted the sequestration of property belonging to enemy merchants, 
neutrals would remain important to efforts to attract imports of food and war materials. 
The trading partners of the German mercantile community in Bordeaux, for example, 
continued to be exploited. The Bordeaux-based Danish merchant, Meyer, worked as the 
Republic's intermediary with Hamburg and Copenhagen in its search for vital imports. 
The restoration of the freedom of commerce was a gradual one. On 17 October 1794, the 
government lost its right of first purchase of all imported goods of prime necessity. This 
initially applied only to French merchants, with neutrals having to wait until 15 November 
before they were allowed to trade at will. "O 
Eventually, on 24 December 1794, the same day that the Maximum was lifted, it was 
proposed to release confiscated foreign property and to reimburse the funds which came 
from any sale. Johannot, who proposed this measure on behalf of the government, 
claimed that it would mean the resumption of free trade and restore confidence in France 
as a trading partner. "' The proposal provoked a lively discussion. Those opposed 
warned that foreign money corrupted French politicians and that enemy merchants 
retained agents in Paris who were engaged in dealings less wholesome than trade. 
Cambon and Thirion argued, on the basis of droil des gens and the Ancien R6gime 
custom of reciprocity, that enemy property should be withheld until the British, Spanish 
and Dutch released that of French citizens. Those in favour argued that free trade was the 
best means of meeting French needs for raw materials and food. Ramel even reverted to 
the language heard before the Terror, that it was up to France to lead by example. The 
war was being waged against governments and not peoples: 'il faut distinguer dans la 
guerre ce qui tient qu'aux droits des gouvernements et ce qui tient aux, rdlations 
particuli6res'. While wars broke the former, the latter remained intact, which was 
standard eighteenth-century thinking. "' 
The debate showed that the Thermidorians were not entirely convinced of the wisdom 
of a return to freedom of commerce between French and foreigners. They were not 
against free trade in principle, regarding it as the best means of meeting demand for food 
and material, but some believed that its restoration might give certain advantages to the 
Republic's enemies. The fact that in the debate both sides pointed to malign foreign 
influence behind the arguments of the opposition reflects a deep anxiety about the 
" ýLefebvre, 'Le Commerce exterieur en Van Il', 266,274. 
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consequences of so significant a change in economic policy. The Convention, however, 
eventually accepted the proposals. This decision was due less to a cosmopolitan view of 
commerce, but to a calculation that the benefits of free trade for France would be more 
durable than the potential risks of returning financial and economic advantages to her 
enemies. 
For the Thermidorians as for the Terrorists, the real hidden enemy were not foreign 
merchants, but foreign speculators. Girod, Richard, Ramel and R6al, all supporters of the 
repeal of sequestration, suggested that the seizure of foreigners' property was the product 
of intrigue by foreign agioteurs, among whom Edouard Walckiers was cited by name, 
who sought to benefit from the resultant shifts in exchange rates. The eighteenth-century 
fear of foreign banking networks emerged in these discussions, with London and 
Amsterdam as the centre of international speculation on the money markets. "' These 
suspicions only intensified with the explosion in prices which followed the abolition of the 
Maximum. Some hostility towards foreign financiers was justified, if not on the scale that 
some revolutionaries suspecte& From 1795, Oberkampf used the Paris-based Genevan 
financier Th6odore Rivier to channel French money to Britain via Basle, which allowed 
the entrepreneur to trade illegally with Britain without having to draw British currency in 
Paris. "" The period after Thermidor witnessed vast fortunes being made by speculators 
who were willing to run the high financial risks. In 1798 Heinzmann remarked of that 
some of his fellow Germans had come to France and got rich by'une sp6culation 
avantageuse'. "' As the Genevan economist Francis d'lvernois, now a confirmed counter- 
revolutionary, noted, such people made their fortune not from private enterprise, but off 
the state, through the purchase and resale of biens nationaux, confirming the worst fears 
of those in the Constituent Assembly who had opposed the nationalisation of church lands 
in 1789. "" The Swiss Henri Meister concurred with many revolutionaries in seeing 
foreigners as the worst of the speculators, believing that foreigners had profited from the 
sale of imigri property far more than French citizens. "' 
"Woniteur, Nos. 10 1 (11 Niv6se 111/31 December 1794), 102 (12 Niv6se III/I January 
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While such evidence is highly subjective, it illustrates the extent to which the economic 
and financial climate of the Revolution after Thermidor had aggravated fears of foreign 
agioteurs who pillaged the Republic of its wealth., Despite the continued suspicion, 
however, foreign financiers still had their uses. The Swiss banker Perregaux, who had 
played a leading role in raising funds for the purchase of foreign currency during the Year 
II, was allowed to use some of these funds to buy merchandise in Copenhagen. "' When 
the government finally ceased to print assignals in February 1796, Perregaux was among 
the bankers appointed to a consortium which would issue new notes based on unsold 
biens nationaux. 11' 
As with the regime of the Terror, the only foreigners whom the Thern-ddorians and the 
Directory regarded in an unequivocally favourable light were foreign manufacturers and 
artisans. The war and the Terror had certainly dissuaded newcomers from establishing 
new workshops and manufactures. In 1798 Heinzmann met German artisans who had set 
up shop in northern France, but remarked that few seem to have arrived since the Terror. 
German and Swiss artisans who had once come to France to ply their trade could, he 
suggested, make just as much money in their home countries. " 
For this reason; the revolutionaries sought to encourage and protect those who 
remained because they contributed to the war effort and enriched the economy. On 25 
December 1794, Boissy dAnglas reported on'un des prodiges de la libert6'. He was 
speaking of the manufacture of clocks set up in Besangon by the representatives on 
mission to the Doubs in 1793. He claimed that the attractions of the Republic had 
brought 'douze mille 6trangers, habiles dans Part de Phorlogerie' from Geneva, Neuchitel 
and London. Boissy sought a decree which would ensure that they remained in France 
and encourage others to come. Among the measures proposed was the payment of 
bounties to the entrepreneur who employed the most workers and produced the best 
quality. All this, he argued, would also lead to the growth of auxiliary industries such as 
those which made watch-chains and the necessary toolS. 12' To attract foreign craftsmen, 
the Thermidorians were using method s identical to those of the Ancien R6gime bureau de 
commerce. They also shared the same long-term goal: to transmit the skills and 
"9Lefebvre, 'Le Commerce ext6rieur en I'an 11,266. 
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knowledge of foreigners to French apprentices who would ensure the future prosperity of 
a particular industry in France. 
Both the Thermidorians and the Directory found that they faced an uphill struggle in 
trying to achieve these aims. Their financial and economic policies, from the deregulation 
of prices on 24 December 1794 to the return to coin in February 1797, brought dramatic 
oscillations in the value of French currency which made enterprise in France a risky 
business. Some artisans did flourish in the more relaxed social climate of the Directory. 
Meyer remarked that in Paris the Scottish glassmaker O'Reilly was doing very nicely by 
producing one vase in eight days of work, but to such a degree of perfection and skill that 
he could charge a very high price. Meanwhile, a German porcelain manufacturer named 
Dihl showed Meyer the stores of his vast workshop which were'richement garnie and the 
shop floor where painters and gilders worked on his plates and vases. " Others suffered, 
however, from the economic dislocation brought by the winter of nonanle-cinq, the 
financial crisis of 1797 and the continuing conflict. The war made the transfer of the most 
desirable technology and expertise from abroad almost impossible. Oberkampf made use 
of his sisters' residence at Aarau in Switzerland to obtain sketches and notes about the 
methods of his Swiss competitors. He also used his contacts in London to obtain 
information about recent developments in the machinery and processes of fabric 
printing. '2' These semi-legitimate methods of obtaining new skills and processes were no 
different from the industrial espionage encouraged by the Ancien Rigime. None the less, 
the teams of expert British workers needed to implement these processes were not readily 
available. There were some exceptions, of course. In 1797, William Robinson brought a 
flax-spinning machine to France, while the incorrigible Charles Albert, the Alsatian 
arrested and imprisoned in Lancaster in 1791, was released in 1796, returned to France 
and set up an agency to import British technology. He set up a spinning mill at Coye-la- 
ForEt, north of Paris, with the help of some of the British artisans with whom he had once 
worked in Toulouse. 124 
For most French manufacturers, however, the war signalled the loss of foreign skills. 
Albert's former employer, Boyer-Fonfr6de, had expanded his plant by 1798 to include 
forty-eight looms, originally operated by Manchester workers. Their imprisonment during 
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the Terror left him with a labour shortage. 121 The declining proportion of foreigners 
among Oberkampfs workforce might have been symptomatic both of the disruption 
caused by the war and of the successful training of French workers in the skills originally 
brought by foreigners. Before 1793,9.3% of his workers were foreigners, thereafter that 
figure gradually declined to 4.6%. 12' None the less, the demand for new techniques did 
not cease and when the British mills proved inaccessible, the French turned elsewhere. In 
1798 two Americans, Reynaud and Ford, were given a grant of 6,000 fivres by the 
Directory to establish a textile factory with the most up-to-date technology, but the 
enterprise failed. That same year, in an echo of Alcock's hiring of skilled British prisoners 
of war under the Ancien R6gime, La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt employed an Englishman 
named Gibson and four Irish prisoners at the cotton mill at Cire des Mello. "' 
If the end of the Terror had not made the recruitment of foreign artisans and expertise 
any easier, it had at least freed foreign manufacturers and artisans from the necessity of 
political orthodoxy. At Jouy-en-Josas, Oberkampf s role as local magnate remained 
unchallenged. He did not bother to renew his membership of the local Jacobin club in 
Vend6miaire 111. With the Terror over, he was probably happy to wash his hands of 
political militancy. In the less restrictive political climate, the entrepreneur who had paid 
out so much in patriotic contributions now protested against the forced loan decreed on 
10 December 1795, to which he was ordered to pay 300,000 fivres in coin and paper. He 
claimed that he wanted to invest in bringing production and profits back to pre-war levels. 
A reluctant political animal from the start, Oberkampf s political opportunism was dictated 
by his ultimate aim of protecting his business. The former Jacobin would eventually 
applaud the advent of Napoleon Bonaparte as the harbinger of 'general happiness and 
peace'. " 
The war and the economic crises of the post-Thermidor period made life especially 
hard for the poorest foreign migrants. In April 1796, Meyer crossed the Pont-Neuf and 
noted that Wine les pauvres petits Savoyards, etablis avec feurs sellettes le long des 
trottoirs pour nettoyer les souliers des passans, ont beaucoup de peine A gagner leur vie, 
leurs grands protecteurs ont disparu, & il arrive rarement aux pidtons dune espece tr6s- 
"'Lyons, France under the Directory, 187. 
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diff6rente de leurs pr6decesseurs de faire nettoyer leurs bottes, ou leurs souliers. "" 
Heinzmann stuffily cited a French pamphlet which claimed of the women forced into 
prostitution that 'elles viennent la plfipart de Utrangee. Without a flicker of sympathy, he 
concurred, saying that 'on compte parmi les filles publiques beaucoup de Suissesses, des 
Italiennes, des Espagnoles, des Allemandes, des Hollandaises et des Angloises ... 
le 
superflu le plus impOr de tous ces pays'. Heinzmann was determined to suggest that the 
libertine decline in morals commented on by some of his compatriots was due not to the 
system of government, but to foreigners who 'croyent avoir trouv6 ici le sol qui leur 
convient le miewe. "O 
The end of the Terror, as Oberkampf s experience shows, enabled foreign 
entrepreneurs to leave the political arena and to concentrate on their businesses. The 
return to free commerce certainly benefited foreign merchants who were still able to trade 
despite the war. Foreign artisans who had remained in France could still prosper, as 
Meyer discovered. The extravagant social climate in the upper reaches of Directorial 
society enabled those foreign craftsmen whose skills were devoted to luxury industries to 
make money from the nouveaux riches. In other respects, however, matters did not 
improve for foreigners involved in French economic life. Besides the economic hardship 
from which most people suffered, the continued conflict meant that, despite the efforts of 
the government to attract foreign expertise, British skills and technology were not 
forthcoming. Such British workers as remained in France were not always available, as 
Boyer-Fonfr&de discovered. Meanwhile, if the political repression of the Terror had 
disappeared, the vagaries of French finances made investment in anything other than land 
a risky venture, and this in turn aggravated the old suspicions of foreign financiers. The 
Directory, like the revolutionary government of the Year 11, was at least pragmatic 
enough to use the connections of some foreign bankers, such as Perregaux. If the 
revolutionary government had gone to great lengths to retain the skills, contacts and 
services of foreign artisans, merchants and financiers during Terror, the economic 
difficulties which resulted from the continuing conflict and the financial policies of the 
Thermidorians and the Directory discouraged the flow of new expertise and skills into 
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France. As both Meister and Heinzmann observed, if it was the Terror which had driven 
these foreigners out, the regimes which followed failed to create the conditions which 
would attract many of them back. 
vi 
The end of the Terror did bring an improvement in the conditions of most foreigners in 
France. Those imprisoned during the Terror were eventually released. For radicals, the 
political activity which flowered anew encouraged them in their activities and aspirations 
once more. For many foreign merchants, bankers, manufacturers and artisans, the lifting 
of trade restrictions and of sequestration freed them from economic restraint. Some of 
those foreigners who had left France in fear or disgust felt safe enough to return, if only to 
see how things had changed. These improvements did not necessarily stem from 
measures aimed specifically at making life more comfortable for foreigners, but rather 
from more general changes in the apparatus of government and policing after 9 
Thermidor. 
It is true that most of the repressive laws against foreigners decreed during the Terror 
were eventually withdrawn. The appalling law of 7 Prairial 11, offering no quarter to 
British or Hanoverian prisoners, was repealed, but not before it had been extended by the 
Thermidorians themselves to include Spanish troops. The law of 27 Germinal 11, 
expelling foreign subjects from Paris, French ports and frontier towns, was also repealed. 
It took longer to rescind these laws, however, than it did to revoke those aimed more 
generally at French citizens. Moreover, both the Thermidorians and the Directory enacted 
their own legislation against foreigners, often reverting to measures similar to those taken 
in 1793 - 1794, This may suggest that the punitive, exclusive mentality of the Terror did 
not disappear with 9 Thermidor, but remained lurking beneath the surface of republican 
ideology and attitudes. Alternatively, it may mean that the urge to exclude, restrict and 
watch foreigners was not attributable to any such mentality, but was a response to 
problems external to ideology and attitudes, such as the continuing conflict and the 
persistence of political instability. Both possibilities carry weight. Ideology and attitudes 
probably combined with the circumstances to ensure the occasional resurrection of 
'Terrorist' measures against foreigners. 
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On one hand, the revolutionaries retained the fear of conspiracy and the exclusive 
implications of their ideology. The vast majority of revolutionaries usually accepted laws 
against foreigners because they still feared their malign capabilities. They saw them at 
work behind the popular uprisings, conspiracies, economic crises and royalist movements 
which harrassed regimes after Thermidor. This paranoia can be explained by a 
predisposition to see conspiracy - and foreign conspiracy in particular - behind complex 
problems. On the other hand, xenophobia and an obsession with conspiracy were not the 
only implications of the revolutionaries' cultural and ideological background. The Terror 
had given most revolutionaries a jolt and throughout the post-Thermidor period some 
objected to renewed measures against foreigners on the grounds of civil liberties, because 
they feared a return to the dark days of the Year 11. If revolutionary attitudes and 
ideology were so powerful a force in politics, it is necessary to explain why certain 
implications of that ideology won out over others, why the xenophobic, rather than the 
benign, elements were carried over into legislation. 
The answer lies in the circumstances of war and internal problems. Despite their 
military success, French regimes remained beset by domestic difficulties. For as long as 
the war continued, it was natural for revolutionaries to explain problems closer to home 
by reference to the conflict and to enemy influence. In fact, it seemed that the more 
successful the French were by feats of arms, the more likely the enemy were to resort to 
domestic subversion. Conspiracy and counter-revolution did exist in France, of course, 
and there was genuine evidence that some foreigners were involved in political intrigue, be 
it Jacobin or royalist. It was the failure to secure outright victory in the war that ensured 
that fife for foreigners never returned to the freedom enjoyed before 1793. Not only did 
war and instability bring out the darker side of the revolutionary mentality, but they 
persuaded the more reluctant among them that repressive measures against foreigners 
were necessary, if temporary. It was these circumstances which allowed 'rerrorist'laws 
to be recast by post-Thermidor regimes without much fear of being accused of returning 
to the days of the Jacobin 'dictatorship'. That the war and domestic instability were vital 
factors can be shown by the rhythm of legislation against foreigners: after Thermidor, 
each major law followed a particular crisis. 
Despite the problems faced by the post-Thermidor regimes, military success did 
encourage the resurgence of cosmopolitan rhetoric. None the less, this language reflected 
nothing more than French strategic interests and justified annexations and the enforced 
'liberation' of France's neighbours, as it had done since the Propagandist decrees of 1792. 
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The revolutionaries were also governed by national interest rather than their cosmopolitan 
ideology in their treatment of foreigners within France. Such pragmatism could none the 
less shelter foreigners from the more exclusive, nationalising implications of revolutionary 
ideas and legislation. As with every regime since 1789, under the Thermidorians and the 
Directory those foreigners who could be of some use to the Revolution were protected. 
Both the Thermidorians and the Directory attempted to attract foreign entrepreneurs 
and artisans, like every eighteenth-century regime in France, because they brought much- 
needed technology, skills and prosperity. If foreigners were now officially excluded from 
service in the French army by Article 287 of the new Constitution, in reality the 
revolutionaries were still reluctant to demobilise seasoned troops and they were simply 
subsumed into regular French units. As the French conquered more territory and so 
stretched their own resources, the Directory circumvented the Constitution by recruiting 
foreign legions under the theoretical command of the 'sister republics'. It was this 
pragmatism, above all in pursuit of French foreign policy, which also ensured that foreign 
patriots would be well-received. They were, however, expected to serve French strategic 
interests as well as the aspirations of their own country. Although those tainted with 
Jacobinism and Terrorism were distrusted, at least with the end of the Terror the 
pressures for political conformity were no longer as acute. 
On the other hand, foreigners who could not be of use to the Republic still suffered 
from the possibility of exclusion and persecution. The foreign clergy in particular 
remained the targets of both popular and official hostility. Once the regime of the Terror 
had eliminated the distinction between foreign ecclesiastical property and that of the 
French church, the Thermidorian and Directorial authorities were reluctant to reassert it. 
This led to bitter disputes over the confiscation and sale of the property. For the foreign 
clergy, the end of the Terror simply signalled new struggles for survival. 
The driving force behind this pragmatic approach, in which inclusion and 
encouragement was interspersed with surveillance and persecution, was the combination 
of political instability and war. While in some cases the need for troops, material, money 
and foreign allies ensured that certain foreigners would be welcomed, in other cases 
military and political crises stirred the darker, exclusive forces of revolutionary anxieties. 
For as long as France remained both at war and dogged by domestic insecurity, the 
Revolution would not - and could not - return to its earlier, cosmopolitan openness. 
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Conclusion. The French Revolution, citizenship and national identity. 
In early February 1997, the small town of Vitrolles near Marseille prepared for its 
second ballot in the mayoral elections, The Socialist incumbent faced a strong challenge 
from the candidate of the extreme right-wing and xenophobic Front National. A couple of 
days before voting, a local coal miner told a British journalist that, come the final vote on 
Sunday 9 February, 'a Republican reflex! would bring out enough people to destroy the 
Front National's attempt to take political control of yet another town. ' This hope was not 
realised, but its persistence shows that the memory of the French Revolution retains its 
emotive power in current debates on citizenship and immigration in the Fifth Republic. 
Revolutionary ideology had two implications as regards the place of foreigners in the 
nation. On one hand, the doctrine of the rights of man implied that all men could be 
citizens, either in their own countries or in France, on fulfilment of certain basic 
conditions. As these rights were universal, race, religion, or language were theoretically 
irrelevant: being human and having a proven desire and ability to contribute to the life of 
the nation was sufficient. In the early years of the Revolution, certain revolutionaries 
uttered or wrote invitations to virtuous, talented and diligent foreigners to come and enjoy 
the fruits of liberty, while enriching the country at the same time. On the other hand the 
notion of national sovereignty implied that, while conditions for membership of the nation 
may be assimilationist, only citizens - those who fulfilled those conditions - were to be 
allowed an active role in the state. This implication was only understood by the 
Constituent Assembly when it began to reform France in accordance with its principles 
and were stalled by the stumbling block of foreigners in the army, the clergy and even in 
state administration. Some revolutionaries, such as Dubois-Crancd for the army and 
Gr6goire for the clergy, argued that foreigners be squeezed out of these institutions, 
which, they argued, should be run by nationals for the sake of the nation. From the very 
outset, however, diplomatic, economic and political circumstances demanded a pragmatic 
approach in the treatment of foreigners. The sweeping terms of legislation which 
excluded foreigners were rarely applied in full, because the revolutionaries were unwilling 
to lose the expertise, skills and the support which certain types of foreigners might offer, 
particularly with the outbreak of war. Even during the Terror, the revolutionaries 
'Lichfield, J., 'Basildon-en-Provence, the grey French town that is sorely tempted by 
infamy', Independent (7 February 1997). 
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protected those whom they believed would be of some use to the war effort, exempting 
them from the harshest laws and putting them to work for the Republic. 
This is not to deny that many foreigners were excluded from the life of the nation. The 
foreign clergy, for example, were initially protected from the nationalisation of church 
land and the closure of religious orders because of their foreign status. Eventually, 
however, it was the fact that they were enemy subjects which led to their arrest and the 
seizure of their property. None the less, while some foreigners were clearly persecuted 
for their nationality, some revolutionaries could not abandon the universal implications of 
their ideology, even as the Republic faced the crises of 1793 - 1794. To have done so 
would have meant admitting that their struggle was of less significance than they had 
previously claimed. All men, regardless of nationality, were therefore capable of 
patriotism, defined as a lack of self-interest and a concern for the welfare of the nation. 
The problem was that as the Revolution pursued its radical path, that patriotism became 
increasingly exclusive, not on lines of nationality, but along those of political allegiance. 
By the Year II, when patriotism focused on loyalty to the government, this circle of true 
patriots was very exclusive indeed. It was none the less not one which excluded on the 
basis of nationality. Foreigners who conformed to the political orthodoxy or who 
contributed to the war effort were serving the patrie and were therefore defined as 
patriots. 
The Revolution therefore saw the persistence of two inheritances from the Ancien 
Rdgime. Firstly, while a significant number were driven out by legislation and by 
circumstances, some foreigners remained in the structures of French state and society. 
Secondly, the inclusive, assimilationist definition of the nation survived. These 
continuities suggest that, while the political language and structures may have changed, at 
a deeper level there were similarities between the old order and the new in their approach 
to foreigners. The explanation for this lies in the fact that the pressures facing both 
regimes remained the same. The Revolution, of course, did not blindly adopt Ancien 
R6gime practices, and sometimes adopted its own policies, as the abolition of the droit 
d'aubaine suggests. Moreover, if it inherited its problems from the old order, the 
Revolution also created difficulties of its own, which intensified the original troubles. 
None the less, the differences between ideology and practice and the blend of continuities 
and novelty in the treatment of foreigners implies at least three conclusions on the 
Revolution. 
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Firstly, the gap between what revolutionary ideology implied and how the 
revolutionaries actually dealt with foreigners in practice suggests that ideology was not 
the dynamic which drove the Revolution along its radical course. ' Instead, the 
revolutionaries were pragmatic, restraining, even denying, the logical implications of their 
principles as circumstances dictated. When foreigners were expelled from the positions 
which they had previously occupied in the French state, it was usually when new 
considerations outweighed the revolutionaries' original reservations, as was the case with 
the Swiss regiments in August 1792. It was the revolutionaries' calculation, that the 
diplomatic upset was worth the elimination of a potentially counter-revolutionary force, 
which led to their disbandment. If revolutionary ideology implied exclusion, it was not the 
prime factor in decisions over the fate of foreigners. At the very most it took certain 
circumstances for the revolutionaries to follow up such implications with concrete action. 
A result of this pragmatism was that foreigners remained in the service of the French 
state throughout the Revolution. The service of the state was not the exclusive reserve of 
French citizens, even under the revolutionary government in the Year 11. The second 
conclusion is, therefore, that the model provided by Joan Landes's work on women is not 
applicable to foreigners? There was no concerted effort to exclude them from the 'public 
sphere', despite legislation to the contrary and despite the implications of a xenophobic, 
exclusive patriotism which emerged by the Year II. In fact, it is possible that, too tied by 
diplomatic, economic and political concerns to expel foreigners from French public life, 
the revolutionaries actively sought instead to ensure their loyalty by establishing 
assimilationist conditions for citizenship. 
For all their ideological claims to a new order, therefore, the revolutionaries did not 
entirely 'nationalise' the state. Bound by the same conditions which dictated the Ancien 
Rdgime's approach foreigners, their approach to the problem represented a continuity 
from the absolute monarchy. Both regimes based their decisions on a careful weighing of 
the interests of the state, even if the language used and specific laws may have differed 
between the absolute monarchy and the Revolution. The resulting persistence of 
foreigners in the army, administration, the church and finance suggests that in practice the 
legal differences between citizens and resident foreigners remained blurred during the 
Revolution. Foreigners continued to serve the state in capacities which would be 
'Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class, 19 -51; Furet, Penser la Nvolufionfranýaise, 81 
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anathema to modem nation-states. This inheritance from the Ancien R6gime suggests the 
third conclusion, that one should be wary of seeing too much modernity in the order 
created by the French Revolution. If both the war and the Terror gave rise to 'le rdveil du 
nationalisme', attitudes and practices still had a long way to develop before matching 
those which have characterised the 'total wars' of the twentieth century. ' To be sure, the 
intense xenophobia and the suspension of the civil liberties of enemy aliens, familiar to 
modem wars, were very much in evidence in France in the 1790s, but their full 
implications were never realised. While the modem world has inherited some of its 
political culture from the French Revolution, the revolutionaries themselves may have 
been driven by circumstances to invest that same culture with a different degree of 
significance. 
The modernity of the measures taken by the revolutionaries is also cast in doubt when 
it is understood that the French were not alone in enacting laws against foreigners. Spain 
was the first country to take such steps and its laws were especially draconian, even 
before she entered the European conflict. As early as November 1789, foreigners were 
expelled from Madrid. In July 1791, all foreigners in Spain had to register with the 
authorities, 'transients' had to have the permission of the secretary of state to remain in the 
country and they were not permitted to perform any occupation. In March 1793, when 
Spain entered the war, and months before the French took comparable measures, the king 
ordered all non-domiciled French citizens to leave the kingdom. ' Catherine 11 of Russia 
went further still. On the news of the execution of Louis XVI, the uka. - of 8/19 February 
1793 prohibited all trade between Russia and France, expelled all French citizens from 
Russia and recalled all the Tsarina's subjects from France. ' Britain also enacted police 
measures against French citizens, just before she joined the coalition powers. On 15 
December 1792, the Alien Bill was presented to parliament, which aimed to control the 
movements of French citizens in Britain! The Alien Act of 7 January 1793, in force for a 
period of ten years until its expiry in 1803 (when it was not renewed), was enforced by the 
police and led to a'complete system of surveillance for suspects, whether British or 
foreigW. ' Even the republic of the United States succumbed, passing the Alien and 
"Mathiez, La Revolution et les itrangers, 137,177. 
'Herr, The Eighteenih-Century Revolution in Spain, 256 - 257,269 - 270,311,380 -381. 
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Sedition Act in 1798, empowering the authorities to expel foreigners who might have had 
subversive intentions. " 
Such measures had their precedents in Ancien R6gime practices in times of war, and 
had been exercised under the old concept of droit des gens. What was novel was the 
intensity with which the legislation was enforced. If modernity can be gauged by the 
severity of measures taken against enemy aliens in wartime, then it was not only the 
political culture of the French Revolution which was at the source of the state's harsh 
discrimination between citizens and foreigners. It was also produced by the reaction of 
other powers against the 'contagion! of revolutionary ideology. 
Such discrimination between foreigners and citizens suggests that the experience of 
foreigners in France may also shed light on the Revolutions contribution to notions of 
nationality and citizenship. The intensity of police measures against foreigners taken by 
many countries in this period represented an expansion of state surveillance over ordinary 
people. In France, the state itself played a central role in the evolution of the French 
understanding of citizenship and nationality, and not just in the revolutionary period. ' 
The Ancien R6gime's conception of nationality, defined by the subject's loyalty to the 
monarch and residence on French territory, was reinforced by the Revolution, which also 
stressed residence and loyalty, only to the nation rather than to the king. What had 
changed was the source of legitimacy for the state's activities, which had been transferred 
from king to people. In practical terms, however, it was the territorial and institutional 
framework of the state which remained the focus of loyalty and the protector of a citizen's 
rights. Under both the Ancien R6gime and the Revolution, the state and its various 
institutions was the cement which gave coherence and unity to the various linguistic, 
religious and cultural groups who inhabited French territory. 
During the Revolution, however, the state intruded into the everyday lives of ordinary 
people on an unprecedented scale. This development encouraged people to discriminate 
more between citizens and non-citizens. During the Terror, not only did certain laws 
against foreigners set them apart from French people, but they made nationality matter on 
a daily basis. The authorities demanded from individuals details such as place of birth and 
'Godechot, J. (trans. Rowen, H. H. ), France and the A 11antic Revolution of the 
Eighteenth Century, 1770 - 1799 (New York: Free Press, 1965), 233; Kramer, L. S., Thc 
French Revolution and the creation of American political culture, Klaits, J., & Haltzel, NI. 
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nationality as they issued documents like passports and caries de Are1j. Surveillance and 
control of foreigners was nothing new, but the apparatus by which the laws were 
implemented entered the lives of individuals with an efficiency and intensity which was 
unfamiliar to most people. In 1793 - 1794, decrees were applied by local committees who 
may have known many of the foreigners by sight and who had the ability to make life for 
them very unpleasant. It was this bureaucratisation of everyday life which made 
nationality significant and which demanded clarity in one's origins and allegiances. 
Demanding as the French revolutionary state was, the controls imposed on foreigners 
were only the beginning of the process, when compared to the expansion of official 
bureaucracy in the twentieth century. - Under the Revolution, foreigners were certainly 
discriminated against by being denied their civil rights for significant periods of time. 
More recently, however, the state has expanded from an almost purely political entity, to a 
provider of social services. It was not the French Revolution, but the modem urge to 
protect standards of living and to ensure that work, health and social security remain 
available to citizens which gave discrimination between citizens and foreigners the 
urgency with which it is today invested. Citizenship is now'a powerful instrument of 
social closure, protecting prosperous states from the migrant poor and excluding 
foreigners from certain rights, benefits and obligations. " 
The extension of state surveillance during the Revolution made differences between 
foreigners and citizens more explicit, but not absolute. The indistinct line of demarcation 
between citizens and non-citizens in the revolutionary period stemmed from the peculiar 
circumstances of the 1790s. The Revolution never succeeded, therefore, in applying in 
practice the strict discrin-dnation between foreigners and citizens which was implicit in the 
doctrine of the sovereignty of the nation. 
Meanwhile, the evolution of national identity, as distinct from political notions of 
citizenship and nationality, was the result of long-term social and cultural conditioning 
rather than of revolutionary ideology. If the French RevolutioWs doctrine of national 
sovereignty was the ideological root of modern political nationalism, it was the deep- 
rooted prejudices and fears, drawn out by circumstances such as political crises and 
invasion, which gave the conception of the nation its emotive force. 
This was as true of Britain, Germany and the United States in the eighteenth century as 
it was for France. British identity was shaped by the interlinked responses to war with 
France, a defensive reaction of Protestantism against Catholicism, the growth of 
"Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, ix - x. 
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commerce and the expansion of empire. All these factors led ordinary people to identify 
themselves as Britons and, in engaging with them, ultimately to lay claim to 'a much 
broader access to citizenship'. Germany also experienced the growth of a'primitive 
nationalism' and a sense of a separate national identity in reaction to French invasion and 
occupation. It was claimed that the French version of liberty and equality was an 
abstraction and that under their enlightened rulers, Germans enjoyed true freedom, which 
meant freedom from arbitrary oppression and moral liberty. Germans, it was argued, 
were also different - and superior - from the French in character, In the United States the 
Alien and Sedition Act was a'concerted legislative attempt to define what it meant to be 
an American, and the definition tended to exclude precisely those people who showed the 
greatest inclination to support "French" ideae. " It was these responses, and not any 
particular political conception of the nation, which helped to develop a sense of national 
identity in the countries concerned. Ideological forces such as nationalism are given 
potency and relevance by the specific political and cultural contexts in which they are 
enunciated. 
This implies that, no matter how universal the revolutionaries claimed that their 
doctrine of national sovereignty was, it would vary in intensity and meaning from place to 
place and from one era to the other. Much as the revolutionaries insisted on defining 
nationality on political or contractual lines, culture, language and specific political and 
social circumstances were inescapable contexts for the development both of national 
identity and of the various forms of nationalism across the world. In France, the civic 
ideal of nationality, based on a contract between citizens without reference to religion, 
language and race, therefore developed alongside a national identity which was emerging 
both from the experience of the Revolution itself and from long-term political, social and 
cultural conditions peculiar to France. Despite the revolutionaries! attempts to define 
French nationality with reference only to an egalitarian, political community, in the long 
term they could not forestall the linguistic and the cultural from lending their weight in 
determining attitudes towards nationality and, above all, towards what it was to be 
French. 
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